#title Socialism (ASA Monographs) #subtitle Ideals, Ideologies and Local Practice #author Chris M. Hann #date December 17, 1992 #source <[[https://www.routledge.com/Socialism-Ideals-Ideologies-and-Local-Practice/Hann/p/book/9780415083225][routledge.com/Socialism-Ideals-Ideologies-and-Local-Practice/Hann/p/book/9780415083225]]> #lang en #pubdate 2024-10-25T12:26:20.247Z #authors Alan Barnard, Angela Cheater, Chris Hann, Ernest Gellner, Frances Pine, Grant Evans, Jack M.Potter, Joanna Overing, Jomatham Spemcer, Katherime Verdery, Ladislav Holy, Michael Stewart, Pat Caplan, Peter Skalmk, Ralph Grillo, Ray Abrahams, Sufian Bukurura, Susam Wright, Tamara Dragadze #topics socialism, politics, philosophy, anarchism, anthropology #isbn 9780415083225 #publisher Routledge #cover c-m-chris-m-hann-socialism-ideals-ideologies-and-l-1.jpg ** [Front Matter] *** Socialism Socialism examines socialist ideals and realities from a variety of anthropological perspectives. Although socialism as a radical critique of capitalist industrial society may appear to be defunct, no one can doubt that it will leave behind powerful cultural legacies in countries all over the world, as well as conceptual legacies within anthropology and other social sciences. The contributors reveal the factors which have given socialism such a profound worldwide impact, and which helped socialist societies to reproduce themselves for so long. They develop theories and analyses of socialism both in relation to ‘primitive communism’ and as a modern form of social organization with revolutionary aspirations. Case studies are drawn not only from the non-European countries with which anthropology is most commonly associated, but also from both Western and Eastern Europe. Recurring themes include the links with ethnic and national conflicts, with ‘traditional’ cultures and religious practices, and with gender relations. A number of contributors also illuminate the mechanisms of the recent changes which have removed socialists from power in many countries. The first book to present a sustained and wide-ranging investigation of socialism by social anthropologists, this volume will do much to help us comprehend the experiences of ‘ordinary people’ under socialism and their responses to new post-socialist dilemmas. As well as opening up new fields of investigation for political anthropology, it makes an important contribution to our understanding of some of the most central and far-reaching events of contemporary history. ASA Monographs 31 *** [Title Page]
Well fed and clad, educated and cosseted young East German professionals stampeding to the West did not pretend to be running away from disliked political philosophy; ...they admitted that what they were after ..was a wider assortment of goods in the shops and wider selection of holidays.Unfortunately, as Peter Skalmk brings out clearly, many among the nonmigrants and ordinary citizens of all the countries which have recently (and with good reason) abandoned the fetters of orthodox central planning will find the ‘truth’ of capitalist market economies no more palatable than the alleged ‘lies’ of socialism. Many will find themselves much worse off materially under the new slogans of ‘market economy’ and ‘joining the West’; and they will recall the original moral critique which socialism offered. Indeed, Havel might do well to recall that an earlier generation of East European intellectuals was once just as confident that it had discovered ‘truth’—in socialism itself.[23] Havel’s conceit is a very significant one, and I think it can direct us towards the role political anthropology should play in the study of these societies. In much of Eastern Europe in 1989 there was a sense, carefully fostered by opposition intellectuals over many years, of ‘people power’.[24] The word ‘society’ was by no means just a technical term used in academic analyses. Rather, society was an active collective agent embarked upon the heroic task of emancipating itself from the socialist state. According to this ‘Manichean’ (Hankiss 1990) perspective, state and society are viewed as diametrically opposed players in a zero-sum game. Socialism is construed as the apotheosis of artificial, ‘top-down’, bureaucratic, etatist social engineering, whilst (civil) society is presented as a ‘natural’, organic entity composed of autonomous individuals and groupings who generate solidarity and consensus ‘from below’, together with the values and identities conducive to a fully human existence. Many people, and above all anthropologists, with their vaguely populist sympathies, will be tempted to enter into this Manichean game with gusto on the side of ‘society’. But a little reflection should enable them to see that this very opposition should be approached very warily. It is, of course, itself the product of centuries of Western political theory. The extent to which certain ideas associated with the singular noun ‘state’ and the collective noun ‘society’ have been popularized in socialist (and now ex-socialist) political systems is a matter for empirical investigation, as are the channels by which the ideas have been disseminated. Anthropologists can play a part, along with other intellectuals, in tracing the genealogies of such ideas, but their more distinctive contribution lies in documenting the significance of the ideas in concrete social contexts. Perhaps it is time that anthropologists recalled the conclusions of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard in their 1940 manifesto for political anthropology: African Political Systems, they found, could not be usefully illuminated by Western political theory.[25] The complication today is that, unlike the African cases considered by those authors, the ‘worn coinage’ of Western political philosophy and its concern for morality in the abstract is widely disseminated among many of the people anthropologists wish to study. Thus the concepts of state and society may be prominent in the arguments and self-understandings of some East Europeans, but such data do not necessarily take us very far in the search for explanations of how actual socialist political systems have operated. It may be useful to go back briefly to the African papers in this volume, in order to pursue this point about intellectual elites and the question of what should take priority in anthropological research. Ralph Grillo is concerned with intellectual genealogies of ‘African socialism’, and his ‘ethnography’ comprises a study of the texts produced by leading politicians. The essential anthropological counterpoint is provided in the chapters by Caplan and Abrahams and Bukurura, which are concerned with how villagers experienced socialist policies and adapted to them. Like most chapters in this volume these are concerned both with a general exposition of ideas and specific local evidence. It is not my purpose here to argue that any one type of approach is better than another, and indeed the conference proved that sharply opposed styles of anthropology may all have a useful contribution to make. But it did seem to be generally agreed that anthropology cannot afford to lose its direct engagement with ‘ordi nary people’ (or even, in socialist parlance, ‘the masses’). Of course the very notion of ‘ordinary people’ may itself be manipulated and contested by opposed groups of political activists, as Susan Wright demonstrates for Teesside; but she also gives space to the voices of village women in a valuable case study which complements the more general sections of her chapter. Certainly, it is a valid and important task for anthropologists to study the intellectual producers of new cultures and historiographies, and to criticize the texts of dead politicians as well as dead anthropologists. But it is at least as vital to document the actual life experiences of other people as studied during fieldwork, and we need to be especially careful in trusting the intellectuals themselves to provide authentic accounts of the systems in whose creation and maintenance they are deeply implicated. Related questions concerning the anthropologist’s own political commitments and ethical responsibilities punctuated the conference throughout. Jonathan Spencer argued at one point that the past dominance of evolutionary and positivist frameworks had linked the discipline itself to the projects of social engineers; and this history made it very difficult for anthropologists today to become engaged in debate on political and economic issues of concern to those they study. In response, Ray Abrahams acknowledged the ethical and other difficulties involved in representing the interests of the local groups we study, but pointed out that alternatives might sometimes be worse. For if anthropologists eschewed such engagement, other, less modest self-styled scientific experts would step forward, with much greater likelihood of disastrous practical outcomes. Some young African participants seemed to go further, notably Abrahams’ co-author Sufian Bukurura, in arguing that indigenous anthropologists, as intellectuals themselves, could not content themselves with offering interpretations of their social worlds: they also had an obligation to change them. This commitment was not elaborated in specifically socialist terms, and would certainly entail paying more respect to local interests and genuine participation than has been in the case in socialist development hitherto; but these and other exchanges in the discussion did, I think, serve to remind the conference audience again of the common ground that may exist between anthropology and the emancipatory political projects launched by the pioneers of socialism. *** State and Society in Eastern Europe—and Elsewhere The last two decades have seen a number of valuable anthropological studies of Eurasian socialist societies. Little appreciated for the most part, either within anthropology or within the other academic subjects dealing with the region, some of this work I suggest, may point the way towards more satisfactory understandings of other varieties of socialism as well. I also think it has implications for the study of many non-socialist societies. Of course by no means all fieldworkers in socialist countries have been concerned explicitly to address contemporary socialist conditions. Sometimes they may have experienced practical constraints, in other cases their intellectual interests have lain elsewhere. For example, a good deal of work has been carried out by Western anthropologists in various parts of Yugoslavia in the socialist period. Much of this was historically orientated (for example, Halpern and Halpern 1972; Winner 1971) or it was concerned primarily with the distinctive cultural traditions of specific ethnographic contexts (Lockwood 1975; Rheubottom 1971). But starting in the 1970s, the era of East European detente, a number of researchers began to confront head-on the ‘problems of socialism’ (c.f. Cole 1985) and this is the work I wish to highlight here. Of course, political conditions dictated that certain countries would figure much more prominently in this work than others: those most intensively studied in Eastern Europe have been the very diverse cases of Hungary, Poland, and Romania.[26] Much of this work has concentrated upon the kind of case study that would offer the closest approximation to the ususal scope of a fieldwork project in a more ‘exotic’ setting. Thus the anthropologists studied the survival or disintegration of peripheral groups, such as certain ethnic minorities (for instance, McArthur 1976 on Transylvanian Saxons; Stewart 1987 and Williams 1992 on Gypsies). Not only did they choose to work in bounded communities, but they often selected villages in very remote mountain locations which inevitably reflected socialist changes in different ways from settlements closer to the centres of urban development (for example in Poland, Pine and Bogdanowicz 1982, Hann 1985; in Romania, Beck 1976, Randall 1976). A few researchers, however, studied villages in which the more general lines of socialist transformation emerge very clearly: examples would include the work of Peter Bell on the Great Hungarian Plain (1984) and David Kideckel (forthcoming) on Transylvania. All of these studies provide valuable documentation of how socialism was experienced at local levels. They bring out the compromises that were struck in the actual implementation of government policies, and the ambiguities in the position of local officials, charged on the one hand to implement directives received from outside (‘from above’) but also required to observe the norms of social interaction with kinsmen and neighbours in their communities. (These ambiguities were by no means confined to Eastern Europe, as Pat Caplan makes clear in her analogy between the officials of TANU in Tanzania and the earlier predicament of ‘the proverbial headman in British Central Africa’ (p. 77).) Not even collectivization, as the work of Kideckel in particular illustrates, can be understood simply as the imposition of state power upon helpless villagers. Villagers were able to influence its implementation, and in Hungary they were able eventually to subvert and transform it to their own advantage (cf. Elek 1991; Hann 1980; Szelenyi 1988). Other anthropological studies of socialism have moved beyond the conventional framework of the community study. Steven Sampson (1984a) has argued in favour of taking a ‘vertical slice’ approach, by which he means that the anthropologist should select a specific theme in social life (in Sampson’s case the subject was settlement policy in Ceau escu’s Romania) and pursue it at many levels, from individuals and families in small communities to the highest governmental decisiontakers. Equally ambitious is the work of Janine Wedel (1986; see also Wedel (ed.) 1992) in Poland, which is undoubtedly one of the countries where the ‘state versus society’ arguments have been most prominent (for reasons which have much to do with historical discontinuities in Polish political history). Wedel’s anthropology ties in with a good deal of work by Polish social scientists as well as ‘dissident’ intellectuals throughout Eastern Europe. A ‘private’ domain, is argued to be more significant than the ‘public’ domain which is dominated by the socialist state. Citizens have created their own networks not merely to help them cope with economic shortage but also to provide them with positive values and identities lacking in socialism. Wedel writes of ‘a more vital Poland that operates underneath the surface of the state, sometimes limiting it, sometimes, without its gratitude, enabling it to function’ (1992:viii). Although much of her work would seem to confirm the usefulness of the ‘state versus society’ dichotomy, Wedel also goes on to question the rhetorical construction of such a simple adversarial relationship. As the quotation above already hints, an alternative interpretation of the evidence which she and other anthropologists have gathered in socialist Eastern Europe would emphasize the ‘interpenetration’ and ‘entwining’ of the allegedly separate spheres of state and society, public and private, formal and informal. The administrative apparatus of socialist states is large; apart from the large civil service, most economic enterprises are state controlled, likewise the academies and universities. Just as the staff of all these ‘state’ bodies cannot be arbitrarily detached from their positions in ‘society’, so there is not much in socialist ‘society’ (consider for a moment the provision of welfare services and education) that can be understood without careful reference to agencies associated with ‘the state’. In short, it may be much too simple to argue (as so many intellectuals have, both Eastern and Western) that under socialism ‘society’ was squashed by a more or less totalitarian form of state power, and that now in the aftermath we may expect the ‘vacuum’ to be filled by a Westernstyle ‘civil society’. The actual patterns are more complex. For example, in the Tanzanian case Abrahams and Bukurura show that the notion of a monolithic ‘party-state’ is misleading, given the differences which exist between the TANU party and the state bureaucracy. In the Romanian case Verdery discusses competition within and between bureaucracies by adapting the old anthropological concept of ‘segmentation’. In Poland too, as Wedel has shown, the ‘vacuum’ metaphor is quite unhelpful. Here an unusually chaotic form of socialism provided conditions in which intellectuals were able to deploy ‘society’ as a concept to create the illusion of an integrated and unified populace, with very diverse groups being drawn together through their common opposition to perceived powerholders. A system of power usually theorized in terms of a strong state dominating, penetrating, or colonizing a weak society actually generated the converse, a weak state and a much stronger sense of a coherent ‘society’ than one normally expects to find in capitalist conditions. Of course this unity and ‘solidarity’ proved difficult to sustain when socialist powerholders were defeated or withdrew, at which point nationalist aspirations often provided the only alternative rallying slogans. It is obvious, then, that informal, ‘non-public networks’ play a vital role in the actual social organization of socialist societies. They are particularly well demonstrated in Pine’s chapter, which shows the influence of kinship, neighbourhood, and the domestic division of labour upon the myriad of new economic activities in which Polish women are now engaged. This ‘second economy’ under socialism closely resembles phenomena already well-known to anthropologists and sociologists from studies of many other complex societies, where people do not have to march on May Day and display slogans in their windows. From crowded slums in African cities (Hart 1973) to contemporary Britain (Pahl 1984), the importance of this dimension of social life has been well documented. Researchers have also shown that it must never be artificially detached from the ‘formal’ or ‘public’ dimension (Harding and Jenkins 1989; cf. Hart forthcoming), and that it can be reliably investigated only through intensive ethnographic research. As research into the actual social and working lives of ordinary people proceeds, the similarities between basic organizational characteristics of socialist Eurasia and modern conditions in the so-called First and Third Worlds may come to seem much more compelling than the differences. It follows that the chances of anything radically different emerging in post-socialist Eurasia must be considered rather slim. Poles will march on 3 May (a national holiday commemorating the bourgeois constitution of 1791) instead of May Day, and the slogans in shop windows will be different; or they may not march at all, and political slogans may disappear from shops altogether. But, as Janine Wedel concludes, ‘the continuities of the rodowisko [‘social circle’] will be critical in shaping Poland’ (1992:18). If this analysis is correct, more radical conclusions may follow. Ironically, it seems to me, not only do the strong states in which socialist societies are supposed to specialize turn out to be much weaker than was supposed, but a closer examination of the socialist cases undermines the continued application of the whole discourse of state and society as this has evolved in Western theorizing since pre-industrial times. Whatever their popularity among East Europeans themselves, the concepts of state and society are so ‘entwined’ as to be unhelpful in contemporary social science investigations. Anthropologists have recently made a start in this direction, when a majority voted after a public debate in favour of declaring the concept of society ‘obsolete’ ,[27] An equally critical look at the concept of the state is now surely overdue. Having already jettisoned much of the available theoretical baggage (note again that hardly a single anthropologist in this volume uses the hallowed Marxist concepts of class and exploitation), political anthropologists may not find it easy to drop these terms as well. They may fear some intellectual impoverishment of their subject if they are unable to come up with neat synthetic alternatives. I would argue that it is unfair to expect this of them. This volume contains a number of chapters which ask searching questions about definitions of the political and the implied scope of political anthropology (see especially chapters by Overing, Holy, and Spencer). In the case of socialism, we can expect anthropological work to bring out both significant differences in its reception by different peoples with distinctive cultural traditions, and the striking similarities which its derivatives have generated all over the contemporary world. Investigations may also reveal that socialist societies have much more in common with many non-socialist societies than is usually supposed, a point noted by several contributors. *** Conclusion Twentieth-century socialisms may be viewed as the most distinctive and systematic attempts to humanize the allegedly ‘disembedded’ economies of capitalism, and thereby to create good societies in the modern world. The demise of Stalinism has little bearing on the continuing urgency of this fundamental moral imperative. But it is undeniable that in practice, and in spite of many rhetorical efforts to demonstrate the contrary, socialist ideals and ideologies—such as materialist rationality and development planning —have often proved incompatible with local traditions, with the established values, religious idioms and authentic aspirations of real human communities. For the most part, of course, socialisms have been pursued not in mature capitalist conditions, but among peoples whose experience of modern industrial society has been slight or non-existent. The study of the social and cultural characteristics of these peoples has been the speciality of anthropology, a discipline which has itself been profoundly influenced by socialist ideals. The full legacies of the many varieties of socialism, short term and long term, practical and theoretical, will only become clear through further investigations. For this to happen, we may need a perestroika (but not necessarily a revolution, still less disintegration) in actually existing political anthropology! [1] The absence of almost half the original conference papers from this volume is a source of deep regret to me the editor. Although the quality of the materials was uniformly high, to publish the full proceedings would have required a second volume—and unfortunately there is no precedent for such a step in the ASA Monographs series. A number of papers were excluded from the final selection because arrangements had already been made for their publication elsewhere, and I am aware that several people had good reasons for preferring this course (this applies in particular to two papers dealing with the contemporary transformation of the Soviet Union; see Humphrey 1991; Vitebsky 1992). Those which remain reflect a consciously eclectic policy designed to ensure representation not only of as many countries and ethnographic contexts as possible, but also of the many styles and approaches available within contemporary anthropology worldwide. [2] The phrase ‘actually existing socialism’ (Realsozialismus) originates among East German dissidents in the 1970s. They were critical of their socialist regime but loyal to Marxian ideals; see Bahro 1978.(1990–91:188)
But still we know that when the Europeans came, the Bushmen lived in small tribes (or clans), sometimes federated together; that they used to hunt in common, and divided the spoil without quarrelling; that they never abandoned their wounded, and displayed strong affection to their comrades.Concepts such as ‘anarchist’, ‘communist’, ‘socialist’, and even ‘Bushman’, are artificially constructed. This does not mean that they have no meaning. On the contrary, it means that their meanings are contingent on the anthropological and sometimes the political perspectives of the commentators. Each ethnographer’s understanding of the ‘Bushmen’ is mediated through a desire to represent them within a larger theory of society. For the last seventy years or so, ‘primitive communism’ has erroneously been equated with either ‘revolutionary communism’ or ‘Marxism’. My intention in this chapter is to provide an alternative, very much non-Marxist view of primitive communism—namely that of Peter Kropotkin, anarchist Russian prince, geographer, and an early mentor of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown. Whereas Marx and Engels perceived history as a sequence of stages, Kropotkin saw it in terms of a continuity of fundamental human goodness. His own contribution on ‘Anarchism’ in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1910; reprinted in Kropotkin 1987c: 7—22) is a classic summary of the historical setting for his social theory. After hearing a lecture entitled ‘On the law of mutual aid’ by the Russian zoologist Karl Fredorovich Kessler in 1880, and reading The Descent of Man (Darwin 1871) in 1883, Kropotkin resolved to put forward his own version of Darwinism (Kropotkin 1987a:13—14; see also 1988a [1899]:298—301). The result was Mutual Aid (Kropotkin 1987a [1902]). This was conceived as an answer to the Social Darwinists, who saw in nature a mutual struggle which validated the aims of capitalism. Among other noteworthy writings are Kropotkin’s influential comments on ‘Anarchist Communism’ (1987b [1887]) and The state’ (1987d [1897]). The former was originally published in The Nineteenth Century as two separate articles—‘The scientific bases of anarchy’ and ‘The coming anarchy’. The titles are revealing, for they reflect Kropotkin’s twin concerns: the theoretical understanding of society, and the practical solution to its problems. The practical solution was much the simpler aspect, as abolition of the state was seen as the easy answer. The state, in its turn, was a problematic concept. For many, including some anarchists in Kropotkin’s day, the state and society were synonymous. Yet Kropotkin (for example, 1987d [1897]:9—16) argued strongly against this assumption. For Kropotkin, society predates the state, and his notion includes both animal societies and human, ‘primitive communist’ societies. *** Authority and Sharing Among the Bushmen Two specific concerns in Bushman ethnography have been the degree of authority in the hands of leaders, and the extent of sharing as a mechanism for redistributing wealth and preventing the development of a social hierarchy. Among the earliest true ethnographers of Bushmen was Dorothea Bleek. In 1920 and 1921 she conducted field research with the Nharo (whom she called Naron) and the Southern !Kung or •Au//eisi (Auen), who lived along the Bechuanaland-South West Africa border. Her comments are interesting because she implies a change, in the time not long before her fieldwork, from hierarchical to egalitarian organization among those she classified as Northern and Central Bushmen.Peter Kropotkin (1987a [1902]:83)
Both Naron [Central Bushmen] and Auen [Northern Bushmen] had chiefs when the old men were young. The middle-aged men just remember them.... Among Southern Bushmen there were no chiefs and they had no name for chieftainship.. There are no class distinctions among Naron and Auen, nor, excepting the medicine men, are there any trades.Contrast this statement with the comments of a more recent ethnographer George Silberbauer on the G/wi, a Central group who live east of the Nharo in what became (at Silberbauer’s own instigation) the Central Kalahari Game Reserve of Botswana:(Bleek 1928:36, 37)
There are no chiefs or headmen and every adult member of the band has rights equal to those of all the other members who reside in the band’s territory.... In the regulation of the band’s affairs, none has any more authority than any other by reason of superior status and, except for the obligations within his or her kinship group toward senior kin., no man or woman yields to the superior authority of any other member.Silberbauer, like most of his contemporaries, has emphasized the lack of hierarchy. Elsewhere (1982:31, 34), he proposes consensus as the basis of Bushman political power. Power, he suggests, lies not in the ability of individuals to force a consensus, but in their perceiving the mood of the band and compromising and creating opportunities to have their goals realized when the time is appropriate. Has Bushman social organization really changed, or has its perception, by Bushmen themselves or by Europeans, changed? Is there really a north/south difference in this issue, as Bleek’s statement suggests, or is the difference dependent on the respective insights of northern and southern ethnographers? In my view, when Bleek argued that there were chiefs in the past, even placing the statement in the mouths of her Bushman informants, she was trying to counter potential claims arising from the descriptions of Bushmen common in her day. Kropotkin’s (1987a [1902]: 83—4) understanding of the Bushmen hails from the same writings known to Bleek.[29] Yet he perceived them as representatives of a primitive communist and not a hierarchical social structure. He also perceived Bushman society as in a state of decline from its high degree of mutual aid, a point I shall return to later. Bushman society is commonly characterized in late twentieth-century sources as being based on sharing. These statements by Tanaka, on the G//ana and G/wi, and Marshall, on the Zu/’hoa^si or Central !Kung, are typical.(Silberbauer 1965:73)
The integrating and governing principles of egalitarian San society are the principles of sharing and cooperation.. For outsiders, the San ideology of equal sharing is very difficult to comprehend, and its practice is even more difficult. It was this point that gave me the most trouble when I began living among the San.(Tanaka 1980:95–6)
They lived in a kind of material plenty.... They borrow what they do not own. With this ease, they have not hoarded, and the accumulation of objects has not become associated with status.Sahlins (1974:9–10) quotes this last passage, from Marshall’s ‘Sharing, talking, and giving’ (1961), as a keynote to his theory of the ‘original affluent society’. In reprints of her paper, Marshall has amended the last sentence to read: ‘I believe that for these reasons they have not developed permanent storage, have not hoarded, and the accumulation of objects has not become associated with admirable status’ (for example, 1976:308–9). In the original version she goes on to say: ‘they mitigate jealousy and envy, to which they are prone, by passing things on to others’ (1961:244). In the later versions, she specifies: ‘by passing on to others objects that might be coveted’ (1976: 309). Although 1 doubt whether these alterations mark any significant changes in Marshall’s thinking, much less any transformations in !Kung society itself, they nevertheless display subtle changes in emphasis, first with reference to storage, and secondly with reference to the reasons why an individual might want to pass objects on to others. In mentioning storage, Marshall in fact amplifies Sahlins’ theory, which, of course, is built on her own ethnography. In mentioning coveting, she not only clarifies her original statement but also gives emphasis to the point, made in the meantime by Lee (for instance, 1965 passim; cf. Lee 1979:370–400; Draper 1978), that ! Kung society is fraught with dispute and violence. Marshall’s addition on coveting is a far cry from Sahlins’ reading of her original statement, or from Tanaka’s, which gives emphasis to sharing in its positive sense by coupling it with cooperation. ‘Sharing’ is an emotive word, and one must be careful not to misconstrue its ethnographic meanings. Marshall’s amplified description has grown simultaneously towards and away from that of Sahlins, while Tanaka here has picked up on only one aspect of her discussion—one which concerned him especially in his role as fieldworker. It is perhaps worth further reflection that the groups studied by Tanaka—the G//ana and the G/wi (Central Kalahari Bushmen)—lack any notion of formalized, delayed-reciprocal giving on non-consumable property. Their ‘sharing’ is less formal than that found among the !Kung. According to Schapera (1930:147): ‘The economic life of the [Bushman] band, although in effect it approaches a sort of communism, is really based on a notion of private property.’ He does go on to point out that land is held in common ownership, but movable property is individually owned, as are meat, vegetable food, and water (1930:147— 9). Lee (1979:333—400) places particular emphasis on relations of production as determinants of !Kung politics. Although they do have words to express notions of leadership and authority (for example, kx’au n!a, headman or ‘great owner’), !Kung have no formal political structures. Rights to land and resources are inherited bilaterally, and kinship bonds provide a framework for both production and political organization. The core group of kinsmen within each band are known as the kx’ausi (owners) of the n!ore (band territory). Membership of the core group, seniority of residence, age, and personal qualities are all factors in ascribed leadership, but boastfulness and attempts to dominate are strongly discouraged. Virtually all Bushman groups possess systems of universal kin categorization (Barnard 1978; 1981). This ideology of classifying everyone as a member of some kin category affords them the mechanism for distributing both movable property and rights over natural resources (cf. Keenan 1981: 16—18). Other forms of social classification, either kinship based or non-kinship based, define the social limits of particular arenas of distribution. Marshall (for instance, 1976:156—312) emphasizes the significance of both kinship and sharing for maintaining cooperation within the band, and between bands. In particular, !Kung society is characterized by strict rules of meat-sharing. Hunters lend arrows to one another, and the ‘owner’ of the kill is the owner of the killing arrow even though it will have been shot by another hunter. The owner shares his meat with the other hunters, with his affines, with the members of his band, and often with members of other, nearby bands too. Those who receive meat then distribute it to their families, to name relatives, and to others. Some twenty years after Marshall’s field work, Wiessner took up in more detail the problem of the formalized giving of non-consumables and succeeded in uncovering a wide network (Wiessner 1977; 1982; 1986). This has come to be known by the !Kung term hxaro, which means roughly ‘giving in formalized exchange’. By the time of marriage, the average !Kung will have between ten and sixteen hxaro partners, including both close kin and distant relatives and friends (Wiessner 1982: 72—4). Underlying the hxaro system of delayed, balanced reciprocity is an assumption that these giftgiving partners exist in a state of mutual generalized reciprocity of rights to water and plant resources (1982:74— 7). In addition to exchange within !Kung society, there has long been trade contact between !Kung and other peoples (see, for example, Wilmsen 1986). The evidence is extensive: all of Zii/’ho,^ (Central ! Kung) country and beyond ‘seems to have been crisscrossed with well- developed trading networks’ (Gordon 1984:207). Implicit in the accounts of Gordon and Wilmsen is an assumption that other recent ethnographers have been blinded by their desire to see the !Kung as isolated remnants of primitive purity untouched by wider economic structures. But does this mean that they, or their even more ‘acculturated’ southern neighbours, have long since lost their primitive communism and mutual aid? *** Communism, Capitalism, and ‘acculturated Bushmen’ In his definition of primitive communism, Lee (1988) recognizes a relative egalitarianism and emphasizes the communal ownership of land, rather than specifically the lack of hierarchical institutions. For Lee (1988: 254—5), even chiefly societies qualify as retaining primitive communist principles in a ‘semi-communal’ social structure (cf. Testart 1985; Flanagan 1989; Gulbrandsen 1991). But to what extent are the Bushmen communistic? This dilemma lies at the root of the quarrel in the mid-1970s between Elizabeth Wily and H.J. Heinz. Wily argued (for example, 1973a; 1973b; 1976) that Bushman social organization exemplified principles of collective ownership and communal will, while Heinz argued (1970; 1973; 1975) that on the contrary it exhibited the incipient capitalist principles of private ownership and free enterprise. Each had interpreted their respective experiences at the !X settlement at Bere, where Wily had served as teacher and Heinz as benefactor and development planner, as evidence for the equation of Bushman ideology with their own. Heinz established livestock-rearing at Takathswaane, on the main road across the Kalahari, in 1969. By 1971 he had moved a number of Takathswaane families to a new settlement at Bere, a few miles to the west. At Heinz’s instigation, !Xo« families from Okwa were invited to join the scheme too. The only requirement was that they should each own at least one cow. At that point, with two bands of different geographical origin, Bere was declared a ‘closed’ settlement. Early on in the project a shop and a school were built. Each was a success in some sense, but each also marked the onset of unanticipated difficulties. The shop was run by Heinz’s !Xo« wife, who because of her status and her financial skills soon found herself in a difficult position in the community. The school became the preserve of Liz Wily, who proved to be an excellent teacher but whose ideas were at odds with those of Heinz. The latter had explicitly set up Bere on capitalist principles, while Wily was said to have espoused at least some of the principles of Maoist China. Their well-publicized quarrel resulted in Wily leaving the scheme and taking up a post as Botswana’s first Basarwa (Bushman) Development Officer. Today Bere is run by the Botswana government. It is fair to say that the !Xo are neither successful capitalists nor Maoists, though they may be, in Kropotkin’s loosest sense, ‘anarchist communists’. The greatest problem with the Bere scheme has always been the reluctance on the part of the !Xo residents to invest the time required to keep herds of animals. The small scale of livestock ownership also militated against subsistence by herding. Heinz was right to maintain that Bushman economics is predicated on individualism as much as on collectivism, but individual ownership of very small herds (often one beast per family) does not permit sufficient sales of livestock for the accumulation of capital, much less the maintenance of a fully fledged capitalist system. In an earlier paper (Barnard 1986:49—50), I noted the tendency towards buying and selling meat, rather than exchanging or sharing it, between Nharo groups at Hanahai, another government settlement scheme to the north of Bere. It is significant, however, that despite such new buying and selling arrangements between social groups previously defined spatially as ‘band clusters’, these Nharo give meat freely, in the traditional manner, within the bands that make up a given band cluster. There is a temptation to regard buy ing/selling relationships as indicative of social change, simply because they have not occurred before. Yet it could well be that they define age-old divisions between social and territorial units—units which would not previously have had any contact at all with one another. It is hence not surprising that they buy and sell meat, and it would be more surprising if they did give meat freely across band cluster boundaries. If Bushmen are communists, then their communism is confined to the ‘commune’. *** Primitive Communism and the Foraging Ethos One element in a complex debate which has recently graced the pages of Current Anthropology (Solway and Lee 1990; Wilmsen and Denbow 1990) is the question of a primitive communist mode of production. The main protagonists in the wider, more implicit, debate are Richard Lee (for example, 1979; 1984), Lorna Marshall (1976), George Silberbauer (1981), and the many others who have described Bushman society as an entity in itself (the ‘isolationists’ or ‘traditionalists’); and Edwin Wilmsen (for instance, 1983; 1989), Carmel Schrire (1980), James Denbow (1984), Robert Gordon (1984), and others who have emphasized historical contacts between Bushmen and non-Bushmen (the ‘integrationists’ or ‘revisionists’). Jacqueline Solway and Richard Lee (1990) have bent considerably towards the revisionists in recognizing historical links, yet they nevertheless reject the radical criticisms of those who deny the existence of a mode of production based on foraging or sharing. Wilmsen and Denbow (1990) also accuse Lee in particular of a shift from describing Bushmen as exemplars of a ‘foraging’ (Lee 1981), to a ‘communal’ (Lee 1988; 1990) mode of production. This seems to be unacceptable to Wilmsen and Denbow because of their emphasis on external trade, but the simple existence of trade need not undermine Lee’s position. The key point, as Solway and Lee (1990:119) imply, is that foraging and communalism generally do go together. I prefer instead to think of a foraging mode of thought, which is linked to communal as well as individual interests. This mode of thought persists after people cease to depend on hunting and gathering as their primary means of subsistence. Foraging remains very much in the ethos of Bushman society, even where groups look after boreholes and livestock, keep their own animals, and grow crops. The Bushmen on the margins of the larger, non-Bushman society are essentially foragers. To them wage-labour and seasonal changes in subsistence pursuits are but large-scale foraging strategies (Guenther 1986a; Motzafi 1986; Barnard 1988a). If the concept of ‘mode of production’ makes any sense at all, it makes sense as a broad characterization of all these activities. Bushman are ‘foragers’ in many ways. Kin classification and gift-giving involve social ‘foraging’, for relatives and for relationships of exchange (cf. Barnard 1978; Wiessner 1977). Their religious ideology is characterized as ‘foraging’ for ideas (cf. Guenther 1979; Barnard 1988b). Even the Khoekhoe word saan or san, so popular as an ethnic label for ‘Bushmen’, means simply ‘foragers’—with all the negative as well as the positive connotations ‘foraging’ conjures (cf. Guenther 1986b).[30] Kropotkin used the splendidly sympathetic and detailed account of Peter Kolb (Kolben 1731) as his main source on the Khoekhoe or ‘Hottentots’ (Kropotkin 1987a [1902]:84–5). Kropotkin describes the Khoekhoe as being the same in ‘social manner’, but ‘a little more developed than the Bushmen’ (1987a [1902]:84). Indeed, he generalizes from Kolb’s description of the ‘Hottentots’ to ‘savages’ almost universally in one crucial regard— food sharing.(Marshall 1961:243–4)
If anything is given to a Hottentot, he at once divides it among all present —a habit which, as is known, so much struck Darwin among the Fuegians. He cannot eat alone, and, however hungry, he calls those who pass by to share his food. And when Kolben expressed his astonishment thereat, he received the answer: ‘That is Hottentot manner.’ But this is not Hottentot manner only: it is an all but universal habit among the ‘savages’.Kropotkin goes on to quote at length Kolb’s views of Khoekhoe morality. For example: ‘One of the greatest Pleasures of the Hottentots certainly lies in their Gifts and Good Offices to one another’ (Kolben 1731:89—90). From the ‘Hottentots’, Kropotkin goes on to tell of the ‘natives of Australia’, the ‘Papuas’, the ‘Eskimos’, and others. The ‘Eskimos’ receive special commendation for their ‘communism’ (Kropotkin 1987a [1902] :88—9), which, like ‘communism’ among the Bushmen, Kropotkin thought was fast disappearing as a result of foreign influence. There are two related problems here. First, there is the problem of the disappearing culture. Secondly, there is the problem of hunter-gatherer/ herder divide, so significant in modern anthropology that it overrides the more obvious unity of what later came to be called Khoisan culture. The first problem is simple. Cultures are always ‘disappearing’, just after they are studied. The phenomenon occurs consistently across the globe, with much the same frequency as, say, that cannibals are always found on the other side of the hill and not among one’s own kind (Arens 1979). The second problem concerns the failure of modern anthropologists to take in the idea of the unity of the Khoisan culture area. This unity seems to have been obvious to Kolb, and, I think, also to Kropotkin, but it is sadly lacking in recent work on both sides of the current ‘Great Bushman Debate’. *** The Golden Age of Sharing Price (1975) and Bird-David (1990) have drawn attention to the differences between ‘sharing’ and ‘reciprocity’. ‘Sharing’ is defined as an internal, integrative process of giving without the expectation of return, and resembles Sahlins’ notion of ‘generalized reciprocity’. It is frequently found within small groups such as bands. Beyond that, it ‘may be found universally, to varied extents and in varied realms, just as [balanced and negative reciprocity] are’ (Bird-David 1990:195). Indeed, it could well be ‘the most universal form of human economic behavior, distinct from and more fundamental than reciprocity’ (Price 1975:3). Price and Bird- David define ‘reciprocity’ as giving with the expectation of return—‘the gift’ in Mauss’s (1990 [1925]) sense. It is commonplace to regard hunter-gatherers as having distinctive political and especially economic forms of organization, and sharing is often seen as especially significant in hunting and gathering societies. Yet, while some of these typically hunter-gatherer features of social structure (for example, egalitarianism) are much more applicable to Khoisan foragers than to Khoisan herders, there are nevertheless similarities which have until now escaped notice. In Khoekhoe and Damara society, institutionalized gift-giving and meat-sharing are as important as in some Bushman societies (Barnard 1992:169, 189—91, 203—5). Likewise, marital exchanges involving the transfer of goods, often cited as a typical feature of pastoralist societies, are found among Kalahari hunter-gatherers (Barnard 1980:120–2; Lee 1984:74–7). The existence of ‘sharing’ practices among the Khoekhoe and ‘reciprocity’ among Bushmen should cause us to rethink our notions of what constitutes a typical ‘hunting’ or ‘herding’ society, and indeed to consider the notion of a pan-Khoisan constellation of economic institutions. Kropotkin grasped this, and expressed this view accurately in his very brief discussion of mutual aid among the Bushmen and Khoekhoe. Most modern attempts to draw boundaries between ‘our kind of society’ and ‘other kinds’ have placed the boundary right down the middle— between ‘hunter-gatherers’ and ‘others’, between ‘Khoe’ and ‘San’ (for example, Lee and DeVore 1968). However, attempts to temper classification on the basis of means of subsistence with a closer look at the ideology of sharing and reciprocity have yielded different results. Thus the Golden Age of Sharing can be defined either more narrowly than the hunter-gatherer (for instance, Woodburn 1980, 1982; Testart 1981; 1982, Lee 1981, 1988, 1990), or more widely (Sahlins 1974). I prefer to see the notion of ‘sharing’ defined in cultural, ideological terms. My vision of a foraging ethos is not far from Lee’s, except that, unlike him, I do not conceive of such an ethos as dependent in any sense on the mode of production of the larger society. It could apply just as well, and with positive associations, to the san of any society, including the urban homeless of modern Western societies. Figure 1.1 illustrates, very loosely (with a double line), the relative extent of the Golden Age of Sharing according to each of the various theorists who have commented on the question. [[c-m-chris-m-hann-socialism-ideals-ideologies-and-l-2.png][Figure 1.1 The Golden Age of Sharing]] I suggest that the idea of ‘foraging’ can help us to identify the central characteristics of Bushman society, not quite in the literal sense of Ingold (1986:79–100, 101–29; 1988), who emphasizes non-deliberate action, but in a sense which connotes a lack of concern about the specific result of the activity. When a Bushman man goes ‘hunting’, he will almost certainly stop to pick berries or nuts (cf. Barnard 1980:116–17). He might even bring some home, especially if the hunt proper is unsuccessful. His wife, in her turn, may go off to collect firewood and come back with some roots to roast. I find the term ‘foraging’ is useful as a description of these kinds of activity, and even more useful in designating the ethos and ideology of Bushman society.[31] *** A Summary of Characterizations of Bushman Society Bushman society has been characterized in any number of ways. The following list represents only a few of the characterizations which have been made since Kropotkin’s time: 1. primitive communism, or 1. incipient capitalism; 1. mutual aid, or 1. anarchy (in its negative sense); 1. universal kinship, or 1. immediate-return economies; 1. foraging mode of production, or 1. domestic mode of production; 1. natural purity and a mystical awareness of nature, or 1. technological simplicity, but with an ingenuity associated with a foraging ethos; 1. isolation from the wider regional politico-economic system of Southern Africa, or 1. integration into that system, as traders, labourers, and servants. Some of these are contradictions of others. Indeed, I have deliberately paired a number of characterizations which can be taken as opposites, though not all pairings are really opposed in quite this manner. Nevertheless, characterizations emerge which highlight alternative understandings of Bushman society. Are they poor or rich? Violent or peaceful? Practical or mystical? Traditionally isolated from their neighbours or integrated in a network of widespread trade links? In a sense, each of these oppositions expresses a contradictory truth about Bushman society. They are poor because their wants are many; rich because their needs are few. They are violent because of the relatively high incidence of homicide; peaceful because of the lack of warfare in living memory. They are practical because of their successful adaptation to both the natural environment and changing social conditions; mystical because their adaptation to nature expresses a harmony lacking in ‘advanced’ societies. They are traditionally isolated, in the sense that both they and outsiders define them in terms of their relation to nature; yet they are integrated, in the sense that they have long traded and shared their land and resources with members of other ethnic groups. Each characterization identifies a different aspect of the same society. This does not mean that the Bushmen are not really anarchists or communists. They are simultaneously both and neither. They are communists because they hold land in common. They are noncommunists because they each own movable property as individuals. They are anarchists because they possess no form of indigenous overlordship. They are non-anarchists because they recognize, and have long recognized, the overlordship of the neighbouring tribal chief, the colonial state, or the nation-state. *** Conclusion The descriptions available to Schapera when compiling his magnificent Khoisan Peoples of South Africa (1930) suggested that both the Khoekhoe and the Bushmen had a system of communal ownership over land. Neverthless, Schapera (1930:319, 321) rejected the idea that either this system or the widespread systems of sharing and exchange of food, livestock, and material culture, indicated a form of true ‘communism’, whereas earlier writers (such as von Francois 1896:222) had suggested it did. Schapera’s position seems to be part of a wider phenomenon. As Lee (for example, 1990:231—5) and Leacock (1983) have at least hinted, anthropologists writing in the decades following the Bolshevik Revolution had quite a different notion of ‘primitive communism’ than did those writing before it. Generally speaking, the term seems to have carried few political overtones before that time, whereas afterwards only Marxists have seen fit to use it at all. Not only did the authoritarian communists appropriate the state, they appropriated the word ‘communist’ too. Their intellectual descendants jealously guard it to this day, while others refrain from using it lest they be branded ‘Marxists’ or worse. Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid was at the same time primitivist and evolutionist. Mutual aid is found in all human societies and in nature; that is, in animal societies. Yet, at the end of the day, Kropotkin’s understanding of Bushman society actually approaches the ‘revisionist’ view more closely than it does that of Lee, Marshall, Tanaka, and Silberbauer. In a speech to English anarchists in 1888, Kropotkin (1988a [1888]:102) described ‘Anarchist-Communism’ simply as a combination of the ‘two great movements’ of the nineteenth century: ‘Liberty of the individual’ and ‘social co-operation of the whole community’. It is worth some reflection that Kropotkin’s descriptions of societies he considered ‘communist’ might still serve as models of ethnographic generalization, if not as charters for political action. [28] I would like to thank Chris Hann, Adam Kuper, and Ed Wilmsen for their comments on earlier drafts. [29] Kropotkin’s knowledge of Bushmen was entirely second-hand. In contrast, Dorothea Bleek grew up with Bushmen. Her father, Wilhelm Bleek, was the world’s foremost authority on Bushman languages and folklore. After his untimely death in 1875, his work was continued by Dorothea’s aunt Lucy Lloyd, and ultimately by Dorothea herself. Kropotkin’s main source on the Bushmen seems to have been Volume 2 of Theodor Waitz’s six-volume survey, Anthropologie der Naturvdlker (Waitz 1860). Among primary sources he cites Lichtenstein (1811—12), Fritsch (1872 [1863]; 1868) and W.H.I.Bleek (1875), and mentions in passing Philip (1828), Burchell (1822—24) and Moffat (1842), all cited by Waitz. Kropotkin also refers to Elisee Reclus’s nineteen-volume Geographic universelle (1878—94). Like Kropotkin, Reclus was both a geographer and an anarchist, and the two had worked closely together in France in the 1870s. [30] It is a peculiar irony that this term is the one favoured by both Lee (who calls these people ‘San’) and Wilmsen (who calls them ‘San-speaking peoples’), when most other specialists have returned to other labels—most commonly ‘Bushmen’. The subject of what to call ‘Bushmen’ is also an ongoing debate, and one with a grand history. The first recorded usage seems to have been in 1682, in the journal of Olof Bergh (Wilson 1986: 257). In the early days of Dutch settlement at the Cape, Soaqua or Sonqua (the Cape Khoekhoe masculine plural form; San is common gender plural) seems to have been more common, but Bosjesmans, Bushmen, and other variants gained predominance by the late eighteenth century. Peter Kolb (or Kolben), for example, referred to ‘a Sort of Hottentot Banditti ... call’d Buschies or High-way Men’ (Kolben 1731:89–90). Kolb’s account was probably far better known in the eighteenth than it has been in the twentieth century. From the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, Bushmen were frequently described as part of ‘Hottentot’ society, and indeed late twentieth-century work by some of the revisionists (such as Schrire 1980) suggests a return to this view. [31] Ingold shares with Kropotkin the idea of a continuity between animal and human societies, though the modern scholar also points to a number of significant contrasts. I share many of the specific views Ingold espouses, but disagree with his restriction of the term ‘foraging’ to non-human activities alone. In my view this places undue emphasis on the intentionality of human activities. *** References(Kropotkin 1987a [1902]:84)
the conjunction of a norm of reciprocity with a reality of exploitation would not distinguish the primitive political economy from any other: everywhere in the world the indigenous category for exploitation is ‘reciprocity’.Sahlins must take this position on the universality of the political economy. For him social order, and thus the state of sociality itself, is only possible through the action forthcoming from institutions of hierarchy. It is only through exploitation that people can be pushed beyond the original asocial and anarchic domestic mode. Sahlins (1972:132ff.) thus looks with a cynical eye at the observations by Levi-Strauss on the plight of the generous chief among the Nambikwara of Brazil who was at the mercy of collective greed. In his article on Nambikwara chieftainship, Levi-Strauss (1967 [1944]) had concluded that it was a relation of reciprocity, and not one of subordination/domination, that bound the group as a recognized collectivity to its chief.[38] Given the data presented by Levi-Strauss, it is difficult to detect chiefly exploitation. Sahlins does not quote passages from Levi-Strauss where he details the ways in which the chief had to work harder than anyone else, and how it was through his own personal labour that he provided in times of economic disaster (see Levi-Strauss 1967[1944]). The chief’s skills and initiative were greater than those of other people. At the same time he had no power to order the labour of members of his group, nor could he reprimand disorderly conduct or laziness. In sum, he had no coercive power at his disposal (1967[1944:53). Levi-Strauss explains that for the Nambikwara consent was at the origin of leadership and the only measure of its legitimacy. Indeed, the difficulties of leadership were so great, the duties of the leader so exacting and tiresome, that Levi-Strauss wonders why anyone accepted the role of leader in Nambikwara society—was the prize worth the trouble? It is easy, on the other hand, to see why the Nambikwara group, given its own conditions for leadership, wanted a leader. The weight of the welfare of the group was on his shoulders. It was also because of its desire for collectivity that the group desired the leader. Sahlins, on the other hand, writes as if leadership is imposed upon the group, and for the sake of the collectivity so acquired household units must sacrifice their autonomy and their leisure—they must bow to exploitation. It is difficult to understand why people would accept political leadership under such conditions. The Nambikwara, far from displaying any acceptance of relations of subordination for the sake of collectivity, would have left any leader whom they understood to be using coercive techniques. They did, however, recognize leadership as a force that brings about collectivity. Levi-Strauss tells us that their word for chief, Uilikande, seemed to mean ‘the one who unites’ or ‘the one who joins together’. He concludes that ‘the leader appears as the cause of the group’s willingness to aggregate rather than as the result of the need for a central authority felt by a group already constituted’ (1967:53). The critical question is the nature of this collectivity that the Nambikwara desired. What was it for? Levi-Strauss gives us a good clue when he states that a major duty of leadership was to create high morale within the group: ‘the chief must be a good singer and dancer, a merrymaker always ready to cheer up the band and to brighten the dullness of daily life’ (1967:55). To summarize briefly, for Marx all modes of production are social ones, with community the hallmark of all pre-capitalist production. For Sahlins, tribal social order is achieved to the degree that exploitative political forces through the means of mystification overcome the asocial structure of production. His argument depends in part upon a rather arbitrary separation of ‘the domestic’ from ‘the public’. Although such a split clearly fits our own understanding of the relation between family and state or civil society, its saliency is not always so clear-cut for the indigenous peoples of Amazonia. Moreover, given the stress that they often place on the freedom of the individual in work, the primary unit of production could just as well be, not the household, but the individual person, male or female, adult or child. It can equally be said (somewhat chez Marx) that the community itself, especially for the peoples of the Guianas, constituted a basic unit of production. *** Collectivity as a Modality of the Intimate and the Informal: The Guianese Example The social unity valued by the indigenous peoples of the Guianas bears little resemblance to the ‘collectivity’ envisaged as necessary to their wellbeing by Sahlins. It is also a type of social linkage that can be difficult for the ethnographer to describe. Riviere has recently argued (in press) that the community, a settlement of people that typically dwelt within a single multi-family communal dwelling, was the basic social unity in the Guianas. He states that as a unit this community was politically autonomous, and in ideal socially and economically self-sufficient. He stresses, however, the ephemerality of these communities and the fluidity of their social arrangements. Thomas, who writes on the Pemon of Venezuela (1982), similarly emphasizes the difficulty of seeing ‘collectivity’ as a strong factor in the social organization of this Guianese people. He comments that in the Pemon case, order and solidarity were not associated, for their emphasis was so strongly upon the principles of personal autonomy and egalitarianism. Thus Pemon attachment to community was not to a concrete solidary entity; nor did the settlement in any convincing way impinge upon its members as ‘the community as a whole’ (1982:235—6). The Pemon were a peaceful people—a peacefulness, Thomas suggests, that was to a large extent a function of ‘the community’ having a minimal constraining effect, in structural terms, upon the individual. Each person, beyond the level of nuclear family and sibling set, defined his or her own unique social field for both work and residence. The first response of a Pemon to insult, injury, or personal friction was to move; the response to dissension was felt to be in one’s own hands. Because the community was not a decision-making body, it could not achieve hegemony over the individual in concrete economic or political terms. Yet at the same time Thomas comments that for the Pemon ‘autonomy is not being alone’ (1982:236). Thus, we return to my opening comments about sociality for the tropical forest peoples of South America being predicated upon the principle of personal autonomy. For them, autonomy is a highly social state, and this seems to be the puzzle for the Western analyst. Collectivity of a very important type did obviously characterize life in a Pemon settlement, and the order for which they strove was not simply a figment of the tropical imagination. Settlements did have physical existence on one site over a twenty-year time span. Thomas, almost inadvertently, places his finger upon the primary characteristic of Amazonian collectivity when he stresses the intimacy achieved between members of a settlement. He notes that ‘the conditions of constant interaction and solidarity within the Pemon household and settlement are conducive to a heightened awareness of others’ moods and needs and of the necessity of adapting oneself to them’ (1982:235). The persistent destabilization of hierarchy in Pemon social relationships—as, for example, might hold between father-in-law and son-in-law—is another lead that should guide us to their understanding of sociality. The institutionalization of hierarchy is not conducive to informality, nor to relations of intimacy, and the only collectivity with which Pemon individuals were comfortable was that conducive to the establishment of the intimate and the informal. As already mentioned, Sahlins describes his ‘domestic mode of production’ as a ‘modality of the intimate’, which from his point of view embodies the anarchy of nature. The indigenous peoples of the Guianas, on the other hand, understand such a modality as a highly desirable social state to be achieved. It is my argument that sociality for them was the accomplishment of the principles of intimacy and informality through the everyday activities of community life. In contrast to peoples who believe that their communities have temporal existence through such mechanisms as the corporate ownership of property and the jural rules of such corporation, the Guianese community had existence through time as a political, economic, and social unit to the extent that its members were able to achieve, on a daily basis, the goals of intimacy and informality. Community for them was a process of existence that had to be daily achieved by individuals through both tact and work (see Overing 1989). The question remains of how a collectivity based upon such principles might also be conducive to production. *** The Community as ‘a Force of Production’ Many of the attributes of Sahlins’ ‘domestic mode of production’— leisure, affluence, the freedom to choose how and when one works— can be dependent upon community. For a large number of indigenous peoples of the Amazon, the community is an obvious unit of production.[39] When I conducted fieldwork among the Piaroa, the local group was usually composed of six to seven families living together within a large communal house. Informal work organization that cross-cut household boundaries typified the rhythm of daily work. A husband and wife were careful to discuss with each other their daily plans. But, although they jointly owned their garden plots, or shared the ownership of such plots with another couple, daily production and consumption patterns did not closely conform to the family unit. A woman could be accompanied to her field by daughter, daughter-in-law, mother, sister, sister-in-law, and female visitors. Young girls worked with mother, father’s sister, mother’s sister, brother, sister, potential sister-in-law, and father. A boy could choose to work with his father, his mother’s brother, his sister or his mates—or not at all. Men went hunting alone or with whomsoever they pleased. If large peccary were sighted, a man would join a hunting party comprised of all the men in his community. Collecting parties were frequently spontaneous affairs that cross-cut family units. The household, although a hearth-owning unit, was no more a primary unit of consumption than it was for production. Because each game species was subject to specific culinary rules, consumption patterns within the community could be complicated. Depending upon age and gender, people could eat certain parts of an animal, but not others. Thus for some meals young men might cook and eat together, while women and children ate separately from a common pot, as too might the adult men as a group. As these examples indicate, daily production and consumption for the Piaroa was loosely organized, and work usually reflected the personal moods and preferences of the individuals involved. As with the Pemon, right of preference referred both to the personal choice of co-residents with whom one found it most congenial to spend time and to the type of task itself. The Piaroa stated explicitly that the affluent community was the one that could take into account on a daily level both flexibility in schedules of work and right to individual preference. Affluence was a matter of achieving personal comfort in work. The achievement of such wealth demanded the establishment of a community that had both the high morale and the size to allow for flexibility and fluid patterns of cooperation. The Piaroa repeatedly stated the correlation between personal affluence and community size. A very small community of fifteen people simply did not have the membership resources to allow for personal choice and a positive everyday state of mood and health in the carrying out of all the duties required for daily survival—the fishing, the hunting, the collecting of food and firewood, the gardening, the preparation of game and garden produce, the making of tools and clothing, and the conducting of ritual necessary for daily protection. The size of a community and thus its affluence was related to the qualities of its leader, for it was his job to attract into his community a large number of people who could also amiably cooperate on a daily basis (see Overing Kaplan 1975). While the leader of a Piaroa community had no powers of coercion over work, and little weight in the daily organization of economic activities, it was his duty (as it was for the Nambikwara chief) to maintain the high morale of his community so that work, and existence generally, remained comfortable for its members. As Goldman has noted for the Cubeo of the North-west Amazon (1963: 88), the critical difference between the wealthy and the poor community was not a matter of productive accumulation, but of morale. This makes good sense if a primary value of a people is upon personal autonomy and personal comfort in work, a value encompassing the idea that work must cater to individual desires, talents, and dispositions. The important point that Goldman understood about Amazonian social and political organization, and the philosophy of sociality that supported it, was that the very fact of people living together in a community was dependent upon the daily creation of high morale among its members. Since linkage to others for both the Piaroa and the Cubeo remained (insistently) on a relatively informal plane and to a large extent subject to personal preference, the group stayed together only so long as its members and its leader achieved and maintained geniality of relationships (Goldman 1963:279–83; Overing 1989: 164). It was through the construction of high morale that collective activities, and indeed all work, could be smoothly carried out. In this respect the community could be viewed as a force of production. As Goldman points out, collectivity and the political work required to create and maintain community were more a matter of the ‘politics of mood management’, than the establishment of institutions of hierarchy incorporating command/obedience relations. It is important to be even clearer on the relations between community, wealth, and personal autonomy. Wealth for the Piaroa was assessed from the point of view of the individual, and not of the community. Both the capacity to create materially and to act socially were aspects of personal autonomy: the power for both social and material action was in the hands of the individual. Each person was responsible for developing within the self the capacities that allowed for his or her own social and material existence. Individuals were truly wealthy only if their ‘thoughts were awakened’ (ta’kwa poiaechi), and therefore the ‘life of the mind’ (ta’kwaru) well developed. It was the well- developed ‘life of the mind’ that gave one the powerful means to act materially in the world. The stress in the Piaroa theory of power was upon the agent’s knowledge, capabilities, and will: these qualities, which together formed a person’s ta’kwaru, were the source of materially good things in life. Nevertheless, wealth was a social notion. A wealthy individual by definition lived with many people and enjoyed a certain quality of life that gave both leisure and abundance. The wealthy person had the powers to live tranquilly with others. Tact, the recognition of the personal autonomy of others, was clearly considered to be an aspect of productive knowledge.[40] Although the stress in the Piaroa theory of power and wealth was upon personal autonomy and creativity, it was also a theory firmly based upon the ideal of sociality and not that of property. Personal possession as we know it is very different from the Piaroa understanding of it, and several observations about their views are pertinent. Products of work were possessed by the individual, and not the group. They were recognized as manifestations of the particular individual’s thoughts, and ownership or personal possession was often expressed through reference to the person’s life of the mind (see Overing 1992). The owner also had the privilege of disposal, but not necessarily privileged use. Generosity in sharing (the disposing and distributing of the products of one’s labour) was an important social principle for the Piaroa, and in some areas an obligation, such as all products brought back to the house from the jungle. In hunting, fishing, and collecting a person appropriated in large part on behalf of the collectivity. Possession also denoted a relationship of nurture, as with a kinsman. It is significant that the use of kinship terms was in the possessed form. This is logical, for one created kinsmen not only through reproductive capacity, but also through work freely chosen through personal decision. To create kinsmen demanded personal responsibility in a form not so different from that required in the caring for other products of one’s work. Kinsmen, as other possessions, required nurturing and protecting. In short, the notion of personal possession among the Piaroa emphasized ownership as a social relationship. The community as a collectivity of kinsmen living and therefore working together was ideally a community of nurture.[41] The Piaroa, in referring to the membership of their communal house, most often used the phrase ‘tutae itsotu’, which literally meant ‘the collectivity of like beings to which I belong’. According to the Piaroa, people became physically ‘of a kind’ through the process of living together. Thus those who were not originally close kinsmen became so over time through proximity. The process of ‘becoming of a kind’ included working and eating together, and mutual caring for one another through daily work. The work of each adult, and especially that of the leader who possessed the greatest productive skills, contributed to the daily achievement of community, its relatedness, and well-being. Through physical contact, the food one ate affected everyone with whom one lived, as too did one’s own personal powers (see Overing 1986). Moreover, the food one ate was usually as much a result of the work of others as of self—and as such a product of their thoughts as well as one’s own. It is clear that work, conducted through the modality of the intimate and the informal, was not alienated from the personal relationships of community and their morality. The Piaroa did not distinguish ‘work’ as a category separable from human living in general. Work, as far as possible, was to be pleasurable. Both intensely personal and social, it was ideally both a product of pleasurable social relationships and a creator of them.[42] As Gow (1991) has described work for the indigenous peoples of the Lower Urubamba in Peru, it was action that fulfilled the desire to provide for self and the desires and lives of others—of children, spouse, and other members of the community. Only through such work could a proper community and linkage with others be created and maintained. Thus personal work and social linkage were constitutive of each other. Without the tranquil relationships of good community life, one could not work. Without work, one had no community. In other words, work, understood as the daily maintenance of life, was the way in which linkage with others could be achieved. *** Conclusion What was notable about Piaroa production, within the framework of community, was the informality of its organization and the personal autonomy that such informality allowed. Their vision of the good life was in sharp contrast to Sahlins’ understanding of the productive and therefore social community, where through relations of hierarchy resources, labour, and their products could be exploited to their fullest. His yardstick is capitalism: the economic defects of ‘the domestic mode of production’ must be overcome so that tribal peoples can become workers. But should this occur, as when the indigenous peoples of Amazonia become involved in wage-labour, they are no longer operating within a modality of the intimate and the informal. As Marx understood, the change from one form of sociality (with its attachment to community) to the next (with its focus upon productive progress) was a radical step in general in the history of humankind. Sahlins, although he captures well the principles of autonomy and intimacy so characteristic of tribal economies, does not give these principles either social or political value. They do have both, and they were values often and vehemently expressed in daily life by individual Piaroa. The political choice of the Piaroa was to opt for daily physical and emotional comfort rather than for, let us say, the more abstract stability provided by the rules and regulations ordering past and future inheritance. The primary political goal of the Guianese community was the achievement of the social, but such sociality was dependent upon both the economic autonomy of the individual members of the community and the creation of high morale among them. It tends to go against the grain in Western analysis to ascribe political freedom to the tribal, or to label as ‘political’ the freedom that such peoples as those of the Guianas demand in work and their everyday decisions. As already mentioned, Marx tends not to grant political status to such freedom for ‘the tribal’. Lefort (1986:153), however, construes Marx’s interpretation of the primitive commune to be, in implication at least, no less political than economic. With capitalism, Marx understands the workers’ lack of freedom (lack of property) as a political fact. Where people do have mastery over their own labour and the products of it (where they are property owners in more or less the original sense), would these people in Marx’s understanding be politically free? Probably not, but in the light of modern ethnography we can claim they are—or at the very least we can argue that their freedom in work is a political fact. [32] I give warm thanks to the Leverhulme Foundation who, in awarding me a Research Grant for the academic year of 1989/90 gave me the time to work on many of the issues of this paper. I also thank Peter Riviere and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro for their comments on an earlier draft of it. [33] For example see Marx and Engels (1970 [1845–46]:51). [34] See the discussion by Lefort (1986:142). [35] The discussion of Marx and Engels in German Ideology (Part 1: Feuerbach) on gender relations makes clear that Marx in his discussion of original property was referring especially to one’s freedom in disposing of one’s own labour. However, they also maintained that women never had such autonomy (see 1970 [1845–46]: 44, 52). [36] See also the discussion of Lefort (1986:143). [37] Sahlins conflates throughout most of his discussion in Stone Age Economics what in ordinary anthropological parlance would be separated as ‘hunters and gatherers’ and ‘horticulturalists’. I am not opposed to such conflation. [38] Sahlins quotes only from Tristes Tropiques (1961), and not from Levi- Strauss’s article on Nambikwara chieftainship, which was first published in 1944. [39] For some Amazonian groups, such as the Achuar of Ecuador, demographic factors make the household a fairly literal unit of production. See Descola (1986). [40] See Thomas (1982) and Goldman (1963) on the same theme. [41] The observations of Ingold (1986: chap. 9) on collectivity and personal possession in band societies bear many similarities to my own on the Piaroa. See also Ingold (1986:227) on the ‘community of nurture’ among hunters and gatherers. [42] See Overing (1989), where I describe the Piaroa ‘aesthetics of production’ which entails a particular relation between morality, the beauty of a person, and productive knowledge. *** References(Sahlins 1972:134)
The word ‘African’ [in African Socialism] is not introduced to describe a continent to which a foreign ideology is to be transplanted. It is meant to convey the African roots of a system that is itself African in its characteristics. African socialism is a term describing an African political and economic system that is positively African (Section 7). The main features of African Socialism include—(i) political democracy; (ii) mutual social responsibility; (iii) various forms of ownership; (iv) a range of controls to ensure that property is used in the mutual interests of society and its members; (v) diffusion of ownership to avoid concentration of economic power; (vi) progressive taxes to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and income (Section 48).The first two of these represent ‘African traditions’ which ‘form an essential basis for African Socialism’ (Section 8), in which,
every member of society is important and equal; every mature citizen can belong to the party without restriction or discrimination; and the party will entertain and accommodate different points of view. African Socialism rests on full, equal and unfettered democracy. Thus African Socialism differs politically from communism because it ensures every mature citizen equal political rights and from capitalism because it prevents the exercise of disproportionate political influence by economic power groups. Another fundamental force in African traditional life was religion which provided a strict moral code for the community. This will be a prominent feature of African Socialism (Section 10).However, ‘progress cannot be achieved by reverting to pre-colonial conditions. The best of Kenya’s African social heritage and colonial economic legacy must be re-organized and mobilized’ (Section 2). Thus, while drawing on African tradition, African Socialism should be flexible and efficient, ‘designed to be a working system in a modern setting, fully prepared to adapt itself to changing circumstances and new problems’ (Section 22). Well, was it socialism? This question, awkward for an anthropologist, much exercised proponents and opponents of the Paper. A second is more manageable: What kind of socialism was it? African socialism can be described as ‘a potpourri of ideas having little coherence’ (Friedland and Rosberg 1964:1; cf. Cox 1966:19, 70; Kilson 1966:18). Sessional Paper No. 10 is, however, relatively coherent, and the strategy of sustained growth (see Section 98), with the state as planner and facilitator of economic goals and the welfare which their achievement would enable, makes it relatively easy to ‘place’ its socialism and identify its origins. It is European democratic socialism of the post-war years, the socialism of the German SPD’s Bad Godesberg Programme, of the British Labour Party of Attlee and Gaitskell, of Swedish social democracy. A focus on the views of the Paper’s principal author, Tom Mboya is revealing.[44] A frequent visitor to Europe, Mboya had important contacts with the British Labour movement. Of Mboya’s year at Ruskin College (1955—56), where he drew up a ‘Plan for a Socialist Political Party in Kenya’, Goldsworthy (1982:54) says: ‘Mboya described himself as a democratic socialist. His political thinking was basically pragmatic...in a thoroughly “British” mould’ (cf. Rake 1962:109). In 1960, it was Mboya who was chosen to go to London ‘to allay the fears aroused in British business circles’ (p. 171) about the approaching independence of Kenya (Rake entitles chapter 12 of his book ‘A socialist in a city suit’). Goldsworthy comments:
Mboya’s distinctly non-revolutionary approach to the economic future ...was wholly of a piece with the seven years’ work he had already done ..in his capacity as labour leader. Mboya the advocate of economic continuity was the same Mboya who had always sought the workers’ advancement by incremental means within existing structures.In many ways a technician concerned with practical matters of planning (see, for example, 1964:254—7), Mboya was, according to Goldsworthy (1982:204—5), ‘a concerned developmentalist whose broad ideas were very typical of the time and culture. The language of “growth” and “modernization” came readily to him.’ His emphasis on a mixed economy, with ‘centralized planning, Israeli-style workers’ enterprises, producer and consumer co-operatives, state distribution networks’ (ibid.), enables us to identify African Socialism, as its proponents identified it, with other major strands of socialist thought and practice. One might debate whether policy and practice were consistent, or whether any of this theory should have been applied to the Kenyan case, but it seems fruitless to argue whether or not this is ‘really’ socialism according to some universal touchstone. *** What the Critics Said Gertzel (1970:54) identifies two factions in KANU in 1964–65: the proEastern ‘Radicals’, and the pro-Western ‘Conservatives’, with opposing views on the economy, land policy, and nationalization. Mboya, like Kenyatta (1964:79), was against nationalization and dissociated himself from British Labour Party ‘Clause Four Socialists’ (Mboya 1963:169). Gertzel suggests that Sessional Paper No. 10 was integral to a campaign against the Radicals, defining African socialism ‘in terms to which [they] could not logically take exception’ (Gertzel 1970:69). Speaking in the Parliamentary debate, Bildad Kaggia, a key figure in ‘Mau Mau’ and undoubtedly one of the ‘Radicals’, not least for his views on land reform (cf. Odinga 1967:263–9), gave the Paper a guarded welcome:(1982:171; cf. Leys 1975:60)
I do not mind calling our socialism African socialism, Kenya socialism, Kikuyu socialism, or even Luo socialism, but I believe that whatever prefixes we use, it must be socialism and not capitalism, and I believe that the Government is really intending to implement socialism as applied to our own conditions and environment, but not to bring capitalism under the cover of socialism.Kaggia, however, soon joined the ranks of the opponents, chief of whom was Oginga Odinga, then the Vice-President of Kenya. Odinga, a complex figure—teacher, businessman, ethnic leader of the Luo—with many contacts in the Eastern bloc, resigned from the Government in April 1966, and founded the radical Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). His resignation statement (in Gertzel et al. 1969:143), called for policies which would bring about ‘complete economic, social and political independence’, and the Manifesto of the KPU argued:(in Gertzel et al. 1969:139)
In the mouths of the Government and KANU leaders, ‘African Socialism’ has become a meaningless phrase. What they call African socialism is neither African nor socialism. It is a cloak for the practice of total capitalism. To describe the policies of the present Government as ‘African Socialism’ is an insult to the intelligence of the people... The KPU condemns the Government’s and KANU’s capitalist policies: it is opposed to the creation of a small class of rich people while the masses live in poverty. It will pursue truly socialist policies to benefit the wananchi. It will share out the nation’s wealth equitably among the people, extend national control over the means of production and break the foreigners’ grip on the economy.In his autobiography, Odinga declared: ‘Only the political and economic content of independence can reveal whether it will have any real meaning for the mass of the people’ (1967:255). He attacks ‘opportunist or career politicians.manipulating office for self interest’; who ‘want to build a capitalist system in the image of Western capitalism but are too embarrassed or dishonest to call it that’ (1967:250, 302). In similar vein, the Journal of African Marxists (1982) praised the 1963 KANU Manifesto (‘a testament to what might have been’, p. 18), but considered the ‘puffed-up African middle class [which] emerged to rule us in 1963 were, in many cases those who had betrayed our freedom fighters’ (p. 11). The rejoinder of Mboya and Kenyatta was sharp. In 1963 Mboya had attacked ‘so-called “socialists” [who] peddle and parrot foreign slogans’ (1964:251), and later he declared: There are those in the East and in the West who have tried to tell us what we mean by African socialism, and there are those at home who twist the phrase to their own petty uses’ (1970: 73). Similarly Kenyatta: There are some persons who suggest that our African Socialism is of no account. They would have Kenya surrender to external interests and put what they call ‘scientific socialism’ in its place. Such people are traitors to the cause of Kenya nationalism’ (1968:313). Academics too have dealt severely with African Socialism. Ahmed Mohiddin called it ‘a mere rationalisation and Africanisation of the existing socioeconomic institutions [which] promotes and encourages class divisions’ (1981:79); its basis is ‘not traditional African values but the profit motive’ (1981:196). The 1972ILO Report offered a mildly phrased, though no less damning assessment (‘dynamic factors tending to perpetuate and intensify inequalities may be operative in the Kenyan social and economic system’—ILO 1972:97), and called for policies ‘in line with the philosophy underlying Sessional Paper No. 10’ (p. 12). Leys claimed that references to socialism in the Paper should be taken as nothing more than the ‘homage vice pays to virtue’ (Leys 1975:262—3). Kenyatta’s and Mboya’s African Socialism ‘was a pure statement of “bourgeois socialism”...a formulation of “comprador” ideology’ (p. 208). Odinga’s and Kaggia’s socialism, Leys added, ‘was of a petty- bourgeois variety’, thus putting everyone firmly in their place. There is little evidence for what any of this meant on the ground, but events surrounding the ‘Little General Election’ of 1966 are instructive. Following the formation of the KPU, the KANU Government obliged former MPs of their party to resign. There were twenty-nine byelections of which KANU won twenty on a 33 percent turnout (Gertzel 1970:83ff.). Gertzel (1970, chap. 4) contains an account, largely by John Okumu (see also Okumu 1969) of the by-elections in the Nyanza area of western Kenya, Odinga’s homeland, where the KPU won most of its seats. Okumu (1969: 113) describes how the KPU, adopting the bull (a potent Luo image) as their logo, campaigned through ‘clan heads and other local notables’ with many small meetings in their homes. For such elders, ‘and for most others the election was about Odinga’s position and therefore the position of the Luo themselves’ (1969:108). Certainly the KPU campaign had ‘strong egalitarian overtones’, and an ‘appeal to traditional Luo ideas of equality and to the strong attachment to community characteristic of Luo social organization’ (1969:119). But the main issues were fears of Kikuyu dominance and the dominance of the centre over regions and localities (1969:120, 123). In Nyanza at least, therefore, the split between KANU and the KPU was seen essentially in ‘ethnic’ rather than ideological terms. Parkin, who observed that during the late 1960s the KPU became ‘almost exclusively’ a (Luo) ethnic political party, suspects that its left-wing identification was essentially ‘rhetorical’ (1978:220, 224; but see Buijtenhuis 1973:35ff.). *** Community, Family, Land, Labour What, then, of the ‘African’ in ‘African Socialism’? ‘Tradition’ is a word used frequently throughout Part I of Sessional Paper No. 10, and usages may be grouped around two main headings which the Paper itself identifies: ‘Mutual social responsibility’—the association of African tradition with the ‘co-’ words: cooperation, community, corporateness, co-ownership, and so on; and ‘Political democracy’—the democratic and classless nature of traditional African society. I link these themes from the Paper with the wider discourse in which they are located —discourse, like ‘networks’ (Barnes 1969:66ff.), is finite but unbounded. Nyerere wrote that he was ‘brought up in tribal socialism’ (1964:245). In the construction of this socialism the ‘co-’ words are crucial, and they are linked directly with ‘Ujamaa’, a word of Arabic origin implying ‘gathered together’. Kenyatta explained as follows:(in Gertzel et al. 1969:150)
We must create a sense of togetherness, of national familyhood. In Swahili we express this by the word ‘ujamaa’, which can also be roughly translated as socialism.... We shall make use of those attitudes of selfhelp, good-neighbourliness and communal assistance, which are such an important feature of our traditional societies.A belief in the ‘communitarian’ values of traditional society was widely shared in Anglophone Africa (cf. Onuoha 1965:19), and in Francophone Africa too (cf. Andrain 1964; 1966; and, for example, Mamadou Dia, in Friedland and Rosberg 1964:248—9). Within East Africa, an influential statement of principle was Nyerere’s Kivukoni speech of 1962 (Nyerere 1964). In this address, originally given in Swahili, Nyerere argued that in(1964:8)
traditional African society.nobody starved.he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member. That was socialism. That is socialism.. We were individuals within a com munity. We took care of the community, and the community took care of us. We neither needed nor wished to exploit our fellow men.For Nyerere (1964:246), the foundation was the extended family; for Kenyatta it was ‘the sense of brotherhood’ (1968:308). Thus ‘mutual social responsibility’ (a key tenet of African Socialism, and a significant phrase in the whole discourse) was seen as an ‘extension of the African family spirit to the nation as a whole’ (Mboya 1970:78; cf. Mboya 1963: 256; 1970:171). Central to community are land and labour. For Padmore: ‘Our starting point must be the land, with its communal ownership and production and its element of co-operative self-help’ (1964 [1959]:231). Kenyatta wrote: ‘I love the soil, and I love those who love the soil.... I go back to the soil every morning of my life’ (1964:62). Mboya suggested that ‘in the African tradition’ the idea that ‘we are all sons (and daughters) of the soil’ gave rise to the ‘logic and practice of equality’, and ‘the practice of the communal ownership of the vital means of life—the land’ (Mboya 1964:253; cf. Mboya 1963:163). For Nyerere: To us in Africa, land was always recognized as belonging to the community.the African’s right to land was simply the right to use it’ (1964:242; cf. Mboya 1963:165). Hence, the Government’s intolerance of large underdeveloped landholdings was ‘in keeping with African socialism or traditions in which the concept of ownership and property rights was never the inalienable right it was in Europe’ (Mboya 1970:84). Mboya continues:(Nyerere 1964:240)
This single unifying African principle has been that no matter who owned or managed land or other productive resources, they were expected to be used, and used for the general welfare. No individual family or clan could treat productive assets as private property unless the uses to which those assets were put were regarded as consonant with general welfare.no person could treat a piece of land as his own with the freedom to use it or not to use it as he chose.According to Odinga, ‘the tribe as a whole was the proprietor of all the land in its area’; animals were ‘community property’, and ‘common ownership of the land was accompanied by a system of communal cultivation’ (1967: 13). Hence there was antipathy towards consolidation of land into individual plots, and Odinga argued that, under Luo land tenure, individual land ownership was not entrenched, and cooperation was a spirit in which the people were deeply steeped. It might be said that this traditional Luo farming was halfway to socialism (1967:14). ‘The spirit of self-help and co-operation will have to be encouraged’, said Padmore, whilst warning simultaneously, ‘idleness will have to be condemned as a social evil’ (1964 [1959]:234). Kenyatta, in his ‘Back to the land’ speech (1964:60–2; 1968:232–4), asserted: ‘Whereas we believe in African Socialism, we do not believe in loitering and idleness. We believe in co-operatives, but not in promoting a state of affairs in which some people try to live on the sweat of others.’ ‘In traditional African society’, said Nyerere (1964:240), ‘everybody was a worker’ (meaning ‘not idle’). ‘Parasitism’ was avoided. Nyerere quoted a Swahili proverb ‘Mgeni siku mbili; siku ya tatu mpe jembe’ (Treat your guest as a guest for two days; on the third day give him a hoe!’), and adds: ‘In actual fact, the guest was likely to ask for the hoe even before his host had given him one—for he knew what was expected of him, and would have been ashamed to remain idle’ (1964: 241). (The same proverb is cited by Mboya 1963:163, Onuoha, 1965:34; and Brockway 1963:29.) Describing how cooperative labour would be employed in the building of a hut, Mboya concluded that ‘if someone refused to take part, then he would find that when his time came few people would come to help him and he might be completely boycotted’ (1963:166). Thus,
the African structure of interdependence within the community, where each man knows he has certain responsibilities and duties and where there are certain sanctions against those who do not fulfil expectations ...provides the discipline, self-reliance and stability needed in new nations.*** Democracy and Class Padmore had commented extensively on the democratic traditions of pre-colonial society in Nigeria and Ghana, where chiefs ‘derived their authority from the common peoples delegated through elders and counsellors’ (1949: 112). ‘We, in Africa’, said Nyerere (1964:246), ‘have no more need of being “converted” to socialism than we have of being “taught” democracy. Both are rooted in our own past—in the traditional society which produced us.’ This theme was taken up in chapter IX of Kenyatta’s Facing Mount Kenya, where he sought to show how at successive levels of Kikuyu organization (family, village, district, nation—his terms) a senior male was ‘president’, presiding over council meetings and representing the council at the next higher level. He continued:(Mboya 1963:68–9)
In the whole governmental organisation there was no inheritable position, everything depending on personal merit.... The group had the right to recall and dismiss or suspend any of its representatives whose behaviour was contrary to the well- established rules of conduct. In fact, it was the voice of the people or public opinion that ruled the country. The spirit of collectivism was.ingrained in the mind of the people.According to Kenyatta, ‘An elder.renders his services freely.. In ‘recognition he receives public tributes ceremonially, and is regarded specifically as the father and officiating priest of the community’ (1961 [1938]: 265). One finds a similar notion in chapter 1 of Odinga’s autobiography, entitled At the Feet of the Village Elders: ‘The [hut] in the centre [of the compound] was the duol or office of the Jaduong Dala, or chief elder.. He had to consult with the other elders, and they formed themselves into a kind of village cabinet to regulate village life and maintain discipline’ (1967:6). Similarly, Mboya believed that political systems in Kenya traditionally ‘assured every mature member of the tribe a voice or at least an influence in tribal decisions, such influence or voice depending more on age grouping rather than wealth’ (1970:171); elsewhere he extends this claim to include the Baganda (1963:72). Consequently, it was(1961 [1938])
a true reflection of African thought and tradition that the chosen leader of the nation should have his home and his roots in a locality where, also, he is the chosen leader of his kinsmen and his neighbours.. We have no tradition of kingship in this country.. Our people have always governed their affairs by looking to a council of elders elected and headed by their own chosen leader, giving them strong and wise leadership. That tradition—which is an Africanism—will be preserved in this new constitution.If traditional African society was democratic, it was also classless. Sessional Paper No. 10 set out the reasons why Marxism was not applicable in Africa, concluding that:(in Gertzel et al. 1969:195)
The sharp class divisions that once existed in Europe have no place in African Socialism and no parallel in African society. No class problem arose in the traditional African society and none exists today among Africans (Section 36).Where elders were only ‘guardians’ of wealth (Nyerere 1964:241), ‘everyone was a worker’, albeit perhaps in different senses. (Others were not so sanguine: for Senghor (1964:265; cf. Nkrumah 1966:5), traditional African societies were ‘community-based’, but not without hierarchy.) Moreover, the community basis of pre-colonial African society undermined the applicability of a Marxist conception of class. Thus, ‘the whole African social system arising out of and resting upon the basis of the tribal communal or common ownership in the means of living—the land—shaped itself in agreement with that basis into a form of ‘primitive communism’ (Padmore 1964 [1959]:223). *** The Making of a Myth
There is a kind of socialism which is still unknown in England and in the Continent of Europe, but which prevails in all African communities not under the rule of Europe, and that is, the principle of hospitality. This is socialism pure and simple.In sum, then, there is a vision of affinity between socialism and the traditions of African society: no classes, common ownership, or at any rate control, of the means of production, cooperation in labour, and a fundamental form of democracy. Socialism was Africa’s ‘pristine condition’ (Abraham 1962:182). It is easy to dismiss all this, to argue (1) that Africa was never thus; or (2) if it once was, colonialism has long since changed it; or (3) if it still was, tradition could not coexist with modernity; or (4) if traditional Africa was as ‘communitarian’ as believed, its attributes were not essentially ‘African’, but ‘human’, reflecting the values of societies ‘at a certain level of productive capacity’ (Babu 1981:57); or (5) that whatever the nature of traditional African society, socialism is universal and scientific (cf. Cox 1966:71, 105, and elsewhere).[45] It will be observed, too, that a striking feature of the discussion is a complete silence on questions of gender. On (2), Kaggia’s speech in the debate on Sessional Paper No. 10 cast doubt on the extent to which(Sierra Leone Weekly News, May 1913,
in Ayo Langley 1979:506–7)
the old African society which was here before the British came...is still in existence.. We must agree that most of this has been completely destroyed and there is very little that is left, unless we suggest here that we are going to demolish everything that we have here, that we go back to our old traditions and we start building our socialism on that.His doubts were shared by Potekhin, who argued that private ownership of land had long been a feature of much of Africa (Potekhin 1964:109). Furthermore, Potekhin, like the Journal of African Marxists, thought that recent African society was distinctly not classless. Cox (1966:32) accepted that the view of Africa as an ‘early communal society’ which ‘embodied the principles of socialism’ was correct, and in accordance with Engels. However, he argued that much of Africa had already achieved a feudal stage before the colonial era, and that colonialism had led to further decay of communal systems of ownership (cf. Babu 1981:589; Nkrumah 1966). Policies followed by independent African governments would lead to their further deterioration. On (1), Mboya himself had reservations (1970:100). Much earlier, Malinowski in his preface to Facing Mount Kenya (Kenyatta 1961 [1938]:xi) had expressed, guardedly, his doubts about Kenyatta’s argument, and criticized ‘such antitheses as “collective” v. “individual” in opposing the native outlook as “essentially social” to the European as “essentially personal’”. The counter-argument was, however, put most fully by the American anthropologist Igor Kopytoff, who through an account of Suku agriculture disputed the notion that it was characterized by ‘co-operation’ (Kopytoff 1964:56ff; cf. Morse 1964:49–50). Against this, Sprinzak (1973) believed that Kopytoff paid insufficient attention to what the proponents of African socialism had actually said. He proposed to treat the notion of a communitarian basis of African society as an ideal type construct. ‘The dominant feature of social life before the advent of the Europeans was the kinship group with its special social interactions’ and its ‘non-individualistic thinking’ (1973: 634, 635). Drawing on Horton, he claimed that ‘the structure of social thinking of the traditional society in Africa was communal’, meaning ‘no individual or group. develops a counter ideology’ (1973:642); cf. Nkrumah’s argument (1966:5) that African socialism was about the ‘spirit’ of traditional African society, not its ‘structure’. Sprinzak may be guilty of special pleading, of trying to rescue an idea from its contradictions, but his point that African socialist ideas should be treated seriously is well taken. But whose myth was it, and how was it constructed? By the time of Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Mboya, many of the themes were commonplace, and I will briefly examine their sources.[46] The influence of George Padmore is the most conspicuous (Hooker 1967; Nelkin 1964; Padmore 1949, 1956). Padmore was a communist expelled from the Comintern for ‘petty bourgeois nationalist deviation’ (Hooker 1967:32), but he had remained of the Left, associating with the British Independent Labour Party, and he retained an affection for Lenin (Padmore 1956:290ff.). Concerned with the position of subordinate races under colonialism, he advocated a socialist stance for that great unifying conception of the post-war period in Africa: Pan-Africanism. But disillusionment with Third and Second Internationals led him to a socialism which was neither capitalist nor communist (Padmore 1956: 229; see also 148—51 passim, and p. 319 for his praise of Mao and Tito). It is easy in retrospect to see how Padmore and others arrived at an independent, non-aligned socialism, but African socialism implies more than this. So whence the idea that traditional African society was socialistic? A key source was, I believe, Facing Mount Kenya, which Padmore must have read (he mentions it—1956:150) but does not obviously use in any of his accounts of Kenya (for example, 1949, 1956). Throughout, Kenyatta emphasizes doing things together: ‘partnership’, ‘co-operation’, ‘reciprocal obligations’, ‘mutual help and the tribal solidarity’; ‘mutual help, extending from the family group to the tribe’ (p. 174), ‘corporate effort’. Indeed there is considerable continuity in the discourse through which African society is constructed from Facing Mount Kenya to Sessional Paper No. 10, and indeed far beyond. But Kenyatta’s construction of African tradition (which makes it available for the discourse of African socialism) did not depend on any specifically socialist or, rather, Marxist philosophy. The case for the existence of primitive communism in pre-colonial Africa is not one that is generally made (though see Cox 1966, chap. 4; and also Padmore’s remark cited above). There are, rather, two other, related, ways of framing Africa which seem to have been influential. The first is the liberal, missionary perspective. In Facing Mount Kenya, Kenyatta (1961 [1938]:123) refers to a review by Oldham (of a book by the German writer Knak) which obviously made a strong impression on him. Oldham/Knak had argued that ‘full recognition should be given to the spiritual values in African society [which were] in many respects nearer to the true meaning and Christian understanding of life than western civilization’ (Oldham 1931:549, 550). What Kenyatta drew from this was the key phrase ‘sense of mutual obligation and responsibility’, which Oldham’s review employed on several occasions (1931:551—2). The significance of this perspective requires further investigation, but note that Onuoha (1965) provides another example of religious intervention in the debate when he interprets the already formed discourse of traditional African socialism in the language of post-Vatican II Catholicism. The second is, perhaps not surprisingly, social anthropology. The discipline has several times appeared in this story, though mainly as a source of material and ideas for critics of the idea of African socialism. This is obviously so in the case of Kopytoff, but Cox, for example, makes great use of African Political Systems (see Fortes and EvansPritchard 1940) as well as Marxist sociologists/anthropologists such as Suret-Canale, Potekhin, and Worsley in his defence of the ‘scientific’ viewpoint. More difficult to substantiate is the influence of anthropology on the other side. Certainly there is Malinowski and Kenyatta, but beyond that? One problem is that anthropology or anthropological evidence was rarely cited explicitly. Thus Odinga, Mboya, Nyerere (and indeed Kenyatta) were usually inclined to draw more on personal experience. Yet what they said often read like anthropology; it is presented in the anthropological register. It is anthropological at the discursive level. The anthropological influence stemmed from the way that the discipline shaped discussion of traditional African society and represented it, or at any rate some aspects of it; for instance, acephalous lineage systems. It wrote about Africa in such a way as to make its results ‘available’ for the discourse of African socialism (just as ‘ordered anarchy’ makes the Nuer available for another political tradition). In his 1966 paper Nkrumah associates an emphasis on the ‘structural’, as opposed to ‘spiri tual’, basis of African socialism with the ‘anthropological’ approach (pp. 5–6). Reviewing early sources for the idea of a collectivist basis for African societies, Kopytoff concludes that African socialism reflected ‘the building by the elite of a Pan-African social mythology whose vocabulary remains essentially Western’ (1964:55). He also wondered whether ‘the categories of Western mythology [have] influenced the social sciences in their analyses of [African] societies’ (1964:59). Ranger (1983:261) has referred to ‘two ambiguous legacies’ bequeathed to African politicians: traditions transplanted from Europe to Africa; and the ‘whole body of reified “tradition” invented by colonial administrators, missionaries, “progressive nationalists”, elders and anthropologists’ (1983: 261–2); cf. Hopkins’ concept (1973: 10) of ‘Merrie Africa’. He points out that the novelist Ngugi, who rejects the one, is in danger of succumbing to the other. This might be illustrated by the passage in Petals of Blood (pp. 120ff.), in which Ngugi portrays ‘Ilmorog’ (Kenya, Africa) before the fall, so to say, in terms strongly reminiscent of the discourse of which I have been speaking. *** ‘A Philosophy of Our Own’ Why the myth? Why the appeal of African Socialism? The attractiveness of the idea is frequently explained by reference to its political ‘function’. Kopytoff himself (1964:62) found in it a device for mobilizing support for the socialist policies it proclaimed—see also Mushkat (1975:86). In fact it was more usually asserted that its function was diametrically opposite: the ‘most likely and attractive label to promote a capitalist model of Kenya’ (Mohiddin 1981:203); ‘to formulate a “developmental” ideology adapted to “comprador” interests’ (Leys 1975:270). Dissident pamplets put it more bluntly. Thus the ‘People’s Front of East Africa’, opposing Sessional Paper No. 10, announced: ‘It is only a fool who can support the theories which go under the name of “African Socialism”.... So-called “African socialist” ideologies are nothing but a dishonest smokescreen for capitalism.. The only Socialism valid the world over is Scientific Socialism’ (cited in Andrain 1966:43). In similar vein, the Journal of African Marxists, concluded:(in Gertzel et al. 1969:139)
Many African regimes have sought to disguise class antagonisms by declaring themselves to be ‘African Socialist’. They then go on to glorify a mythical African past where, in theory, all people were nice to each other and all shared communally the wealth produced communally.. In practice African Socialism generally protects and nourishes a neo-colonial dependency with imperialist-oriented economies.. The word ‘socialism’—detached from its social and economic moorings—is merely bandied about by these regimes to cover their innate inadequacies with a cloak of morality.This journal condemned Sessional Paper No. 10 as ‘full of dubious concepts and ambiguities’, such as the message that ‘there need be no class struggle in Kenya because Kenyans—true to their mythical African heritage —form one big united family.... Ruling class ideology thus projects an imaginary relationship which blurs the real and deep divisions in our society’ (1982:27, 38). Remarks such as that attributed to one MP (‘An African socialist is by nature a capitalist’, in Gertzel et al. (1969:83)), perhaps illustrate Mohiddin’s point that to describe Kenya’s policies as African Socialism is ‘simply an exercise in linguistic gymnastics’ (1981:194). Burke commented that the metaphysical nature of the concept of ujamaa enabled it ‘to provide justification or explanation for almost any government policy’ (1964:219). Certainly in Kenya, the rhetoric of African Socialism was used to justify policies which might otherwise have been unpalatable, such as wage-restraint (Mboya 1970:71), or the one-party state which Kenyatta defended by reference to the assumed absence of a class struggle in Africa (1964:24), and the existence of ‘the traditional Tribal Council’ and other mechanisms which provided the opportunity for ‘constructive opposition from within’ (cf. Kenyatta 1968: 230). As Onuoha (1965: 64) put it: ‘Ancient tribal government was democratic without an opposition party. It would, therefore, seem more African to continue in that tradition.’ Be that as it may, like Sprinzak, I still think there is something to be gained by taking what African leaders have said at face value. What was the meaning (rather than the function) of African socialism? Friedland and Rosberg (1964:4—5) stress the importance for African socialism of discussions of Negritude and the African Personality, and thus of rediscovering roots. A wide range of writers, including ‘radicals’ such as Kaggia, Odinga, and Babu, alluded to the need to repair ‘damaged ego or loss of identity’ (Burke 1964:205), incurred through the colonial experience. ‘Liberation of the mind was to pave the way for liberation from the colonial government’, said Kaggia (1975:74). The African’, said Odinga, ‘was made ashamed of the traditions of his own society’ (1967: 63). He described how he encouraged his own nickname of ‘Jaramogi’ (1967:133), and cultivated the use of ‘traditional’ dress when speaking in the Legislative Council, as a means of demonstrating the falsity of the view that ‘civilized meant European and that anything traditional was inferior’ (1967:141–2; cf. Parkin 1978:219, 239, passim). This is a constant motif of Kenyatta’s, but the Kenyan politician who developed the theme most fully was Mboya:(1982:88–9)
We are immersed in a massive transition in which we are seeking new identities at personal, national and international levels. Africans are struggling to build new societies and a new Africa and we need a new political philosophy—a philosophy of our own— which will explain, validify (sic), and help to cement our experience.(Cox’s comment on this is: ‘What a lot of meaningless phrases’ (1966: 76).) In a speech on ‘Africa and Afro-Americans’, Mboya (1970:228) explained that it was at this level that ‘African-ness’ was to be found:(Mboya 1964:250) That ‘philosophy of our own’ was African socialism, which referred to proved codes of conduct in the African societies which have, over the ages, conferred dignity on our people and afforded them security regardless of their station in life...to universal charity which characterized our societies and.to the African’s thought processes and cosmological ideas which regard man, not as a social means, but as an end and entity in the society.(Mboya 1964:251)
Some [black Americans] think that to identify with Africa one should wear a shaggy beard or a piece of cloth on one’s head or a cheap garment on one’s body. I find here a complete misunderstanding of what African culture really means. An African walks barefoot or wears sandals made out of old tyres not because it is his culture, but because he lives in poverty. We live in mud and wattle huts and buy cheap Hong Kong fabrics not because it is part of our culture, but because these are the conditions imposed on us today by poverty.. Our culture is something much deeper. It is the sum of our personality and our attitude toward life. The basic qualities that distinguish it are our extended family ties and the codes governing relations between old and young, our concept of mutual social responsibility and communal activities, cur sense of humour, our belief in a supreme being and our ceremonies for birth, marriage and death. These things have a deep meaning for us, and they pervade our culture, regardless of tribe or clan. They are qualities that shape our lives, and they will influence the new institutions that we are now establishing.What started as a chapter on socialism must end as one on person and identity. African Socialism, says Onuoha, is ‘an expression of the desire of all Africans to find themselves, be themselves, and assert themselves’ (1965: 30). The point, I think, is not the success or failure of the enterprise, but what it was trying to do. African Socialism was attempting to address not just the economic or political problems of independence, but also the cultural, and indeed spiritual ones. In this respect, the African authors of African Socialism and (perhaps with the exception of those who espoused full blooded ‘scientific socialism’) their African critics shared much common ground. Even when they disagreed about the socialism, they usually agreed about the African. And it is understandable why they did so. [43] Researching the labour force of the then East African Railways and Harbours (see Grillo 1973; 1974), I was in Nairobi when Sessional Paper No. 10 appeared, and queued, in the rain, for an early copy. As in Mohiddin (1981), African Socialism (capitalized) refers to the doctrines set out in Kenya’s Sessional Paper No. 10, and socialism (uncapitalized) to the wider doctrines. I thank Sussex colleagues Richard Brown, Saul Dubow, and Bill Epstein for their advice and help. [44] The authorship is debated. Leys (1975:208) says: ‘According to people who should know it was largely drafted by an American economist in Mboya’s ministry’—Professor Edgar O.Edwards of Rice University (an expatriate adviser to the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, see Edwards 1968:6, 12). Goldsworthy’s bibliography (1982:296) notes: ‘Mboya acted more as supervisor and editor than as writer. However, the pamphlet bears the stamp of his thinking and he more than once defended it in print.’ Mboya’s own account (1970:74) of its drafting shows it was a collective product, and the product of a collective discourse. As Leys suggests, ‘it does not really matter who drafted it’ (Leys 1975:208). [45] On (3) Mboya himself pointed out the drawbacks of the extended family —joint ownership of land, and the system of supporting dependants— which ‘can be detrimental in... the modern, monetary exchange economy’ (1970:171), a view shared by the radical Tanzanian, A.R.M.Babu who argues that even if traditional African practice were collectivist, the forms of organization of that epoch were ‘backward’ and hence a ‘hindrance to progress’ (1981:58, cf. Cox 1966:32). On (4) and (5), I.I.Potekhin, the leading Soviet Africanist of the 1950s, the British communist Idris Cox, Babu, and the Journal of African Marxists all oppose the idea of a specifically ‘African’ socialism. Onuoha (1965:89—92) described a seminar at Nairobi in 1964 at which John Kakonge, SecretaryGeneral of the Uganda Peoples’ Congress, argued that ‘there was only one type of true Socialism’, namely ‘Scientific Socialism’, and that ‘African Socialism’ was to be rejected as a ‘call for us to return to the past and to reject all mankind’s achievements’ (p. 89). (See Mushkat 1975 for a review of the socialist bloc’s position.) [46] There are two lines of descent: one Francophone, traceable through discussions of Negritude and the African Personality, at times very philosophical, even ‘mystical’; the other Anglophone, more rooted in an account of social practice (though see Nkrumah 1964). I concentrate on the latter. Mushkat (1975) and Mudimbe (1988) provide good accounts of the former. *** References
In traditional African society, everybody was a worker. There was no other way of earning a living for the community.... I do not use the word ‘worker’ simply as opposed to ‘employer’ but also as opposed to ‘loiterer’ or ‘idler’.... There is no such thing as socialism without work.. The foundation, and the objective, of African Socialism is the Extended Family. The true African Socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemies.. He rather regards all men as his brethren. That is why the first article of TANU’s creed is ‘BINADAMU WOTE NO NDUGU ZANGU NA AFRIKA NI MOJA’ (‘all human beings are my brothers and sisters and Africa is one’). ‘UJAMAA’, then, or ‘Familyhood‘ describes our Socialism. It is opposed to Capitalism.and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire Socialism.. We in Africa have no more need of being ‘converted’ to socialism than we have of being ‘taught’ democracy. Both are rooted in our own past.The site of my fieldwork has been the village of Kanga, situated in the north of Mafia, a large island lying off the Rufiji Delta some 80 miles south of Dar-es-Salaam. The southern part of the island was largely transformed into coconut and cashewnut plantations during the period of Arab rule of the coast and islands, utilizing slave labour imported from the interior. The north, however, where the soil was less suitable, remained the preserve of the indigenous peoples variously known as Washirazi, Wambwera, Wapokomo—all of them Muslim Swahili- speakers practising subsistence cultivation of crops such as rice (both wet and dry-land), millet, beans, sweet potatoes, and, more recently, maize. Coconuts, and to a lesser extent cashewnuts, were none the less introduced into the north during the German period and are today the chief cash crop for all Mafians. Coconut trees, unlike the bush land adjacent to the northern villages, are individually owned, may be bought and sold for cash, and are inherited according to Islamic law. Both women and men inherit trees from parents and spouses, but women inherit at only half the rate of men. Kanga village in the mid-1960s had a population of around 1,000 people. Although, like most coastal villages, it was largely a nucleated settlement, some of its hamlets were spread out to the south and east. The village centre consisted of the dispensary, a couple of small shops, and a mosque, while the local primary school, which at that time had only classes 1—4, lay some distance to the north of the village, as it served both Kanga and its northern neighbour, Bweni. Kanga, like all other villages at that period, had a Village Development Committee (VDC) of some twenty members. It rapidly became plain to me that the workings of the VDC was a form of ‘mosque polities’; membership was dominated almost entirely by those of higher socio-religious status—that is, Wambwera rather than Wapokomo—and particularly those closely related to the village Sheikh. The Chairman was a Gunya Sharif (descendant of the Prophet), the Diwan (representative to the District Council) was a cousin and brother-in-law to the Sheikh, and so on. Members of the Wapokomo ethnic group, on the other hand, especially those deeply involved in the spirit possession cults, were conspicuous by their absence on the VDC at this stage even though some of them, especially shamans, were among the wealthier members of the village (cf. Caplan 1975, chap. 7). The political rhetoric of the Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU) in this period was concerned with the values of hard work and self-reliance.[49] In speeches by Nyerere and other leaders, it was emphasized that Tanzania was a poor country whose main resource was its people. For socialism to be achieved, people had to rely on themselves instead of expecting handouts, whether from foreign governments or from the state. Accordingly, in each village there was at least one self-help project to which all able-bodied adult villagers were supposed to contribute labour. In Kanga, the project was the building of a teacher’s house. Villagers were less than enthusiastic about this work, and heads of ‘ten-house cells’ were often hard put to it to recruit labour when it was their turn to do so. Most of the exhortations for communal labour came from the government-appointed and salaried VEO (Village Executive Officer). For the first few months, the incumbent was a youth from the south of the island, and it was obvious that adult villagers resented being told what to do by one whom they regarded not only as an outsider, but a mere stripling at that. After a few months, this youth was replaced by another southerner, a much older man who had already served in this capacity in the south of the island. Far from improving matters, relations between the villagers and the VEO became even more seriously strained. The new official constantly called meetings at which he berated the villagers for their lack of understanding or enthusiasm for what the Government was trying to do, and threatened them with dire consequences. At one meeting, he called the people of Kanga, especially the women, ‘ignorant’ (wajinga—a serious insult). After a few months, this official was transferred, much to everyone’s relief, and a new VEO was brought in. This man was a Kanga villager, brother of the Diwan, and also a more tactful person. For most of the rest of my stay tensions were lessened, and the self-help project made some slight progress. Even this VEO, however, completely failed to persuade the villagers that another proposed self-help scheme—a communally cultivated field of cotton—was a good idea. At meeting after meeting visiting government officials tried to convince the villagers who resisted on the grounds that cotton was a labour-intensive crop whose peaks coincided with peak labour demand for food crops. Furthermore, they declared themselves uninterested in communal cultivation. It was apparent during much of this period that the way the villagers saw ‘progress’ (maendeleo) differed considerably from the view of government officials. When questioned (and I must confess here that I posed this question mainly to men during this period), people said that the major problems (mashida) in the village were first, the appalling state of the road, and secondly, the lack of water. The road, which runs from north to south linking the northern villages to the central large village of Kirongwe, and thence to the district capital Kilindoni, was and still is for much of its length a dirt track which becomes impassable in the rains. At that time, there was no regular transport north of Kirongwe; indeed, villagers usually walked across the mangrove flats, which took about two and a half hours. If they were lucky, they would get a lift on one of the few lorries which ran between Kirongwe and Kilindoni some 12 miles to the south. Kilindoni had a wide variety of (relatively) large shops selling cloth and other goods. It also housed the magistrate’s court, the district hospital, and a variety of government offices, including that of the Area Commissioner, the most important government official on the island. For most of the northern villagers Kilindoni was their metropolis, and they needed better access to it. Most were convinced that if the road were improved, everything else in terms of development would follow. The second problem, the lack of water, was exacerbated by a drought during 1965, when many of the existing wells in the village ran dry. Women had to walk long distances to fetch water, often resorting to going in the cool of the night, when some wells which were dry during the day had a little water. In the numerous meetings called when visiting government officials arrived in their Land Rovers, these problems were rarely addressed, and if raised by villagers, tended to be brushed aside by officials. The latter had their own agenda, which included communal cotton-growing, cleaning the coconut plantations and planting additional acreages of cassava. They also wanted the villagers to dig and use pit latrines and to send their children to school. None of these proposals met with much enthusiasm from the villagers. Some children, almost all boys, did attend school, but campaigns to persuade or coerce parents into sending girls were relatively unsuccessful. Parents argued that girls should be secluded at puberty and married off as soon as possible afterwards. The school attendance campaign waged by the VEO received a considerable setback when the Headmaster was arraigned before the VDC, accused of beating a child too severely in a case brought by the boy’s father. The campaign to dig pit latrines was totally unsuccessful—they were thought to be ‘dirty’ and ‘smelly’, although villagers usually told officials that they would do as requested provided that the Government supplied the materials. Efforts by the Agricultural Officer to persuade the villagers to grow more cassava did meet with somewhat more success. Cassava was recognised as both drought- and locust-resistant, and therefore a useful crop, although it was still thought locally to be inferior to rice, the preferred staple (to which it is indeed nutritionally much inferior). A large area of bush land was set aside by the Agricultural Officer, and a number of men began to cultivate fields there. A difference, then, between pre- and post-colonial periods is that the penetration by the state into even such areas as northern Mafia, formerly considered to be a remote backwater, intensified after independence. During the mid-1960s, people were constantly being urged to pay their dues and join TANU. ‘Tanu, Tanu yajenga nchi’ (‘TANU, TANU is building the country’) was heard not only on the radio but became the song most frequently sung at gatherings in the village. Despite this, people were in the main not too interested in TANU, regarding it as a part of ‘government’ (serikali). Moreover, there was a curious continuity about the campaigns run during the colonial period, and those of the post-colonial period. Not only were the exhortations similar, but so was the method of communication; namely, from the top down. So too was the response—to listen politely to the visiting officials, to try and squeeze some resources out of them if possible, and then to watch them go and return to business as usual. During my year in Kanga I attended numerous meetings of the VDC, but I only once heard the villagers being asked to set their own agenda for maendeleo. This was at a meeting at which no non-villagers (except myself) were present. They came up with a list of things they thought were needed including (inevitably) improvements to the road and to the wells, and help with cultivation in the form of coconut seedlings and traps for pests like pigs and monkeys. They also wanted the school to be upgraded to Standard 5, and asked for a proper TANU office to be built. A letter was duly conveyed to the higher authorities by the VEO but it seemed to have little effect. If villagers and officials did not always agree on what ‘progress’ really meant, there was even less agreement on how it should be achieved. For the officials it meant self-help, whereas for the villagers it meant the Government providing at least part of whatever was needed. Since government officials found it difficult to convince the villagers to provide labour for self-help schemes, they resorted to threats: usually to call in the next level of authority. One VEO told me frankly, ‘My job is to frighten people’, a statement which squared ill with contentions that TANU was the people’s party. People had their own ways of getting back at those in power. One was stubborn silence. Another was effusive agreement in meetings, and lack of action afterwards. But a third was purveying gossip about them, and this was disseminated particularly effectively in songs sung by women at public events as in the following examples:(Nyerere 1966:165) It is therefore obvious that the foreign currency we shall use to pay back the loans used in the development of the urban areas will not come from the towns or the industries. Where, then, shall we get it from? We shall get it from the villages and from agriculture.. Everybody wants development; but not everybody understands and accepts the basic requirements for development. The biggest requirement is hard work.(Nyerere 1968:242)
Hogo la M. [the Area Commissioner] nilidhania kigoma, lakini imenitia homa. I had thought that M’s penis was only a little cassava tuber, but (in fact) it has given me a fever [a reference to his reputation for fornication]. Mwalimu S.kajitia kinuni, na yeye si mtwanzi. Teacher S. [a TANU secretary on the island] has put himself at the mortar, but he is no pounder!*** The 1970s: The Villagization Campaign(Here the double entendre lies in the metaphor of pounding, which is both sexual and also refers to the exercise of power.) Ulisema we utapiga kilemba, taifa nitajenga. You said you would put on a turban and go and build the country. (‘Putting on a turban’ not only means ‘taking up an office’, it is also slang for ‘having a man’. The song refers to a woman politician.)
In a socialist Tanzania, then, our agricultural organization would be predominantly that of cooperatives living and working for the good of all. This means that most of our farming would be done by groups of people who live as a community and work as a community. ... A nation of such village communities would be a socialist nation. For the essential element in them would be equality of all members of the community, and the members’ self-government in all matters which concerned only their own affairs. ... Yet socialist communities cannot be established by compulsion.... For a farmer may well be suspicious of the Government official or Party leader who comes to him and says, ‘Do this’; he will be more likely to listen to the one who says This is a good thing to do for the following reasons and I am myself participating with my friends in doing it’.. [I]t is vital that whatever encouragement Government and TANU give to this type of scheme, they must not try to run it; they must help the people to run it themselves. .What is here being proposed is that we in Tanzania should move from being a nation of individual peasant producers who are gradually adopting the incentives and the ethics of the capitalist system. Instead we should gradually become a nation of ujamaa villages where the people cooperate directly in small groups and where these small groups cooperate together for joint enterprises.I returned to Kanga nine years after my first fieldwork to find a number of small but significant changes in the village. Both the dispensary and the school had been upgraded somewhat, and almost all children, including girls, attended school on a more or less regular basis. Water was less of a problem, mainly due to more plentiful rainfall and not to any improvement in the village wells, but the road remained in its original state and people still complained that ‘travel is our biggest problem’. However, the major clashes with the Government during this period came from the villagization policy. The Arusha Declaration in 1967 had urged the setting up of socialist villages in Tanzania, but progress towards this goal had been extremely slow. In 1973, TANU decided that it must be hastened, and during 1974, the villagization campaign (Operation Sogeza) was carried out. In the space of twelve months, a large part of Tanzania’s rural population was moved from scattered settlements into nucleated villages of around 250 households each. Kanga, in spite of being a nucleated coastal village, had, like other northern Mafian villages, gone through this process. People had been forced to move, sometimes long, sometimes short distances, and were vociferous in their complaints about the situation. At a meeting which was filmed by the camera team acompanying me on this occasion, visiting officials exhorted the villagers to accept the new situation and to rebuild their houses properly, instead of trying to return to their old house sites under the guise of building field huts (a common practice during the agricultural season). A second matter of concern to the officials on this occasion was the level of food production. Although it appeared that Kanga had suffered rather less from the villagization campaign than other areas, and food production had not dropped very much as a result, party and government representatives complained that their inspection of fields had shown that many people were not cultivating cassava. The Area Commissioner then spoke:(Nyerere 1968:351–65)
From now on, if any able bodied man over 18 has not at least one acre of cassava, he will be sent to the school (chuo) which has just been opened at Kilombero to teach people who do not know how to cultivate to do so. From now on there will be no more fines— we know that people come and pay their fines and think nothing of it. Everyone who doesn’t cultivate will get a month either at Kilombero or another similar place.In short, then, villagers in Kanga, as elsewhere in the country, had not only been moved by force, but were also being told to increase their cultivation or face unpleasant consequences. *** The 1980s: Progress/no Progress?
The most fundamental principle of our socialist policy is equality among all citizens...equality means equal access to basic social services. It also means equality in decision making on matters of interest and importance to society. It means, above all, equality in personal incomes. By providing free education Tanzania has made remarkable achievments in the struggle against one of our enemies, ignorance. At the time of independence in 1961, only 486,000 children went to primary school. Today 3.7 million go. In 1961, only 11,832 pupils were enrolled in public secondary school. In 1984, 40,617 were enrolled. The number of hospitals has increased from 98 at independence to 149 today. The number of dispensaries has increased from 978 to more than 2,600.. Infant mortality has fallen from 225 babies for every 1,000 children born to 137.. In 1961, only about 11 percent had access to clean water. Today it is estimated that over 10 million people or just under 50 percent of the population have access to clean water within 400 metres of their homes. The policy of socialism has enabled us to prevent the growth of gross inequalities in incomes between Tanzanians. For example in 1962, the ratio of urban personal income after tax was estimated to be 18.8 to 1.. In 1984 the ratio was 4.9 to 1. This progress towards equality in personal incomes has been made possible through deliberate fiscal, monetary and income policies. These policies have helped us to prevent the growth of a class society.A further nine years on, when I returned again in 1985, it was to concentrate on precisely those areas in which Tanzania claimed to have made most progress—food production, health, and education. Tanzania was in a state of economic crisis. The oil price rises, the war with Uganda, and a series of droughts had played havoc with development planning. Inflation was astronomical and was accompanied by an acute shortage of all goods. In the village, people still complained about the problem of travel and the lack of good water, but they now spoke also about prices, making comparisons with the ‘good old days’. I asked if they did not think any progress had taken place—no, none they said. I persisted, suggesting education and health, much stressed in state rhetoric, as areas in which great improvements had taken place in the twenty years since I had first come to the village. What about the fact that all the children now attended the local school, which had been extended up to standard 6? Yes, but hardly any went to secondary school, and there were no jobs locally. I visited the local primary school on several occasions —absenteeism was rife and there were few textbooks or writing materials for those children present. The books they had often failed to reflect the reality of their lives. For example, basic readers introduced school children to Mr Juma, a farmer, and ‘Mrs Juma’, a ‘housewife’ who was pictured arranging flowers. The reality was that, as Nyerere had pointed out in the Arusha Declaration, village women worked very hard every day of their lives. Indeed, the fact that their children now attended school for most of the day increased their own work-loads, as older children were no longer available to help with younger ones, or be sent on errands. What about the upgrading of the dispensary to clinic? People replied that often there were no medicines, and the staff ‘did not always treat people properly’. The paramedic in the clinic was from Moshi, and was used to a somewhat higher standard of living than he found in northern Mafia. He had an uneasy relationship with the villagers, and towards the end of my stay was arrested for selling medicines illegally. Did they not think that the Mother and Child Health Centre which had been set up offered useful facilities? I sat in for several days at the MCH centre, staffed by a young midwife from the south of the island. She actually appeared to get on very well with village women, who were keen to bring their babies for weighing and for vaccinations and arrived in large numbers. But throughout the two months of my stay there was no kerosene for the clinic fridge, and therefore no drugs requiring this facility could be stored, including vaccinations. Many women, who had come from neighbouring villages carrying heavy toddlers, were angry to find that they could not get them vaccinated when they arrived. When I attended a meeting called to hear two visiting Health Officers, I discovered that not much had changed in the way state functionaries communicated with villagers. Unusually, it was attended by a handful of women. They had been specially summoned and sat on the side, almost too far away to hear the speeches, which were in any case almost identical to ones the villagers and I had been hearing for the past twenty years. The Health Officer intoned:(President Mwinyi, Dec. 1986 at a conference on the Arusha Declaration)
There has been a lot of diarrhoea and vomiting, and this is not the first time. There are three reasons: people don’t use latrines—there are 300 houses here and only 3 latrines—they don’t boil drinking water, and they don’t clear the weeds and brush from around their houses. Nor do they always wash their hands before eating.The villagers replied that they needed help with materials to carry out the officials’ instructions, but this was ignored. As the meeting continued, the villagers were harangued by their village manager, their paramedic, and the two visiting health officers. No one asked for their views of the situation, they were simply told what to do, until finally the villagers’ response became a mixture of apparent acquiescence and annoyance:
Villager: Let’s close the meeting. We will dig latrines, and ask the women to clear around the houses, and we will send our children to the clinic...let’s close the meeting. Health Officer: There is another problem—people don’t take their children to be vaccinated..You women—what about taking your children to the clinic for vaccinations?The women did not respond at all. Nobody mentioned that the clinic had been without kerosene for the fridge, and therefore without vaccine for months. The men may well not have known this, and the women would not speak in public. *** Socialism for Whom? Gender and ‘development’
It would be appropriate to ask our farmers, especially the men, how many hours a week and how many weeks a year they work. Many do not even work for half as many hours as the wage-earner does. The truth is that in the villages, the women work very hard. At times they work for 12 or 14 hours per day. They even work on Sundays and public holidays. Women who live in the villages work harder than anybody else in Tanzania. But the men who live in villages (and some of the women in towns) are on leave for half of their life.Although the cultivation of cassava had continued to expand, it was apparent that by the 1980s locally grown food supplies had dropped, and people were more reliant upon purchasing to meet their daily needs. Vagaries of the weather aside, a major reason for this was the fact that men were playing even less part in subsistence farming than before, and were concentrating their energies on planting coconut trees. Coconuts were no longer sold to the cooperatives, nor was copra being produced. Instead, nuts were exported by dhow directly to Dar-es-Salaam, where they fetched high prices in the local markets. Men were not only planting new trees themselves as fast as they could, they were even hiring the labour of upcountry immigrants to so so. This situation had increased the local wealth disparities between women and men—it was male labour that was replaced by hired labour, and it was men who were likely to profit from increased cash cropping. At the same time, male labour was withdrawn from subsistence production, leaving women with yet heavier workloads. In spite of these conditions, the local branch of the UWT (Tanzania Women’s Organization), organized by the (male) village manager (Katibu Kata), had made more attempts to persuade the women to cultivate communally. Although the women’s communal field had not been at all successful the previous year, the Katibu Kata called a meeting of the village women: | Manager: | What about the cassava field? We must plan for the rains. We will use the same field as last year. | | Chairwoman of UWT: | Let those who want to come, come, and I will be among them. | | Manager: | We need a committee for this. | | Women: | We’ll just go, even if there are only a few of us. | | Manager: | No, all women must turn up on Wednesday. | | Chairwoman: | Those who want to can come and those who don’t... | | Manager: | Never mind that, no more democracy, everyone come at 8 a.m. | | Woman: | So that’s a government decree? Then we’ll have to go. | | Manager: | Now we’re going to start afresh. Never mind who was in last year. Let’s have someone from each area to spread the word. I want you all here at 8 a.m. with your bill-hooks and hoes. You won’t find any kohl or face powder there! | | Women | (indignantly): You think we’re using make-up at this time of year? But if we get access to sweet potato seeds, we’ll have to give that priority over cassava. | | Manager | (resignedly): Better let ten women who have no work come than none at all. | | Women | (angrily): Are there are any women who don’t have work? | In this dialogue, the Manager attempts to impose on the women not only an idea (communal organization), but also a schema for organizing it (a committee), and a precise timetable. The women attempt to point out that it should be voluntary, and that cassava cultivation, which is not very seasonal, is less important than planting sweet potatoes, which depends upon the short rains, but he is not listening; indeed, he belittles them by suggesting that their main concern is their make-up. Thus the main function of this officially supported women’s organization seemed to be to extract yet more work out of women, and to impose another agenda on them. It is no wonder that they resisted involvement in such schemes.[50] Another scheme in which women signally refused to participate involved the acquisition of a lorry by Kanga village, although, in this case, most men were enthusiastic. I first heard about this project when I arrived in Dar-es-Salaam in 1985 and visited some Kangans living there. A number of other villagers appeared who were visiting the capital to negotiate with the island’s MP and other officials about the purchase of a British Leyland lorry. I was amazed that the villagers could contemplate raising the kind of money involved (£18,000). Soon afterwards I was back in the village, where a meeting was called to discuss this question. The Mafia MP, who was holding the funds, had come to collect the balance of about £6,000. He reported that out of the 629 adults in the village, only 182 people had so far contributed and few of these were women:(Nyerere 1968:244–5)
Mafia MP: The women are not in there. Yet they have the ability (nguvu). All the women here make mats and sell raffia—I counted three loads of it just now. And many women buy ‘Mombasa’ kanga at 900 shillings each. Maybe some can’t afford to contribute, but many could find ways of raising the money. The women in Baleni (another village) gave 50,000 shillings. If 44 women from that village can pay, others here could too. And where are the women anyway? I wanted them to come to this meeting. Are they looking after the fields or what? Villager: They are harvesting.It was finally decided to adopt the suggestion made originally by the MP. People who had cattle would offer them instead of cash, so that they could be slaughtered and the meat sold. For the rest of my stay, several animals a week were butchered—a process which took most of the day, and occupied the time of a large number of men while the women continued their harvesting. The money was finally raised, but largely without the participation of the women. Soon after my departure, the lorry was ordered. Why was there such a divergence of interests between men and women in this matter? At first I thought that the men’s desire for a lorry was to bring the ‘cargo’ of development to the village. This was partly true, but I later realized that they did not want the lorry so much in order to bring in goods as to get themselves to the District capital. Their main desire was to be able to visit the government offices, the shops, the law court, and the hospital. They wanted to be able to participate more fully in the political life there, to go and transact business themselves, rather than have to wait passively for the state to intervene in their lives in the form of visiting officials. In this respect, having a lorry and being mobile meant a diminution of the inequality between themselves and government officials. Women, on the other hand, were much less interested in acquiring a lorry because they did not travel nearly as much as men. They were usually too busy, and they rarely had the cash for fares. Few of them had sufficient cash to buy shares in the lorry, a project about which they had not been consulted since they were not invited to attend village meetings. *** Conclusion This chapter covers two decades of Tanzanian history in which some form of socialist ideology was dominant at the state level. What effect has this ideology and the policies associated with it had on one village in a relatively remote area? Villagers have undoubtedly benefited from improved health and educational facilities, but not to the extent which they had hoped and which they felt had been promised. More villagers are now involved in local government, but beyond the village level people still experience the government as ‘them’ not ‘us’, as instructions not consultation. Paradoxically, then, in spite of the rhetoric of socialism in the postindependence era, continuities exist between this and the period of colonial rule in terms of the methods of communication, the state’s requirements of the peasants, and the structural position of party/state bureaucrats. The socialist state in Tanzania did not succeed in changing the top-down flow of information and decision-making. Nor did the state tackle increasing gender asymmetry very seriously. The gap between men and women in wealth, cash income, work-load/leisure, education, and morbidity has widened (Caplan 1989). Women not only remain excluded from village government, but also the organization which is supposed to represent their interests is seen, with some justice, as an agent of government, designed to extract from them yet more in terms of work and money. So did the fact that Tanzania chose to practise a form of socialism make any difference? Much depends upon the basis for comparison. People in northern Mafia compare their standard of living today with that of ten, twenty, or thirty years ago, particularly in terms of prices, and complain. They compare what they have with what they had hoped to have, or what they feel they were promised by independence and ujamaa, and find it lacking. We, however, may compare Tanzania with other parts of Africa, ravaged by war and famine, and decide that it has not, after all, done too badly. Tanzanian socialism has not achieved equality, but there is less inequality than in most other African countries. Furthermore, throughout the post-colonial period, there has been reasonably open, even critical debate about government policies. We might even conclude that what was needed was more, rather than less socialism. [47] The following is a small (and rather arbitrary) selection of the material available on these debates: Cliffe and Saul 1972; Coulson 1979 and 1982; Fortmann 1980; Hyden 1980; Kahama et al. 1986; Kim et al. 1979; Mwansasu and Pratt 1979; Raikes 1978; Shivji 1976; Von Freyhold 1979; Yeager 1989. [48] The most important source for gender relations in Tanzania is Mascarenhas and Mbilinyi 1983. Other useful references are Oomin-Myin 1981; Swantz 1985; and Vuorela 1987. [49] At the time of my first fieldwork, begun in 1965, Tanzania had been independent for only a few years and the union with Zanzibar was only twelve months old. The respective ruling parties of each, however, remained separate—TANU for the mainland, and the ASP (Afro-Shirazi Party) for the islands—until 1977. [50] See Geiger 1982 for further information on the UWT. *** References
The arts are now financially starved and politicians are suspicious of artists.... We are witnessing an increasing reaction from the politicians, and by that they are making everybody afraid of speaking. In the long run, that is not very healthy. If people learn that artists can speak freely, then they too will be able to learn to speak freely. The unity between the African politician and the artist during the time of the struggle needs to be preserved.[66]Doubtless, cultural officials (see, for example, Chifunyise 1991) would agree with Mhlanga’s sentiments. However, both writers and workers have, in creating new cultural forms, assumed their right to structure their own performances, often against the interests of the ruling class identified with the new state (Cheater 1988). Government itself has concentrated on training schoolchildren in the traditional performative arts; busing adult performers to airports to greet visiting dignitaries; and organizing, as part of the annual independence celebrations, ‘galas’ extolling Zimbabwe’s cultural diversity. These cultural galas are arranged in the main cities by sub-committees representing the Department of Culture and private organizations. Thousands of printed invitations dispatched to individuals of significant rank create a polyglot audience. Performances are carefully planned to display Zimbabwe’s diverse sub-cultures for mutual exchange and admiration. Performers, however, offer twists unforeseen by the organizers. Traditional’ dance groups display themselves as a mixture of colonials and characters from a Western children’s television programme. Traditional’ choral groups combine male and female members in semi-identical modern uniform, and sing songs in impeccably traditional idioms protesting against corruption in contemporary Zimbabwean society. Such creativity is highly appreciated by the elite audiences, though the politicians present as patrons may wriggle uncomfortably. The contrived artificiality of these cultural events reveals the Government’s problem in defining ‘culture’ as primarily performative, where the meaning is the performance itself (the performance is the message), but where the consumption of performative culture is also taken as a signifier of personal as well as social identity. Performative culture thus substitutes for real knowledge of how others live and think, and enables the hard issues of structural relations in multi-cultural contexts to be avoided. Perhaps for that reason, the Government approach satisfies few social actors in Zimbabwean society, especially those in contention with the ruling class for the control of Zimbabwean historicity, such as the chiefs and the youth. *** Culture as Lifestyle Versus Socialism and Tradition as Aesthetic The de facto practical emphasis on performative culture, described above, contradicts the explicit understanding of the NAC Director that ‘our culture is defined not in theoretical terms but in the ways we live in both the urban and the rural areas’.[67] This understanding endangers the nationalist project in culture, particularly when it forces a recognition that urban lifestyles, especially among the youth, contradict both traditional and austere socialist expectations of appropriately modest demeanour which puts the collective whole before individual interests. Young black Zimbabweans have, over the past half-decade, recurrently been accused (usually by high-ranking politicians whose own lifestyles are not notably traditional) of having ‘abandoned their culture’, of being culturally ‘handicapped’ and ‘bankrupt’ and of practising ‘cultural prostitution’, ‘cultural suicide’, and ‘cultural degradation’.[68] They like international pop music, disco-dancing, dreadlocks and other non-traditional hairstyles, and punk clothing. They see all of these as symbolically denying primitivity, which they emphatically reject. They express contempt for local musicians and artists (often working on traditional themes) whose work is ‘the last word in mediocrity’, who ‘just do not measure up’ to the expectations of cultural consumers.[69] Increasingly, they also consume alcohol and marijuana. Clearly, their everyday cultural performance threatens not merely the ascetic project of socialism, but also the ease of social control. These young people, whether ‘Westernized’ or ‘rasta’, are beginning to defend themselves publicly against charges that they have sold out to (Western) cultural imperialism:
It is, indeed, true that our own culture and values are fading out of action.... Indeed the youth have adopted Western norms and values, but then what did you expect? What did you teach us? And what did you raise us to be? .We were taught and trained to be ‘blue-eyed niggers’ from table manners to playing rugby and football. Perhaps, someone would like to tell me where I could have learned Shona culture.. I refuse to debate whether this is good or bad, or right or wrong —that’s just the way it is. It is quite clear that our education is almost completely English. Can we, therefore, be blamed for our pro-Western ways? After all, it is what we were taught.. We live in a society very similar to that of the West. The parents go to work every day, the children go to school, and the rest of the day is spent watching Western-type television and/or listening to Western-type radio. Occasionally we have Western-type parties, braais [i.e., barbeques], picnics and lakeside holidays. We observe Western-type manners and Christian values. Where are we supposed to learn our own ways in such a Westernised environment? If we cannot learn our ways at school or at home or even in the streets (which, by the way, are also Western), then where shall we learn them? .I find myself in a state of confusion, my culture is in conflict with my religion and what I consider to be the noble cause of women’s liberation. All these conflicts are the result of Westernisation and the tremendous change that our lifestyle has gone through, while our culture has stood still.The accusations of youth’s cultural inadequacy have increased in frequency and volume as university students and schoolchildren have become publicly critical of government (Cheater 1991b). They are directed especially against urban youth, and those known as ‘the nose brigades’ (now indigenized as nozi, plural manozi), who speak English through their noses like the English themselves. This speech style has come to symbolize the total rejection of ‘traditional culture’. This rejection is related, as the above quotation makes quite clear, to class- differentiated educational experien ces, but more generally parents are alleged to have lost control over their children. At the same time, the political elders have some difficulty in mobilizing onto their side of this argument, those young people whom the ‘noses’ call ‘SRBs’ (Strong/ Severe Rural Backgrounds), who have not suffered cultural imperialism to the same degree in their home or educational backgrounds, but who have been exposed to the parastatal radio and television services. Politicians critical of both broadcasting and youth seem to want presented on television not contemporary urban Zimbabwean behaviour (which has great entertainment value to those living it), but idealized representations of what they think should be: ‘If you want to perform in Shona, it should be good Shona so that it will set a good example. I am being very critical because people exhibit our own skills, culture, through drama and if what we have seen on ZTV depicts our culture, then I am afraid they [not we] have not been good enough’, was one ministerial comment.[70] But youth’s rejection of the politicians’ cultural nationalism is a delightful irony when set against Fry’s (1976:41) remark (concerning what is now the elders’ generation of cultural nationalists), that the tranceinducing dance at traditional seances ‘was not so different from modern western pop dancing; it was highly expressive and individualistic’! One is tempted to speculate that, in these arguments about ‘culture’, young people have little difficulty in identifying at a long distance potential measures to control their own behaviour. As a much older black female Zimbabwean at a conference put the point about her own life and career: ‘when you want to do something different, they think of all the logical reasons against it. When they run out of logic, they say “But you can’t. It’s against our culture”!’ Indeed, youthful resentment at falling education standards and extremely high school-leaver unemployment, is probably in the process of crystallizing into a social movement, spearheaded by the university and polytechnic students, in which the cultural argument forms the core of their dispute with the ruling class. When young black Zimbabweans writing in national newspapers use terms like ‘blue-eyed niggers’, they intend to annoy politicians through colonially inspired satire. They also display a selfmocking confidence in their colonial cultural inheritance, which is equally unacceptable to the policitians.(Jaya, 1990:8)
What baffles [the ruling class] is that in spite of the Presidential concerns which were expressed in no uncertain terms, the youth still cling line, hook and sinker to Western cultures. As if that is not deviant enough, they have the audacity to embark on a collision course with elders who are determined to preserve culture.[71]If youth is critical of the politicians’ stance on ‘traditional culture’, so too are the chiefs—for diametrically opposed reasons. In 1981, in the name of socialist democracy and state control, the chiefs were stripped of their colonial powers to administer customary law and allocate land (see Cheater 1990). Special skills, described by Seidman (1982), were required to get through Parliament the bill which removed from the chiefs and headmen their former legal obligations in traditional courts. The new courts were riddled with apparently uncontrollable corruption and in 1990 a decision was taken to reinstate traditional courts. However, even those chiefs who form part of the legislature are reported as saying that, whereas the colonialists fully recognized their customary roles, ‘our own children thought we were not to exercise our hereditary powers’.[72] This is the context in which problematic structural relations in ‘traditional’ cultures have been delegated to the chiefs to handle. Together with the police, and in the absence of specific legislation, the chiefs are now expected, under the control of the state, to do the politicians’ dirty work, being ‘urged to weed out bad customs’ within rural society.[73] *** Gender Equality and ‘bad Customs’ If traditional performative culture was the subject of nationalist encouragement by Zimbabwe’s ‘socialist’ rulers, specific customs flagrantly contravening socialist ideals had to be confronted and condemned as ‘bad’. Most ‘bad customs’ have to do with the traditional subordination of women to men. As identified recently by one minister,[74] these ‘bad customs’ include: ‘demands by relatives of a dead person for large sums of money before the corpse is buried’[75]; the giving in marriage of young female children to much older men to indemnify the girls’ kin for traditional torts and deaths (see Reynolds 1990:14—15); enforced widow inheritance; the sororate; and the stripping of property from a man’s wife and children by his patrikin immediately after his death. These ‘bad customs’ all reflect the relational content of Shona culture. They concern rights over people and property involved in bridewealth transactions which contradict socialist equality. But anti-colonial nationalism has precluded any assault on the institution of bridewealth itself.[76] This may be due to the fact that high bridewealth has always been a source of prestige for families of high rank, in the present as in the past. Yet bride-wealth generates these ‘bad customs’ which, through their control of rights over people and their labour, primarily benefit men, who comprise over 90 per cent of the legislative assembly. So securing the passage of gender-equitable legislation through Parliament requires that members of Parliament put their party-political before their cultural interests. The legal reform of problematic structural relationships has usually taken place without serious explanation of the reason, and occasionally with deliberate intent to mislead. For example, the 1982 Legal Age of Majority Act was outlined correctly to a press conference in English; and then ‘explained’ to the ZANU(PF) Women’s League in Shona as involving no change in parental control, particularly over daughters’ sexual beha viour and marriage. In fact this act stripped fathers or guardians of their right to claim damages from those responsible for their daughters’ pre-marital pregnancies, and parents of their right to arrange, or forbid, marriages among their offspring over the age of 18 years. It has been the source of considerable popular disaffection, requiring a Supreme Court clarification of its intent, though as yet there has been no move to amend it.[77] Legal reform favouring gender equality is the one area in which ZANU did keep its 1980 electoral promises (cf. Stewart et al. 1990). The state has given adult women control over their own sexuality. It is now they, not their fathers, who can sue for seduction damages. They have the right to choose their marriage partner, to secure financial maintenance from the fathers of children born out of marriage, and personal as well as child maintenance following divorce or a husband’s death (previously, according to customary law, his estate would be inherited by an agnate, whether or not the widow agreed to marry him, widow inheritance being a sometimes negotiable custom among most Shona-speakers). Women have obtained rights to a share of the property jointly generated in a marriage, as well as to their own income and property earned during marriage. They are now eligible to own immovable property in their own right, whether married or not. They are entitled to individualized personal taxation (the colonial system was based on the concept of a family taxpayer), and to equal pay for equal work. Gender discrimination in job recruitment has been outlawed, and the Government has announced that it intends to work towards the target of women occupying 30 per cent of all managerial posts in the civil service.[78] There are, however, certain important rights which women do not yet hold equally with men, including the symbolically significant right, relative to traditional patrivirilocality, to permanent residence in Zimbabwe for a foreign spouse. In practical terms, although employed women enjoy equal pay for equal work, urban women tend to occupy lower-ranked jobs, and therefore earn lower incomes, on average, than men. Rural women still have no formal rights to ‘communal’ land, while the resettlement programme was geared to family settlement under a male head. Despite their new legal rights, then, the majority of Zimbabwean women have no independent access to the means of production. Their continued economic dependence on men in marriage has thus been only marginally affected by gender-blind legislation. Moreover, as these legal reforms have structurally changed gender relations, so various attempts to re-subordinate women have emerged in public behavioural performances. A steady flow of letters to the newspapers has, for the past decade, quoted St Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians in support of their contention that women were born to be subordinated in marriage; that husbands ‘manage’ their homes, while wives are merely ‘workers’. Claiming compatibility with both Christianity and ‘traditional culture’, more provocative letters (some signed by high-ranking males belonging to the ruling party) have asserted a husband’s right to beat his wife regularly and have elicited strongly worded dissent. Running through all of these written performances is the message that liberated women claiming their legal rights may be regarded as unmarriageable, that structural relationships may have changed in the law, but not in social interaction. Still more striking, perhaps, is the performative re-subordination of women, using the idioms allegedly pertaining to traditional African ‘cultures’, within ZANU(PF) itself. For the first five years of independence, mixed groups of traditional dancers greeted important state visitors at Zimbabwe’s airports. Nowadays, they are separated by sex. When in the mid-1980s President Khomenei of Iran refused to attend a mixed-sex state banquet, the banquet went ahead without him and Zimbabweans fumed publicly about this insult to their female cabinet ministers, among others. But following the Pope’s 1986 visit, whenever the state has received visitors or the President has departed or returned home, there has been a phalanx of kneeling members of the ZANU(PF) Women’s League on the airport tarmac. Protest against the inappropriateness of such behaviour, especially among socialists, has drawn the response that kneeling is the way women traditionally show their respect in African society. The female members of the households of some members of the Politburo do indeed approach paterfamilias and all male visitors on their knees; for example, when they serve tea. But in most rural and urban households that I personally have entered, the standard pattern is a half-curtsey or brief bob, accompanied by respectful clapping. Kneeling is anathema to educated black women. Female kneeling, it appears, is encouraged by very high-ranking party and state officials. At an agricultural college’s celebrations in late 1989, the State President as guest of honour was presented with a silver tray. The presentation was made, on damp grass under trees, by a young woman, born at the college and herself a secondary school teacher in Harare, who was dressed in a summer suit, stockings and high-heeled shoes. Much taller than the President, she extended the tray in her left hand and her right hand to shake his. He did not extend his hand, nor did he take the tray. He merely looked, unsmiling, into the distance, while two elderly Women’s League members, wearing dresses printed with his image, and already on their knees behind him, flapped their hands and hissed ‘pasi, pasi’ (down, down). The young teacher looked around, bewildered, for guidance. The college staff looked at one another and then at the ground, obviously embarrassed.[79] With a hard face, the teacher shrugged, and knelt on the wet grass. The President smiled and accepted his tray. A few people clapped raggedly; the majority did not applaud. After the Presidential motorcade had departed in a fanfare of police sirens, the college community, male and female, commiserated with the teacher: ‘What can one do? It is not right, we have never done it that way, but what can we do?’ Idioms of patriarchy and kinship hierarchy have also been used in recent years by members of the ZANU(PF) Women’s League, against the party’s political rivals. In 1989, a Women’s League march, led by a female cabinet minister, demonstrated against the formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) by Edgar Tekere, himself formerly among the ZANU(PF) top leadership.
Comrade Mujuru said in African custom the father was the head of a house. If anything went wrong, a child would not complain to the father.... ‘You will never get a child telling his father to step down because he has failed to run the affairs of the house, but there are always ways of dealing with their problems’.. She wondered why most men behind ZUM had failed to manage their homes. ‘How can a man who has failed to run the affairs of his house and family lead a nation? How can you let people from outside come to deal with the problems of your country and yet they don’t know your culture or the way you live?’[80]There is clearly a patent contradiction between the past socialist legal reconstruction of gender relations, and recent intra-party behaviour. How should this complex contradiction be explained? One might concur with Martin (1987:31) that ‘Kinship symbolism indeed legitimises authority and commands respect; it also stresses the obligations of those who are in power and reinforces expectations which cannot be discarded, at least not too often’. But even among Zimbabwean parliamentarians of the ruling party, the idiom of fatherhood has been regarded as unsuitable to modern politics:
Mr Speaker, sir, for those who have a family, you have a counterpart who is your wife. Sometimes your children are grown up and the opposition increases. This is very healthy, it helps you to think, you really govern and you would always learn to do it. You do not have to dictate.... Let us leave our children with a legacy that they will be proud of. [Or] they will find themselves with no option but to spit on our graves, after we are dead.[81]The recent disputed political use of the idioms of traditional patriarchy ran in parallel with the new-found ZANU(PF) concern with the ‘abandonment’ of their ‘traditional culture’ among Zimbabwean youth. Both may have reflected an attempt, within ZANU(PF) itself as well as in Zimbabwean society more broadly, to establish a politics of consensus as the socialist agenda foundered and dissent (within and beyond the party) increased. Even within the ruling class itself, there has been dispute over the control of Zimbabwean historicity; for example, over the desirability of establishing a one-party state. It is within this context one must set the recent emerging attempt, in classical (national) socialist style, to create a personality cult focusing specifically on the young around the party leader and state President. *** Conclusion By examining a mixture of public discourse and ethnographic events, this chapter has tried to explain why the developing trend in Zimbabwean ‘socialism’ over the past decade was so ‘revisionist’. Having started its career in government with a difficult contradiction between its nationalism and its socialism, ZANU(PF) at first used the development of traditional performative culture to divert attention from its socialist attacks on traditional relationships. But following the establishment of an executive Presidency in 1987, ZANU(PF) faced rising criticism of its socialist policies. In this situation, the party came increasingly to emphasise the importance of ‘traditional culture’, using inegalitarian performance to contradict its previous socialist legal re-structuring of relationships. Selected elements of its original nationalist agenda (focused on the land question) and of ‘traditional culture’ compatible with patriarchal authority, have been invoked for support. ZANU(PF)’s attempted recourse to the symbols of an allegedly consensual past was clearly related to its desire to retain its ‘peaches’. Ultimately, it abandoned socialism as the official party ideology in order to hang on to power. However, not least through its past political (mis)management of cultural issues, the party has alienated many sectors of Zimbabwean society, in particular its pragmatic, youthful electorate, over the future direction in which Zimbabwe’s ‘cultural model’ should be pushed. Perhaps, as this conflict over the control of its historicity develops further, and contra Martin (1987), Zimbabwe may yet prove to be one African state in which the political manipulation of traditional symbols and idioms of power will not be sufficient to enable socialist politicians manqu(e)es to retain control of the state. [59] I am most grateful to Peter Fry for a rightfully stringent critique of an early draft of this chapter, and to Rudo Gaidzanwa for later comments. [60] In addition to the national Heroes’ Acre in Harare, provincial and district Heroes’ Acres have been designated since the mid-1980s, at which reburials of guerrilla remains (often re-located from mass graves) have become an extremely important ritual focus of waning party solidarity. [61] Folowing the analysis in this chapter, however, I would predict that spirit mediums will very shortly be included in these rituals. [62] The Herald, 29 Jan. 1991, p. 3. [63] ZANU (1980:8). [64] The Herald, 28 Dec. 1990, p. 5; 9 Jan. 1991, p. 1. It is a neat irony that those responsible for ‘selling’ the land on which they were resettled are those who, in 1980, flatly refused resettlement on a collectivized basis in that area! [65] The Herald, 10 Dec. 1990, p. 8. [66] The Herald, 31 Dec. 1990, p. 2. [67] The Herald, 10 Dec. 1990, p. 8. [68] The Herald, 13 Nov. 1990, p. 5; Sunday Mail, 25 Nov. 1990, p. 6. [69] The Herald, 11 Jan. 1991, p. 11. [70] Sunday Mail, 21 Feb. 1988, p. 1; my emphasis and addition. [71] Sunday Mail, 25 Nov. 1990, p. 6. [72] Sunday Mail, 26 Nov. 1989, p. C8; cf. The Herald, 13 Dec. 1990, p. 7. [73] The Herald, 6 Nov. 1990, p. 1. [74] Ibid. [75] Although a minority of such persons are the male victims of homicide or murder, the vast majority are females for whom bridewealth payments have not been completed, or even started—in which case the man responsible for the death is required to ‘marry the grave’ (kuroora guva) in a post-mortem payment. See also Hollemann (1975). [76] The Herald, 10 Dec. 1990, p. 8. [77] Given youthful disaffection, the legal age of majority (including the right to vote) might in future be raised from its current level of 18 years. [78] The Herald, 16 Nov. 1990, p. 13. [79] What prevented me (standing next to the teacher) from intervening was the thought of what the comeback would be on the college principal, a personal friend who had invited me to the occasion. So do we personally learn the precise constraints of relationship, which are usually glossed as ‘cultural’ and which engender our compliance against both belief and political judgement. [80] Sunday Mail, 28 May 1989, p. 1. [81] Hansard, 12 Dec. 1990, cols 3070, 3071; my emphasis. *** References
If a national race loves its history filled with greatness and its language and culture, its tradition and ancient customs, that we call patriotism. One who discards this progressive patriotism, this love of the nation and calls for cosmopolitanism, is not a true socialist. People like these are bourgeois cosmopolitans.*** Cultural Criticism and Images of Equality Writing of the prospects for socialism in industrial societies, John Dunn (1984) has isolated a number of crucial components of socialist politics. The most important of these are a cultural critique of things as they are, a vision of things as they should be, and a political programme which promises to effect the transition from critique to vision. This requires the control of state power, and the practical politics of socialism inevitably centre on state intervention in the economy. Dunn also argues that the cultural critique of the distribution of goods and rewards is, and is likely to remain, the strongest component of socialist politics, not least because even the doughtiest defenders of capitalism find it difficult to invoke the idea of ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ when confronted with capitalism’s indifference to the social context of its economic logic:(Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1987:74)
As a response to the morally and practically anarchic aspects of capitalist production, socialism is above all else an attempt to reimpose order upon modern social experience through the benign exercise of political au thority: to replace the aesthetic, moral and practical anarchy of capitalist production with a new, benign and spiritually compelling order.Dunn’s identification of this central strength of socialist politics should be particularly attractive to anthropologists as it identifies a fruitful area for ethnographic inquiry.[85] In later sections I shall return to what Dunn sees as the most problematic areas of socialist politics: the practical politics of state intervention in the economy and the long-term vision of an alternative social order in which morality governs economy. First, though, I propose to review some ethnographic evidence on equality and inequality in everyday life in southern Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka lies in a part of the world which has experienced the imposition of crude stereotypes about equality and hierarchy.[86] I therefore need to start with evidence that demonstrates that equality is both possible and valued in everyday life, before assessing how far equality is associated with the ideal of justice in public political criticism. In a village in eastern Ratnapura District in the early 1980s, I discovered assumptions about equality built into certain everyday patterns of work and association.[87] Most work on the village’s paddy fields was still carried out according to the reciprocal labour system known as attam, by which cultivators exchanged, with meticulous balance, labour by the day on one another’s fields.[88] But by the time of my fieldwork paddy cultivation in this village had become the preserve of a relatively privileged minority of the population. The poor were excluded, as were women, from this embodied equality, while the division of the harvest itself was, of course, quite inegalitarian. Until recently the main agricultural activity was swidden or chena cultivation. Again the pattern of work emphasized the equal participation and equal rewards of cocultivators, this time less structured by gender differences; but again this has to be seen in the perspective of wider relations of dominance and inequality, specifically the claims on the crop of local colonial officials (Spencer 1990c:104—9). In conversation, a number of people emphasized the moral importance of these patterns of working. On new colony land opened up to paddy a few miles away, cash was used for all labour relations, a situation which at least one informant disparagingly referred to as ‘just like bisnis [business]’. In this interpretation, paddy work represented a moral enclave in a wider world of amoral, or immoral, economic activity. The patterns of paddy and swidden work can be seen as enduring, even embattled, features of past social relations, continued in a changing present. Other egalitarian features were more self-conscious responses to new circumstances. When I went to live there, the village had recently acquired a ‘Good Works Society’ (subhasadhika samitiya). Villagers contributed a small monthly subscription in return for the promise of help at times of emergency (especially funerals). The society was organized by a group of richer villagers (for whom, it should be said, it served as a political resource of sorts), but its members were also drawn from poor and intermediate groups. It met every month at the village temple, and its proceedings were painfully correct in their bureaucratic formality. This initiative, and others like it found in comparable villages all over Sri Lanka, is clearly reminiscent of the Friendly Societies of nineteenth-century Britain (Thompson 1968: 456—69), even though, I suspect, the Sri Lankan organization generally has a shorter life than its Victorian counterpart. In both cases, structures of ‘mutuality’ (to use Thompson’s word) were deployed as protection against the vicissitudes of economic circumstances. Another, slightly different, response to change is the sramadana, ‘gift of labour’ or collective work party. A group of villagers would assemble for a day’s work, for example, cleaning up the grounds of the Buddhist temple or clearing the paths through the surrounding scrub. Some of these occasions were purely local initiatives. At other times, something called a sramadana was organized by the village UNP leadership, and the participants were rewarded with government relief supplies. The idea of the sramadana has been popularized by the Sarvodaya movement, probably the largest Sri Lankan non-governmental development organization, and its leader A.T.Ariyaratna. The movement has ostensibly Gandhian origins, a commitment to development and selfhelp, and a line in ruralist rhetoric which goes down especially well with the more romantically inclined members of the aid community, even though Ariyaratna has developed the movement in keeping with the imperatives of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.[89] Like that nationalism, it employs idealized images of the past to legitimate present practices. This exploitation of selective readings of the past is particularly important, because it appears to give value to rural people’s way of life even as it disempowers them: the past is past and can only be actively re-created with outside help. Sarvodaya’s vision of rural socialism is just a particularly striking example of a more general phenomenon in Sri Lankan political history: the use by elites of images of the countryside and the rural past in political critique. Such critique characteristically displaces blame for all the ills of the present on the depredations of ‘foreigners’, while keeping quiet about existing inequities in access to power and resources among Sri Lankans (Samaraweera 1981; Moore 1989). It is the ideological correlate of the ‘hidden’ sources of state welfarism which I shall discuss later. More generally, arguments like Ariyaratna’s—that Sri Lanka was the home of a socialist order in the pre-colonial past—indicate the dangers of the idea of ‘political culture’. At some point Ariyaratna’s claims connect up with more academic arguments about the social dimension of Buddhism (for example, Ling 1966), or the Asokan espousal of the ‘first welfare state’ (Sarkisyanz 1965; cf. Southwold 1983:116–18). No one would deny that the past, in Sri Lanka as anywhere, can provide models for radical action in the present, but the very frequency of references to past practice in Sri Lankan politics should make us suspicious of the assumption that these indicate a simple continuity between the concerns of the past and the concerns of the present.[90] Even so, the fact that dominant understandings of the past and present lay so much stress on ‘equality’ indicates that it is a value of proven use in political rhetoric. In a truly hierarchical world there would be nothing to gain from denying the real inequalities of the present, or pointing to the possibility of greater equality in either the past or the future. But this is something less than the moral critique of present practice which Dunn sees as an almost intuitive response to capitalism. In my own fieldwork I did not encounter any worked-through criticism of local social relations which assessed the suffering of the local have-nots and placed the blame fairly and squarely at the door of the local haves. It is, of course, quite possible that I would have found it just as difficult to locate such a textbook case of class consciousness had I been working in Britain rather than Sri Lanka. Besides, it is naive to expect moral critique to focus on the local social order, especially when so much that is important comes to the village from outside (a point I pursue below). I did hear grumbling about the different fortunes of rich and poor but this gathered most force when the ills of the poor could be blamed on the avarice of some other group like Muslims or Tamils. I also witnessed at least one exemplary scene of everyday acquiescence when I questioned a poor cultivator about the merchant’s loan of his seed grain to be repaid at 100 per cent interest come the harvest. Try as I might, I could not induce the cultivator to describe this as anything other than generosity on the part of the merchant. Similarly, the meteoric rise to fortune of the area’s gem-dealers attracted less criticism than might be expected because, according to one farmer I spoke to, ‘at least they’re our people’ (namely, Sinhala, not Muslim or Tamil like the more established wealthy traders in the area). The most sustained moment of social criticism concerned not the distribution of existing local resources, but the state’s distribution of new resources: the allocation of land from a new irrigation scheme. The village arguments that resulted from an attempt to distribute this land in 1984 were dominated by the words sadhara and asadhara: ‘just’ and ‘unjust’, or ‘impartial’ and ‘partial’. James Brow encountered a similar situation in a village in Anuradhapura District in 1983. In his case the problem stemmed from the building of a new ‘model village’ and the allocation of new housing along political party lines. In both cases, protest took the form of petitions to the Prime Minister in Colombo and appeals to the principle of justice. It also emerged in other ways, particularly through a case of spirit possession in which the villagers were urged, by the deity possessing one of their number, to re-unite as one set of kin and one community (Brow 1988; 1990). In fact, Brow’s villagers sent two petitions to the Prime Minister, one claiming that the houses should have been equitably distributed among all the original inhabitants of the village, the other implicitly acknowledging the claims of political party loyalty but asserting that, because of corruption, the houses had not been allocated to the best-qualified Government supporters (Brow 1988:321). One sees here a tension between the claims of an abstract equity, based in an ideal of local community, and the claims of a more limited equity, based in the implicit rules of the game of political patronage. The two petitions indicate, in their divergence, a tension in expectations about the proper distribution of goods and rewards, but it is a tension which focuses on the state and political relationships, not on the market and more strictly economic relationships. *** The Politics of Welfarism There are at least two possible explanations for why people’s expectations about the just distribution of material rewards should focus on the distribution of state benefits. The first, based on a strong reading of the idea of political culture, would argue that this demonstrates the continuing force of an old Buddhist political theory in which material prosperity emanates from the centre of the polity (Sarkisyanz 1965; Tambiah 1976; Roberts 1984). Certainly, a number of writers have drawn attention to the ideological importance of the state in colonial and post-colonial Sri Lanka (Moore 1985: 173; Kapferer 1988; Spencer 1990c: 208—31). But this argument obscures as much as it reveals: modern politicians are not divine kings, whatever their pretensions (cf. Kemper 1990). We also need to attend to a much more historically specific argument, based on the peculiar role of the colonial and post-colonial state in local political economy. In this argument people expect the good things in life to emanate from the political centre precisely because that is what their more recent experience has taught them to expect. Sri Lanka underwent an economic transformation, during the period of colonial rule, far more penetrating than the transformation of the Indian economy. The development of the plantation sector provided the Government with surplus resources, some of which could be devoted to welfare measures. Post-independence governments inherited this situation, and were able to use these resources to finance ambitious programmes of state welfare which were of great benefit to rural dwellers, mostly Sinhala smallholders outside the plantation sector. From the 1930s (when elections based on universal adult franchise were first held) an impressive series of measures was introduced, including universal education, widespread health care (including the near eradication of malaria in the 1940s), and food subsidies. These were originally financed from the plantation sector (Moore 1985:85—120), although the post-1977 Government has also received extraordinarily high levels of foreign aid.[91] As a result, extremely high levels of basic needs provision have been achieved, despite unremarkable levels of economic growth. Sri Lanka has much higher levels of literacy and life expectancy than other countries with comparable per capita GNP. In such a situation it is not surprising that politicians should try to present themselves as righteous heirs to the kings of old. Nor is it surprising that people should, up to a point, allow them their regal fantasies, especially when the actual source of state largesse is mostly hidden from the electorate, or at best unacknowledged in political argument. Previous writers have characterized this state of affairs not as socialism but as ‘welfarism’ (for example, Moore 1985). The state has made occasional attempts at redistributing local resources, most notably through the reform of tenurial relations in the late 1950s and through the creation of a land ceiling in the early 1970s. But land concentration (outside the plantation sector itself) has been less marked in Sri Lanka than its regional neighbours, and these measures have had little impact on the lives of most Sinhala peasants (Herring 1983:50—84, 125—52; Moore 1985:50—84). In this sort of situation it is not control of local resources which lies at the base of local inequalities, but control of the inflow of state resources (cf Alexander 1981: 119—20). Analytic attempts to identify a pattern of local class relations without reference to the state as a source of wealth are futile. That, in the end, is why arguments about economic justice must focus on the state, not on purely local inequalities. It is also why visions of an alternative social order so often treat the existence of the state in something like its present form as a given. The post-colonial state, though, is encountered not merely as a benign source of material benefit. It is also the symbolic focus of the most important force in the island’s politics, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, and the source of a great deal of regulative legislation which the villagers I knew either ignored or knowingly evaded. Finally, the state makes contact with the average villager not just as an impersonal bureaucratic force, but through personalistic ties with local officials and party bosses. One driving force in the local politics of welfarism is the contradiction between a system rooted in personalistic patronage and a set of rewards which are, by definition, universal or near universal in their reach. This suggests obvious parallels with other socialist economies although Sri Lanka differs in respect of a third component of welfarist politics: local party competition. With increasing intensity after the 1970 election ruling politicians have tried to make the political party the sole medium for the transmission of government resources to the electorate. In practice this means that jobs, contracts, and other benefits have been in the hands of the local MP, or in some cases in the hands of village party bosses. Party identification is particularly prominent in Sinhala villages, and a great deal of local politics can be summed up in Moore’s pithy comment: ‘Politics is about who will be employed by the Ceylon Transport Board as bus conductors’ (Moore 1985:210). The diversion of limited goods, like prized government jobs, along the lines of party patronage is resented but generally taken for granted in local politics. Universal benefits, like free education or health care, can hardly be channelled in similar ways. The best a party boss can do is influence the siting of schools and hospitals as ‘rewards’ for a particular community’s support. As many communities are politically split between the major parties, this inevitably benefits both supporters and opponents. The most contentious moments, in a system bound to leave more villagers disappointed than satisfied, occur when politicians distribute goods which are general enough to raise universalist expectations, but nevertheless too few to go round. Thus the distribution of new houses in the village Brow studied led to serious splits, both within the village and within the local UNP (Brow 1990). The new irrigated land in the village I studied proved almost impossible to distribute. There were at least 400 local households which considered themselves not just qualified for, but entitled to, a share of the land, yet fewer than 100 plots to distribute. Although the allocation showed all the signs of being drawn up by the village’s party boss, he argued violently that he was not responsible, blaming instead the MP who in turn tried to shift the blame elsewhere. The temporary solution was to abandon the proposed allocation altogether and promise a fresh allocation. *** State and Revolution These are minor hiccups in the workings of the political system. The state’s distribution of material resources can, though, be linked in a number of ways to the growth of political violence in Sri Lanka. Between 1956 and 1977 governments were regularly ousted at general elections, not least because they failed to deliver economically. The period of the ‘open economy’ since 1977 has seen the end of this pattern, partly because of the Government’s flexible way with constitutional procedures, partly because of the ineptitude of the main opposition party, and partly because the Government has been seen, to a greater extent than any of its predecessors, to deliver something of what it promised. This is in large part due to the huge amounts of external aid it has had at its disposal. It has been plausibly argued that this source of continuing munificence has actively encouraged the country’s rulers to sidestep the usual proprieties of democratic government (Moore 1990). Growing resentment at the Government’s abuse of power and an absence of legitimate channels through which to express that resentment were important factors in the second coming of the JVP in the late 1980s. The flashpoint was provided by the Government’s agreement, more or less at gunpoint, to Rajiv Gandhi’s proposals to settle the Tamil problem, proposals which were seen by many Sinhala people as a betrayal of the central principles of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. The first JVP irruption in 1971 was more directly related to popular expectations about the Gov ernment’s ability to deliver material rewards and it combined millenarian expectations (and styles of action) with more mundane political considerations. The JVP leadership’s vision of the new order drew heavily on the cultural capital of Sinhala nationalism. It promised a return to the prosperous days of the Sinhala kings in the wake of the expulsion of the Tamil workforce from the country’s tea plantations and the expropriation of those plantations for the benefit of the Sinhala peasantry. The foot-soldiers came from a stratum of rural Sinhala youth, well-educated but under- or unemployed (Obeyesekere 1974). Their intentions were, it seems, sometimes quite straightforward: to secure their ‘rightful’ share of state employment and state benefits (Alexander 1981). One popular (and possibly apocryphal) tale of 1971 is that the insurrectionaries, having gained temporary control in one area, set about appointing various of their number to the vacant positions in the local bureaucracy—Government Agent, Assistant Government Agent, and so on—thus reproducing the existing structure of the state, with only the personnel changed. It could be argued that Sri Lanka is a victim of its own success. The post-independence governments’ achievements in social welfare provision led to the emergence of a stratum of well-educated but underemployed and politically volatile youth. The 1971 insurrection brought their problems to the top of the political agenda, but government responses ever since have served only to shift the problem, not remove it. The introduction of positive discrimination in favour of rural Sinhala youth in university admissions was seen as discrimination against Tamil youth. The UNP after its election victory in 1977 made efforts to target educated Sinhala youth and win them to its side, but the pattern of party patronage also excluded Tamil youth, who flocked in ever greater numbers to the cause of the Tigers. The Government’s inability to deal with the Tigers led, eventually, to Indian intervention and the reemergence of the JVP as the vehicle for Sinhala youth discontent. This time the JVP seems to have all but abandoned its earlier use of stern Leninist language, subsuming all visions of a new social order under calls for patriotic defence of the motherland. Their idea of an alternative postrevolutionary social order seems to have been as vague as the Tigers’ vision of social relations in the new world of Tamil Ealam.[92] The case of Sri Lanka does not demonstrate that the successful provision of basic needs leads directly to political disintegration, even if it does show —pace Gellner (1983:22)—that ‘universal Danegeld’ cannot by itself guarantee legitimacy. Throughout the 1980s the Government continued to deliver economic rewards to its followers as the polity disintegrated around it. In this case one needs to explore the specifically political processes by which the Government distributed its resources and how those processes were evaluated, morally as well as materially, by those involved at all levels. It is not the provision of basic needs in general which has contributed to political breakdown, but the specific provision of mass education. Education produces characteristic kinds of cultural dislocation which require new political answers. More government jobs for the boys and girls could soften that need, but not eliminate it. This is not the place to examine the issue in detail, but it is worth noting that Sri Lanka is not alone in confronting the problem; in recent years the frustrations of educated youth have played a large part in the downfall of governments in both India and Bangladesh.[93] If one takes seriously Dunn’s depiction of the centrality of cultural responses to economic forces in the continued vitality of socialism as a political project—‘the sense that these are not a set of terms on which human beings ought to be expected to live’ (Dunn 1984:63)—the idea of an anthropology of socialism takes on a new urgency, as anthropology has long prided itself on its ability to explore the cultural and moral worlds of other people. The Sri Lankan evidence I have presented, while inconclusive and uneven, suggests that the injustices of state distribution are as likely to arouse ‘cultural revulsion’ as the injustices of the marketplace, while the provision of material goods and services is hardly in itself an adequate response to moral critique, and the imagination of plausible political alternatives is difficult everywhere. By the summer of 1991, the space formerly occupied by the JVP in Sinhala youth and student politics was being filled by a social movement demanding a return to ‘indigenous (or national) knowledge’ (jatika cintanaya) and the replacement of the ‘open economy’ (nidahasa artikaya) with a ‘national economy’ (jatika artikaya). In short the demise of socialist models in Eastern Europe has done nothing to alter the cultural contradictions of rapid political and economic change elsewhere in the world. [82] For further discussion of this point, see Spencer (1990d). [83] Because of its early electoral success, which coincided neatly with the onset of the Cold War, more is known about the early history of Sri Lankan socialism than about its later decline. For the first phase (up to the 1930s), see Jayawardena (1972) and Kuruppu (1984); for the early history of the Trotskyist LSSP, see Lerski (1968); for later developments Kearney (1971) and more general works on Sri Lankan politics: for example, Wriggins (1960); Wilson (1979); Jupp (1978). [84] On the JVP in 1971, see Goonetilleke (1975), Wijeweera (1975), Halliday (1975), Obeyesekere (1974), Alexander (1981), Solidarity (1972). For the later history, see Amnesty International (1990a; 1990b), Marino (1989), Chandraprema (1991). [85] For comparative attempts to investigate the cultural critique of capitalist relations, see Moore (1978) and Scott (1976; 1985), both heavily influenced by the work of E.P.Thompson, and Parry and Bloch (1989). [86] Whereas the anthropology of India may be recovering from its earlier stereotypical view of hierarchy (for example, Daniel 1984; Appadurai 1986; cf. Parry 1974, 1979:314–17; Beteille 1983), Sri Lanka has recently been visited with a bad outbreak of what we might call Late Orientalism (for example, Kapferer 1988, 1989; for a less florid version, see Roberts 1984, 1990; cf. Scott 1990; Spencer 1990a). [87] Fieldwork between 1981 and 1983 was supported by an ESRC studentship. [88] On attam, see Spencer (1990c:110–11); cf. Robinson (1975:62-SO); Knox (1911 [1681]:14) [89] For a scathing account of Sarvodaya, see Gombrich and Obeyesekere (1988: 243–55). [90] For further documentation of this point, see the papers collected in Spencer (1990d). [91] In 1986 India, with almost fifty times the population, received less than four times more aid than Sri Lanka. With aid making up nearly 9 per cent of GNP, Sri Lanka received the highest per capita aid donations in Asia (World Bank 1988: Table 22). [92] Cf. Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1987); Chandraprema (1991). [93] The problem is by no means unique to South Asia: cf. Hannerz (1987: 554) and Cheater, this volume. *** References(Dunn 1984:64)
Most attempts to evaluate the role of Theravada Buddhism in economic action in South-east Asia have assumed a broadly capitalist context, and some have argued tendentiously for the fundamental compatibility of Buddhist teachings and the values of capitalism (Martellaro and Choroenthaitawee 1987). Paul Cohen, on the other hand, argues that ‘Buddhist social ethics...are...inconsistent with capitalist values’, and that its ethic is ‘socialistic’ (1984:197). The economic and social issues involved, however, are ambiguous, and this chapter will try to evaluate the role of Theravada Buddhism in the context of socialist development in Laos. Melford E.Spiro was one of the earliest anthropologists directly to address the issues. The peasants Spiro studied were not ‘other-worldly’ and did not reject material pleasures. Suffering for them was ‘believed to be caused by illness, poverty, dacoits, evil spirits, sorcerers, rapacious government officials, drought, and so on’ (1966:1165). Spiro broadly conceded that Buddhism in the context of Burma does not promote capital accumulation, but he also argued that religion does influence economic action by encouraging a particular form of spending rather than saving. Because the religious concerns of Buddhist peasants are primarily associated with rebirth rather than nirvana, the peasant is interested in accumulating merit through charitable deeds. This entails a particular pattern of religious spending, most spectacularly on temple-building. Such spending means that persons can enjoy the fruits of their labour and gain merit into the bargain. To save in the Burmese environment is not rational from the peasants’ point of view, argues Spiro, because of government rapaciousness both in the past and the present. As he wrote elsewhere:Economic investments.are neither very profitable nor very sound. For although the investment potential of the total economy could, in the aggregate, have a crucial influence on Burmese economic growth which in the long run would raise the standard of living of the individual Burman, the savings of the average peasant are too small for his investment returns to increase appreciably his present standard of living. In addition, he would be deferring known present pleasures for a very risky future pleasure.
Thus, in the context of Burma few real economic options were available to the peasant. Essentially the same conclusions are reached in a number of other studies on Buddhism and economic action: Nash (1965), and Spiro (1966) on Burma; Ebihara (1966) on Cambodia; Pfanner and Ingersoll (1961–62) and Keyes (1983b) on Thailand; and Halpern (1964) on Laos. All of these studies agree that merit-making is the central feature of peasant popular Buddhism, and that it is a spur to economic action because wealth facilitates the making of more merit.[95] Hence a significant portion of the peasant’s surplus is directed towards merit-making primarily because there are no ‘rational’ alternatives. In other words, far from being a drag on economic effort because of its ‘other-worldly orientation’, as Weber (1958) had suggested, Buddhism acts as a stimulus. Popular Buddhism may also initially act as an inhibitor of private and potentially capitalist forms of accumulation in the villages through the social pressures on villagers to make merit, with the attendant redistributive implications and importance for village solidarity. Inevitable attempts to break with these traditional patterns, to abandon or radically transform the ‘moral economy’ (Scott 1976), have been a frequent source of tension in villages in developing countries. Buddhism has functioned in Thai and Lao villages as a guardian of the moral economy.[96] The process of development has led in Thailand to the emergence of ‘rationalist’ versions of Buddhism which legitimize a more individualistic road to salvation and provide ideological rationalizations for divergent patterns of economic action (Taylor 1990; Jackson 1989); in underdeveloped Laos such movements are not significant at all. We shall now consider the broader economic and political context in which peasant economic action takes place. *** Problems of Development State-based elites in all developing countries are concerned with the appropriation of the economic surpluses that are generated in their predominantly agrarian societies. Elites in capitalist-orientated countries have attempted to channel some of these surpluses towards the state for investments in infrastructure, including the creation of conditions favourable to the private accumulation of capital. Socialist-orientated development has attempted to channel the bulk of the surpluses into state investments, or into other forms of public investment. Both economic systems have tried, either directly or indirectly, to restrict ‘wasteful’ practices in the traditional system. For example, customary festivals may be shortened, or denied recognition within the timeframe of modern work organizations—bureaucracies and factories—or even outlawed. In Laos in 1977, for instance, the communist government banned the traditional boun bang fay fertility festival, a syncretic ‘animist- Buddhist’ event held each year just before the monsoon rains. The peasants blamed the following disastrous drought on the banning of the festival, and the reaction was such that the ban was discontinued (Evans 1988:20—1), but the government continued to promote a work regime that was divorced from the rhythms of the seasons and religion. The party paper Sieng Pasason ran an editorial entitled, ‘Build a line of conscientiously practising thrift and make it a national habit’. Too much time and wealth was being frittered away: ‘Regarding the practice of thrift, it is necessary to save time,’ the party paper instructed its readers (BBC 1977; cf. Thompson 1967:93) In Laos agricultural cooperatives, ideally, were supposed to be institutions for collectively accumulating capital in the countryside, for applying technological improvements to rice-growing, and for raising standards of living. Yields were to be divided into two parts, a surplus held by the cooperative for reinvestment and payment of taxes, and payments to cooperative members (either families or individuals). Disposal of the former was decided collectively, the latter privately. Income earned by individual cooperative members could be used for religious expenditures. As I have shown elsewhere (Evans 1990), the cooperatives generally were not successful in achieving their aims. This was the result of problems inherent in the organization of the cooperatives, technological incapacity, and the constraints of the wider command-style economy. Inside the cooperatives there were continual disputes over the proportions to be retained for collective investment, and payments to members. These disputes strengthened the feeling among individual peasants that their disposable income, including that available for ceremonial outlays, had been reduced. Outside the cooperatives, restrictions on market transactions lowered the level of activity in the rural economy and led to a general fall in other sources of income. Yet it is also possible that government restrictions on private economic activity and its promotion of collectives had the paradoxical result of channelling what little peasant surplus there was available into religious activity.[97] In most communist systems religion has been suppressed and the assets of religious institutions nationalized. The outlay on public festivals has been restricted and diverted, back into small domestic celebrations. Besides the purely doctrinaire championing of religious repression by ‘militant atheists’, the economic logic was to channel unproductive assets and ‘wasteful’ outlays into economic growth and development. Various Burmese ‘socialist’ regimes have been an exception to this rule because they did not suppress religion, and in fact propagated a version of ‘Buddhist socialism’. The Lao communist government that came to power at the end of 1975 did not promote a doctrine of Buddhist socialism, but neither did it suppress Buddhism. Rather, it attempted to reorganize Buddhism and to bend it to the will of the state. *** Problems of Legitimation Buddhism has traditionally been the main source of ideological legitimation for South-east Asian states, but its role has varied historically in each of them (Smith 1979). Until the rise of modern nationalism it legitimised kingships. In Burma it was used to legitimise republican nationalism. In Thailand nationalism, royalty, and Buddhism fused, as they did temporarily in Cambodia until 1970, and in Laos until 1975. Only the Khmer Rouge revolution in Cambodia followed the orthodox Stalinist line of stamping out religion. In Laos, on the other hand, the new communist state displaced Buddhism from its previously preeminent legitimizing role, making it a subordinate but nevertheless important element of its nationalist ideology. The uses of Buddhism as a legitimating ideology in Laos have been discussed expertly elsewhere (Lafont 1982; Bucknell and Stuart-Fox 1982; Stuart-Fox 1984). These sources have shown how the Lao communists reconciled Buddhist doctrine with their own rudimentary Marxism-Leninism, through a focus on relations between the organization of the Buddhist monkhood, the Sangha, and the state. They pondered issues such as whether ‘other-worldly’ Buddhism is compatible with ‘materialistic’ Marxism. Such doctrinal questions are not unimportant given the leadership role of the monkhood in the country, yet it is interesting to note that monks were less resistant to changes in religious practices than the population at large (Lafont 1982:157). The ‘dialectic of practical religion’ (Leach 1968) proved a greater obstacle to change. In Thailand a strong alliance between the Sangha and the state has allowed the promotion of Buddhism as well as quasi-state-sponsored centralizing and intellectual reforms of religion (Keyes 1971). More recent reform movements have sprung from the growing urban middle classes, who have urged further rationalizations of religion, in particular purging Buddhism of its ‘folk’ superstitions. In Laos, by contrast, neither the state nor the Sangha as a bureaucratic body have ever been very powerful, even among the lowland ethnic Lao peasants. The intellectual sophistication of the Sangha was low, and the interrelationship between Buddhism and various forms of spirit worship shaded off into pure spirit worship as the limits of both state power and the Sangha were reached among the various highland ‘tribal Tai’. Practical rather than doctrinaire Buddhism is the norm (Zago 1976). The relatively weak relationship between the traditional Lao state and the Sangha and the latter’s lack of intellectual sophistication probably accounts for the receptiveness of the Sangha to communist attempts to rationalize its doctrines. Given the modernizing spirit of the communist government and its ‘scientific’ hostility to superstitious practices, it is perhaps not surprising to find that its general approach was endorsed by Thailand’s modernist Buddhists, the followers of Buddhadasa:(1982:462)
These latter are of the opinion that since 1975, Lao Buddhism has freed itself of those false beliefs that have encumbered the Buddhism of other Indochinese countries. As proof, they point to the prohibition of the spirit cult (worship of phi). These monks believe that Lao Buddhism is reverting to the Buddha’s original teaching through the labours of the committee of monks entrusted with revision of the scriptures, all of whose distinguished members are men of religious conviction and undisputed spiritual influence. They believe these reforms, once implemented, will permit the Buddha’s true doctrine to be understood.In fact, communist attempts to curtail ‘superstitious practices’ failed, as we have already seen in the case of the boun bang fay. Moreover, to the degree that the state attempted to control the activities of the Sangha it led many people to have greater recourse to the less controllable local spirit cults who, significantly, had been the target of earlier centralization strategies in Thailand. Monks who objected to stricter control in Laos sometimes left the vats (a vat is a temple or monastery) to become forest monks. The unpredictable movements of some of these monks meant that people came to believe that they could appear and disappear at will and possessed magical powers. The new government in Laos tried to accommodate Buddhist teachings and morality to certain socialist ideals concerning egalitarianism and work for the common good. The concept of the ascetic, selfless person working for a higher existence is the folk model of a good person in rural Laos, and this model influenced the new regime’s concept of the ‘New socialist man’. Most ethnic Lao party members remain active Buddhists, and I have observed persons who have held ministerial positions in the Government walking around shirtless in their homes with gold and jade Buddhist pendants dangling around their necks, and this support for Buddhism was not just political expediency. Speaking to a gathering of monks in late 1976, the then Deputy Premier and Minister of Education, Sports and Religious Affairs Phoumi Vongvichit said:(Lafont 1982:159)
The Lord Buddha gave up all his worldly possessions and became an ordinary person with only an alms bowl to beg food from other people. That meant that he tried to abolish classes in his country and to create only one class—a class of morally conscious people.... We can see now that the revolutionary politics practised by the Lord Buddha have the same goals.Variations on this theme were propagated throughout the country by cadres and by monks. The radical monk Khamtan Thepboualy provided a popularization in his The Lao Sangha and the Revolution (1975). The monks came to play an enhanced role in post-revolutionary Laos as educators in literacy campaigns which were conducted for older people in the vats. This traditional educational role had been declining since the 1950s as secular schools came into existence (Taillard 1974), but the exodus of many educated people after 1975 as refugees threw the regime back into reliance on the monkhood (Lafont 1982). Thus in some respects the role of the Sangha was bolstered in the new situation, even though Buddhist teachings were banned from primary schools. The monks also became an important voice for the new regime’s policies in the countryside, including the promotion of agricultural cooperatives. The idea of using the Sangha in this way was not new. Prior to 1975 various advisers in both Laos and Thailand had sought to involve the Buddhist monkhood in economic development programmes (Niehoff 1964; Boutsavath and Chapelier 1973; cf. Mulder 1973). Modernist reformist Buddhism in Thailand argues similarly for a socially engaged Buddhism (Jackson 1989; Sivaraksa 1985). In 1976 both pragmatic and doctrinal pressures combined in the government’s attempt to forbid ordinary people from supporting monks through daily food offerings. This was part of a campaign against ‘parasitism’ in a poor and underdeveloped country, and the monks were encouraged to establish gardens and work for their food.[98] The context was one of poor harvests and food shortages during the first years of the regime. There were, naturally, doctrinal objections by Buddhists. Monks were not supposed to be preoccupied with mundane material concerns such as obtaining food, and if they worked in the fields they risked taking life accidentally. However, a much more important popular objection was that by attempting to ban the giving of food to monks the regime was depriving people of an opportunity to make merit. This popular resistance caused a progressive retreat by government and local authorities. First, the authorities said only rice could be offered. Later they attempted to bring the giving of food within the purview of the state by promising in some instances themselves to provide vats with rice, or some local authorities attempted to allocate responsibility for the provisioning of monks on a daily basis either to specific families or to small village units (khum). Although some communities in Thailand independently organized a similar allocation of responsibility within the village (Moerman 1966:142), attempts by the state in Laos to regulate the provisioning of the Sangha collapsed. It does, however, seem that in the Lao case the question of whether the monks should help provision themselves or not was less a question of doctrine than necessity. In poorer areas it was not considered outrageous if monks partially provisioned themselves—the alternative being deserted vats.[99] Even as late as 1987 some monks (and any nuns present) close to the capital Vientiane cooked for themselves. They have adjusted to the new situation’, I was told by village officials. From the point of view of the lay person, what was important was the opportunity to earn merit by giving food to the monks on their daily rounds or to the vat. Attempts to close off this opportunity to make merit were more important a threat to the villagers than doctrinal reforms. Much more effective, however, was state disapproval of spending on celebrations or on the upkeep of vats. Until the mid-1980s many vats needed repairs and those which were only half finished at the time the communists took power stood grey and roofless for fifteen years. To finance or to contribute to the building of a temple earns great merit, and usually only well-off people can afford such outlays. Most of these people left Laos after 1975, and the few wealthy people made a point of not displaying their wealth. Some poorer people said they welcomed a respite from the competitive merit-making cycle, but this is once again in full swing in and around Vientiane. *** Ceremonial Redistribution Before 1975 surpluses among Lao peasants were often directed into maintaining the vat, and ceremonial outlays and expenditures on festivals were a well-established means for redistributing wealth in the villages through the medium of the temple. By contributing to the vat the donor acquired both religious merit and social prestige. Merit-making (het boun) is fundamental to popular Theravada Buddhism in Laos and in the neighbouring countries. As one man said, ‘real Buddhists’ are the ones who throw lavish ceremonies. Popular Buddhism is not theologically sophisticated, and it is, by and large, not focused on world renunciation and the ultimate aim of Buddhism, the attainment of niphan (nirvana). Most ordinary Lao peasants have a general understanding of the doctrine of kam (karma) as a tally of an individual’s merit and demerit acquired in previous lives and in the present. Merit is earned by following Buddhist morality and by supporting the Sangha, the symbol of Buddhist ideals in the midst of the villagers’ everyday life. Karma is not understood as a fatalistic doctrine of predestination, but is something that can be ‘worked’ on to improve one’s chances and well-being both in this life and the next. The most unambiguous and socially registered way of making merit is by giving to the Sangha and by holding ceremonies in the vat. The doctrine of karma as a kind of fatalism is usually only invoked to help explain events beyond the control of the individual—sudden misfortune, or a windfall of good fortune. However, recourse is made regularly to various spirits and their mediums—moh dam and nang tiam—to assist with the unpredictable contingencies of everyday life. In fact, popular religion in Laos, as Condominas has demonstrated so well (1970; 1975), is fundamentally Buddhist-spirit cult syncretism. While the literature on Theravada Buddhism in South-east Asia places great stress on its supposed individualism, merit-making is a profoundly social activity in rural villages. The daily rounds of the monks in the village are not just occasions for individual demonstrations of support for the Sangha. They are also highly visible displays of the commitment of the whole community. Furthermore, merit-making of this kind is generally conceived as household support for the Sangha. This is achieved through the general belief in merit-transference so fundamental to popular Buddhism in Laos and Thailand (Keyes 1983a). That is, meritorious actions carried out by one person in the household, or a near relative, or a member of the village, can be transferred to another person or persons who can be either living or dead. Key ritual events, such as the induction of monks into the Sangha or funerals are occasions on which broader networks are activated to provide support. Thus the son of a poorer family can approach a relatively distant relative to sponsor his entry into the Sangha, an act that will earn the donor merit. Throughout Laos religious events are still the principal ones which punctuate the annual cycle of rice-growing. As numerous observers have noted, these festivals provide a moral-religious focus for a village or villages, and are occasions for people from other villages to visit relatives or friends in the host village and for courting. Bouns (usually religious festivals) are forms of ceremonial consumption, and they earn merit as well as social prestige for the host. Christian Taillard comments on the importance of these celebrations:(Appendix in Ling 1979:149)
The dynamic of the boun overcomes antagonisms and contributes to the piep (good-will) of social life. The individual who accumulates more material goods than others, even at their expense, will then have them redistributed among the community through the vat. This levels individual wealth and maintains a socio-economic equilibrium between the various households. By transposing social competition from a material plane to a spiritual plane, the vat establishes a new logic of prestige: the more this is striven for the more wealth is redistributed and the more solidarity is reinforced. Thus a dynamic of redistribution is established whereby competition is no longer a problem but in fact reinforces village solidarity.Buddhist ritual and ceremonies dramatize social and economic reciprocity within the village. Thus merit-making in all its forms plays a basic social role in village life, and its disruption threatens to break a vital filament in the social fabric of the village. One boun khong bouat held for the induction of a monk into the Sangha in 1982 in a village in my research area just outside Vientiane provides a good example of the ceremonial liquidation of wealth. It was given by an elderly widow in memory of her husband, and her young son was becoming a monk to acquire merit for her. The boun itself lasted two days. The first day was taken up with the preparation of the food and gifts to be presented to the Sangha at the vat the following day, the shaving of the youth’s head, well-wishing, and praying. The men prepared a Phasat to which money was appended, while women prepared the food and villagers helped in the general preparations. The bulk of the expense fell on the widow, but relatives and friends also made substantial contributions. This particular boun khong bouat cost 28, 000NK (US$2,800). Matched against the annual earnings of the very highest income-earners in the village, this amounted to approximately five years’ cash income expended on one festival. At that time approximately thirty boun khong bouat were held in the district (tasseng) annually, and considerable wealth was ‘unproductively’ consumed in socialist Laos, despite government calls for thrift. Large sums were also spent on the upkeep of religious monuments or the building of new ones. For example, on the far side of a nearby village, a craftsman and his assistant were employed full-time constructing a 6-metre high Buddha adjacent to an existing vat. People often said that they did not have as much money for the vat as before 1975, and spent what money they had on consumer items. The old headman of another village in the district, who was an active parishioner, complained about the shortage of money because he wished for a better vat in his village. Ngai, the head of the cooperative in the same village, claimed that there had been a significant decline in the number of ceremonies related to the agricultural cycle since 1975. Asked if this was due to Government discouragement, he replied that an empty stomach was the main reason, a boun could cost up to three or four months of a farmer’s income. It appears, however, that after 1975 there was also less social pressure on people to compete for prestige by throwing bouns, largely as a result of Government discouragement and because people did not wish to draw the state’s attention to any wealth they possessed. By frowning on the ‘wastefulness’ of religious ceremonies the government may have inhibited a levelling mechanism in the Lao village. After all, it is a common view in Laos and in neighbouring Thailand ‘that a rich man should spend his money’ (Moerman 1966:153). *** Reciprocity and Solidarity In Laos the state-socialist context has structured the patterns of peasant economic action. Its restrictions on the private accumulation of wealth and on market transactions ensured that traditional patterns of religious spending continued there. Indeed, the contraction of the market and the resurgence of the ‘natural economy’ made villages relatively more autarchic and increased the importance of traditional mechanisms of solidarity such as those centred on the vats. It was hoped that the cooperatives would become the centre of village administration, but they never did. Some cooperatives displaced the vat temporarily as an important centre for secular village affairs (especially if the cooperative had electricity for meetings at night), but community identity remained fixed on the vat, and its status, rather than that of the cooperative, was considered the primary index of a village’s standing and accumulated merit. Why didn’t the cooperative become a focus for village solidarity? The reasons are multiple, and elsewhere I have given a detailed analysis of the contradictions which arose between the peasant economy and the attempts to establish a collectivized agricultural sector (Evans 1990). The latter ultimately disintegrated because it tried to rearrange peasant production without being able to introduce substantial technological improvements. This not only complicated the peasants’ lives unnecessarily but also led to a fall in production, and to the extent that the cooperatives were economically unsuccessful there was less income available for merit-making. This added significantly to their unpopularity, although it could hardly be construed as a fundamental reason for the failure of the cooperativization programme in Laos. Would the cooperativization programme been any more successful had it tried to mobilize Buddhist ideology and practices in order to legitimize the programme? In the final chapter of my book I discussed the problems that voluntary cooperatives have in establishing an ideology that will justify claims made on the individual and the family by the cooperative. In this regard I suggested that the cooperative was at a disadvantage compared with the peasant household, whose solidarity and claims could be presented as ‘natural’ in contrast to the culturally constructed claims of the cooperative. ‘Claims beyond the “natural” ones of kin require different justifications, such as appeals to community, ethnicity, religious duty, nationalism, or revolutionary duty. To compete with or supersede the primordial imperatives of the household these superior claims must be either compelling or compulsory’ (Evans 1990: 216). The socialist Government appealed, of course, to the concept of the ‘new socialist man’, which admittedly had been given a light Buddhist gloss, in its attempt to confirm the cooperatives’ superior claims. Yet it is doubtful that state arguments would have been any more compelling had they upgraded the Buddhist elements into something approximating a Buddhist-socialist ideology, primarily for the economic reasons I have outlined very briefly above—cf. Cohen’s (1984) analysis of grass-roots Buddhist attempts at collective action in Thailand. No doubt the cooperatives could have attempted to integrate themselves into religious festivals and openly begun collective merit-making alongside the individual merit-making of its members. However, just as the failure of the cooperatives to lift peasant productivity undermined its economic rationality, collective merit-making would have undermined its role as a public accumulator of capital in the countryside and simply duplicated what was already being done by its members. Of course, had the cooperatives been economically successful, then they might have been able to enhance their success by collective participation in merit-making, but that did not happen. There is a striking homology between the structure of the peasant economy and the structure of merit-making and ceremonial redistribution in the traditional system. Despite Buddhism’s otherworldly claims, ordinary peasants in Laos and Thailand are not enamoured of poverty and would like to be better off than they are. The organization of the peasant economy does allow good farmers to get ahead both through hard work and through an ability to mobilize the labour of the family and broader kin, and of friends, at crucial times in both the domestic and work cycle. Farmers who do well not only gain respect as good farmers but they are also more able to sponsor meritmaking and thereby share their good fortune and acquire prestige as people who have accumulated merit. The rewards for being a good farmer are socially recognized and reinforced by the local community through the medium of the vat. Lao peasant farmers, in trying to balance out their labour requirements seasonally and throughout the domestic cycle of their household, enter into various traditional labour-exchange arrangements, with occasionally some wage-labour at the margin (Evans 1990: chap. 6). Farmers are involved in complex strategic and short-term decisions about the type of reciprocal obligations they can enter into, and these vary according to the composition of the household, its place in the system of village stratification, and so on.(1977:78)
Not surprisingly labour tends to be mobilized along already existing lines of kinship. Bilateral kin who happen to have neighbouring rice fields are ideal labour-exchange partners, and, of course, for practical reasons neighbours in the field who are not kin are also ideal partners. But, given the importance of the idiom of kinship, attempts will often be made to establish some distant or quasi-familial link.As Moerman (1966) observes, bilateral kinship allows a wide range of possible ties which can be activated or strengthened through social action. The formation of relatively stable labour-exchange groups is one strategy, and these may be reinforced ceremonially. Thus the selection of a sponsor for a boun khong bouat may confirm a kinship link which can be used either to form or strengthen a relationship of reciprocity in the paddy fields. These arrangements are designed to stabilize and potentially enhance the peasant farm’s productivity. It is a system in which ‘rough reciprocity’ is designed in such a way that everyone comes out ahead, and therefore this delicately tuned social mechanism is a crucial part of the incentive structure of the peasant economy (Evans 1990:146—7). Buddhist ceremony and merit-making facilitate these important relationships within the peasant economy and ensure their effectiveness. In this way Buddhism can allow the expression of both private household and broader social interests to be articulated in transcendent terms—precisely the form of ideology that the communist Government was searching for. Cooperatives, on the other hand, made abstract appeals to the ethics of ‘socialist man’ and to nationalism—‘building and strengthening the nation’ —neither of which strikes any deep chords in Lao villages. They also tried to construct a system of prestigious prizes to reward cooperatives and cooperative members. The cooperatives I studied all had pinned to the wall various certificates emblazoned with the Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic laurel congratulating them on their success in production or their patriotism for selling such-and-such a quantity of rice to the state, and so on. It is fairly easy to understand why these awards did not carry the same aura or prestige as acquired individual merit. The awards were usually held collectively, which meant that they reflected only distantly on each member. As far as I could discern, they reflected most strongly on the cooperative heads and in diminishing amounts down from him in what remains a finely graded hierarchical society. But awards from the state still carry much less prestige in the Lao villages than the awarding of prestige to a person by the local community, which is what happened traditionally through the medium of the local vat. The modern state and its system of values is still remote from the world of the villagers in Laos, and while it has clearly gained ground under the socialist regime it is still secondary in the local milieu. If the Sangha ever had been put in a position where it could grant merit to the members of cooperatives for selling rice to the state, it is still unlikely that this would have significantly lifted the prestige of these state awards. It is more likely that such a step would have downgraded the prestige of the Sangha. Members of cooperatives were tempted into channelling their funds in traditional ways by sponsoring bouns. Cooperative leader Ngai boasted that under the new regime only the cooperatives had large enough yields to throw bouns, whereas in the past it was the better-off peasants. Here the head of a cooperative of predominantly landless peasants (see Evans 1990, chap. 5 for details) was dreaming the dream of a traditional well-off peasant. In fact, cooperatives spent little on religious activities. When the cooperative main shed was first completed, monks were brought in and a ceremony was held to bless it. If the ‘socialist’ peasantry had their way, ‘socialist’ merit-making would have become integrated into the cooperatives, but what would become of socialist accumulation then? Cooperatives also threw people together as individuals, expecting them to work as one big happy family. Many peasants complained about this because it robbed them of the ability to make choices about those with whom they would engage in reciprocal labour exchanges. The cooperatives therefore disrupted a crucial element in the incentive structure of the peasant economy, to replace it with, first, moral and political exhortation, and secondly, a work-point ‘cash-nexus’ incentive structure which had little point to it in an agrarian system in which no basic technological change had been introduced. Ironically, the cooperatives ended up reinforcing ‘individualism’ through their failure to construct a rationale for transcendent bonds. Hence the cooperatives rapidly collapsed back into the peasant economy as soon as state pressure was eased. As far as gender relations are concerned, I argued in my book that Lao women had fewer interests in participating in cooperativization campaigns than women elsewhere (for example, in China or Vietnam) because they already had clear access to land, while collectivization was likely to divest them of both ownership and control of land by placing it in the hands of male officials (Evans 1990:129—33). Furthermore, the promotion of trading cooperatives also threatened the important role of women in trade. In this regard we can suggest that collectivization threatened Lao women’s opportunities for merit-making more than it did men’s, and in a context where, theologically, they had greater need for merit (cf. Kirsch 1982). This could only have reinforced their reasons for resistance to socialist reorganization of the economy. Significantly, in Laos the trading cooperatives have been no more successful than the agricultural producer cooperatives. *** Conclusion In Lao villages the economic role of Buddhism has been complex. Given the importance of merit-making in the traditional system, Buddhism could act as a stimulus to economic action which, however, had as its aim the accumulation of merit not capital. In this sense it discouraged accumulation in the interests of either socialism or capitalism. At a practical level Buddhism was more resistant to intrusive socialist attempts to reorganize the peasant economy because these tried to inhibit meritmaking and disrupted religiously mediated bonds of solidarity which were so vital to the peasant economy. Besides the fundamental economic failure of the cooperatives, these institutions were unable to develop substitute bonds of solidarity. Although capitalist developments in the rural economy and reformed Buddhism elsewhere also undermine the moral economy of the villages, these changes operate with a hidden hand rather than a heavy hand, and changes occur piecemeal rather than in one fell swoop. Therefore they engender less uniform peasant resistance than socialism. Under capitalism, gradual changes in relations between villagers are likely to be traced as shifts in individual merit, and so Buddhism is able to act as an ideology which rationalizes the disintegration of the moral economy while simultaneously being used to police it. [94] I would like to thank Charles F.Keyes for comments on a draft of this chapter. More information about the fieldwork on which it is based can be found in Evans 1988, 1990. [95] The only dissenting voice is Thomas Kirsch, who argues that women are relatively prominent in village economic action in Thailand compared with men because of ‘Buddhist devaluation of economic endeavours in general’ (1982:28). Men are involved in a ‘flight from the world’. He does observe that women are more diligent merit-makers than men because of their greater need for merit, but he does not connect this with their economic diligence. Thus, on balance, Buddhism is not important for economic action in Kirsch’s argument. [96] I found only one case of a household attempting to free itself from broader community obligations. It took the form of a conflict between the vat (temple monastery) and a spirit belonging to a nang tiam (female spirit medium). The spirit resided in the house and had a special small room dedicated to it, and it was claimed by this household that the spirit did not like them giving contributions to the vat. Consequently they were able to minimize their communal religious outlays. Generally, however, such spirits do not directly compete with Buddhism in this way (Tambiah 1970). [97] Such a response was observed by Spiro in Burma: ‘From the traditional Burmese monarchy to the present military dictatorship, confiscation of private wealth has been a consistent policy of almost all Burmese governments...these factors alone have served throughout Burmese history to channel savings into religion’ (1982:462). [98] Lafont (1982:156) notes that similar criticisms had been voiced about the monkhood prior to 1975. [99] Poor areas of Thailand have also faced the same dilemma: ‘in some poorer areas, especially the Northeast, the practice of maintaining a vat and its resident monks is economically impossible.. Life, without institutionalized religion or monks, in this region is a distinct possibility’ (Mulder 1973:9). This was also true for many parts of Laos. *** References(Evans 1990:140)
The process of living and working in socialist collectives was to modify the peasants’ most deeply held values and ideas, and the very structure of their thinking would be revised and re-established on a new basis.... New structures were to replace the old: collectives were to replace the lineage. Collective ownership was to ensure economic and social equality, and to eliminate the exploitative class nature of the lineage. Equality was to be established between men and women.. Competition was to be replaced by cooperation, and labour was to be fairly rewarded.On the face of it, the lineages had been permanently destroyed and replaced by the collectives. Yet between 1980 and 1985, ancestral tombs of the apical lineage ancestors of Zengbu’s three villages were rebuilt, and ceremonies were held before them on the usual traditional occasions. The Liu lineage of Pondside rebuilt its central ancestral hall. Symbolic expressions of lineage competition, such as the dragon boat races, where each boat is manned by members of a single lineage, were revived as well. The lineages and their symbolic trappings had returned. (Qian and Xie (1991) document a similar resurgence of traditional lineages in Central China.) This presented an important problem in the anthropological analysis of the Chinese social order. How had lineage structure persisted over four decades, in the face of concerted efforts of revolutionary praxis to destroy it? Plainly, the changes which had been put into effect, although the Chinese experienced them as fundamental and sweeping, were not of a profound enough order to bring about the deeper structural change that was needed. Basic conceptions of the relationship between rights to property, residence rules, and descent, that were characteristic features of the old corporate patrilineages, had persisted throughout the Revolutionary period unchanged and unchallenged. The fundamental structural conception that property should be owned and managed corporately by groups of co-resident, patrilineally related men, which had been the ideational basis for lineage structure, had continued to be the basis for all the socialist collectives designed and implemented in Zengbu by the party since 1949. It could even be argued that when property was transferred from household and lineage ownership to collective ownership, the structural form of the lineage as whole, at the very deepest level, was actually strengthened by the Revolution. The structural assumptions which were the basis of the traditional lineages had retained amazing power over the minds of Maoist revolutionaries. As the party cadres created socialist collectives in the Chinese countryside, they were impelled by their own unconscious assumptions about the nature of social relationships. They did not question the basic elements of the social life they knew: patrilocality, patrilineality, and corporate ownership of property. Unthinkingly, they created socialist collectives which shared the fundamental qualities of the old order. Once again, material interests of patrilineally related men who owned property in common, albeit under a new collective system, provided a material basis that sustained the traditional pattern in the face of deliberate efforts at planned social change. The new context did not prevent efforts to challenge the material interests of the patrilineally related men who formed the collective from being resisted. For example, the possibility of matrilocal residence, which had been advocated by the Dongguan county Women’s Federation in 1979 as an appropriate way of making the revolutionary changes needed to improve the weak structural position of women, was rejected by the Zengbu cadres. Their argument was the classic one expressing the interests of a strong corporate patrilineal system: they did not want to share their scarce land and other property with in-marrying men. Under the patrilocal residence rule, women born in Zengbu had only three months after marriage to transfer affiliation to the collectives of their husbands. After that time they had no further rights to work and to rice rations in Zengbu, in spite of the fact that they had been born there. If they wished to divorce, they did not retain rights to rejoin the collective. This rule rendered divorce difficult and rare. There had been no revolutionary change at all in the assumption that women were not real members of their own families, lineages, or collectives, but temporary adjuncts, who would marry out and became absorbed into their husbands’ kin and social groups. Thus, the new order reproduced the conditions that had placed women in such a weak structural position in the context of the old lineage system, and prevented basic improvements in their status. It is clear, then, that throughout the Maoist period, from Liberation to the early 1980s, the basic structures of the lineage were preserved, and that in a fundamental sense the socialist collective was a structural simulacrum of the old lineage. Leach comments, in speaking of the relationship between kinship and property in Ceylon: ‘Kinship is not a “thing in itself”. The concepts of descent and affinity are expressions of property relations which endure through time.... A particular descent system simply reflects the total process of property succession as effected by the total pattern of inheritance and marriage’ (1961:11). The lineages as unitary corporate groups have been reinforced by the rise of the collectively owned rural industries which are a major feature of the economy during the post-Mao period (Fei 1989). Freedman has drawn to our attention the fact that the strength of the south-eastern Chinese lineages, and of their sub-branches was directly related to the amount of collective property they owned (Freedman 1958:48, 128—32). This remains true (and not simply in the East and South-east; see Unger and Xiong 1990). The existence of corporate property, in the form of collectively owned rural industries or other enterprises, strengthens the solidarity of the lineages and villages in which it occurs. Throughout China, the absence of such industry results in poorer, weaker, and less solidary lineages. The management of collectively owned property is carried out according to traditional assumptions for dealing with such matters: property is allocated to individual households, in some cases by competitive bidding, just as lineage property was distributed in the days before Liberation (see Potter and Potter 1990:267). The traditional lineage village was a competitive arena where fraternally related families competed for power, wealth, and prestige. The return of the household as the basic economic unit under the post-Maoist system recreates this situation, and the competition is resulting in a new process of class differentiation. It is too early to say whether competitive segments within the lineage will build branch halls or create branch ancestral estates. It is not yet clear how much of the specific content of the old lineages will reappear in the newly redifferentiating post-Maoist lineage collectives. Thus, although there have been surface changes in the lineage system of Zengbu’s villagers since 1949, the deep and largely unconscious structural patterns of the lineage have exhibited continuity, a continuity that was never fundamentally attacked by the Revolution, and which is being reinforced by the post-Maoist policies. The claims of Levi-Strauss and of Sahlins (1976) that structures have a way of persisting in people’s minds over generations in the face of changing historical events are certainly confirmed. Marx’s insistence that a society can never be fundamentally changed without changing its economic base is also confirmed. *** The Local Elite In Imperial times, the dominant elite in rural Chinese society was the gentry, consisting of degree-holding graduates of the nationwide civil service examinations. The power of the gentry class was derived from the private landlord families and powerful landowning lineages from which its membership was recruited. The gentry represented the landowning families and lineages to the imperial bureaucracy, and furthered the interests of the landowning class, especially in dealings with peasants. The gentry participated in the exploitation of local tenants, sometimes even collecting taxes from them (J.Potter 1968:22—4). Following the fall of the dynastic order at the turn of the twentieth century (Potter and Potter 1990: 53, 255), the gentry were transmuted into a class of landlords, bureaucrats, and local despots who dominated rural Chinese society. Both the gentry under the imperial dynasties and the landlord-bureaucrat-local despot class of the Republican period were political hinge groups. They mediated between the peasants and the state; their power rested upon a combination of an independent rural economic base and political connections with the ruling government bureaucracy outside the village. Following the land reform and the destruction of the preRevolutionary elite, party members were recruited from the poorest and most oppressed classes of the peasantry, and new party branches were established in the village to carry out the programmes of the new government. A new local elite of party cadres came into being. Throughout the Maoist period this local elite owed its position to political power obtained from membership in and connections to the national party organization; it did not, in the Maoist years, have its own material class base. The Maoist local cadres exerted great power over the peasants. From the point of view of social control, Maoist Zengbu was a kind of bureaucratic feudalism. Beginning in the late 1950s, the peasants were required to labour on behalf of the collective in the villages in which they lived, and under the direction of the local cadres, and were not allowed to seek alternative employment under other auspices or elsewhere (see below). In formal organizational terms the party’s power penetrated to the lowest levels in Chinese rural society (Potter and Potter 1990:270–82). In spite of their formal political position, however, the rural party cadres of Zengbu were not merely subservient tools of a monolithic and totalitarian system of bureaucratic domination, as other observers have tended to depict them (for example, Siu 1989). The brigade-level cadres in particular were mediators between the peasantry and the higher levels of the state and party bureaucracy. There are numerous examples of circumstances in which local level cadres modified the implementation of party policy as they thought best, or as they were forced to do by the exigencies of local conditions. For example, during the Great Leap Forward, the local party secretary cushioned the peasants from the disastrous consequences he foresaw as a result of the party’s requirement that rice be close-planted; he could not prevent close-planting, but he had the peasants plant peanuts and cassava, thus averting starvation. Following the Great Leap Forward, the villagers of Zengbu, under the leadership of their own party secretary, took the initiative in building a breakwater around their low-lying peninsula, so as to secure their fields from floods. This action was taken after state cadres at the commune level, who had previously requisitioned the labour of the people of Zengbu in order to help build embankments for other brigades, reneged on a promise to provide such labour to Zengbu in return. In the early 1960s, the local cadres experimented, not at the state’s direction, but on their own initiative, with household production systems much like those now in effect. During the Cultural Revolution, local cadres challenged the pre-eminence of the state-supported Red Guards. During the 1970s, Zengbu cadres openly criticized the restrictive Maoist economic policies which were constraining local prosperity. During the birth-planning campaigns, the local cadres informed the upper levels unambiguously that some of their more radical policies could only be enforced in weakened form, if at all. It is true that cadres were sometimes forced to act against local interests, but they were by no means ciphers, and made active efforts to oppose unworkable policies. The Chinese political system is best conceptualized, not as an Oriental despotism stronger than society itself, which erodes away all peasant institutions, along the lines proposed by Wittfogel, but as a system of policy bargaining. Under this system, party committees at the various administrative levels negotiate with higher levels over the degree of implementation of central policy. The peasants of Zengbu have some representation of their views, reactions, and interests, as their reaction to policy is transmitted by the local cadres up through the party bureaucracy. The party Central Committee does not have, and never has had, complete and absolute control (Potter and Potter 1990:271). Throughout Zengbu’s recent history there has been a process which we have termed ‘bureaucratic segmentation’, in which peasants and lower- level cadres try to proliferate levels of decision between themselves and the higher level ‘order-givers,’ so as to insulate themselves from direct confrontation with the higher levels of the bureaucracy and to allow for bargaining in the implementation of policy—this analysis supports Shue (1988) and Oi (1989) rather than Siu (1989); see Potter and Potter (1990: 79). In the early 1980s, the post-Mao reforms with their administrative reorganization of the countryside and their attempt to separate economic management from political control threatened the positions of the entire cadre stratum by depriving its members of function and reward. The cadres, however, successfully manipulated the new changes so that they retained power and social position and bolstered them with new-found wealth. For example, local cadres have undertaken to manage the new Hong Kong capitalist factories established in Zengbu, and they receive salaries and bonuses sufficient to provide them with a material basis for their power and prestige. They retain control over the new village and township assemblies, and they have managed to bid successfully for contractual rights over many of the former collective enterprises; see also Huang (1989) and Unger and Xiong (1990). The post-Mao reforms have not destroyed the essential importance of the party cadres, and they still maintain substantial control of the countryside. But in adapting to the post-Mao changes, they have had to transform the nature of their stratum. Formerly, their position and legitimacy was based upon their quasi-religious devotion to the party and the Revolution. During the post-Mao period, as the Chinese Revolution’s charisma was routinized, the cadres transformed themselves into a new class of local notables. Allying themselves through business ties and intermarriage with the newly emerging rich peasant class, they now resemble the imperial gentry, or the rural elite of the republican period, in that their power now rests upon local class interests. Now, cadres have their own local material class interests to protect, interests that do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the party or the state. *** A Caste-Like System of Social Stratification Building upon traditional cultural and social prejudice against peasants dating back to Confucius, the Chinese Government, beginning in the late 1950s, created a caste-like system that divided Chinese society into two hereditary status groups—peasants and urban residents. Peasants were required to remain in their villages, owed their labour to their collectives, and were required to produce their own rice rations and other food. They were not allowed to move into any urban area, even into the local market town, except under rare and unusual circumstances. This formidable system of social control was enforced by means of the household registration system, and the associated system under which access to rations of food, clothing, and fuel was provided to urban residents. A peasant had no way of buying food and other necessities in the cities in the absence of the ration coupons issued only to urban residents. The system was initially created to prevent a massive influx of peasants into Chinese cities. As a consequence of this system, the inequalities between peasants and urban residents with regard to food, wealth, prestige, education, social organization, and culture were institutionalized. The best that Maoism had to offer was available to urban residents and not to peasants. Urban residents had guaranteed jobs, rations, health care, good education, and old-age pensions; peasants enjoyed none of these advantages. Classification as a peasant or as an urban resident was inherited from one’s mother; if she was a peasant, one inherited peasant status; if she was an urban resident, one inherited urban status. Intermarriage was rare, as few urban residents would want to marry a peasant. As Sulamith Potter (in Potter and Potter 1990:312) has put it:(Potter and Potter 1990:254–5)
This system is an extraordinary one_. It is a deliberately created system of birth-ascribed status, in the context of a modern socialist state, enforced by bureaucratic methods rather than by custom. It is a system which, in spite of being based on birth ascription, is intended to be temporary rather than perpetual. It is a system in which status is inherited from the mother, in the context of a social order that has always been characterized by strongly patrilineal institutions.The conditions created by these regulations produced a kind of bureaucratic feudalism that is reminiscent of European serfdom. Social mobility for peasants or their children was defined out of existence. Once the regulations governing peasant status were instituted, peasants could leave the village only as a consequence of rare opportunities provided to army veterans, party members, or scholars of exceptional ability. This was a highly significant change in the nature of the social order, created by the Revolution. Needless to say, for the highly competitive and ambitious people of Zengbu, this took most of the zest out of life. There was no way to better one’s own situation except in the context of one’s collective (S. Potter 1983). In the post-Maoist years this caste-like system has been bent but not as yet broken. From the peasant point of view, the most significant reform has been that the collective has relinquished its control over the peasants’ labour power. (This is a more significant reform than the distribution of collective land to the households: the peasants cannot make much money on these miniscule plots under any form of social organization.) During the Maoist period, when the team controlled the peasant’s labour, if a peasant worked either for another collective unit or on an individual basis (as did a village seamstress who sewed clothes for fellowvillagers), wages were paid to the team and not to the peasant. The peasant was then credited not with money, but only with the appropriate number of work-points for that category of labour; this all but eliminated individual incentive. The only situation in which peasant labour was at the peasant’s own disposal, aside from housework, was the cultivation of the household’s garden plots. With the dismantling of the production teams in the early 1980s, the peasants of Zengbu controlled their own labour for the first time since the Revolution. They could grow whatever crops seemed likely to be the most profitable on their fields; they could become pedlars in the local market economy, now freed of restriction; they could bid a tractor from the team and go into the hauling business, and so on. They were also free to seek employment in towns and cities. (Many urban factory managers have hired peasants because they constitute a cheaper work force and receive no benefits, such as pensions.) In formal terms the caste-like system is still in operation, but some migration to find work is now possible. However, temporary peasant migrants are still legally peasants, and do not have permanent rights to reside in town, or to grain coupons and other rations, or to other perquisites of urban residents (see Fei 1989). They purchase their own grain on the open market or bring it from home. (The demand for grain by non-legal residents of cities has turned the grain-rationing coupons of China’s urban residents into a second currency system.) Peasants can be forced to return to their villages at any time if the Government decides to tell them to do so. Peasant migrants from the poorer interior mountain regions of China are also flooding into the more prosperous rural regions, to work as farm labourers and employees. Zengbu in 1985 had a large resident population of migrants from northern Guangdong province. These migrants worked in the local factories or did the lower-status agricultural work for Zengbu villagers, while the latter became wealthy working in the new Hong Kong factories. Labour mobility allowed under the post-Mao reforms has thus eliminated some of the harsher aspects of the caste-like system for peasants. However, the system itself is still very much in existence, and legal status as an urban resident is tremendously desirable to peasants. It is rumoured that peasant troops who agreed to put down the Tiananmen demonstrators were motivated to do so by the promise of legal urban resident status. *** Conclusion Over two-thirds of the villages of Zengbu welcomed the post-Mao reforms. During the post-Mao period, in this most prosperous part of China— although not necessarily in the more disadvantaged regions; see Unger and Xiong (1990) and Hinton (1989)—many of the peasants have become prosperous beyond their wildest dreams. Hundreds of young unmarried women work in the new export factories which are jointly operated by Hong Kong capitalists and local collectives. Other peasants work as pedlars, construction workers, and haulers, and many have sought work elsewhere in the province, some in the special Shenzhen economic zone on the Hong Kong border. They are using their newfound prosperity and social freedom to resurrect their traditional social, cultural, and ritual practices. Over four decades of revolutionary experience, the fundamental goals, values, and view of the world of the peasants of Zengbu have not changed at all. The major goal in life for village families is still to get rich and to raise their status vis-a-vis the other members of their lineage villages. They wish to secure good marriages for their children, to build new houses for their sons, and to live out a culturally ideal old age in comfort, surrounded by their descendants. Probably some residue of revolutionary goals and Utopian dreams remain in the minds of the cadres and some of the young people —but not much. It has all been overwhelmed by the post-Mao prosperity. Although there was much surface flux and change in Zengbu over the thirty-six years between 1949 and 1985, what impresses me most is the remarkable continuity. There have been reforms but not basic changes in marriage patterns; family and kinship patterns remain much the same; the lineages changed on the surface but the deep structural features persisted throughout the Maoist period. The more shallow symbolism displayed by tombs, ancestral halls, and dragon boat races has reappeared in the post-Maoist period. Traditional religious and magical beliefs have returned, and their content and meaning do not appear to have changed. My conclusion is that in spite of three decades of revolutionary efforts at change there has been remarkable continuity in Zengbu social structure and culture—especially at the deepest structural level—and that there has been a flood-tide return of traditional culture and society during the post-Mao period. In the post-Mao period, Western cultural models arriving via Hong Kong are increasingly influential. They are brought in by visiting relatives, by technicians in the Hong Kong factories who come to live in the village, and by television. The pattern of cultural influence that began before the Revolution, and was temporarily interrupted by it, has been resumed. The influence of the world capitalist system is brought to bear, as well. The adoption of Western-style industrialization in the context of the capitalist world market, emanating from Hong Kong, may prove far more productive of social change, particularly concerning of social mobility and urbanization, than the manipulation of peasant social organization ever was. *** References
We love the Communist Party for realizing that a nation can build itself only through the people of its localities who have been born here for hundreds and thousands of years [i.e., not Hungarians, Germans, Jews, or Gypsies] and who do not abandon the front of work when things get tough [i.e., not Germans, emigrating in record numbers]. The Party knows that the highest honours should go not to visitors eager for gain, clad in foul-smelling tartans [a pun on a Romanian word for Jews], Herods foreign to the interests of this nation.... As [nineteenth-century Romanian poet] Eminescu rightly said, ‘A floating population [i.e., Jews and Roma] cannot represent the stability of institutions, cannot represent the deep- rooted sentiment of the idea of the state, of harmony and national solidarity’.Intellectuals like the author of those lines were contributing in their own way to sharpening ethnic ideology, enlivening it for a larger audience, who might find it an unconscious part of their service to clients on another day. What were some of the forces motivating such an intellectual’s performance? *** Bureaucratic Allocation and Nationalist Intellectuals Alongside the economy of shortage, socialist systems like Romania’s had characteristic processes tied to their nature as redistributive bureaucracies. I have described above how organized shortage produced horizontal competition among units at all levels in the system, including individuals as well as enterprises of production, service, and distribution. My examples so far having emphasized the lower levels, I now focus on similar processes of competition higher up, among segments of the bureaucracy, or among units that wanted allocations from the central budget, rather than the specific goods in short supply that I discussed above. Redistribution, Eric Wolf reminds us (1982: chap. 3), is not a type of society so much as a class of strategies implemented through a variety of means. Redistributors must accumulate things to redistribute and, at the same time, build ‘funds of power’. A redistributive logic locates power in the hands of those persons or—in the socialist case—bureaucratic segments that dispose of large pools of resources to redistribute. Socialist bureaucracies consisted of segments and segments within segments. For instance, the Romanian state bureaucracy (as distinct from the party bureaucracy) included the Committee for Socialist Culture and Education, under which were found museums and publishing houses, each with different sections (fiction, history, electronics, and so on). Also part of the state (as opposed to the party) bureaucracy was the Ministry of Education, to which the various universities and research institutes were subordinate. A few research institutes were subordinated instead to the Ministry of Defence or to the bureaucracy of the party, such as its Central Committee. That is, several people engaged in a single kind of activity, such as historical research, might be pursuing their work under the auspices of different bureaucratic segments: in museums under the Committee for Culture, or in research institutes under the Central Committee or the Ministry of Defence, or in university departments under the Ministry of Education. All of these segments needed funds; in centralized systems like Romania’s up to 1989, most or all of their funds came from the centre. Since units at all levels overstated their budgets and hoarded resources, it is no surprise that claims upon the state budget from its various bureaucratic segments were always much bigger than the central budget could support. Therefore, segments competed to get the attention of central planners for their particular request or endeavour, much as departments in a university try to get the attention of their dean or provost for extra money for this or that. Within any given bureaucratic segment, people such as directors of publishing houses or research institutes or heads of university departments had to come up with arguments that would ensure them a sizeable allocation at the expense of their competitors at the same level of segmentation. These processes of bureaucratic competition were not unique to socialism, as my example of university deans makes clear: what was unique to socialism is that this was the major form of competition at the system level, in the absence of the market-based competition that was largely (if differentially) suppressed in most of these societies. Throughout the bureaucracy, then, there was rampant competition to increase one’s budget at the expense of those roughly equivalent to one on a horizontal scale. In the redistributive systems common to literature in anthropology, chiefs redistribute goods to their followers, just as socialist bureaucrats allocate social rewards.[116] The limits on a chief’s power, as on a socialist bureaucrat’s, come from the power of other chiefs to siphon followers away by giving—or creating the impression that they can give— bigger and better feasts or more generous loans. Like chiefs in such redistributive systems, socialist bureaucrats were constantly under pressure not to be outdone by other bureaucrats: they had continually to strive for influence, amass more resources, and raise the standing of their segment of the bureaucracy. Within this context, social actors at all levels had to justify why they, rather than some other actor or unit, should receive allocations. This was true of enterprise managers, local administrative officials, government ministers, editors of publishing houses, individual authors or scholars— that is, the principle was pervasive. Understanding it is fundamental, for only if the basic form of competition is seen in these terms (rather than in terms of competing ‘cultural capitals’, for instance) can we make sense of the various claims upon resources for cultural production, and this is essential to understanding how ethno-national ideologies might enter into the heart of the politicking that went on among intellectuals and the bureaucrats of culture. Persons seeking an allocation from the centre, whether they were individual supplicants or agents of their bureaucratic segment, stood much chance of success only if they couched their appeal in a language congenial to the central allocators. Central allocators in socialist systems were responsive to some sorts of language and not to other sorts. Since they too had to justify their own decisions to a top party leadership claiming to rule in the name of Marxism-Leninism, appeals couched in the language of socialist equity were generally a better bet, say, than appeals invoking efficient production or higher profits—notions not privileged within these systems’ ideologies until the late 1980s. Appeals invoking social progress for all had greater chance than those that invoked developing the talents of a few gifted persons. In Romania of the 1970s and 1980s—and, I would argue, more covertly in other Eastern European countries—it proved increasingly gainful to appeal to national values. The appeal to national values had little to do with socialism per se. In the Romanian case, it conformed, rather, to the evident personal sympathies of the party leadership. But these sympathies were themselves part of a broader project of ‘homogenization’ characteristic of all socialist states,[117] a project in which effacing deviations from the ideal ‘socialist man’ was all too readily conflated with effacing difference of any kind, including ethnic and national difference from the dominant national group. Within such a homogenizing environment, appeals to national values—that is, ethno-national ideology—became a valuable means of building budgets. Although this was visibly the case in Romania, I suspect that the appeal to national values formed a significant part of behind-the-scenes bargaining in other Eastern European countries as well. The outcome was what we might call contests over representativeness, which is to say that different claimants justified their claim by saying that their project, or their version of a project, was more representative of the true national values than someone else’s project or someone else’s version. For example, Romanian literary critics of the 1980s argued bitterly over whether Romanian novels must, or need not, focus on values of ‘the folk,’ seen by some as the true repositories of the Romanian national character. Some critics such as C.V.Tudor, quoted above, defended national values by expelling aliens (Hungarians, Roma, Jews, Germans) from the state and by defining ‘Romanianness’ through indigenist values. Others promoted a definition of Romanianness as European. For both groups, definitions of national identity split the Romanian population itself into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Romanians, meriting inclusion or exclusion in the contest for bureaucratic attention. The result of their arguments might be greater subsidies or eased censorship for one publication (the indigenist Week, say) at the expense of another (such as the pro-Western Literary Romania or Twentieth Century). Contests over representativeness were particularly common, I believe, in the sphere of cultural production. That is, an argument to get funds on the grounds that one’s work supported Romanian national values best was more likely to make sense for the director of a publishing house, say, than for the head of a salami factory or a steel mill (although even the latter could argue that their enterprises were essential to maintaining national independence, and thus to defending national values). Here are two examples of the sort of thing I have in mind. First, a man I know used to head one of the larger publishing houses for academic books. He explained to me in very self-satisfied terms how he had ‘captured’ the job of republishing the corpus of Romania’s most prolific historian, N.Iorga—whose output included an astounding 1,003 volumes and 12,000 articles. When I began to commiserate, he made it clear that this was in fact a real coup, since the budget accompanying this editorial task was huge, and it had not been easy to secure the contract. Among his arguments had been that Iorga is a ‘national treasure’, an endless source of national values that should be made available to Romanians in current editions. Secondly, the same C.V.Tudor mentioned above wrote a long diatribe that was part of a larger attack on the literary critics who produced school manuals (Tudor 1981). He complained about the selection of past writers whom the existing manuals were emphasizing, and he called into question whether these were really the best, the most representative, of Romanian literary values. This complaint was part of a mammoth agenda to overturn the group then dominating the Writers’ Union; it included allegations that, for example, the ‘wrong’ kinds of writers got the literary prizes, and certain works of ‘unquestioned national value’ appeared in tiny press runs while trash about Baudrillard and Levi-Strauss was rotting unsold in bookstores in editions of many tens of thousands. (This kind of complaint constituted a claim not only for a different relationship to censorship and to the budget but also for sizeable allocations of paper—an item in extremely short supply.) Literary critics, then, fought in print about whose idea of Romanian literature was the ‘correct’ idea, so that they could become more central to the institutions through which Romanian culture was produced and to the privileges that this entailed.[118] The importance of this point—that the form of competition most common to producers of culture was contests over representativeness—is that precisely the category of people who had the most influence over what was disseminated throughout Romanian society were likely to be making arguments in the language of national values. A dispute between two heads of salami factories and their superior would probably not make it into the pages of magazines like The Week, to be read by hundreds of thousands of people; but an argument by a contributor to that magazine arguing against some other literary critic’s definition of Romanian identity certainly did. Representativeness was part of what was at issue in other parts of the essay by Tudor from which I quoted briefly above. To make my point in a somewhat over-simplified way: one result of the nature of bureaucratic competition in Romania was that intellectuals and other producers of culture, the chief fashioners of social ideologies, came to emphasize the language of national values more than other sorts of appeals (such as, perhaps, socialism). This made it all the more likely that ideas about ethnicity would enter into the daily behaviour of hairdressers, petrol station attendants, waiters, those who procured materials for factories, and all those others trying to cope with extreme shortage. *** Ethno-Nationalism and the Transition The two organizational points I have emphasized above—the shortage economy and the nature of bureaucratic competition—both clearly suggest how ethno-national ideology and ethnic sentiment might have persisted and even intensified under socialism. They show that, far from having been made socially irrelevant, as Marxism-Leninism anticipated, and far from having been put into the deep freeze for four decades, as today’s comments about the ‘resuscitation of inter-war nationalism’ suggest, national sentiment had considerable room to flourish during the socialist period. The visibility of its flourishing and the spheres of social life in which it was manifest differed from one case to another. In all of them, however, ethno-nationalism was actively reproduced at one or another point in the operation of socialism and in people’s daily experience within it—the experience of intellectuals and other producers of culture, of fashionable women with greying hair, of people standing in bread lines much longer than the supply of bread, of store clerks hiding goods from Hungarian customers to save for their Romanian friends, of office-workers cooling out their non-Romanian office-mates, of collective-farm heads berating their villagers for not contracting a pig ‘as if you weren’t even a Romanian’.[119] Whether national sentiment ‘went public’ depended partly on the interethnic environment in which people experienced these realities, but the potential of ethnic exclusiveness in situations of shortage remained constant. For these reasons one might anticipate that appeals to ethno-national identity will have a place in post-socialist Romania, as well as in other countries of the region. It will be some time before these economies stop being shot through with shortages—that is, before queues for goods are reduced by income differentials and the differentiating effects of targeting different market sectors. Devices that were important in coping with shortage before will not cease to be relevant just because Ceau escu or Honecker or Jaruzelski is no longer in charge. Although post-socialist states are drastically cutting state subsidies for culture, these will continue to be significant in the support of writers and publishing houses—and their diminution makes claims of representativeness even more urgent, as people fight for the small subsidies that remain. The defence of ‘national values’ can also be expected to enter into the marketing of culture, as well, in another form: that of protectionist arguments in favour of promoting cultural products that are local, in preference to those from the West. Such cultural protectionism, in a nationalist language, also characterized earlier periods of imperfect market economies in the region (see Gheorghiu 1985). In a context in which national ideology already has solid purchase, for the reasons I have suggested, there are additional determinants of its perpetuation in post-socialist politics. One relates to the consequences of electoral politics in enclaves where national minorities outnumber the dominant national group. Creed (1990) argues, for example, that during 1989—90 the worst conflicts between Bulgarians and Turks occurred in heavily Turkish regions of Bulgaria, where elections would sweep Bulgarian politicians from power. Deletant (1990) has made a comparable argument to explain ethnic conflict in the Hungarian- dominated region of Tirgu Mure , in Romanian Transylvania. In both cases, to speak of resusci tated ethnic tensions is less accurate than to speak of new threats that ethnic differences pose to local politicians— many being hangers-on from the former regime. A second reason why ethno-nationalism might be expected to remain an active element in post-socialist societies stems from one of the central characteristics of the ‘logic’ of socialist systems. As systems based on bureaucratic redistribution, they were driven by a logic that strove to maximize redistributive capacity—see, for example, Feher et al. (1983); Campeanu (1988)—but this in turn was buttressed by its obverse: the destruction of resources and organizations outside the control of the apparatus. Because a social actor’s capacity to allocate resources is relative to the resources held by other actors, power at the centre would be enhanced to the extent that the resources of other actors could be disabled.[120] Other foci of production had to be prevented from posing an alternative to the central monopoly on goods. Sociologist Jan Gross, in his analysis of the Soviet incorporation of the Polish Ukraine in 1939 (Gross 1988), helps to fill out this idea. Calling the Soviet state a ‘spoiler state’, Gross argues that its power came from incapacitating actual or potential loci of organization, thus ensuring that no one else could get things done or associate for purposes other than those of the centre. As a result, the intermediate space between state and households was cleansed of all independent organizations, anything not controlled by the state—the kinds of organizations that so heavily populate the space of Western societies and that many refer to with the term ‘civil society’. Trade unions, nationality councils, women’s organizations, churches (where possible), social services, and all manner of other associations were either attached to the state, locked in a struggle of cooptation with it, or placed under severe pressure from it. Hence the significance of those few feeble independent organizations formed during the 1970s and 1980s—such as Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77 and VONS, Hungary’s SZETA (for aid to the poor), and various peace movements, Romania’s short-lived SLOMR (free trade union) and Goma movement in support of Charter 77, Poland’s KOR and, most spectacularly, Solidarity—all of them subject to constant persecution. That the destruction of such independent organizations was indeed imperative, from the ‘system’s’ point of view, is clear from the catastrophic consequences that followed from their persistence—and from that of Solidarity, above all. I believe this is specifically relevant to ethnic relations for the following reason. With the fall of communist party rule, ethno-national resentments flare up in an environment maximally unpropitious to managing them, an environment devoid of any intermediate institutions for channelling ethnic sentiments, for settling disagreements peaceably, or for offering alternative means of expressing one’s grievances. To institutionalize ethnicity is not necessarily to defuse it, of course—often precisely the contrary—but it can sometimes none the less help to prevent excesses of the sort now occurring, for example, in Romania. There, the only association formed to articulate the concerns of Transylvania’s Romanians appears to have been either actually formed by or instantly penetrated by former Secret Police operatives, who use the organization in part to embarrass and destabilize the government in Bucharest.[121] Had there existed independent ethnic organizations with their own stable memberships, programmes, and goals, perhaps such speculation by those shadowy figures the ‘revolution’ disempowered would be more difficult. The efficacy of these suspect nationalist associations is, moreover, directly related to the under-development of alternative political organizations. If, as most anthropologists believe, the history of institutional forms influences their future development, then at least some of Eastern Europe’s once-socialist societies are strongly predisposed toward ethnonational conflict. Its roots are not to be sought primarily in ‘age-old enmities’ or in the ethnic relations of the 1930s, contrary to the opinion of many observers. As this chapter has sought to show, national ideology and national sentiments were amply fortified by the political economy of socialism itself. [110] This chapter summarizes the argument made in Verdery (1991a). A somewhat fuller version of the present essay, but not focused on the question of nationality, can be found in Verdery (1991b). Many persons contributed to my thinking on the questions addressed here, and I acknowledge with gratitude not only this collegial assistance but also the two research grants that supported my work: a fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, and three International Research and Exchanges Board grants for research in Romania. [111] I use the cumbersome term ‘ethno-national’ since some of the groups in question might accept the label ‘ethnic’ but many think of themselves rather as ‘nationalities’. Incorporating both possibilities in my label is preferable to a lengthy definitional exercise, which I see as unnecessary to my purposes here. [112] One of the most common explanations for this fact among political scientists was that the Romanian regime, incapable for one or another reason of generating support for itself by any other means, ‘used’ nationalism to legitimate itself. I think this sort of understanding is misguided—or at best, quite incomplete—for it assumes that the major problems facing all political regimes centre on legitimation: on the creation of the consent of the governed, a peculiarly Western political concern. I also believe, but will not further elaborate the argument here, that one reason the Romanian party talked the language of national identity so much more visibly than some of the other East European party leaderships was that it was virtually forced to do so by the institutional embeddedness of the national discourse, in a context in which Marxism had been very feebly developed prior to the Second World War (see Verdery 1991a: chaps 1, 3). [113] The principal inspirations for the model I present are Campeanu 1988; Feher et al. 1983; Konrad and Szelenyi 1979; and Kornai 1980. Fuller discussion can be found in Verdery 1991b. [114] In Romania, for example, ethno-national groups were supposedly accorded proportional representation in governing bodies such as the National Assembly, the party, and the Central Committee. This practice made nationality salient in politics and contributed to such things as politicization of the census. [115] For a population of 22 million, that means about one copy per 200 persons or per 100 adults, leaving out the 2 million Hungarians who would not have been reading this magazine. [116] Clearly, socialism’s bureaucracies were not comparable with redistribution in chiefdoms, yet some of the insights generated from study of the latter may be instructive in examining the former. [117] Several forthcoming papers by Gail Kligman show this process extremely well for Romania. The subject is also taken up in Lefort 1986: chap. 8. [118] See Verdery 1991a: chap. 5, for fuller discussion of this example. [119] This was the language in which the mayor of the village in which I worked in 1985 berated a peasant for not contracting a pig to the collective farm. [120] An alternative solution, characteristic above all of the Hungarian strategy in the mid to late 1980s, would be to co-opt other foci of production, rather than to disable them. Good examples are the formation of VGMKs in Hungarian factories (Stark 1989) and the restoration of share-cropping in collective farms. [121] For a more extended argument to this effect, see Deletant 1990. Similar points emerge also from Verdery and Kligman 1992, although without specific reference to the national question. *** References(S pt mma 1980; emphasis added)
In our country the government and the party have decided that everyone must have a registered work-place, that everyone will get their wages from their work-place. It is said that what these people do [Gypsy women scavenging for discarded industrial produce] is ‘usury’, they practise ‘usury’ with these goods.The regimes of ‘actually existing socialism’ in Eastern Europe did not just fall, they were pushed. Beset as they were by internal contradictions, they might yet have staggered on through another generation were it not for the capacity of ordinary people to conceive of an alternative life and struggle to achieve it. Despite repeated efforts to shore up these systems through egalitarian social and economic policies, they never achieved more than momentary legitimacy. Most commonly the governments of the region were met with active as well as with passive resistance to their efforts to reform society. This case study of Gypsy responses to Hungarian social policy provides one image of the sources of popular resistance to the massive experiment in social engineering undertaken by the socialist governments of the Soviet bloc.[122] For some twenty-five years from 1961 the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (communist) led a vigorous campaign to assimilate the near half-million Gypsy population into the Magyar working class. The aim of the party was to eliminate totally all traces of Gypsy lifestyle and behaviour. This was to be done by removing the conditions which it was thought reproduced Gypsy identity and community, in particular un- and under-employment of Gypsy adults. The Gypsy assimilation programme formed an important plank in the overall social policy of the Hungarian regime for a number of reasons. Gypsies formed the largest single ethnic minority in Hungary. The largest part of this minority was living in conditions of shocking poverty.[123] The state, which was committed to modernization under conditions of social equality and was attempting to renew its socialist pledge after the political disaster of 1956, had to be seen to act.[124] In the context of Stalinist social theory, modernization would be achieved by mobilizing the greatest possible social cohesion and directing this to achieving certain centrally defined goals. When unity is all, then variation (economic, social, political, even cultural) between sections of society is not a source of dynamism but rather threatens conflict and division. The economic, social, and cultural distinctiveness of the Gypsies, a distinctiveness which had been sustained in apparently autonomous Gypsy communities throughout the first decade of socialist rule, appeared greater than that of any other group in society and as such ideologically embarrassing. By 1961 the time had come to put an end to the Gypsies’ waywardness. The result of the assimilationist campaign was, however, more or less the opposite of that intended. Gypsies were as prominent in Hungarian society in 1985 as they had been in 1960. Even worse, as an unintended consequence of its economic policies it seemed as if the communist regime had inaugurated a veritable ‘time of the Gypsies’. The state had managed to create conditions in which, in popular imagination at least, being a Gypsy seemed the most viable way to survive the privations and humiliations of a planned economy. The issues raised by these events concern more than the historical analysis of a single socialist society. First, similar Gypsy policies were pursued in several other socialist societies of Eastern Europe with comparable results.[125] Secondly, socialist governmental practice, both East and West, has been blighted by its use of the state as the source of social reform. The revival of capitalist radicalism in the 1980s derived in part from the way ‘bottom-up’ social processes, notably the market, were harnessed to its cause. The spectacular failure of top-down redistributive social justice which I will describe here was rooted in a theory of social change and of the relation between intellectuals and the people which characterizes much of socialist discourse all over the world. If the socialist project or anything like it is to be renewed, the hard lessons of cases like this will have to be learnt. *** The Campaign to Assimilate Gypsies in Socialist Hungary The campaign to assimilate Gypsies into the Hungarian working class, lasting from 1961 to 1985, began with the adoption by the political committee of the party of a resolution, ‘On the various tasks connected with the improvement of the Gypsy population’s position’ (Mezey 1986). The crux of this resolution was a decision that Gypsies were neither an ethnic group nor a nation.[126] ‘Cultural’ factors did not play a significant role in the reproduction of Gypsies as a distinct population and any attempt to ‘turn [the Gypsies] into a nation’ by encouraging separate language teaching and the like would be misguided (Ban and Pogany 1957:6). Gypsy nationalist programmes were therefore reactionary, as they ‘preserve the separateness of Gypsies and slow down the process of assimilation’ (Mezey 1986:241). All forms of Gypsy selforganization and expression were to be discouraged as likely to encourage a nostalgic and unnecessary attachment to ways of the past.[127] Instead, the existence of Gypsies was attributed to the nature of the feudal and then the capitalist division of labour. Gypsies were characterized less by a culture than by a ‘way of life’ marked out by behavioural traits such as scavenging, begging, hustling, dealing, and laziness. These were the product of their exclusion from the society and the economy of the past, and lay at the root of their otherness. Gypsies had been sustained by the feudal division of labour in which they had played an important role. They had then lost their social importance as capitalist industrialization rendered their skills redundant. By 1960 Gypsies seemed no more than a ‘survival’ of a defunct way of life. The task therefore was to end the conditions which had produced the Gypsy way of life and thereby ensure their disappearance as a separate population. As the communist reformers saw it, the social effects on Gypsies of profound infrastructural changes offered the possibility at that moment in the early 1960s that ‘the Gypsy problem’ could be solved once and for all. Due to changes in the mode of production initiated at the end of the nineteenth century and continued in the early socialist period, the relation of Gypsies to the majority society had changed and become diversified. First, there were those Gypsies who were no longer really Gypsies at all, that is ‘the assimilated’ (beilleszkedett), who had ‘reached the average economic and cultural level of the population, given up the Gypsy lifestyle and for the most part live dispersed. Thirty per cent of Gypsies fit into this category.’ Gypsies ‘in the process of assimilation’ also made up 30 per cent of the total, ‘liv[ing] in hovels on separate settlements at the edge of towns and villages, working for the most part only occasionally; their cultural level is really low.’ Finally there were the non-assimilated (half-settled or wandering (vandor) Gypsies of whom ‘a significant part have absolutely no work, avoid respectable jobs, live day by day, or sponge off society. They frequently change houses and live at the lowest cultural level; most of them are illiterate. Forty per cent of Gypsies belong in this group’ (Mezey 1986: 240; my translation). It was the lifestyle of this last group which expressed the Gypsy way of doing things in its most explicitly anti-socialist form. Of all aspects of their ‘low cultural level’, it was their rejection of permanent engagement in waged labour in favour of the freedoms of self-employment which marked them out. When their economic activities involved craft labour (such as blacksmithing or music-making) this was not in and of itself socially objectionable to communist officials. But when this shifted into ‘wheeling and dealing’ (kupeckedes), its social character changed. Thus a Gypsy offering to mend a peasant’s fence might be tolerated as performing a useful function, but if during his work he noticed, say, a machine in the yard and offered to buy it (in order later to sell it at a profit), this would reveal his tendency to ‘avoid respectable jobs and sponge off society’. Such wheeling and dealing was only a more active and developed form of those behavioural traits such as begging and laziness which were associated with Gypsies’ exclusion from the old division of labour. The aims of the party were that ‘the Gypsies should not live in permanent houses separately from the rest of the population, that they should be permanently employed, their health conditions be improved and their cultural level raised’ (Mezey 1986:242). Once the Gypsies were put to work, their ‘level of civilization’ would rise to a socialist standard and even they would understand the need to leave behind them their anti-social customs. In this process, work discipline, decent housing, and educational achievement would all go together and, as each improved, so Gypsies would become barely distinguishable from other members of Hungarian society. The uncompromising assimilationist campaign attained greatest intensity in the late 1970s at the very time when Gypsy intellectuals had begun to challenge its assumptions and moral basis.[128] These spokespeople argued that Gypsies constituted an ethnic group and as such should be granted certain rights of self-expression. Though these campaigners managed gradually to enlarge the arena for legitimate Gypsy selfexpression, the state maintained its assimilationist campaign in the field I discuss in this chapter—the organization and representation of labour.[129] Before moving to consider this in more detail I should point out that, just as the party in its own terms acknowledged that Gypsies were not a unitary or homogeneous population, I should do the same in sociological terms. To put matters most simply, neither from the point of view of social morphology nor from that of mores (morales) did Gypsies form a single group. Consequently, the results of the socialist state’s policies among them were not the same for each group. It can, however, be fairly generalized that none of the Gypsy populations entirely surrendered either their ‘way of life’ or their distinct identity, nor were any of those who tried the assimilationist road able to shrug off the stigma of Gypsy descent. Of no group was this more true than the Vlach, Romany-speaking Gypsies. These Gypsies were thought by ordinary Hungarians and officials alike to represent the ‘worst’ of the Gypsies. As such they were subject to the greatest pressure to give up their communities and ‘integrate’ into Magyar society. Yet when I lived with such Gypsies in 1985—86 in the agrarian town of Gyongyos in northern Hungary, they virtually flaunted their distinctive identity, and their communities were flourishing. *** From the Top Down: The Socialist Work Ethic Among the various methods of the assimilation campaign it was the plan to set all able-bodied Gypsies to socialist waged work, which was put at the heart of official initiative. This focus on labour corresponded to the three-tiered categorization of Gypsies listed above. The first group was effectively proletarian; the second group would become such if given the chance; the third (with whom the Vlach Gypsies were associated) comprised those who refused regular work, living instead from hand to mouth. By trading in horses and making money in other shady deals the Vlach Gypsies, it was thought, were able to earn a living without sweat or effort. To communist ideologists this looked suspiciously like exploitation of the labour of the ‘productive workers’. According to their reading of Marx’s labour theory of value, Gypsy traders were creating no new value and therefore must be living off the value others had produced. They were, it was said, ‘practising usury’ (uzerkednek). Money ‘won’ thus would, moreover, be spent ‘easily’ rather than accumulated for future productive use. Trading would therefore never provide a solid basis for an increase in wealth, health, education, and general well-being, but could only encourage renewed bouts of profligacy. The experience of socialist labour was offered as a positive contrast to the image of the carefree but outmoded Vlach Gypsy lifestyle. The integration of these Gypsies into the socialist labour force would remedy their wanton way of life, since by working Gypsies would regain the selfrespect they had lost with the elimination of their old craft occupations and discover for the first time the rewards of consistent effort as part of a social group or collective. Their ‘level of civilization’ would thus be transformed. There was more to the party’s theory than a kind of techno-economic determinism. Their policy differed from previous attempts to assimilate the Gypsies because the socialist construction of ‘labour’ involved more than mere commodity exchange. Working was the duty of all citizens, and, excluding exceptional conditions, Hungarians had no right not to work. Under ‘actually existing socialism’, as Swain has noted (1985:6) ‘labour power has to be purchased since all members of society are expected to work; and it cannot be relinquished simply because of inadequate demand or low profitability’ (1985:6). Labour power was not a separable part of the human person which one could choose to part with or not according to market conditions. Within official ideology, labouring was the activity which constituted one as a full member of society. The nation was conceived as being composed of a ‘working people’ (dolgozo nep), and so it was not primarily as citizens that Hungarians achieved full social status but as workers in the process of social reproduction. In capitalist economies exchange is the stressed and most salient activity in social reproduction. Under actually existing socialism this emphasis was inverted.[130] The key image was that of the ‘productive’ (termelo) work-place, such as a factory, which produced for the nation. The concrete labour of each person was thus directly part of the total effort of the Hungarian people. Because work was itself a socially orientated activity rather than a private one enabling a person to lead a social existence in leisure hours, ‘working’ in a factory was invested with a moral efficacy that is alien to a capitalist economy. By labouring in a factory, the worker was directly ‘building our socialist society’. Physical work was thought to have the uplifting qualities which Westerners are more likely to associate with intellectual or artistic effort. Hence the work-place Socialist Labour Competitions were marked not only in terms of output per brigade but also according to the brigades’ cultural and social activities. There was no ontological difference between these expressions of sociality and increasing productivity. It was in such a context that the then Communist Party daily could proudly emphasize as late as 1987 that ‘communist Hungary has got away from the idea that “work is something unworthy and degrading”’ (Nepszabadsag, 20 Aug. 1987).[131] By making workers out of Gypsies it was thought that the ‘effect of the collective’ (a kollektiva hatasa) would gradually lead them out of their anti-social habits. Because working in a socialist factory was morally exalting, the Gypsies would experience its discipline as a value to be extended to their non-working lives. They would thus ‘grow up’ from their child-like attachment to the sudden and spectacular earnings of the ‘dealer’ (kupec) and the profligate consumption that went with that lifestyle. Communist theorizing, rooted as it was in the naturalistic and positivist interpretations of Marx developed by Kautsky and Lenin (see Kolakowski 1978:40—3; Lichtheim 1961:244—58), assumed that the reform would have relatively straightforward effects. The realization of the obvious financial benefits of work as well as the experience of the work process itself would transform Gypsy consciousness from its individualistic, petty-bourgeois and short-term orientation to a proletarian, collective, long-term one. *** From the Bottom Up: Gypsy Interpretations of Labour So much for this social reform seen from the top down. How did Gypsies experience this policy and how did they interpret it? From the point of view of the party twenty-five years into the reform, it could seem in 1986 that many of its goals had been achieved. In the town where I carried out my research less than 14 per cent of Gypsy men had been in work in 1964.[132] By 1976 the figure had risen to 75 per cent and, by 1983, 92 per cent of able-bodied Gypsy men were in permanent employment. Even more significantly, it was clear that Vlach Gypsies had indeed realized the financial benefits of working. I was often told by Gypsies in approving terms, ‘We all work now’, and equally commonly, I was told how in the old days when there was no waged labour (Romany: butji) Gypsies lived in an unbelievable poverty. Waged labour had patently become an essential part of the lives of the Gypsies—to the extent that Gypsy feasts and parties (which celebrate Gypsy autonomy and distinctiveness) are most commonly organized to coincide with payday. However, it was also obvious that the Gypsies, far from giving up their ‘traditional’ way of life, their communities, their trading in horses, antiques, and other goods, and their occasional craft-work, were in fact using their waged labour to subsidize these irregular activities. These were still the ones that they valued, that they held to express the essence of the good life. I have discussed several aspects of this resistance to change elsewhere.[133] Here I want to focus on how Gypsies interpreted the experience of work and thereby resisted taking on the communist ideology of labour. Contrary to communist party theory, Gypsies came to the experience of ‘socialist wage-labour’ not with a tabula rasa resulting from their exclusion from previous production systems but with a complex set of representations of work and how non-Gypsies conceive of work. Gypsies first tried to make sense of their waged work in socialist factories in terms of these ideas. Communist theory had supposed that Gypsies had lived excluded from pre-socialist society. The reality was that, although often residentially separated, excluded from the bars and denied kinship ties with most peasants, Gypsies in ‘traditional’ Hungarian villages were in more or less constant contact with the Magyar population through providing cheap labour for better-off peasants (see, for example, Fel and Hofer 1969; Havas 1982b). Through such contact, the dominant ethics of peasant Magyars were certainly familiar to Gypsies. The kind of ethical system I am referring to is that described in rich detail by the ethnographers Fel and Hofer for one north Hungarian village as the proper peasant (rendes paraszt) worldview. Though peasant life varied enormously in presocialist Hungary (Hann 1980:17—18), this kind of ethic was widely shared (see Kiss 1981 [1939] for an extended presentation).[134] The foremost features of the peasant ethic can be summarized as a commitment to achieving economic self-sufficiency and personal autonomy through hard, physical labour on the soil of one’s ancestors, avoiding as far as possible any dependency on others and any involvement in monetary or market dealings (Stewart 1988:273—7). The elements I bring to the foreground here are the representations of labour and trade. Labour for the proper peasant was the source of all value— labour conceived as ‘self-denying, careful and efficient work’ on one’s land (Fel and Hofer 1969: 274). Being able to sustain hard work with the aim of self-enrichment was one of the qualities that made one a true peasant. The peasants talked of the pleasures of those months of the year spent toiling out in the fields, (1969:58), and the villagers were so proud of their ardour that they claimed to have a reputation for it even among the migrant workers of Budapest where most people disappeared in the anonymous crowd (1969:348). Herdsmen employed by the villagers who ‘earn all [their money] with a whip’—that is to say, without effort (1969: 240)—were thought to have dubious moral standards and be prone to fritter away their wealth on drink and women.[135] The prolonged and regular character of peasant labour was also significant. Among proper peasants, ‘sudden affluence is viewed with suspicion and is regarded as more or less irregular’, possibly linked to malicious magic (1969:249). Poor peasants who made their money in ‘games of chance’, such as animal trading, were seen as unrespectable and different in nature from the man who lived from his landed property, since the demand on the market ‘for bold and shrewd action is alien to the customary activities of rural farming’ (1969:233). Indeed, any involvement in affairs of the market was thought to be alien to the peasant ideal (cf. Kiss 1981 [1939], and Bell 1984). One way this was evoked was the idea that food bought on the market, especially bread, was less filling than that produced by one’s own labour. Gypsies, who worked for peasants, performing dirty jobs around the yard as well as providing labour at the bottlenecks of the yearly cycle, could not have been unaware of these ideas, which peasants, we can be sure, then as now proudly and loudly articulated. As Okely has argued, wherever Gypsies live they have defined themselves in contrast to the dominant population (Okely 1983:78). In pre-socialist Hungary, I suggest, it was in contrast to the proper peasant ethic that Gypsies had to establish their own identity. Being landless and without other means of production, the Gypsies defined themselves as ‘sons of the market’ (Romany: foroske save), people who lived off their wits, their ability to talk and deal with different sorts of people through their trading. Attachment to land and place, accumulation of wealth for investment, and autonomy via self-sufficient production were all rejected by the Gypsies. Instead, they constructed an image of autonomy and liberty through being able to imagine ‘evading the law of reciprocal exchange’ on the market (Stewart 1992). It was precisely this sort of self-definition, with its suggestion to their ears of usurious exploitation by a middleman, which the communists hoped to abolish by setting the Gypsies to work. But when Gypsies were drawn into the socialist labour force it seemed to them that the nonGypsies were once again trying to persuade them to give up their way of life. As far as the Gypsies were concerned, they were being offered the same alternative as in the past: elevation through labouring for others. What difference to the Gypsy whether the advocate of labour be a peasant or a communist boss? Indeed, the Romany word for nonGypsy, gazo, had traditionally meant ‘peasant’, and when I asked for a gloss on it in 1985 Gypsies were insistent that its meaning had not changed. My informants were perfectly happy with the implication that all non-Gypsies, including party bosses, teachers, factory managers, and fellow-workers were in some sense ‘peasants’, since they all displayed the essential qualities of the peasant world-view. By reinterpreting communist labour ideology in this way Gypsies were not performing an ideological sleight of hand. On the contrary, they understood all too well the implications of communist rhetoric. The point is that they were not being offered Marx’s philosophical/ anthropological view of labour, but rather an amalgam of a naturalistic reading of the labour theory of value and a pre-socialist work ethic. The resulting Stakhanovite image of labour owes more to medieval ideas of labour as the creation of matter than it does to Marx (see Gurevich 1985). It is in this light that one should read the comment by the ordinary Hungarian worker whose words preface this chapter. His comment on the ‘usurious’ practices of Gypsies reflects the widespread view that dealing and scavenging are ways of making money without labour, without producing anything. This was the ethic against which Gypsy culture had been traditionally organized, so it is understandable that they continued to view it with suspicion when it was re-presented by the state in socialist guise. But the Gypsies’ interpretation of communist ideology as ‘proper peasant world-view’ re-hashed tells only half the story of Gypsy resistance to assimilation. Gypsy interpretation of the socialist work ethic was not an intellectual matter, the result of a clash of two ideologies. To put this in anthropological terms, the history of the confrontation between Gypsies and communists was not a case of Gypsy ideology encompassing the challenge posed by the ‘event’ of socialist transformation, as a Dumont-type analysis might suggest. Just as significant as ideological opposition to ‘labour’ was the individual Gypsy’s (constructed) experience, which taught him or her that whatever the rhetoric of the state, it was not via labouring that people got on in socialist Hungary. In other words, it was also because of their experience of working as socialist wage-labourers that Gypsies rejected the socialist construction of labour. No matter how hard the socialist state tried to persuade them that socialist labour was fulfilling, Gypsies were not convinced by their experience in factories that the life of a wage-labourer was the most attractive way to live in socialist Hungary. I have argued elsewhere (Stewart 1990) that the nature of the work process in a socialist factory was not one to induce the kind of qualities associated with a work ethic. Gypsies were often employed on jobs where they were not strictly needed, where their labour was in effect superfluous. Once Gypsies were at work, far from enjoying the beneficial ‘effects of the collective’, they experienced the kind of semi-organized chaos that many commentators on socialist factories have described (Kemeny 1978; Burawoy 1985). They experienced, as did other Hungarians, both urban and rural, the way in which personal ties with one’s bosses ensured access to good jobs and a good position in the internal factory or farm division of labour. Because of the way socialist production lines were organized, the labour force tended to be split between a core group of workers who kept production going, and who re-designed jobs when the machines broke down or the standard materials were unavailable, and on the other hand a peripheral group of workers who simply did what they were told (Kemeny 1978). The core workers were better rewarded by the factory managers, who necessarily colluded with this internal factory hierarchy. The qualities required of such core workers included an ability to get on well with the bosses and with workers in charge of key areas of the factory such as the stores (Lado and Toth 1988:525). Even outside this core group, an ability to hustle from the bosses and foremen allowed one access to a regular and high salary (cf. Haraszti 1971). Only through personal contacts, not through ability or diligence as a worker, could one hope to achieve a position of influence in the socialist production line. In other words the skills of the wheeler-dealer which Gypsies had to use in their ideologically illegitimate self-employed activities were the very ones needed for success in the world of the socialist factory or farm. An ethnography of a collectivized village near Gyongyos shows how salient these concerns were to other ordinary Hungarians at this time. One peasant told Peter Bell that ‘now the people [Magyars] are Gypsy’ (1984: 294). By this he meant that in the socialist world the way to get on was through ‘carrying on like a Gypsy’ (ciganykodas). Bell defined this as ‘worming oneself into the good graces of the leadership through ingratiation, two-facedness, betraying fellow workers, flattery, holding back complaints, granting sexual favours, or, expressed metaphorically “licking upward and spitting (or kicking) downward”’ (1984:253—4). Of the people who ran the village’s cooperative farm it was said, ‘they don’t do any work; they just order people around’ (1984:170). Members of the farm believed that job allocation and access to privileges depends on ‘standing close to the fire’ (1984:247). Whatever the real situation (and Bell showed that a new, strict, cooperative chairman replacing a corrupt one may have altered behaviour without upsetting the ideological stereotypes) it was thought that in this world it was not a person’s labour that advanced him so much as his contacts. As a common saying put it, ‘I’m too busy working to earn any money’. One consequence of this situation was that stealing from the factory or cooperative became legitimate among the workers, who re-named it using the verbs for ‘obtaining’ (szerezni) or ‘bringing’ (hozni) (Bell 1984: 183; cf. Marrese 1981:59—60 for industrial parallels). There were daily reports in the press, books published, and even films made on the lack of work discipline, on the theft of collective property, the moral corruption that accompanied hustling in all spheres of life. There was a definite shared sense that the lot of the modern Hungarian was that of the dealer and the hustler, that is, of the Gypsy.[136] Cruelly, Gypsies themselves were rarely well placed to achieve regular, let alone high, salaries in their waged work. They entered the labour market as un- or semi-skilled workers and were given tasks peripheral to the main production processes. In a word, they continued to provide cheap labour for the dirty jobs. For them it was easier to try and construct an image of themselves as autonomous persons in relation to their traditional occupations of horse-dealing, scavenging, and trading on the unsupervised market, where they were constrained only by their ability to find a buyer in need, and not by their ability to curry favour with those in power. In such markets they could at least symbolically realize their ideal of autonomy (Stewart 1992). This rejection of proletarianization was, of course, only reinforced by the nature of the reforms introduced gradually in Hungary from 1968 onwards, as a result of which various forms of private business and trade were tolerated. Though Gypsies were rarely involved directly in such enterprises, the reforms opened up a space in which Gypsies could operate more or less legitimately. So ‘dealing’ continued to be the ideal for Gypsy youth. If they could get permission to set up as a ‘small manufacturer’ or ‘trader’ (kisiparos), the road to wealth was open to them. The few Gypsies in Gyongyos who had cars, to take just one example of conspicuous wealth, had just such permits and had made their wealth as dealers and traders. *** Reproducing Gypsies The communist reformers between the 1960s and 1980s believed that they were making an entirely original and unprecedented offer to the Gypsies of Hungary. For the first time Gypsies were to be given the chance to participate as full members of society, as members of the class that was nominally in charge of production. Central to the success of the state’s policy was the general attempt by communists across the whole society to create an ideology within which labour had a positive social value.[137] Yet, to take one example of the scale of failure on this front, the state was never even able to repeal laws enforcing registered work on all citizens—laws which had originally been passed as a means to curb the black market after the war. Matters declined so that in the mid-1980s forced labour itself was reintroduced for people avoiding waged labour. Such legislation only worsened the image of manual labour. Throughout the socialist period labour continued to be tainted by the negative connotations it had in the capitalist past, and the very rhetoric within which communists tried to give expression to their morality soon acquired the taint of old forms of thought and speech. In its representations of labour, trade, and morality official communism paralleled widespread popular ideas, and gradually the two merged into a sort of hybrid, a hybrid to which, of course, the Gypsies had a practised 17 aversion.[138] Communist theory had also (wrongly) assumed that Gypsies traditionally lived outside class society, and that this lack of integration explained the profound differences in attitude and material culture between Hungarian peasants and Gypsies. In fact, it was the form of integration of Gypsies into class society which had made them different. During the communist period this was still the case: if Gypsies resisted assimilation it was because of the forms through which they were integrated in the socialist political economy. Even some of the longest- term wage-labourers I knew in Gyongyos were heavily involved in horse-dealing and maintained the ideal of dropping wage-labour if possible. Why did communist bureaucrats have such misleading expectations of the ease with which Gypsies would change their outlook? First, they were used to working with a tabula rasa theory of post-revolutionary cognitive change, and secondly, they held a positivist theory of consciousness for those parts of the collective consciousness which had not been wiped clean. I take these related points in order. Communist theory of social change, like any revolutionary theory, conceived of radical social transformation in terms of creating a clean break from the past among those whose lives were to be changed. Only after such a rupture could the communists impose their scientifically derived formulae for a good social life, uncorrupted by the false consciousness induced by class society. Like other revolutionary regimes, the communists had to create the world afresh in order not to be weighed down by the inertia of the past. The peculiarity of the communist efforts concerning Gypsies was that it was thought that nothing had to be done to wipe their slate clean, since there was nothing on it in the first place. Gypsies had lost their place in the social division of labour decades previously; they spoke an unwritten language, lacked any religion or even any apparent social organisation, and appeared to lack all the qualities that make up nations (different groups appeared not even to acknowledge their identity with one another). They thus presented a blank board waiting to be written on (Guy 1978; cf. Erdos 1960, 1961). Secondly, in so far as Gypsies did clearly have some ideas and shared representations, these could be explained as expressing in a straightforward, utilitarian fashion their material interests. If Gypsies saw themselves (as to some extent they did) as scavengers and beggars, it was assumed this was because they could only make their living in this fashion. The crucial representation of their mode of livelihood which the communist reformers hoped to change bore no simple relation to the Gypsies’ material practice. For many decades, if not centuries, Gypsies in Hungary had in part depended on wages, while representing their mode of money-making as scavenging, begging, and dealing. If Gypsy images of dealing presented an accurate picture of their practice of wealth creation, then as these activities became less important economically to them, so would the idea that Gypsies are, by definition, dealers, beggars, and so on. However, because the representation and the practice were not straightforward reflections of each other, a change in the actual process of reproduction did not alter, in any direct way, the representation of that process. When communist social planners argued that there was no more than a ‘lag’ between cultural and economic change, between base and superstructural transformation (for example, Bathory 1983:9), they only showed how little they knew about Gypsy culture. In fact, because the Gypsy way of imagining reality was ideologically sealed from material practice—in a fashion which it would take another essay to describe—it persisted more or less unscathed by communist attempts to breach it. The failure to create the tabula rasa led the communists in time to a necessary engagement with the ideas people actually held. In this engagement communist theory almost always lost out to local knowledge, or adapted itself in a surprisingly plastic fashion to the contours of popular consciousness. This might be attributed simply to opportunism, of which there are plenty of examples in communist politics (one thinks of the use of anti-Semitism throughout the Soviet dominion—Fejto 1974:295—9), but I would argue for a less reductive, less transactional explanation. Perhaps it was precisely the idealist notion that communist theory was derived scientifically, that is a-socially, which allowed the consequent collapse into its opposite, abandoning even a critique of local models in favour of their total assimilation. Hungarian communism had been derived in an intellectual and social refuge from the world (the internal development of scientific Marxism on the one hand and the conditions of emigre life in Stalin’s Moscow on the other). As far as the people of Hungary were concerned, both Magyar and Gypsy alike, socialism had never begun from a critical engagement with their ideas, their dreams, and their needs. [122] Research was funded by an Economic and Social Research Council grant. I would also thank the London School of Economics for help with the initial writing up of this research (Stewart 1988). [123] During the twentieth century, Gypsy disadvantages altered, but their status as the most multiply disadvantaged population in Hungary was reproduced in new forms. Gypsies had made up one-quarter of all agricultural wage-workers prior to the war and would therefore have been eligible for land in any land reform. But when this came in the wake of the liberation in 1944—45 they were left out of the redistribution (Donath 1979:117; Kozak 1983:114). Then, as agricultural land was collectivized in the 1950s, the main traditional source of Gypsy income dried up: low- paid agricultural wage-work for peasants was now no longer feasible for most Gypsies. At the same time, trading became impractical as there were no markets in agricultural produce or livestock (Fel and Hofer 1969: 352) and the state pursued an active campaign against all forms of marketing. Moreover, factories were still swamped by peasant labour recently liberated from the land, so that in 1960 at most 30 per cent of all adult Gypsies had regular waged work (Kozak 1983:115), with fairly predictable consequences for the economic well-being in a society with no unemployment benefits. [124] Communist parties throughout the Soviet dominion were adopting Gypsy reform policies at this period inspired by the example of the CPSU which had woken up with a fright to its own Gypsy problem in the early 1950s (see Ban and Pogany 1957). [125] In all the socialist countries of South-eastern Europe the ‘Gypsy question’ had a salience equivalent to the ‘immigrant’ question in some North-west European countries. [126] A good, accessible source for ideas current at this time in communist theory is Erdos (1960, 1961). [127] The importance of this question is connected with the rights enjoyed by the officially recognized ‘national minorities’. Unlike other Eastern European countries, the rights of these minorities were genuinely exercised in Hungary (possibly because, having few members, they posed little threat to the state). The rights were jealously guarded, and when, many years ago, a delegation of Gypsies was encouraged to attend a plenum meeting of representatives of the other national minorities, the latter refused to enter once they heard of the proposed Gypsy presence (Janos Bathory, personal communication). Guy, analyzing Czechoslovak data, provides the best discussion in English of the conjunctural and practical reasons for the communist parties’ rejection of national minority status for Gypsies (1978:129–60). He also discusses communist theory of nationality with respect to the Gypsy question (1978:700–23). [128] This provides a powerful example of the way public debate was constrained by the ‘leading role of the party’ under ‘actually existing socialism’. It was only after there had been debates within the party about the application of the terms ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’ (one word had previously been used in Hungarian: beilleszkedes; see Herczeg 1976) to the recognized national minorities that Gypsies were able to raise publicly similar questions in relation to their (unrecognized) ethnic group. [129] In the mid-1980s a new phase of Gypsy-socialist state relations began, characterized by a growing contradiction between official attempts to continue the assimilationist policy and officially tolerated Gypsy efforts to resist it. At this stage a place was allowed for expressions of Gypsy culture as a kind of residue. Those parts of ‘old, traditional’ Gypsy culture which were thought to stem from lumpenization or exclusion from the previous class-based modes of production (extended family, sharing wealth, gambling, scavenging, begging, and so on) would pass away once Gypsies were given work. Thus it was said that the Gypsy with a fixed job and a home in the town will ‘present no special problems’. As the Gypsies become settled wage-workers and indistinguishable socially from the Magyars, so harmless elements of their culture (dress, songs, and so on) would become folklore, a colourful reminder of the past. Gypsies would be workers from Monday to Friday and on the occasional communist Saturday (days of labour ‘freely’ given to the state towards, for instance, Nicaraguan solidarity), but on Sundays and holidays they would re-live their past in folk performances and the like, becoming Gypsies again for a day. [130] In order to bring out the difference, let me caricature reality a little. In England, the general public get a sense of the condition of the economy from daily reports on the state of the Stock Exchange, whereas on a Hungarian news report one was more likely to hear about rises or falls in output in a branch of agriculture or industry. Such a difference in the rituals which surround ‘the economy’ reflected a view of social reproduction which stressed production and not exchange as the decisive moment. [131] Compare Le Goff’s comment about early modern Europe: ‘Before as well as after the Industrial Revolution, social classes which had risen owing to labour hastened to deny their working roots. Labour has really never ceased to be a sort of mark of servility’ (1980:121). [132] There are no separate figures for Vlach Gypsies. One may assume that they were less involved in waged labour than other Gypsies. [133] Most fully in Stewart 1988; in reference to Gypsy ideology: Stewart 1989; in reference to trade: Stewart 1992. [134] Fel and Hofer themselves point out (1969:38) that the ‘proper peasants’ only ever formed a minority in the village which they studied but they provided an ideal according to which other ‘less successful’ villagers strove to live. [135] Cf. Kiss (1981 [1939]:287): ‘easily earned money naturally goes with a rash life-style’. [136] Janos Kenedi (1986) has suggested various functional reasons for the scapegoating of Gypsies, noting the particular ambiguity towards hustling among Hungarians (1986). It seems to me that he over-stresses the particularly Hungarian aspects of this: Gypsies are similarly salient in Romania, Czechoslovakia, and even Russia. [137] See Humphrey for similar Soviet evidence of this (1983:159—70, 228—58, 300–16, 354–8). [138] In a recent work Nee and Stark identify changes in the theorization of communist societies away from notions of monolithic totalitarianism towards theories which allow and account for the evolution and transformation of socialist systems (1989:3–8). In the light of the evidence presented in this chapter, one could take their argument one stage further and suggest that one of the important variables in socialist societies has been the way particular elements of the general socialist ideological complex took root in differing environments. For example, communist egalitarianism found welcoming soil in Czechoslovakia, while the rest of the ideology fell on stony ground (Holy 1992). In Hungary and Romania (Kideckel, forthcoming) attitudes to labour, trade, and the moral economy constituted the elements which took firmest root. *** References(Manual labourer employed at
municipal rubbish tip, March 1988)
When the friends from Polish Solidarity, whom we meet occasionally at the Czech-Polish border, ask how many people Charter 77 has behind it, I feel like answering that if there are millions of people behind Solidarity, only millions of ears stand behind Charter 77.Yet, a little more than a year after Havel expressed this rather pessimistic view, a revolution took place. After the students who demonstrated in Prague on 17 November 1989 were brutally beaten up by the police, they declared an indefinite strike in which they were immediately joined by actors and musicians.[139] The day after the demonstration not a single theatre played in Prague, and very soon thereafter all theatrical and concert performances came to a halt throughout the country. The declaration of the students’ and actors’ strikes was followed by daily mass demonstrations in Prague, which were eventually attended by an estimated 750,000 people (in a city with a population of 1,200,000). The demonstrations soon spread to other cities and towns. Ten days after the students and actors in Prague went on strike, a general strike in protest against the rule of the communist party took place. According to a published survey, about half of the population of the country actually stopped work for two hours on 27 November and a quarter of the population joined in nationwide demonstrations. Ten per cent of the workforce did not take part in the strike in order not to jeopardize essential services, and only 20 per cent did not strike for other reasons (either because they did not want to, or because they were afraid of dismissal and other reprisals from their managers and local party secretaries). Two days after the strike, the Federal Assembly (the Parliament) abolished the article of the Czechoslovak constitution which enshrined the leading role of the communist party, and the communist chairman of the Federal Assembly resigned. The new cabinet formed on 3 December consisted of 15 communists and 5 non-communists. Further mass demonstrations followed, and under the threat of another general strike the new Government survived for only seven days. On 10 December the communist President swore in a new ‘government of national understanding’, which consisted of nine communists and eleven non-communists. Following this act, he resigned. In January, the Prime Minister and one of the Deputy Prime Ministers resigned their Party membership, thereby reducing the number of communists in the cabinet to seven out of twenty. On 28 December, Alexander Dub ek was elected chairman of the Federal Assembly, and on 29 December the Federal Assembly elected Vaclav Havel as President of the Republic. The phrases expressing allegiance to socialism were left out of his constitutionally prescribed oath by mutual agreement of all concerned. A number of Western political commentators looked in disbelief at this revolution, led by actors and a playwright, as if it were in itself some kind of absurd theatre. Yet, the change which this revolution brought about was not only faster than the transition anywhere else in Eastern Europe but, with the possible exceptions of East Germany and Hungary, it was also much more radical. Elections held in June 1990 were contested by twentythree political parties and movements and resulted in the formation of a coalition governemnt of the Civic Forum and Christian Democrats. The Government vigorously pursued its policy of privatization and transition to a free market economy. How, then, can one explain the paradox that the most successful revolution in Eastern Europe was one which defied all textbook formulas and one which was started by students and led by intellectuals who had no support from the masses when they embarked on their political gamble? I want to argue that this paradox is only apparent; it arises through conceptualizing politics in terms of a narrowly defined discourse of political scientists, commentators, and pundits. Such specialists see politics simply as the pursuit of group or sectional interests which exist somehow independently of any particular culture. The politics they talk about is, however, always and everywhere a process embedded in cultural contexts. Cultural premisses and assumptions, which in themselves are not seen as ‘political’, inevitably influence the shape and form of political action in the narrower sense. Once one starts seeing ‘polities’ as an aspect of the cultural system in Czechoslovakia, the seeming paradox of the recent revolution disappears. In this chapter, I shall sketch some of the specifically Czech cultural conceptualizations[140] which affected the course of the ‘velvet revolution’, whilst focusing on two main questions: first, why was the revolution started by students, actors, and other intellectuals? Secondly, why was the publicly expressed opposition of intellectuals to the communist regime so swiftly followed by the masses? *** Students An important instrument of communist propaganda before 1989 was the unceasing comparison of the achievements of socialist Czechoslovakia with the pre-war capitalist Czechoslovak republic. Socialist Czechoslovakia emerged from this comparison as greatly superior to the pre-war capitalist system: full employment and universal education were guaranteed, and medical care and old age pensions were available to everyone. Socialism could also draw support from statistics giving the number of cars, bathrooms, radio sets, and other gadgets per family. This elementary trick of comparing the past with the present and then presenting it as a comparison of one contemporary social system with another may have enjoyed at least partial success as long as there were enough older people around able to enliven such statistics with narratives of their personal experiences of the horrors of the depression years of the 1930s.[141] Such narratives re-emerged again in the form of letters of old communist party members to the party newspaper Rude Pravo in the early months of 1990 as arguments against privatization and the introduction of an economic model based on market principles. The crucial point is that it is personal experience of this kind which gives credence to the statistics employed by the official propaganda. Statistical figures are remote from experience. Reality, as it is understood by the people themselves, can only be apprehended through ‘experience close’ concepts. Although undoubtedly the proverbial pattern according to which the values of one generation are denied by the next one played some role, the main reason for the politicization of young people in Czechoslovakia lies in the fact that their life experience was quite different from that of their parents, and certainly their grandparents. Most of those involved in the demonstration on 17 November and in the subsequent student strike were not even born in 1968, and few could remember it personally. Their personal experience was limited to post-1968 Czechoslovakia, and they compared it not with the Czechoslovakia of the past but with its contemporary neighbours to the West. In comparison with their counterparts there, they felt deprived. They were prevented from travelling, from playing and listening to the music they liked, from reading books and looking at pictures they liked, from hearing more than one view in the course of their education, and even from choosing freely whether or not to believe in God. Another factor impelling young people to rebel against the state was the complete failure of the regime to force the population to toe the socialist line. Although leading dissidents were given prison sentences after 1968, the main forms of controlling dissent were economic. Dissidents were prevented from getting employment appropriate to their qualifications and could at best earn their living in menial jobs. Writers, journalists, actors, and even priests were employed as stokers, unskilled labourers, lumbermen, or—in exceptional, particularly fortunate cases— taxi drivers. One of the most effective means of forcing potential dissidents to give up their subversive activity was the impact of repression upon their children. Irrespective of their academic achievements, they were denied access to higher education. It is one thing to engage in political opposition against the regime and suffer in consequence; it is another to engage in such opposition in the knowledge that one’s children will suffer as well. There is no doubt that using children as hostages was the most effective means of breaking down the widespread popular opposition which followed the invasion by Warsaw Pact countries in 1968 (Simecka 1984). Young people in 1989 were free from this particular kind of pressure. Of course not only they themselves but their parents too could have suffered for their actions. But while it is difficult to justify morally the punishment of innocent children for actions of their parents over which they had no influence, it is not so difficult to accept the risk of punishment for the parents as a result of the actions of their children. After all, it was precisely the inactivity of the parents’ generation which had got the country into the mess in which it found itself. The possible punishment of the parents, unlike that of the children, was not a punishment of the innocent. *** Actors The small circle of dissidents who stood in active opposition to the regime objected particularly to the systematic persecution of scholars, journalists, writers, poets, musicians, pop-singers, and other artists who had declared their open support for the reforms of 1968 and were unwilling to gain the regime’s favour by publicly revoking their ‘ideological mistakes’. The active dissidents formed only a tiny minority of the country’s intelligentsia, but this small circle comprised virtually all leading Czech and Slovak intellectuals, among them many of those who had contributed to the high international profile of Czechoslovak cinema, drama, and literature in the 1960s. Those who did not emigrate (as did Kundera and Forman) were banned, forced to survive in menial occupations, and from time to time imprisoned (like Havel himself). Their creativity was pushed underground. The result was that hardly a novel, film, or play of any significance was published or performed in Czechoslovakia after 1968. In the words of Heinrich Boll, Czechoslovakia became ‘a cultural Biafra’. The Czech conceptualization of the nation and its relationship to the state are key elements in my argument. The self-image of the Czechs, perpetually invoked in all possible contexts and marshalled to motivate practical action, is the image of a highly cultured and well-educated nation. At present this image motivates what the Czechs describe as their ‘return to Europe’, which they generally perceive as the ultimate goal of their revolution. They have always detested being classified as East Europeans, and are always ready to point out that Prague in fact lies west of Vienna. For the Czechs, Eastern Europe consists of the Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria, and possibly Poland, but Czechoslovakia itself is part of Central Europe. It is common to describe it as lying in ‘the heart of Europe’ or even as being ‘the heart of Europe’. The Czechs use the concept of kulturnost (a noun derived from the adjective ‘cultured’) to construct a boundary between themselves and the ‘uncultured’ East, into which they were lumped after the communist coup d’etat in 1948. They see their proper place as being alongside the civilized, cultured, and educated nations of Western Europe. The idea of ‘the return to Europe’ dominated the election campaign in June 1990 when virtually every political party presented itself to the voters as the party best-qualified to lead Czechoslovakia into Europe. The systematic creation of a cultural desert in post-1968 Czechoslovakia was thus perceived as a gift of the state to a people whose self-image is that of a highly cultured and well educated nation. The persistence of rigid censorship and the systematic persecution of anybody expressing a thought which deviated from the official line were seen by intellectuals as the state’s betrayal of the very nation to which it nominally owed allegiance. The state’s cultural policy pushed the intellectuals into resisting its power in the name of the nation of which they formed a part. Actors joined the students in the strike not because their grudge against the state was any greater than that of other intellectuals, but simply because they, together with musicians, were the only intellectuals who could strike effectively. One would hardly notice a writer or poet on strike in the solitude of his study. Of all intellectuals the actors were the most visible— and this brings me to the second question, the question of what exactly made the strike so effective. *** Masses The idea that a strike in the theatres of London’s West End could possibly topple the British Government, when neither miners nor ambulance drivers could come anywhere close to it in the 1980s, is clearly laughable. The strike of actors in Prague theatres, however, not only spread like wildfire to all the theatres and concert halls in the country (and was emulated by other entertainers, such as footballers, who refused to play their scheduled league matches) but was followed within ten days by a nationwide general strike. With hindsight, it is clear that the general strike could have followed even earlier. The intellectuals who led the revolution were cautious in estimating the impact of their own action on the masses, and thought that at least ten days were needed to rouse them from their lethargy. Their caution derived from their awareness that, in contrast to Poland and Romania, the Czechs and Slovaks were not suffering any significant economic deprivation. In spite of its technological backwardness, the Czechoslovak economy was in better shape than any other in the Soviet bloc, and one obvious source for widespread popular opposition to communist rule was therefore missing. The intellectuals were also very well aware that their specific grievances could hardly be sufficient to motivate the population at large. Most people even did not know who the leading intellectuals were. When Havel first addressed the mass rallies, most people perceived him as one of ‘those mysterious dissidents’. When he later emerged as the only serious candidate for the Presidency, Czech newspapers hurriedly printed articles explaining who he was. Many puzzled cooperative farmers and factory workers believed that if he really was the world- famous playwright he was suddenly made out to be, his plays would surely have been staged in Czechoslovakia and they would have heard about him before. But whatever one might say about the cultural and educational level of those who expressed such views, they too were Czechs. They too saw themselves as members of a cultured and well-educated nation. What they resented as members of this nation was not the persecution of a few intellectuals, but the affront which they felt when they had to obey orders from those who knew not only less than they should have known in their leadership positions, but often less than those whom they were supposed to lead. The image of those in authority as blithering idiots was all-pervasive and an endless source of popular jokes. The Civic Forum skilfully exploited these feelings when it broadcast the secret recording of the General Secretary’s impromptu speech to the district party secretaries. The grammatically incorrect and syntactically incoherent speech of the man who had formerly been the most powerful man in the country itself drove the point home without any need for further comment. The crowds of ordinary people who listened in the street to this broadcast roared with contemptuous laughter, displaying in this way their own kulturnost. The message was: less cultured nations would shoot you, we laugh at you. What gave the velvet revolution its impetus was the general feeling in the country that on 17 November state repression had reached an unbearable level. People’s self-perception as a cultured and well- educated nation played a significant role in fostering this general feeling. The ‘uncultured’ use of brutal force by the state against the ‘cultured’ and peaceful demonstrators made it clear that the Czechs had a state unbefitting a cultured nation. In an open confrontation between intellectuals and future intellectuals (students) with uncultured and uneducated power, the masses would have to be on the side of the cultured and educated. Various other aspects of Czech culture were also influential at this juncture. References to Czech history recur not only in much political commentary but also in everyday political discourse. By constantly referring in this way to their history, the Czechs tell themselves who they are. They do so by projecting contemporary ideas and values into their narratives of the past, thus creating myths which are then in turn invoked for legitimation purposes. One of the important myths which the Czechs create when narrating their history is the myth of a nation whose leading personalities have always been intellectuals. The ‘father of the country’, King Charles IV, is remembered primarily as the founder of the oldest university north of the Alps. The most important Czech martyr, Jan Hus, was a professor at this university. The Hussite movement owed its authority mainly to the fact that the Czech people were led by preachers ‘with better knowledge of the scriptures than the Pope himself. A tiny group of Czech intellectuals kept the Czech language alive in the nineteenth century and managed to bring the Czechs into the fold of modern European nations. A university professor, a high-school teacher, and an astronomer were the founding fathers of the Czechoslovak republic in 1918. All the many components of this myth together provided a charter for action. In the confrontation between intellectuals and the power of the state in 1989, the myth helped to sway the nation to the side of the intellectuals.[142] The political impact of the actors’ strike derives to a great extent from the fact that these notions of Czech nationhood and Czech history are encapsulated in the symbol of the National Theatre. Even those with only a smattering of knowledge of Czech history know two things about the National Theatre. The first (not, in fact, historically accurate) is that the National Theatre, by keeping the Czech language alive, was instrumental in the survival of the Czech nation in the period when the Czechs were unsuccessfully fighting for their political rights as a nation within the Austrian monarchy. The second (likewise dubious in terms of historical fact) is that the theatre’s construction was made possible only by the financial contributions of ordinary people at a cost of considerable financial sacrifice and that, after a fire in 1881 before construction was completed, it was rebuilt in record time exclusively through such contributions. The words ‘Nation to itself’ emblazoned above the proscenium remind everybody of this remarkable dedication to the national cause. The story of the building of the National Theatre is one of the most important national myths, and, in consequence, the theatre itself is one of the most important symbols of the Czech nation and, after Prague castle, probably the most frequently visited site. Few Czechs have never visited the National Theatre. It is popularly known as ‘the golden chapel’, a name which suggests that this building serves more as a national shrine than as a venue for theatrical performances. Although the actors’ strike did not start in the National Theatre, the fact that the actors of the National Theatre immediately joined it was of the utmost importance. The fact that the National Theatre was not playing was seen as an unmistakable sign that the nation’s situation was critical. One must, however, look beyond the actors’ strike and examine other myth-symbol complexes to explain the politicization of the masses. Like other previous demonstrations, that held on 17 November 1989 was timed for a symbolically significant day, the fiftieth anniversary of the closing of all Czech universities in 1939. This day marked the execution of nine students and the deportation of some 1,200 into concentration camps as a reprisal for students’ demonstrations against the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. These 1939 demonstrations took place during the funeral of Jan Opletal, a student who had been shot dead by the Germans during a pro-Czechoslovak demonstration on 28 October (a national holiday commemorating the foundation of the republic). In comparison with earlier demonstrations in 1989, that called for 17 November was different in two respects. First, it was authorized by the city authorities after they had agreed with the students on the route for their march. Secondly, the police and what later appeared to be specially trained anti-terrorist units brutally assaulted the students. As all possible escape routes were blocked by the police themselves after the students were told to disperse, it seems clear that the purpose of the police attack was not so much to disperse the demonstration as to teach all possible demonstrators a lesson once and for all.[143] The demonstration on 17 November was the culmination of a large number of demonstrations, none of which articulated any specific political demands formulated by the independent initiatives. They did not even demand the legalization of these initiatives. In none of the preNovember demonstrations were there calls for the Government’s resignation, change in the party’s leadership, or the party’s relinquishing its monopoly of power, or change of the whole political system. The only demand the demonstrators expressed explicitly was in chants for ‘Freedom’ and ‘Give us freedom!’ The demonstrators relied heavily on the display of nationalist symbols. In addition to their choice of venues and timing, which both had strong nationalist connotations, the participants sang the national anthem, carried national flags, and wore ribbons in the national colours. They encouraged bystanders to join them by shouting ‘Czechs come with us!’. The police who confronted the demonstrators with truncheons, tear-gas, dogs, and water cannon were greeted as ‘Fascists’ and ‘Gestapo’. One commentator missed the point when he suggested in an underground newspaper that the demonstrators might as well have shouted ‘communists’, for beating up opponents was not a prerogative of fascists but an integral part of communist political culture (Listy, 19, 2 (1989):16). The true meaning of the abuse directed at the police was expressed by a participant in one of the demonstrations, when he described it euphemistically as ‘assuring the police that they were not Czechs’ (Listy, 19, 1 (1989):44). *** Nation, State, and Freedom The demand for freedom, the only demand the demonstrators articulated, was thus expressed in the context of strong nationalist emotions and was understood by the demonstrators and the Government alike as an anti-government protest. Nationalism, government, and freedom are thus intertwined and feed on one another. In invoking this package of interrelated notions, the demonstrations were clearly expressing a specifically Czech cultural construction of the relations between nation and state. Although the concept of the Czech nation as a community of people speaking the same language and sharing the same culture crystallized only during the period of the national revival in the nineteenth century, the Czechs now conceptualize this community as a natural entity that has existed from the dawn of time. Until the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Czech nation had its own state, the Czech kingdom. The suppression of the uprising of the Czech nobility against the centralizing and absolutist tendency of the Habsburg monarchy at the beginning of the seventeenth century effectively meant the end of the sovereignty of the Czech state. The centre of political power moved from Prague to Vienna, and for the Czech nation there followed 300 years of ‘darkness’, ‘oppression’, and ‘suffering’. The founding of the independent Czechoslovak state in 1918 was hailed as the liberation of the nation after 300 years of Habsburg rule. Freedom of the nation was seen as the major achievement of the political change—freedom in the sense of the nation being the master of its own collective destiny. For the Czechs, freedom is the core symbol of a nation enclosed within its own state, and the calls for freedom in the demonstrations of 1988 and 1989 were invocations of this symbol. If this interpretation is correct, why then should people who have their nation-state rally behind ‘freedom’ and other nationalist symbols, and, even more importantly, why should their action be seen as antistate? The question can be reformulated as, why is the nation opposed to the state? The answer lies in the logical implications of ‘freedom’ as the central ideological construct and core symbol of the relations between the nation and state. One of the implications is that the nation is free not just when it has its own state but when that state is an instrument for the management and channelling of the nation’s interests. The ultimate interest of the nation is, of course, its continued independent existence. All this is contained in the notion that the Czech nation has always been there, even in the centuries of darkness and oppression when it was not free and lacked a state to manage its interests. One can start to understand why it was not felt to be free in the pre-November days, in spite of having its own state, when one looks at the political rituals and symbols employed by the communist party. These did little to engender a perception of the Czechoslovak state as an organization for the pursuit of national interests. The two most important slogans displayed all over the country were ‘The Soviet Union— our example’ and ‘With the Soviet Union for ever’ (the popular attitude to these was expressed as usual in a joke: ‘With the Soviet Union for ever but not a day longer’). It is no wonder that in the spring of 1980 it was widely rumoured in Prague that Czechoslovakia was to be fully incorporated into the Soviet Union as one of its republics (Gellner 1987:126). Likewise it is no wonder that the communist system itself is widely seen as something alien to the national interest. If, in the Czech conceptualization, the state is seen as the political instrument of the nation’s freedom, the state has to guarantee both the freedom of the nation as a whole and the freedom of all its constituent parts. A nation-state cannot be repressive. If it is repressive, it is not a state which serves the nation’s interest. In this context of notions it is logical that the demand for freedom was expressed in overtly nationalistic terms and eventually pitched the nation against the state. As the police were the visible instrument of the state’s repression, it was logical that they were seen as standing outside and against the nation. This view was strongly reinforced every time the police took action against demonstrators who were waving national flags, singing the national anthem, and invoking other nationalist symbols. When on 17 November police brutality became all too clearly visible, and reminiscent in a way of what German fascists had done fifty years earlier, the tension between the nation and the state escalated into an open revolt of the people against the state.[144] Repression is the opposite of care and compassion, and the socialist state had devoted a considerable amount of propaganda to presenting its caring image. It did this mainly through stressing its role as the guarantor of a social security system available to all citizens. Now, in the Czech cultural conceptualization care is a primarily feminine trait, and therefore the cultural construction of gender relations in Czechoslovakia also influenced interpretations of the events of 17 November. The pattern of gender relations is underpinned by a few basic assumptions about femininity. Its defining features are motherhood and the socialization of children. Maternal sentiments are culturally assumed to be grounded in female nature. As something given in nature, they are not open to manipulation by culture and society, for culture and society can only accommodate the givens of nature. They cannot go against them. The result is a strong cultural affirmation of a ‘naturally given’ association of women with the domestic domain (which allows the woman to hold the purse and be responsible for the running of the domestic economy), and of the ‘naturally’ determined gravitation of women towards caring professions in the public domain (more than 90 per cent of teachers are women, and women outnumber men in the health service not only as nurses but also as doctors). To give birth, to bring up children, and to be caring are the culturally assumed main characteristics of womanhood. All the activities of the Czechoslovak Union of Women were built on this conceptualization of womanhood, with motherhood as its central image.[145] Mother, as a symbol with all its connotations, enters into the construction of the nation despite the fact that there is no semantic equivalent of the word ‘motherland’ in the Czech language. For the Czechs, their country is their ‘homeland’ (domovina) or vlast (a noun etymologically connected in at least one of its senses with the verb vlastniti—to own; Macura 1983:162), and this makes it different from all other countries (zeme—lands). Unlike the terms ‘fatherland’ and ‘motherland’, the term vlast has no semantic association with parenthood. Its parental role is, however, made explicit by being referred to as matka vlast (matka—mother). Through this metaphor, the country (vlast) is construed as a life-engendering entity. It is a mother to every individual Czech, and all Czechs are its children (building upon this metaphor, one of the independent initiatives called itself the ‘Czech children’). In the same way as one is born into a family and one’s personal identity—signified by one’s name—is established at birth, one is also born into a nation. Like one’s personal identity, one’s national identity is primary and one belongs to a nation in the same way that one belongs to a family. Both are preconditions for human existence. Neither the family nor the nation is made up of autonomous individuals, but rather individuals come into being as parts of the family and the nation. Through the metaphor of the mother country, Czechs remind themselves that each individual has two mothers: as a member of the family one has a biological genetrix, and as a member of the nation one has a symbolic genetrix. If through the metaphor of the mother country the nation is construed as a life-engendering entity, the state—construed as the guardian of the nation’s interests—cannot but behave in a caring— namely, motherly—way. It certainly should not repress members of the nation, the metaphorical children of the mother country. If it does, it has alienated itself from the nation, it has betrayed it. On 17 November 1989 the socialist state was not just beating up its citizens, the metaphorical children of the nation. It was beating up actual children— young people who were ‘the future of the nation’, in other words, those who would physically assure the nation’s continued existence. As with many other cultural premisses, those which motivated the perception of the events of 17 November were largely taken for granted and not an object of explicit discourse. Their existence can only be inferred from the explicit discourses into which they feed as verbally unformulated assumptions underlying their logic. One such explicit discourse has a direct bearing on the events of 17 November, and this is the discourse concerning the leadership of the Czechoslovak Union of Women after this date. The then leadership of this organization expressed its regret about the severity of the police action. It did not, however, condemn the police outright, but described the repression as ‘disproportionate’ to the task of maintaining public order at the demonstration. This formulation outraged the rank and file members, who saw in it the betrayal of the maternal feelings of the women whom the Union was supposed to represent. The leadership was forced to resign and the Union did not survive the crisis. At its next congress it dissolved itself and was replaced by a number of new independent women’s organizations. *** Conclusion The revolution in Czechoslovakia was triggered on 17 November 1989, when the socialist state, in using violence against students (young people —our children) in a demonstration for which it itself gave permission, showed that it had betrayed the nation. The nation’s outrage against the state was given visibility and shape by intellectuals (mainly actors) and students who were in the forefront of the popular revolt. This revolt highlighted not an opposition between socialism and democracy—as stressed by Western commentators—but an opposition between totalitarianism and freedom. Demands for an end to the communist party’s monopoly of power and for the creation of a democratic political structure were articulated by diverse groups of intellectuals and students at a meeting in one of the Prague theatres on 19 November. The opposition of the independent initiatives to communist power had always been formulated in terms of a demand for respecting the citizens’s legal rights. It was therefore appropriate that the organization now founded to co-ordinate the opposition to communist rule was called Civic Forum. Its spokesman— Vaclav Havel— addressed the demonstrators on 21 November, and subsequently presented the Forum’s demands to the communist government and led political negotiations with it. It was due to Civic Forum that the conflict between the nation and its state was eventually redefined as a conflict between citizens and the state. Civic Forum’s political demands for the creation of a democratic political structure were embraced by the people when it became clear that this was the way to achieve their main objective: the replacement of the hated state. Democracy entered on the coat-tails of a more general desire to bring relations between the nation and state back into line with a culturally constituted ideal. I would suggest that in the context of the cultural construction of these relations, the questions of the specific form the government should take were initially quite secondary. (Of course they came to the forefront eventually, for one cannot avoid the task of creating tangible structures for the expression of all cultural relations.) What the Czechoslovak Revolution expressed was something deeper than political dissatisfaction. It was the expression of a dissatisfaction with a situation in which the relationship between nation and state was defined in such a way that one could not talk about the one through the other. The ‘political’ crisis was precipitated by an event which highlighted this culturally unacceptable conceptualization of the nationstate relationship. The Civic Forum’s policy document, published on the eve of the November general strike, spoke of a deep moral, spiritual, ecological, social, economic, and political crisis in the country. In my view, the document is right to put the political crisis last and the moral crisis first, for the ultimate crisis lay in the symbolic order, and it was this crisis which precipitated the political change. [139] Although I have been in Czechoslovak several times since 1986, 1 observed the events of November 1989 and the pre-November demonstrations at a distance. My account is based on reports in Czechoslovak official and underground press and mass media. Kronika sametovc revalues (A chronicle of the ‘velvet revolution’), published by the Czechoslovak Press Agency, provides a useful summary of events between 17 November and 10 December 1989. [140] In this chapter, I am specifically concerned with Czech cultural conceptualizations. The revolution started in Prague, but it spread immediately to Slovakia and the leading Czech intellectuals sought actively to engage their Slovak colleagues in the common cause. The reasons for dissatisfaction with the com munist regime were to some extent different among the Slovaks than among the Czechs; and the Slovaks’ differing expectations of post-socialist arrangements are at the root of the contemporary tension between the Czechs and Slovaks. However, I am not qualified to comment on Slovak cultural conceptualizations and their effect on the political process in Slovakia. [141] Similar personal experiences of unemployed miners’ hardships in the 1930s were used to sustain the morale of British miners striking in the 1980s against pit closures. [142] The rallying of the masses behind the intellectuals was of course considerably facilitated by television. It was significant that the students were first joined in the strike by actors, and that the actors were seen as the main representatives of the intellectuals. The actors who openly rebelled were not unknown dissidents but men and women whose names and faces were known from television screens. This gave them visibility which no dissidents could hope to match. [143] The massacre, as it was later referred to, occurred on one of Prague’s major streets when the students were marching through in an attempt to reach the city centre, instead of ending the demonstration at the cemetery on the outskirts of Prague as had been agreed with the authorities. One theory advanced during the later parliamentary inquiry into the events of 17 November was that the students were actively encouraged to march onto the city centre by provocateurs from the ranks of the police and that the massacre was planned by the police right from the start. There is good evidence which supports this view. [144] It was no wonder that one of the representatives of Charter 77, who were normally very careful to check the accuracy of their information, reported to the world press that a student had been killed by the police during the demonstration. The logic of the situation made the rumour of a death entirely plausible to every Czech. [145] The new Government in 1990 abolished celebrations of International Women’s Day and reinstituted Mother’s Day. This change met with no opposition, as if the people were saying; ‘Correct, what right does a woman have to be venerated unless she is a mother?’ *** References(Vaclav Havel, in The Times, 12 August 1988)
Complete equality between men and women before the law and in social life; a radical reform of marriage and family laws; recognition of maternity as a social function; protection of mothers and infants. Initiation of social care and upbringing of infants and children (creches, kindergarten, children’s homes, etc.). The establishment of institutions that will gradually relieve the burden of household drudgery (public kitchens and laundries) and systematic cultural struggle against the ideology and traditions of female bondage.Poland, with its awkward and recalcitrant peasantry who stubbornly refused collectivization and its flourishing, indeed almost dominant ‘second economy’,[150] was in many ways the maverick state of socialist Eastern Europe. The profligate Gierek years saw the creation of a massive national debt. Hungry for hard currency, the Government allowed and even encouraged the growth of a black market which extended to every possible commodity and service. Throughout the 1970s in Poland, the vast discrepancy between official policy and actual practice was openly acknowledged in all but the highest official circles. As I was often told by the villagers in the highlands where I did research, ‘Tutaj nic nie jest wolno, ale wszystko jest mo liwe’ (‘here nothing is allowed but everything is possible’). This chapter is concerned with the position of Polish peasant women in the south-western highlands during the later years of the socialist regime, when nothing was permitted but everything was possible. Specifically, it focuses on the complex strategies devised by women in their pursuit of economic security, and the ways in which these often entailed delicate balancing acts between obligations, time, and labour in the domestic economy, the state sector, and the ubiquitous ‘second economy’. There can be no doubt that the lives of the peasantry, and particularly the lives of peasant women, changed enormously in the years between the establishment of the socialist regime in 1947 and its demise in 1989. That the dreams of early socialist feminists, such as Clara Zetkin and Alexandra Kollantai, envisaging a world marked by total equality at work, collective responsibility for domestic labour and child care, and equitable partnership and free choice within marriage, were not realized even in the early post-Revolution years in Soviet Russia is perhaps not surprising. What is striking is that, despite the fact that in Poland, as in other Eastern bloc countries, legislation, extremely progressive by Western European standards, to protect and support women in areas such as work and safety, family and marriage, and health care and maternity, was initiated in the mid-1950s, its practical application was minimal, particularly in rural areas (Sokolowska 1963; Jancar 1978; Pomian 1989). Clearly, the ‘revolution from the top’ did not extend fully to women, who remained for the most part definitely at the bottom. Kolankiewicz and Lewis state this bluntly:(From the programme of the International Women’s Secretariat of the Comintern, under Clara Zetkin, Moscow, 1924) The best thing is to keep your land and your women; if you must lose one, better to lose the women and keep the land.(Polish peasant man, highland village, 1979)
most of the burden of decreasing living standards is shouldered by women, who make up 51.2 per cent of the population. It is women who have to stand in queues for goods in short supply; it is also they who serve their irate sisters in retail outlets.. They had to cope with the decline of ..communal feeding and cleaning facilities which raised the hours spent on housework and shopping to 7.5 per day on average. This was aside from the time spent at work, where they earned at best 30 per cent less than their male counterparts, although figures are apparently so shameful that official statistics do not provide a breakdown by sex.In rural Poland, women’s labour has a particular developmental cycle, which corresponds with life stages characterized by early marriage, repeated child-bearing and the demands of child-rearing, and a labourintensive and highly flexible agricultural economy and market network. The types of paid work available to rural women, the labour demands of the family farm (especially when male waged labour entails long absences from home), and the social demands of caring for children, the ill and the old, combine to create a certain pattern of female economic activity. This pattern, I would argue, is characteristic of rural underdevelopment generally and not of Polish socialism in particular; what we witness is not so much the socialist government’s failure to integrate women fully into the labour market, although this is certainly one aspect of the problem, as the difficulty of changing women’s situation and lives when the economy is backward and when there is no social or cultural context for questioning gender ascriptions. In Poland, for various cultural and historical reasons including the very powerful position of the Roman Catholic church, there is enormous ideological stress placed upon the family and upon a woman’s role within it as mother and nurturer (cf. Siemie ska 1987; Holy, this volume). That this does not coincide with the realities of many women’s lives is clear. Women are certainly nurturers and carers, but face-to-face relations between women and men within the family are often brutal, male alcoholism and domestic violence are common, and the family often represents anything but a ‘safe place’ or haven. For peasants particularly, socialism often represented the ‘enemy other’, manifested in the state which had the potential to invade their lives at any moment. In contrast to this state, the family, centred in popular representation more around the nurturing mother than the patriarchal father, could be seen as protecting and caring for its members. For the peasantry, the ideological value placed on the family is reinforced by the fact that it is the productive and reproductive centre of social and economic life. The ideology of gender within the family often masks the fact that in terms of both agricultural labour and waged work, women are not ‘different but equal’ but are subject to mutually exclusive, unequal systems of constraints. While all peasants can be seen in some ways as disadvantaged in relation to national social and economic hierarchies, women’s association with the family economy and lack of consistent integration into external economic structures is decidedly more marked. Three factors particularly can be seen as militating against the integration of regional groups of peasants into the national economy. First, economic development in Poland was uneven during the socialist period, and the rural areas lagged far behind urban centres in health care, education, and work opportunities. Secondly, while collectivization programmes in the other Eastern bloc countries transformed agrarian conditions, or at least provided alternative labour and authority structures to those of the peasant family farm, less than 20 per cent of Polish agricultural lands were collectivized, while the rest remained in the hands of peasant farmers. This meant that erosion of the authority of the senior generations, and particularly of the senior men, occurred far more slowly in rural Poland than in other parts of Eastern Europe. Thirdly, Poland’s history of partition from 1772 until 1918 meant that many peasants identify far more strongly with their villages and regions than with any idea of the nation. Whereas the post-war generation of children, educated under the state system, have a strong sense of Polish history, albeit through a socialist lens, the sentiments which they learn at home are often strongly anti-state. Particularly in regions such as the southern mountains, which have for generations been peripheral and isolated, the state is regarded with hostility. Villagers may take instrumental attitudes in their dealings with state bureaucracy, but they also harbour deep resentment towards powerholders whom they see as having failed to develop agriculture adequately. Many retained a deep suspicion that the final aim of the Government was to collectivize their land. Although state-supported ‘agricultural circles’, equipment coopera tives, and distribution networks were all used extensively by the peasants during the socialist period, and certainly facilitated what little growth took place in the agricultural sector, the peasant farmers rarely let go of the idea that these organizations were really just a ploy, masking or preceding further concerted attempts towards state control and ultimate collectivization.[151] The pattern which emerged was one in which peasants participated instrumentally in both the agricultural and waged sectors of the state economy, but gave priority to their local systems of reciprocity and cooperation, which revolved around established authority structures and divisions of labour based on the small family farm. Many peasants worked for wages in the state sector in order to supplement their inadequate agricultural income. In the region in which I did research, however, the second economy provided more, and more flexible, economic opportunities for the peasants. My argument here is that the integration and participation of women and men in these three sectors, the domestic economy and family farm, the state waged sector, and the second economy, were uneven. Women’s economic careers, although straddling the three sectors, were rooted most firmly in the domestic organization associated with traditional peasant farming. I want also to suggest that in the Podhale region where I worked, and possibly in other regions as well, the family provided both in fact and in ideology an alternative and often oppositional social structure to the state. In so far as the peasants in this region rebelled against socialism, they did so through the ‘everyday acts of resistance and rebellion’ characteristic of peasants everywhere rather than through any coordinated or planned political strategy (Scott 1985). These acts of rebellion, predominantly played out in subversive social behaviour and small gestures of economic sabotage, locate the family and the wider net of kinship and neighbourhood relations as the source of resistance from below. It is in these spheres of family, kinship, and domestic economy that the agency of women is most vividly expressed. *** Ethnographic Background The Podhale lies in the south-western foothills of the Polish Carpathians, a breathtakingly beautiful area of gentle slopes and valleys leading up to the formidable peaks of the High Tatra Mountains. The people of the Podhale are the Gorale, or highlanders, a distinct ethnic group of shepherds and subsistence farmers with a reputation for innate wisdom, autonomy, and wild and colourful behaviour.[152] Until as late as the 1960s the peasant villages of this region were poor and isolated. Partible inheritance had led over generations to extreme fragmentation of fields and dwarfing of holdings. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the largest peasant farms were about 25 ha, while the average size was nearer to 2 ha. Peasants supplemented their subsistence farming with activities such as carpentry, weaving, knitting, and basketry, and midwifery and bone-setting within the village; with the sale of eggs and cheese at the local market, and with sporadic migrant labour, sometimes as far afield as Budapest. Members of the poorer families worked as day labourers on the farms of the wealthier villagers, and on the local estates, and young girls were sent into domestic service. On the whole, however, the village economies centred on subsistence farming, and agricultural production was based on the extended family, often encompassing two or three separate households, and on reciprocal labour exchanges between kin and neighbours. The household and agricultural divisions of labour were based on age and gender, and although in reality the practical boundaries were flexible, ideal female and male spheres were clearly demarcated. At the head of the farming household stood the senior couple, the male gazda and the female gospodyni, who exercised considerable moral and economic authority over junior members. The gospodyni, however, was responsible primarily for domestic management and organization of female and child labour, while the overall running of the farm was seen as falling under the encompassing authority of the gazda (see Pine 1988). When the socialist regime took power in Poland in 1947, it inherited a country ravished by war, with a rural economy which had been severely under-developed even before the destruction of the war years took its toll. The Government immediately embarked upon a programme of intensive industrial development. Attempts to collectivize farm lands were eventually abandoned in the face of massive peasant protest and refusal to deliver goods, but this only meant that even more resources were invested in industrial development at the expense of agriculture (see Pine and Bogdanowicz 1982; Hann 1985; Kolankiewicz and Lewis 1988). In the area of the Podhale which I am discussing here, there was never a consolidated attempt to collectivize. The land is too poor, the terrain too rugged, and the climate too harsh to support a thriving agricultural sector. Rather, small enterprises were built, such as a shoe factory and a ski factory, and the region was also developed for tourism, to absorb the overspill of tourists from the long-established alpine resort town of Zakopane. Communications with the rest of the country improved as roads were built and bus and train services extended. This in turn enabled the villagers to travel to and from town to work in the local factories, and to take advantage of the demand for goods and services created by the growing influx of tourists. By the 1970s acute deprivation had become on the whole a thing of the past, yet the memory of poverty remains strong to this day. The peasants’ attachment to their land and distrust of government officials and local administrators are rooted in this remembered past of exclusion and deprivation. The village in which I have done research is small for the area, with a population of about 800, and a total household count of about 160. Today it has a shop, a school, a post office, a tourist hostel, a bar, and a new church and cemetery. The market town Nowy Targ is about 10 km from the village. Nowy Targ is the site of an historic periodic market, which every Thursday draws huge crowds both of local farmers and market women buying and selling livestock, tools, food, crafts, and wool, and of tourists from all over Poland who come to buy these commodities or to seek out such rare bargains as amber necklaces, coral earrings, fine old shawls, and gold rings. Nowy Targ is also the local gmina (local government area) headquarters, accommodating the court, police station, secondary school, technical colleges, and the communist party headquarters. There is a wide range of both state and private enterprises in the town, providing employment for local residents and for many of the inhabitants of outlying villages. Just outside Nowy Targ are the factories built during the post-war industrialization drive.These factories are also places of employment for village women and men (Pine and Bogdanowicz 1982). The village itself lies in a remote valley, which has been accessible by road and rail only since the 1950s. Its economy is still primarily agricultural. Less than 10 per cent of the village households are without farmland, and even members of most of these households work regularly in the fields of their parents or siblings. From the late 1950s the groundwork was laid for the economic development of this village. Agricultural production and distribution improved somewhat with the development of Agricultural Circles to manage and distribute farming machinery, and cooperatives for purchasing local produce (in this area primarily milk). Men from most households joined the Circle and contracted to provide the state distribution centres with milk and, in rare cases, beef, and pork. Farming production itself remained highly labourintensive and unmechanized, and the division of labour continued to be based on gender and generation divisions within the extended family, and patterns of cooperation and reciprocal labour with close kin. For the majority of village households, however, farming alone could not provide a sufficient income. By 1977, when I first went to the village, many adults, both female and male, derived more of their income from activities outside farming. While many villagers worked in the state sector, either in one of the local factories or in the service and less frequently the administrative sectors, the most lucrative income sources were found in the legal, semi-legal, and straightforwardly illegal second economy. Here activities ranged from petty commodity production and sale, self-employed building and carpentry, to illicit currency deals, smuggling, and black market trading. A further economic dimension was added by the pattern of wage-labour migration to the United States.[153] By the late 1970s the most affluent village families were those from which one or more member had gone to work in Chicago, staying with kin for two or three years and working, often illegally, to earn dollars to finance a big new house in the village, suitable for accommodating tourists, *** Divisions of Labour Many adult villagers are involved in all three economic spheres. Nearly all villagers, from the very young to the very old, work in the fields during planting, hay-making, and harvest, and take some role in the day-to-day chores of running a farm. Most men and women of the post-war generations have worked in the state sector, often part-time or temporarily, as factory hands or other unskilled workers, less commonly full-time, and permanently in the service sector or in administrative posts in town. Finally, it would be hard to find a villager with no contact with the second or informal economy, be it an occasional expedition to the market to sell eggs and cheese, a regular provision of some service such as driving, or seasonal work such as private building. In each of these three spheres, principles of gender and age can be seen to underpin the divisions and organization of labour. I would also argue that the gender divisions of the domestic and farming economy, and the ideologies of male and female which relate to the family and the domestic group, can be seen as extending into the division of labour outside family farming, particularly into the second economy. Within most village households various economic activities are pursued, which together make up the household economy with farming as the priority. Both women and men are involved in every stage of agricultural production, but clear distinctions are made about spheres of work. Women are associated with the house and the farmyard, and are responsible for cooking, for feeding both the people and the livestock, milking the cows, and gathering the eggs. Men are responsible for maintaining the buildings, for slaughtering animals and preparing meat and sausage, and for looking after machinery and tools. Just as women are associated with the house and its immediate proximity, men are associated with the outside, with the fields and the woods, and with the work that is carried out there. Women and children rake hay and help to bring it in, weed fields, plant and pick potatoes and other root vegetables, and gather and bundle grain. All household members except the very young and the very old or infirm participate in threshing. Men work with horses, tractors, and machines, turning and fertilizing the soil, ploughing, and sowing grain and cutting hay. During the most intensive times of agricultural work, planting potatoes, hay-making, and harvest, men, women, and children work together in the fields, often with the help of kin and neighbours. At these times, labour is exchanged between households, and male and female labour is separately accounted and balanced.[154] Both women and men market farm produce. Men, however, are usually the ones who take the main responsibilty for delivering quotas of produce to the distributive cooperatives, and organizing the private sale of livestock at markets, and of meat to private sources. Women market small amounts of produce on an occasional basis; they take eggs to market, make and sell cheese and butter, and during the summer months gather and sell mushrooms and berries. Villagers themselves see farming as a household enterprise, and rarely acknowledge, at least overtly, conflicts of interest between men and women in terms of production. The farm is usually owned jointly, and women as well as men own individual fields and property. They do, however, clearly recognize the different male and female spheres. Male work is seen as important, female work as subsidiary. This was put clearly to me by one 60-year-old woman, who said, ‘The farm is ours. The cows and pigs are his; the eggs are mine.’ While both women and men are equally necessary to, and involved in, all phases of agricultural production, their roles are ascribed different values, and women’s work is viewed, by themselves and by men, as practically and economically less significant. The difference between the value of a cow and the value of eggs is a measure of this. A small number of farms specialize in dairy or meat production, and have no household members working outside agriculture, and a few very old couples, without any resident children, survive solely by subsistence farming. Most adults, however, also work in other fields at some point in their lives. Their earnings are on the whole channelled back into the household economy, although young single men and women may only give part to their parents or senior kin, and keep the rest for their own use, particularly saving up for marriage. Most villagers follow one of two patterns after leaving school; they either begin to work for the state, or they are apprenticed to close kin and begin immediately to work in the second economy. What interests me here is not so much the different sorts of jobs that men and women do as the way in which gender distinctions are maintained in the different economic spheres. Patterns of male waged labour and work in the second economy are determined largely by the need to generate income above that which can be obtained from farming, and by the demands of farm work, which vary greatly according to season. During the summer and early autumn the demands of agricultural labour are most demanding, and take priority over other work. Men who work in the state sector organize their holidays around these peaks, or negotiate shifts which allow them to spend much of the day in the fields. Work in the informal sector, which is often organized on an irregular, highly ad hoc basis, may be suspended during these times. During the slack agricultural months, however, men are free to work as drivers, to haul timber, and to take on building contracts. This work is quite highly paid. It involves long hours away from home, and often out of the village. Male workers are recruited in much the same ways that agricultural labour is organized. As in farming, a man may work alone, or with a son or brother, for small jobs, but for larger work, such as building contracts, a team is recruited through ties of kinship, neighbourhood, and friendship, with individual members recruited on the basis of skill or access to tools and machinery. Although social ties are essential in recruitment, such work is strictly accounted and conducted like a business enterprise. In this it is different from farming; most farm labour involving members of other households is arranged in terms of strictly calculated, balanced reciprocity. Elsewhere the work is contractual, and men are usually paid in cash by their employers. This pattern of alternating agricultural labour with paid work continues throughout a man’s life, mitigated obviously by the availability of work and by the developmental cycle of the farm labour force. Women’s working lives unfold differently. Just as male work is largely organized around the needs of the farm, the work of women must accommodate the demands of the domestic household. This does not mean that women’s non-farming labour is not also affected by the farming cycle; it is, and, like men, women who work for the state arrange their free time and their shifts around planting, haymaking, and harvest. Other factors, however, also influence the ways and the areas in which women work. The majority of young village women go to work in the state sector after leaving school, either on the factory floor or in the service sector, waitressing, cleaning, or working as shop assistants. This work is, as the the quotation from Kolankiewicz and Lewis on p. 228 indicates, extremely badly paid. It has, however, several advantages for women, which are directly connected to their household responsibilities. First, state employment brings with it rights to health care and pensions. For women, this involves sixteen weeks’ paid maternity leave, and an option of up to three years unpaid leave. Second, waged work in the state sector is viewed as relatively undemanding. It is often extremely hard work, but no more so than either farming or domestic labour. And while farm work and domestic labour must be done well, and involve great personal commitment to the general well-being of the family, state work is viewed with detachment, with little emphasis placed upon good performance or productivity. Finally, work in the state sector is seen as badly organized, which ironically makes it flexible in terms of women’s time. Often with the collusion of the managers, women take turns leaving work to stand in queues for food and scarce consumer goods, to negotiate and exchange with other women the ‘under-the-counter’ goods and produce which might be available at the workplaces of each, and to sell and exchange both farm produce and any number of goods and services to which they might have access through their families and kin. In some cases, the workplace provides opportunities for petty pilfering. One woman, for example, worked for the state weaving cooperative, and when ever possible smuggled home with her a ball of the high-quality wool used in tapestries and clothes, which she could then sell, or use in her own private weaving. The important point here is that women view state work totally instrumentally. They feel no moral obligation to the state, and no compunction to work well or to be productive. This frees them to take advantage of facilities available, and to use the workplace as the location for a variety of tasks necessary for daily home life, and deals aimed at helping the domestic economy. The maternity benefits offered by the state also make such work attractive to young married women. A common pattern is for a woman to work for the state until the birth of her first child, and then take the paid leave to which she is entitled, during which time she helps on the farm, and often works with other female household members knitting, weaving, or sewing, or making cheese for sale. Most women return to paid work at the end of this period, but after the birth of her second or third child a woman is more likely to remain off work for the full three- year period. Many women do not return to wage-labour, finding it too much to accommodate with the demands of domestic labour and child care, particularly when their participation in second economy dealing becomes more time-consuming and financially rewarding. Some women return to state work when their older children become able to care for younger ones; others continue to divide their time between the daily farm and domestic work required of them, and some type of ‘informal’ activity. *** Women’s Working Lives Women’s labour on the farm and in the house, revolving as it does around the daily care and nurture of people and livestock, ties them consistently far more closely to the farm and the village than does that of men. Some women, despite this, become successful market women who travel as far afield as Crakow and Warsaw, selling wool, sheepskins, and cheeses in the railway and bus stations, or on the street in the main squares. A few women are known to be involved in smuggling, usually of highland sheepskins and foreign gold and currency, and to travel routes which take them across national borders and even as far as Turkey. Still other women go abroad, usually to Hungary or Czechoslavakia, to work on short contracts. All women I knew in these categories were either young and unmarried, or were well into middle age with grown, married children among whom was a resident daughter or daughter-inlaw capable of taking over the daily running of the farm and household. The only exceptions to this pattern are a few young women, with children, who have gone to America for one or two years to work; their children were left in the care of their own mothers, who may or may not have been members of the same household. The important point here, I think, is that wage-labour in North America is so extraordinarily lucrative,[155] and so difficult to arrange, that normal constraints and obligations cease to apply when such an opportunity presents itself.[156] Women who travel extensively, however, are the exception. Most women try to find ways of earning money which are compatible with the demands of the farm and the family. On the whole, they do what they are best at, with the people with whom they are used to working. The tourist industry in particular provides an extension of existing domestic roles for women, and a range of jobs and services which can coexist with child care and farm work. Networks of female kin and affines, who provide the basis for women’s cooperative activities in agriculture and in elaborate domestic work such as cooking for a wedding or a christening, are also central in developing labour pools, marketing networks, and distributive channels for goods and services. Sisters and sisters-in-law drop in on one another in the evening, and sit together in the kitchen with their young daughters, chatting and knitting sweaters to sell. Little girls are taught to knit by their mothers and sisters when they are 6 or 7; often by age 8 or 9 they are knitting for sale, sitting up late at night, exchanging gossip with their elder kinswomen to the fast clacking of needles. If pressed for time, several girls and women may work on one sweater, one knitting the front, another the back, and two others the arms. The sweaters, if not commissioned by a particular tourist, are taken by one of the women to sell on the Nowy Targ market, or passed on to a market woman, who collects from various village women before market day and sells their produce, either paying them by the piece or on commission. Women with modern two- or three-storey houses, often paid for with American dollars, let rooms to tourists who come to ski in the winter and to relax in the clean mountain air in the summer. Many such women do not register their rooms with the local tourist board; although they risk of being caught and fined, they also avoid paying taxes, and can choose their own guests and regulate their own prices. Tourists tend to return to the same family, and to bring various friends over the years. If the village woman lacks room for the friends in her own house she passes them on to a sister, sister-in-law, or daughter. Villagers often become very friendly with tourists, while at the same time viewing them quite instrumentally, and incorporating them into their network of znajomy, acquaintances who can do one favours. Much as the tourists are passed around the female kin circle, so are the opportunities and potential for asking favours which the tourists offer shared among kin. One village woman who is a wonderful cook started a small private restaurant in her own house. When her ‘own’ tourists started to bring their friends and she needed to expand, she trained her cousin to be her assistant, and began to employ her young daughters, as well as the daughters of sisters and cousins, to wait on the tables. This organization of female kin labour is identical to that which would be orchestrated at a wesele, the elaborate two-day Gorale wedding feast. The labour network was simply transposed into a seasonal, money-making enterprise. In certain families the women serve illicit vodka in their basements, drawing custom from village men as well as from tourists. Others sell milk, eggs, and cheese to the tourists, and occasionally try to interest them in buying an article of clothing sent from America, or gold or jewellery from some more questionable source. They sell the tourists sweaters or wool, offer them sheepskin coats in the winter months, and generally provide them with whatever services they appear to need, and even some they had not anticipated. These types of female entrepreneurial activity mediate between the world of the household and of kinship, and the outside world of strangers. The work can be seen as using the same skills, and as based on the same ideologies of correct female work, as female labour in the farming household. However, it takes place outside the spheres of farming and household subsistence, and involves payment for service or product. The women use their networks of kinship and affinity to produce and sell their goods to the outside economy, or to bring the outside world in, in the form of tourists. The tourists are certainly not totally incorporated into the internal world of the village, the household, and the kin networks; but they are welcomed into the household and provided with many of the services with which women also provide their families. They are also given part entry to the world of female kinship, although whether the tourist is valued as a person or as an economic asset is not always absolutely clear. Women’s reasons for working for the state are practical and pragmatic, and the work they do there, as I have already discussed, is seen as neither important nor worthwhile. State-sector employment is outside the constraints of morality which temper economic relations between co-villagers and productive relations within the family and the household. Although it could well be argued that, particularly in relation to maternity benefit, the socialist system implemented policies which allowed women more choice and control over their work than they had had previously, the women themselves do not perceive this. They see the state as producing the scarcities, the queues, and most of the factors which make their lives so hard —fair exchange, then, that those involved in waged work in the state sector should use that time and those workplaces to cope with the problems of daily life. Female family and kinship networks, centred in the household and extended out into an intricately wrought complex of relationships, form the basis for women’s cooperative production, exchanges of support and services, and sale and distribution of produce. It is interesting to compare female networks with the agricultural circles and cooperatives established by the state but run by male peasants; in terms of the organization of production, distribution, and marketing, there are marked similarities. To some extent, kinship can be seen as providing an alternative basis for economic organization to that of the state. The household is the focus of morality for the Gorale villager; it is the place in which work is perceived as being part of one process, and in which, despite legitimate hierarchies of age and gender, common interest is assumed. Within the household, by word and by example, children are taught an ambivalent attitude to the state. On the one hand, they are told that if they want to ‘get on’, they must be polite to teachers, speak only in ‘clean’ Polish, behave humbly in front of priests and bureaucrats, and generally conform to society’s ideas of good, and civilized, behaviour. On the other hand, they continually witness other kinds of behaviour. The moment visiting priests or officials leave, the villagers drop their appearance of humility, and start turning them into figures of fun. They mimic them accurately and mercilessly, parodying an affected ‘elegant’ accent, pretending to mince along on high heels in the snow, and telling stories of the priests’ wandering hands, or the villas owned by the priests’ sons in the mountains. Children see their parents using the Gorale dialect to communicate in front of strangers, and using house names instead of surnames in address and identity to provide a cloak of anonymity in a private language and naming system that the outsider cannot penetrate. They hear tales of how, as children, their parents were sent to steal kindling from the estates of wealthier villagers or the gentry, and how they were whipped and beaten if caught. At the same time they see their mothers returning from work with wool smuggled out of the factory, and their fathers turning up with loads of coal which have somehow gone astray from their intended destination. The implicit parallels are clear. They are taught to protect their own information and that of those close to them, to run and alert people working in the fields if police come into the village, and to combine their polite deference to priests and bureaucrats with an alert but totally guarded reticence. These strategies effectively locate loyalty, morality, and interest first in the household and family, and second within the village. They identify the enemy ‘other’ as the powerful outsider: the landed gentry or rich peasants of old, the priests, and the contemporary state officials. It is largely from their mothers, and from listening to the talk of their mothers and their female kin, that children receive these teachings. *** Conclusions The failure of the Eastern European socialist regimes to win the hearts and minds of the people is now indisputable. For the Gorale, as for other isolated, peripheral groups of peasants (cf. Kligman 1988), the socialist state represented only one more stage in a long history of opposition and subversive action against the ‘outside’. In fact, many aspects of villagers’ lives improved during the socialist period. Health care, education, and opportunities in waged labour all lagged far behind the urban areas, but were a marked improvement on what formerly had been available. Ironically, collectivization, which the villagers feared and most often cited as the reason for their anti-state sentiments, was never much of a threat in the mountains. The socialist regime failed, however, either to implement any policies to develop private agriculture, or to provide the kind of work which would allow villagers in such unproductive regions as the Podhale to move permanently away from agriculture. For women particularly, work in the state sector was limited, and conditions arduous and unrewarding. Consequently, the central role of the family farm, and the gender divisions within it were never seriously threatened. The house, centred on the family and particularly the mother, continued to play a vital role in the village economy and to be the primary source of social identity and value. Because conditions in the state sector were so poor for women, they used the state economy and policies only at the times that served them best. For most women, work continued to be associated with the house and farm, and to be organized through networks of female kinship. Their ability to transform these into flexible entrepreneurial strategies for dealing with the external economy made their lives somewhat easier during the years of shortage. I stated at the beginning of this chapter that the developmental cycle of female labour, which creates for women a constantly interrupted pattern of conflicting needs and obligations, can be seen as much as a symptom of under-development as of socialism gone wrong. Studies from Africa and from Latin America have stressed comparable balancing acts to those that Gorale women perfected in the post-war years. It remains to be seen whether the post-socialist Government commitment to rapid conversion to a free market economy will help or hinder rural women. Current trends of rising unemployment[157] and factory closures, and increasingly vocal arguments in the press and from the Government itself that women should be ‘allowed’ to return to the home and look after their families, all suggest that that there will be a marked decline in female participation in the structured workforce. It seems likely that for many rural women, waged work opportunities will diminish rapidly, and their dependence on informal earnings, small-scale marketing, and homebased industry will increase. This in turn suggests that rural Poles may turn inward again, relying more and more on production for subsistence, and looking increasingly to village-based ties of kinship and neighbourhood to provide a safety net in times of deprivation. For the Gorale, many of these networks are already firmly in place. Whether the skills of survival they have developed over the years will continue to serve them well in what appears to be a climate of increasing polarization between rich and poor, and between urban and rural areas, remains to be seen. [150] The term ‘second economy’, referring to economic activity which is not included in the state or cooperative sectors, has a wide range in Eastern Europe. In addition to the legal private sector, it extends to illicit and illegal activities throughout the economy, and is used in much the same way as the term ‘informal economy’ in the anthropological discussion of nonsocialist societies. For comparative material, see Grossman (ed.) 1987, and Hann (ed.) 1990. [151] For a comprehensive discussion of Polish agriculture at this period, see Galeski 1972. [152] Field research was carried out in 1977–79, 1981, 1984, and 1989.1 am grateful to the Social Science Research Council for funding the 1977–79 research, and to the Economic and Social Science Research Council for funding the 1989 research. Additional support was received in 1977–79 and 1981 from the British Council, and in 1977 from the Central Research Fund of London University. [153] The first mass migrations of Gorale to North America occurred during years of famine in the late nineteenth century, and continued until America closed its doors to European migrants in 1915. More limited migration persisted throughout the first half of this century. It stopped only during the first two decades of the socialist regime and was reactivated after Polish travel restrictions were partly lifted in the 1970s. [154] Labour is ranked, with adult male labour being the most valued, followed by that of women, and then of children. If a household sends only women and children to a neighbour’s threshing party, they in turn will receive only female and child help when their turn comes. Old women who live alone are at a particular disadvantage here, as whatever help they give to neighbours is likely to be reciprocated with a minimal team of perhaps one woman and one child. The old woman’s choice is either to work for as many neighbours as possible, exhausting herself and neglecting her own fields, in order to accumulate enough ‘credit’ for her own harvest, or to hire day labour, which is usually viewed as a highly unreliable option. [155] In 1979, average savings over a two-year period in Chicago were $20,000, then equivalent to about 2,600,000 zlotys at the unofficial exchange rate, or about twenty years of above-average earnings in Poland. Moreover, during the 1970s and 1980s many goods, particularly motor vehicles and building supplies, were only easily available for hard currency. [156] In the 1970s and 1980s both Polish passports and American visas were quite difficult to obtain, and often involved a great deal of time, expense, and manipulation of connections. It is my impression that female applicants with young children were favourably viewed by both Polish and American authorities, as it was assumed that they were certain to return to their children. [157] At the time of writing in November 1991, official unemployment is 2 million of whom over 53 per cent are women. *** References(1988:60; my emphasis)
‘Getting things done’ depends on an argument that goes as follows. The first priority is to bring jobs to the area; bringing jobs to the area depends on being able to attract employers; being able to attract employers depends on their attracting bright young executives. And this in turn depends on being seen to do ‘prestige’ projects which ‘get you in the twenty-first century’. And this is largely a matter of building large-scale city-centre developments and a system of urban motorways.The effect of ‘modernizing’, ‘thinking big’, and ‘getting things done’ in such a large and remote authority was, as Gladstone goes on to illustrate, to limit and control public information and comment on proposals that affected them. This attitude to decision-making was defended on the grounds of professionalism or with the political argument that councillors were representatives elected to make decisions that were right for the people—even if those people disagreed and protested. Although not peculiar to the Labour Party, this politics of modernization, using local government to carry out large-scale redevelopment with ‘efficient’ use of resources for a public good that they determined, can be considered one of the prime ingredients of Labourism (Gyford 1985). *** The Outcome of Modernization Through the 1960s, Teesside was booming. Blue-collar wages were among the highest in the country; it seemed that growth and full employment might be possible. A continuous process of modernization of steel and chemicals was subsidized through the Government’s regional programme. Local authorities prepared sites for them and built new housing estates. It was intended that modernization would be accompanied by diversification of the economy and employment. It is difficult to establish why this failed. Sadler provides evidence of one agreement between ICI and the Government to prevent other large firms that would compete for male labour from setting up in the area, and another arrangement with Eston Urban District Council to allocate its new housing to ICI Wilton (1990:334—5).[162] These are two factors in a complicated process, the results of which were that large firms which might have diversified male employment did not set up in the area. Teesside was made dependent on the fortunes of two firms. This was not the subject of dispute at the time. Hudson explains the political context:(1976:50)
The alliance between the major chemical and steel companies, the trades unions whose members found or retained employment with them as fresh capital flowed in and the local councils many of whose members were employed by these companies, was an extremely powerful one. It cut across class boundaries in a vigorous promotion of one conception of what Teesside’s future ought to be.This ‘one conception’ of what was good for Teesside lasted into the 1970s. ICI’s and BSC’s vast holdings of land meant that there was restricted space for the development of oil-related industries in Teesside.[163] Local authorities, trade unions, and capitalists, with funding from central government and the European Community, ‘reclaimed’ a bird migration site of international importance for this purpose. Conservationists’ protests were rejected with the slogan ‘jobs not birds’. It was not until the late 1970s that the county council first began to leave the alliance of industry and unions and began to emphasize the cost of capital-intensive and land-extensive development which created only 2— 6 jobs per acre. Labour had held that this cross-class conception of what was good for the region was ‘in the interests of the working class’. Contrary to its initial impression, this phrase connotes a politics of modernization which was not based on consciousness of the interests of workers defined by their position in the system of production. It also sounds neutral, as if what is in the interests of the working class benefits all people in that class position. It was, however, highly gendered. The modernization policies of continuous investment in capital-intensive heavy-industry plants, using large tracts of land, with heavy environmental costs, was to secure ‘men’s jobs’. State policies which were ‘in the interests of the working class’, while appearing neutral, affected men and women differentially. Manufacturing industry that would compete for ICI and BSC’s male workers might be discouraged from entering the area, but firms with jobs considered suitable for women were welcome. They solved another problem for heavy industry. In the heyday of the unions’ emphasis on the need for a male breadwinner to earn a family wage (Land 1980), increased housing rents in new council houses and the cost of a ‘modern’ standard of living put pressure for higher wages on heavy industries. This was alleviated by providing ‘women’s’ employment.[164] Between 1958 and 1975 half of the new manufacturing jobs and most of the new service jobs in the new town centre and in local government were filled by women—although service-sector employment only ever reached two-thirds of that aimed for in the Teesside Survey and Plan (Hudson 1989:366). This employment enabled women to supplement household income so that they could afford the higher cost of living and the expenditure on so-called labour-saving devices which were supposed to ease women’s dual or triple roles in household management, community organizing, and waged employment. While modernization was intended to cut away historical forms, as part of the process, gender relations were entrenched in what was considered ‘traditional’. In the return to ‘normal’ after women had done even the heaviest jobs in the steelworks during the Second World War, there was a strict demarcation between what was considered a man’s job and a woman’s job.[165] Both might be in manufacturing, but men’s jobs were in ‘heavy’ industry and women’s jobs were in ‘new’ factories. Men’s labour was associated with established trade unions; women’s labour was ‘green’, meaning they had never previously been in waged labour and were not unionized. Men’s work was organized in a three- shift system whereas women’s jobs were timed around the men’s shifts to enable them to be home with a dinner cooked, ready for the husband’s arrival. Men’s and women’s jobs were associated with different levels of pay; and women’s jobs were characterized by insecurity, being parttime, casual, or temporary. The policies to diversify employment in Teesside were implemented in such a way as to protect the status of male labour and their trade unions and entrench a strict gender division of work. *** Restructuring and Recession When the recession started in the mid-1970s, the modernized industry of the North-east was shown to be weak. Central government had been trying to operate on a notion of a ‘national economy’. Local authorities had been using ideas of regionalism. Meanwhile capitalists ceased to work within either regional or national frames. They had been restructuring capital internationally. What had become important was not just whether industrial activity was ‘modern’, but where a plant fitted into the international division of labour (Massey 1984). Firms distributed their functions across the globe. Massive state investment to modernize Teesside’s steel and chemicals industries had been used to specialize in very vulnerable sectors.[166] Modernization had been accompanied by a concentration on branch plants of firms based elsewhere. State support had not been used for the diversification necessary for a self-sustaining regional economy. If, before the modernization programme in the 1960s, Teesside was considered a peripheral region in the United Kingdom, in the 1970s it became a global outpost in a new international organization of capital. The recession revealed the problems. From 1975, first the Labour and then the 1979 Conservative Government cut back state support for industry. First to go were the ‘new’ industries which mainly employed women on industrial estates. Gradually, all the major industries were affected: shipbuilding, steel, chemicals, and even the new oil-related industry. Modernization policies had already worsened the employment problem. Between 1965 and 1976 capital investment in ‘old’ industries in Cleveland had displaced 34,000 workers, while ‘new’ industry on industrial estates had created only 11,400 new jobs. The effect of the recession on this industrial scene was that in 1974—77 male registered unemployment doubled to 8.2 per cent. By 1981 it was 18 per cent, with 66,000 redundancies in that year alone. In March 1985 it peaked at 22.5 per cent. It remained the highest in mainland United Kingdom at over 20 per cent for the rest of the 1980s, with half of the 44,000 people in question unemployed for more than a year. The concern in the village where I began fieldwork in the mid-1980s was that school-leavers might never get a job and earn a wage. This is borne out by the figures. Of those who left school in Cleveland county in 1985 only 9 per cent went into permanent employment, 46 per cent were on Youth Training Schemes. Of those on such schemes in 1983/ 84 only 35 per cent had a job by January 1985 (the national figure was 60 per cent) (Foord et al., n.d.). YTS managed the transition from school to unemployment, not from school to work, and the situation continues. Even those who still had a job felt the impact of high unemployment. Around a core of well-paid, permanent male employees at ICI and BSC is a penumbra of men who are taken on for peak workloads and whose employment is insecure, short-term, sub-contracted, and non-unionized. However, Foord et al. (ibid.) indicate that the distinction between women’s work and men’s work is still maintained. Men are not taking jobs traditionally done by women as the wages are considered too low for a man. Similarly, Morris (1985) suggests that the domestic division of labour, whereby women do almost all daily domestic work, has not changed under conditions of high male unemployment. *** The County Council’s Response to High Unemployment In twenty years, Teesside had gone from boom to bust, from the epitome of Harold Wilson’s ‘white heat of new technology’ to Britain’s unemploy ment blackspot with the greatest area of derelict industrial land in Western Europe (2,000 acres in 1974, according to Hudson 1986:13). By the late 1970s it was becoming clear to some people in the local authorities that high levels of fixed capital investment, underwritten by central government regional policies and supported by local authority land-use policies was associated with environmental problems and rapidly rising unemployment. The local authorities tried to use their resources to promote the local economy but their role and ability to intervene in the local economy and society were being curtailed. Central government began to marginalize local authorities by setting up other agencies to take over certain of their functions. In February 1986 a Task Force of five civil servants with direct access to ministers and a £1 million budget from central government was sent to Middlesbrough. They set up projects to work with public- and private-sector and community groups on ‘enterprise’ and skills training. In October 1986 the formation of four Development Corporations, one to be based in Teesside, was announced at the Tory Party Conference. An appointed committee of ten, mainly men in business and property development, took over local authority planning powers on land adjacent to 10 miles of the River Tees. Central government promised them a budget of £160 million to redevelop the land ‘single-mindedly’ over six to seven years, seemingly without regard to equity issues. The Manpower Services Commission, through a centrally appointed board, greatly expanded its schemes for unemployed people in the county. Community Programme places doubled in August 1985. The voluntary sector took great advantage of the availablility of ‘jobs’ and finances to cover support costs to develop environmental and care schemes. Those changes represented a shift in the balance of power and resources away from the county council to the private and voluntary sectors. In the mid-1980s, whilst the national Labour Party (Kinnock 1985) spoke of ‘the enabling state’ in opposition to Thatcherism’s ‘roll back of the state’, some county council officers and councillors in Cleveland began to look in new ways at the role of the council in the county. It was estimated that unemployment would remain at around 20 per cent into the next century. What was needed was jobs, but local government could not counter the effects of international movements of capital and central government policy through autonomous development. It was argued that high unemployment would remain and its social effects should be addressed. In areas with high unemployment the council’s research unit produced a stark picture of poverty, lack of self-esteem, lack of community activity, and a lack of knowledge of available support for unemployed people (Smith 1986). An informal network of officers and councillors began to look for ideas from authorities with New Left programmes. A number of small projects were pursued jointly with the churches and with voluntary organizations. One of the major concerns was to discover how to turn a ‘dependency culture’ into an ‘enterprise’ one and build a social basis for future economic development. The thinking is captured in the resulting Unemployment Strategy:(1986:23)
For all people in Cleveland there is dependency on a narrow economic base and a few large firms.... For the unemployed, already victims of dependency, new aspects of social and economic dependency operate, involving the government, through Social Security and MSC, and local government through social services and concessions. This leads to a sense of powerless and hopelessness.The first sentence here signals a clear move away from the Labourist argument that to support the interests of the ‘few large firms’ is to protect jobs and therefore is in the interest of the working class. The strategy also moved away from other aspects of Labourism. Instead of a comprehensive plan devised by experts in their definition of the people’s best interests, the council was to respond to unemployed people in a way that empowered them. It was argued that instead of bringing unemployed people into contact with bureaucracies in a way that controlled them, the council’s resources should be used to foster initiative and enterprise. This could be through supporting community action or through involving clients in the design of services. This discussion revealed that unemployed people did not have the resources to exercise their rights as citizens, and their problems were not reaching the council through the traditional routes of pub- and club-based Labour Party and work-based trade unions. Other categories of people who had been outside waged employment were seen to be similarly disempowered as citizens and as the public. There were few alternative local organizations through which communities could be reinvigorated and people could become more active in ‘gaining control of their own lives’. The county council recognized that it could not remedy these problems alone; it would have to collaborate with other agencies and the voluntary sector. Instead of the simple 1960s image of a council responsible for its people within its area, this introduced a far more complicated picture of a council in an arena of organizations with different relations to the public. Here were many of the themes Gyford (1985) identified in the New Urban Left. As they widened the agenda from the traditional issues labelled ‘working class’, the relationship of the council to people became very complicated. Those who were at first called ‘unemployed’ soon came to be constructed as clients, consumers, the public, citizens, the community, and voters. They were held together in the overall aim to use council resources to empower ‘ordinary people’. It was planned to do this by having community development teams in four Action Areas working on the above agenda. From the bottom of the council’s hierarchy at the interface with people, they were to feed their perspective on council operations to a central team of officers who would create the necessary changes in the way the council worked. The development of this Unemployment Strategy was taking place in a council where the old guard had all the chairs but two to three members of each committee considered themselves new ‘Young Left’.[167] Despite being in a minority, they were hard working and committed to different aspects of the empowerment vision of local socialism represented by the Unemployment Strategy. It was formally adopted in April 1987 and was fully operational eighteen months later. Subsequently, a new Labour leader took over with the support of the Young Left. His emphasis is on efficient delivery of a high level of services, and it seems that the Young Left’s agenda with its complex array of relations between the council and different constructions of ‘people’ may be narrowed down to one: the modelling of the council on the retailing image of people as consumers. *** Contested Ideas of Local Socialism in Practice A history of Labourism can be traced in the settlement pattern along one valley in the rural part of the county. Here also, different visions of socialism are being contested currently. The valley contains three settlements. On one side is a market town. On the opposite bank and on the valley floor are two villages which sprang up in the nineteenth century when the mining and steelworks were developed. In terms of voting behaviour, like most of the county, this area is marginal. One current councillor was the first Labour councillor on the Urban District Council in the 1950s. He worked hard to get more Labour candidates on the council, and by the 1960s Labour had control. He became wedded to the large-scale planning and modernization ideas. He was on the cross-party organization for industrial development in the region in the 1960s. He consistently holds that his aim is to create jobs, and that to do this there has to be financial support for companies, industrial sites, a good road network, and a modern image for the area that will attract executives. From the late 1960s various bodies, including the larger county council, made plans to redevelop the area. The mines, which had been the rationale for the location of the villages, had closed. The future of the steelworks was uncertain. Men commuted to work in heavy industry on Teesside, but there was very little work for women. To attract industry, an industrial estate was to be built on the edge of the market town. The valley was too steep for industrial traffic, so one plan was to fill it (using the ‘unsightly’ shale heaps), and to take a new road across and connect it with the new network planned for Teesside. The two villages in the valley were now redundant, and the plans proposed the demolition of nearly all of one, but only half of the one on the bank as it was divided by the boundary between two councils. Their ‘unfit’ terraces were to be demolished and the people relocated to a modern council housing estate attached to the market town. When, in 1973, the public were at last consulted on these plans, there was an outcry. The Urban District Council commissioned its own consultant and modified the plans, aiming to rebuild rather than demolish the village on the valley floor. But even when this was announced, it caused uproar. Implementation of the plan continued during the period when local government was reorganized and the new distict council took up responsibility for the sub-standard housing in the villages. The leader of the Labour group on the district council was upset that all he got for recognition of rural problems was a bad name in the press. His power base was in the urban area. Each of the councillors from the hitherto separate and small rural council areas seem to have related to the leader individually as clients to a patron, seeking approval and funding for plans for their area. In return, the councillor was expected to keep control of his ward, so that no public outcry should occur over council plans. On top of the impetus against active public participation that came from the new professionalism of planning and the political ideas of representative democracy, this was an added incentive for practices to build up whereby councillors tended to constrain local initiatives and dampen anything which could be construed as dissent. This is illustrated by an incident in the village on top of the bank, where the plan was to demolish half of it. In the 1970s some terraces were taken down to accommodate the new road. (They managed to regrade the road without filling the valley.) A further terrace was demolished as ‘substandard’, leaving a grassed gash through the village. Villagers hoped that the site would be used to build old people’s bungalows. In the late 1980s, the green gash remained, but the problem for elderly people was getting worse. The village has only two- or three- bedroomed houses. If a person needs a bungalow, they have to move to another village, quite a distance away. In their own village, they are almost always looked after by children or friends; isolated in a new village, in story after story that I heard, they could not cope on their own again, they became mentally disturbed, or they just suddenly died. Women in the village argued they should be able to look after their own elderly relatives, and they should not be ‘sent out of the village to die’. The women raised a petition and sent it to the district council. As the district council no longer had resources to build houses itself, the request was passed to a housing association. A year later, the housing association presented its plans in a full day consultation in the village hall. The plan was for mainly highly quality three-bedroomed houses. One after another, people came into the hall and, on seeing the plan, explained that what was wanted was old people’s bungalows. They told the housing association officers about the petition. The officers explained that district council officers had advised them that the need was for better, quality houses to attract executives to the area who would bring jobs. At tea-time the Labour councillors arrived. They clustered around the modernization advocate, who was known to have worked hard and with integrity all his lifetime to bring jobs to the area and to do what was best for the working class. He tried to explain that these plans were best for the area. The women respected him, but clearly disapproved: they said that they wanted the one building site in the village to be used for old people’s bungalows. He became very angry. He talked about holding things up and getting things done. He got out his diary and explained to the women that these plans would go to committee in a few days time and they had gone to a lot of trouble to get them approved before the housing association regulations changed. After that there would be little chance of getting this kind of project funded in future. The choice was to accept the plans or lose the opportunity. The women did not concede. The housing association officer interceded by saying his association tried to ensure they did what the people wanted. The green gash remains. This councillor is utterly consistent in pursuing the principles of modernization and the Labourist style of political practice that flows from that. He holds to the cross-class consensus, even in the recession, treating it like a cloud which, in time, will surely lift, and then there will be a response to his unstinting attempts to get industry and jobs to return to the area. He says he is working for the best interests of the working class, even if they disagree. The most important way to promote their interests is to keep in power, and, whereas for the good of the region he will work cross-class and cross-party, in the market town he works adamantly to promote Labour and put down the Conservative and latterly the Green opposition. In the 1980s, the market town began to attract young professionals who were prepared to commute to work on Teesside. Some joined the Labour Party and one became the county councillor. A struggle ensued in the Labour Party branch. New members wanted to increase the membership by holding discussions on current issues and finding out about what was going on in the council. According to reports I have heard, at every attempt the Labourist councillors have responded by using the rule book to stretch the business part of the meeting through the allotted time. There is no time for discussions, and many members cease attending these branch meetings. Into this setting came the Unemployment Strategy Action Area team of three community workers. Nobody in the party or the town knew they were coming until they saw advertisements for the posts in the newspaper. The adamant modernizer, when he heard that an Unemployment Strategy was to address the social problems of unemployment, immediately proclaimed that it would do nothing to create jobs. Even before the team started work, the traditional Labourist agenda was reasserted. The team has been working on local service provision and, especially in the vast housing estate, enabling women to express their demands and improve facilities in their area. This raises gender issues. In the above account of the old people’s bungalows in my fieldwork village I indicated that the petition was raised by women, and it was mainly women who attended the public meeting. This may look like ‘political activity’, but locally it is classified as women’s work for their family, part of their caring and domestic roles. ‘Politics’ is for men, and women should not have to put up with it. The gender divisions that have been identified in this chapter come together at this point. Labourist industrial policy is based on a distinction between men’s work and women’s work, with clearly differentiated wages and conditions associated with each. The domestic distribution of income in such households is now well documented (Pahl 1983; Morris 1984). The idea that the male ‘breadwinner’ should have money for his own private use, whereas the wife’s money is for household management, seems to survive into unemployment. What seems not to have been noticed before is the impact that this domestic distribution of income has on community organizing and local politics. Women’s role of family carer in this fieldwork village is not confined to work in the house. Besides caring for relatives and neighbours, it concerns running children’s activities, an old people’s luncheon club, and social afternoons, geared especially at unemployed people, in the village hall. These activities are all run by women and funded out of their housekeeping (via bingo and coffee mornings and other fundraising events). Family caring is women’s public activity, but it is a different public space from that controlled by men. Men occupy their own space in the village, notably the Working Men’s Club, and ‘political’ talk is confined there, in the men-only bar.[168] The boundaries around male space and men’s concerns are maintained with frightening severity (Wright 1986). The housing association public meeting was on women’s own ground in the village hall, but even so, many who had been in the forefront of organizing the campaign were reticent, and the speaking in the final confrontation with the male councillors was done by only a few women. To engage those who are involved in community activities in the reinvigoration of local politics, as the Unemployment Strategy set out to do, is to threaten this male control of ‘public’ space. This uncovers the gendered nature of the old agenda which had been in the interests of the apparently neutral ‘working class’. If the work with women is perceived as a threat, in other cases the work of the team is hardly noticed. The words ‘empowerment’, ‘helping people get more control of their lives’, and ‘involvement in the community’, are used with approval by people in the town. But ideas about developing new relations between the council and different categories of ‘people’ seem to be too complex to communicate clearly. None of the politicians, even of the Young Left, have taken up the principles of the Unemployment Strategy and promoted them as an alternative vision of local socialism. The county councillor who is in the new administration and presumably supports its emphasis on services to the consumer, is reputed to hold that the Unem ployment Strategy is a waste of money. In a nice involution of the different ideas of local socialism, he is said to have argued that the money would have been better spent sending a delegation to Japan to attract a branch plant to the area. *** Conclusion In this chapter I have identified two principles of local socialism which suggest different Labour political practices and contain different visions of how local social relations should be organized. For some people, these are recognized as stark alternatives at the level of principles. The adamant modernizer in my case study maintains a consistent stand on principles, policies, and political practice. This seems to be rare. The example of the county councillor above indicates how the ideas weave in and out of one another in arguments. Others seem to use the whole range of ideas as an available repertoire without acknowledging the different versions of local socialism that lie behind them. The analysis of industrial development and of the causes of unemployment in this chapter suggests why modernization has failed to achieve its aims. The cross-class consensus seems not to have benefited ‘the working class’, and that phrase, contrary to the assumptions of some sociologists, does not connote politics based on class conflict. Rather, it stands for a traditional Labourist agenda which, while appearing neutral, is strongly gendered. In the case study, the clash over bungalows versus executive housing indicated the gulf between women’s definition of what was needed to deal literally and metaphorically with death in their community, as against the Labourist politicians’ and planners’ external imposition of a definition of ‘development’ which they claimed to be in the villagers’ best interests. The women, although not powerless, in that they resisted this imposition, have not yet been able to make the council act on their definition. The alternative New Left agenda with its aim of empowerment of people in their relations to authorities, in terms of being citizens, consumers, and members of the public, has not yet been conveyed clearly in principle or in practice. It has been marginalized as the antics of community workers. In the contest between different local socialisms in this locality, even in the face of high unemployment, the old guard has managed to retain the definition of the public as the ‘working class’ and to keep to its established political practices. [158] This chapter is based on research conducted in one- to three-month periods each year from 1985. It includes an ethnography of an ex-mining and steel village, archival research on policies affecting the mining villages since the 1960s, interviews with officers and councillors on ‘community development’ in all its various meanings, and in particular, annual interviews to plot the development of the county council’s Unemployment Strategy. I am grateful to Cleveland County Council for funding my attachment to its Research and Intelligence Unit from January to December 1991 in order to make an evaluation of the Unemployment Strategy. [159] Main influences were Miliband (1969), Cockburn (1978), and subsequent feminists, for example, Eisenstein (1981), Franzaway et al. (1988), Walby (1990). [160] Edwards (1991) explores another way in which the phrase ‘ordinary people’ is used in relation to class. [161] The Teesside Survey and Plan identified 40 per cent of Teesside’s housing as sub-standard. It recommended that 28,000 dwellings should be cleared and a further 30,000 rehabilitated. [162] There was a similar agreement to protect the National Coal Board’s labour in the Durham coalfields. Alternative male employment was safely steered away from existing sites of heavy industry and into new towns and industrial estates elsewhere in the region: 46 per cent of new firms were located in eight such sites between 1961 and 1973 (Hudson 1989:364). [163] In 1970 steel and chemicals had 6,000 acres, half the industrial land in Teesside, much of it undeveloped (Hudson 1986:6). [164] Some firms providing ‘women’s’ manufacturing work were established alongside heavy industrial plant, clearly making a differential between men’s and women’s jobs and wages. An example is the KP Crisp factory, which was set up alongside ICI Billingham. [165] My field work confirms Price’s (1987) analysis of women’s involvement in steel production in nearby Consett. [166] The problems in Teesside were not caused by under-investment. From 1975 to 1979, new investment in Cleveland’s manufacturing industry (mainly oil, chemicals, and metals) was £11,800 per employee, five times the national average (Cleveland County Council 1980). In that period the area received a quarter of the national total of Regional Development Grant payments (Foord et al., n.d.). This state support had not created diversification of employment: in 1965, 79 per cent of manufacturing employment was in heavy industry, and in 1984 the figure was 74 per cent. In 1971, 40 per cent of all manufacturing plants in the Northern Region were branch or subsidunry plants of industries based elsewhere (Hudson 1989:365). In the most successful new town in the region, Washington, in 1980, 20 per cent of the manufacturing jobs were lost within the space of six months (Hudson 1989:373). [167] They called themselves ‘Young Left’, and although they drew on many ideas from the New Urban Left, did not share their characteristics. The New Urban Left were from welfare-state professions; the Young Left in Cleveland were, like the old guard, in manual employment or unemployed, and only eight out of forty-eight councillors seem to have a professional qualification. They were predominantly male (only five women councillors), and all were white. [168] The domestic distribution of income is reflected in the resource bases of these two institutions. In 1985 the village hall raised sufficient to cover its weekly running costs of £45, whereas the annual surplus on the bar account alone in the Working Men’s Club was £42,300. *** References(Cleveland County Council 1987)