International Terrorism

Cover

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

An Annual

“Event Data”

Report 1998

Cobra Institute

Publisher Details

First published in the United States in 2000

By DIANE Publishing

P.O. Box 1428

Collingdale. PA. 19023

Copyright 2000 Cobra Institute. Inc.

AH rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN0 756 70105 8

To our Children
Christina Nicole
Jason Christopher
Joshua Colt
Meilia Ann
Melissa Dawn
Raymond Christopher

This One
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Contents

Preface

Acknowledgment

Chapter 1

1. Background 1

2. Data on Terrorism 2

3. Review of Literature: Previous Chronologies

4. Methodology

A. Concepts and Definitions

B. Collection Issues: Source Reliability and Comprehensiveness

C. Collection Procedures

D. Sources

E. Selected References

F. Incident Identifier Code

G. Collection Criteria

1. Date and Place of Attack

2. Tactics and Weapons Used

3. Targets of Terrorist Attacks

4. Identity of the Perpetrators

5. Principal Target

6. Victim Information

7. Target Country Response

8. International Action Taken

9. Fate of the Perpetrator

5. Availability of Data

6. Socio-political Background of Terrorist Events for 1998

Chapter 2 Global Overview of 1998 Findings

1. Approach

2. Perspectives on Terrorism

3. 1998 Global Overview Data

Figure 1: Highlights of the 1998 Global Overview Of International Terrorist Incidents

Tables

1: Characterization of International Terrorist

Incidents against American Targets

2: Countries Experiencing the Largest Number of

International Terrorist Incidents in 1998

3: 1998 International Terrorist Incidents by Region

4: Regional Distribution of Terrorist Victims in 1998

5: Most Active Perpetrators/Groups Worldwide in 1998

6: Terrorists Incidents by Target Worldwide in 1998

7: Terrorist Incidents by Tactic Worldwide in 1998

8: Nationalities Most Targeted in 1998

9: Most Lethal Terrorist Incidents in 1998

4. Comments on 1998 Overview

A. Global Perspective

B. Regional Political Background

Chapter 3 Regional Reports & Chronologies for 1998

Africa

Socio-political Background

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Table 10: Distribution of International

Terrorist Incidents by Country (Africa)

Table 11: Distribution of Incidents and

Victims by Perpetrator (Africa)

Table 12: Distribution of Incidents by

Tactic (Africa)

Table 13: Distribution of Incidents by

Target (Africa)

Asia

Socio-political background

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Table 14: Distribution of International

Terrorist Incidents by Country (Asia)

Table 15: Distribution of Incidents and

Victims by Perpetrator (Asia)

Table 16: Distribution of Incidents by

Tactic (Asia)

Table 17: Distribution of Incidents by

Target (Asia)

Eurasia

Socio-political Background

Terrorist findings for 1998

Table 18: Distribution of International

Terrorist Incidents by Country (Eurasia)

Table 19: Distribution of Incidents and

Victims by Perpetrator (Eurasia)

Table 20: Distribution of Incidents by

Tactic (Eurasia)

Table 21: Distribution of Incidents by

Target (Eurasia)

Europe

Socio-political Background

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Table 22: Distribution of International

Terrorist Incidents by Country (Europe)

Table 23: Distribution of Incidents and

Victims by Perpetrator (Europe)

Table 24: Distribution of Incidents by

Tactic (Europe)

Table 25: Distribution of Incidents by

Target (Europe)

Western Hemisphere

Latin America

Socio-political Background

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Table 26: Distribution of International

Terrorist Incidents by Country (Latin America)

Table 27: Distribution of Incidents and

Victims by Perpetrator (Latin America)

Table 28: Distribution of Incidents by Tactic (Latin America)

Table 29: Distribution of Incidents by Target (Latin America)

Middle East

Socio-political Background

Issue Highlights: Observations

Terrorist findings for 1998

Table 30: Distribution of International

Terrorist Incidents by Country (Middle East)

Table 31: Distribution of Incidents and

Victims by Perpetrator (Middle East)

Table 32: Distribution of Incidents by Tactic (Middle East)

Tabic 33: Distribution of Incidents by Target (Middle East)

Concluding Remarks:

A. About the Problem

B. About this Book

C. About the Future

Appendices

1. Chronology of international terrorist incidents: Africa (1998)

2. Chronolog)' of international terrorist incidents: Asia (1998)

3. Chronology of international terrorist incidents: Eurasia (1998)

4. Chronology of international terrorist incidents: Europe (1998)

5. Chronology of international terrorist incidents: Middle East (1998)

6. Chronology of international terrorist incidents: Western Hemisphere (1998)

Figure 1: Highlights of the 1998 Globa! Overview Of International Terrorist Incidents

Tables

1: Characterization of International Terrorist

Incidents against American Targets

2: Countries Experiencing the Largest Number of International Terrorist Incidents in 1998

3: 1998 International Terrorist Incidents by Region

4: Regional Distribution of Terrorist Victims in 1998

5: Most Active Perpetrators^G roups Worldwide in 1998

6: Terrorists Incidents by Target Worldwide in 1998

7: Terrorist Incidents by Tactic Worldwide in 1998

8: Nationalities Most Targeted in 1998

9: Most Lethal Terrorist Incidents in 1998

4. Comments on 1998 Overview A. Global Perspective

B. Regional Political Background

Chapter 3 Regional Reports & Chronologies for 1998

Africa

Socio-political Background

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Table 10: Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents by Country (Africa)

Table 11: Distribution of Incidents and

Victims by Perpetrator (Africa)

Table 12: Distribution of Incidents by Tactic (Africa)

Table 13: Distribution of Incidents by Target (Africa)

Asia

Socio-political background

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Table 14: Distribution of International

Terrorist Incidents by Country (Asia)

Table 15: Distribution of Incidents and

Victims by Perpetrator (Asia)

Table 16: Distribution of Incidents by Tactic (Asia)

Table 17: Distribution of Incidents by Target (Asia)

Eurasia

Socio-political Background

Terrorist findings for 1998

Table 18: Distribution of International

Terrorist Incidents by Country (Eurasia)

Table 19: Distribution of Incidents and

Victims by Perpetrator (Eurasia)

Table 20: Distribution of Incidents by Tactic (Eurasia)

Table 21: Distribution of Incidents by Target (Eurasia)

Europe

Socio-political Background

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Table 22: Distribution of International

Terrorist Incidents by Country (Europe)

Table 23: Distribution of Incidents and

Victims by Perpetrator (Europe)

Table 24: Distribution of Incidents by

Tactic (Europe)

Table 25: Distribution of Incidents by Target (Europe)

Preface

This volume is the first in a planned series of annual publications by the Cobra Institute. The series is intended to provide comprehensive and reliable data on worldwide terrorist events compiled from internationally published sources. We are presenting this important information in an easily readable, single-volume format. It is suitable for use by policy makers, terrorism investigators, and counter-terrorism respondents, as well as for analysts of international business and concerned citizens interested in keeping abreast of the international terrorism problem and its growing potential as a threat to public security. The detailed incident-by-incident chronology contained in these reports will be particularly valuable to those engaged in analytical studies of international terrorism and related issues.

Existing chronologies on terrorism have been problematical for a number of reasons: they either engaged in too much detail, much of it extraneous to a strict definition of the topic, or they were inclined to give short shrift to incident-oriented facts in favor of topical relevance and policy issues. Previous efforts were also often scant of meaningful details and the reliability of data was rarely ascertained. In addition, even the best chronologies appeared to occasionally waffle on the definitions of terrorism being used as a criterion for selecting material. In light of these inadequacies, we concluded that the development of an improved, annually published database would fill an important need toward understanding political terrorism.

Fortunately, this chronology is not an unprecedented effort. Several scholarly and government- sponsored chronologies have already established a solid basis of methodology and good data. At least two chronologies of terrorism, those of the Rand-St. Andrews team and of E.F. Mickolus, must be gratefully acknowledged for their substantial merit. Ih general, they have served as models for the development of new collection procedures. However, neither of these databases has successfully integrated all of the major elements of an authoritative database into a single, convenient and reliable reference tool.

At the present time, except for the U.S. State Department’s annual report, which provides limited incident-specific information, no comprehensive published report is offered annually in a single volume suitable to fill the needs of all interested readers. This Cobra report is intended to satisfy this need.

This study attempts to build a meaningful terrorist database from publicly available unclassified sources. It focuses on the discrete events and issues that comprise each particular terrorist “incident”. As such, it is, in general, a more detailed structure than was formerly available for the policy' maker, the academic, or the inquisitive lay person. On the other hand, the database is configured on the basis of practical criteria; whether a category of information should be included is determined by both policy and explanatory' relevance and practical collection capabilities. Consequently, it does not include every conceivable category of relevance to the topic. Nor does it define other activities, such as criminal or other types of conflict, as “terrorism”. This tendency to “conflate” the definition of terrorism (i.e., to be “conflict-inclusive”) has often had the effect of subverting even some of the established databases. Thus the researcher ends up with a database version of hobo stew instead of a well-defined recipe. Therefore, in the midst of such confusion, it becomes increasingly less clear whether one is dealing with, to use an analytical metaphor, apples, oranges or pears - or whether there is any real fruit in there at all. In contrast, this chronology has consistently attempted to utilize a single set of operational criteria for data collection and final placement in the chronology.

Finally, this 1998 chronology has been compiled with particular emphasis on maximizing completeness and reliability. This has been achieved through the use of an extensive bibliography of news sources as well as other broadcast and published information. Wherever possible and deemed necessary multiple sources of information for a given incident were researched and crosschecked in order to maximize reliability.

In summan . we believe that the reader will find the Cobra Institute's chronology of terrorist events to be an excellent, off-the-shelf, one volume, and thoroughly researched reference.

The reader is invited to send comments and/or suggestions, which he or she believes will enhance the utility of future volumes of this chronology to Cobra Institute, P.O. Box 338, Abingdon. Maryland 21009.

Acknowledgements

This book represents the initial research effort of the Cobra Institute. Like much original research it was often tedious and challenging. It was also invariably time-consuming when measured against a priori milestones - and personally draining. A typical research effort involved sifting through massive or complex library documents or secondary source tomes and many long hours squinting at the silicon screen. Throughout the process, the goal has been to facilitate a coherent and accurate picture of international terrorism by describing actual terrorist events - fully and impartially. In the process, it was hoped that such an inductive approach would provide the grist for subsequent analyses at the strategic-political level. In reality, any such research is routinely very much an internal struggle with the “process."

This research effort was primarily the product of Frank Shanty's root optimism and indomitable will, and his willingness to work around the clock in order to finish a product. Ray Picquct contributed primarily by writing the introduction and by providing socio-political background information, and methodological insight.

This book owes much to the enlightened and practical guidance of Dr. Frank Shanty Senior, both in terms of down-to-earth technical insights and personal wisdom.

On the academic side the authors want to thank Dr. Stewart Johnson for important advice and counsel provided during the preparation of this manuscript. Because the book was the result of a study of terrorist “behavior”, it owes an intellectual debt to the sub-discipline of behaviorism in social science. In particular, it can be viewed as part of the burgeoning tradition of the “events-data” approach to comparative political analysis. In addition, it owes much to the events-data sub-field of political science for both methodological guidance and inspiration. Special appreciation is hereby accorded to Mr. Ralph Carrick who helped in the research and Mrs. Dorothy Garren who did much of the typing for this volume.

Many individuals took the time to read sections of the manuscript. Daria Novak read extensive sections of the book and provided annotated feedback. Melanie Shanty provided ongoing technical support for the entire project as, well as reading and editing the manuscript.

The authors would also like to express their heartfelt thanks to Mr. Herman Baron of Diane Publications for providing wise counsel, for doing the other things a publisher should do - and for being a loyal friend. Without his assistance, this publication would not have happened.

On a personal level, perhaps the most valuable assistance was provided, by the authors’ families, each in their own way, for instilling - throughout the process - the basic motivation to complete the undertaking in a timely manner. The overriding, indeed, the transcendent concern of both authors is for the imperative and timely victory in the ongoing battle against international terrorism.

Finally, the authors are inclined to insist that any opinions and errors found in the book are attributed to them alone.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1. Background

The wave of terrorism experienced in the 1990's has been unique. In terms of tactics, target selection and weapons employed, terrorism has become more lethal and much more difficult to combat. The nature and scope of this new face of warfare had changed dramatically over the past several decades. Since the late 1960’s there has been a virtual explosion of global terrorist activity. Due in part to advances in weapons and communication technologies and the changing political landscape, a new breed of politically motivated, issue-oriented terrorism has emerged. In this decade alone terrorist methods and tactics have produced dozens and sometimes hundreds of casualties per incident. This escalation of violence and destruction was experienced in Asia, Africa. Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, and within our own borders over the past several years. Nevertheless, the list of casualties experienced thus far could pale in comparison to the fatalities, which could result in the event of an effectively disseminated chemical or biological attack. This potential exists as terrorists, sponsoring nation-states and other well financed and organized elements attempt to develop or otherwise acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities.

International terrorism in 1998 encompassed both horrible attacks involving hundreds of innocent civilians and numerous “routine” incidents, many of which were associated with ongoing insurgencies. Although the scale of some major incidents (e.g., the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) were extraordinary in terms of numbers of casualties and fatalities, most were small in scale and ordinary when measured in the same terms. According to Cobra's research findings there were 398 international terrorist incidents in 1998 resulting in 1,346 killed and 5,474 injured. Although these figures indicate that the number of casualties has increased over recent years, the issue requires a close examination of the phenomenon.

According to the official U.S. government report, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998, the number of terrorist incidents has been steadily dropping but simultaneously increasing in lethality in recent years.[1] Were it not for the fact that, in absolute terms, more people are lying dead in the streets in the aftermath of these attacks, this reported downward trend would seem to bode well for the future. Unfortunately, a closer examination of recent incidents by Cobra Institute is not encouraging. Not only are more Americans getting killed in terrorist incidents, the increasing magnitude and intensity of recent terrorist incidents also appears to constitute a serious potential threat to U.S. national interests. This increase in threat-level appears to be largely due to a change in the criteria of strategic target decisions associated with some of the incidents (i.e.. the targets now include undeniably significant and symbol-laden facilities, such as the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993), and because the weapon(s) of choice for international terrorists now includes the use of extremely powerful explosive devices which can easily cause massive casualties. The incidents against the American embassies in Africa also indicate that citizens of host nations that associated themselves with U.S. interests are at increased risk of becoming victims of anti- American terrorists.

The U.S. State Department calculates that the number of attacks in 1998 (i.e., reported at 274) constituted a substantial drop from the 1997 figure of 304. Reportedly, the number of casualties from these incidents was the highest ever recorded: 741 people died; 5,952 were injured. Cobra research indicates 398 incidents in 1998, not 274, and 1,346 are believed to have been killed, not 741. While this substantial difference may be. in part, attributable to differences in the definitional classification of events as international terrorism, it also suggests that terrorism may be worsening across the board. Not only are terrorists more lethal, more incidents have occurred. Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyze this difference between the State Department’s published findings and the Cobra data in detail, because an incident-by-incident presentation of State Department data is not provided in its 1998 report.

The year 1998 involved enormous tragedy for all of the individual victims, but this assessment includes only a relatively small number of attacks on large strategic or symbolic targets. Many of the killed and injured were indeed, victims of the two strikes on U.S. embassies, in Nairobi, Kenya (i.e., 213 killed, 4,021 wounded), the other in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (i.e.. 12 killed. 85 wounded.) However, many other victims were prey to the plethora of small-scale incidents, which typically involved only a feu victims. Suffice it to say that these individuals were often just as dead, their suffering just as egregious, as those associated with the larger and better known attacks. The implication is to suggest that an assessment of annual terrorist events needs to include the perspective of the individual victim - as well as aggregate statistics on deaths and casualties or property damages.

In important ways the year 1998 represents a high water mark in the struggle with terrorism. It was simultaneously the most lethal year on record to date and a touchstone for several important developments in the fight against terrorists. Although a terrorist group was indeed able to destroy important symbols of .America’s presence in the Third World, terrorist forces suffered serious setbacks in several countries, particularly in Egypt, in the arrests of numerous terrorist suspects associated with Osama bin Laden’s group, Al Qa'ida, and in the initiation of major new counter-terrorism efforts by the United States, including the unilateral bombing of suspect terrorist sites in Afghanistan and the Sudan. In addition, the United States implemented new executive directives (i.e., Presidential Decision Directives (PDD 62 and 63), which were designed to provide new authorities for subsequent counter-terrorist efforts and to establish the basis for a new counter-terrorism program.

2. Data on Terrorism

The topic of terrorism often defies common understanding. Although media accounts tend to emphasize either immediate, dramatic social impact or national security concerns, they often ignore or underplay other elements of terrorist behavior or counter-terrorist response systems. Most academic analyses assume that good data on terrorist incidents are either unavailable for technical reasons or that access to such information is restricted or classified by state authorities. By contrast, government accounts of a terrorist incident are frequently either limited by the technical requirements of intelligence collection or they are, for practical purposes, off limits to all but the “cognoscenti.” Unfortunately, because of real enough “data" availability problems, meaningful analysis of terrorist incidents is often severely limited in both scope and power.

This study attempts to build a meaningful terrorist database from publicly available, unclassified sources. It focuses on the accurate description of the discrete events and issues that comprise each particular terrorist “incident”. In this book each discrete incident is provided as an “event” and each is configured on the basis of practical criteria. In general, whether a category is included is determined by both policy and explanatory relevance and practical collection capabilities. One implication is that, for practical and cost reasons, descriptions of incidents will not necessarily include every conceivable category of relevance to the topic. On the other hand, incident descriptions will often include an abundance of detailed information that may exceed the immediate needs of the generalist or the policy maker.

3. Review of Literature: Previous Chronologies

Chronologies of terrorist acts have existed for at least thirty years. Most were simple descriptions of terrorist activities using whatever information was available. Eventually, some of these efforts attempted to be systematic and comprehensive - but with mixed results. Without question some at least provided useful ways to arrange vast amounts of disparate information. Others were less successful, and many were eventually abandoned, presumably because of the inherent difficulty of the enterprise. According to Schmid and Jongman. terrorism chronologies are problematical in their own right and many were of dubious quality and value:

(the chronology] of terrorist deeds is the most simple form of scientific activity. In many cases there is a covert political purpose behind it, with the citing involving only the atrocities committed by one side, without regard for context and preceding provocative events. More often than not, newspaper accounts form the only basis of such surveys, which are presented without efforts at double-checking. For many objectives, chronologies form a dubious basis for scientific inquiry. The origin and quality of the information is often forgotten as chronology data are incorporated in a computer file and correlated against each other, producing “hard” statistical findings. Unfortunately, few other researchers seem willing to replicate such research with other, better data, and “scientific findings” obtained in such a manner sometimes go unchallenged for years, if not forever?

Two chronologies of terrorist events, the Rand-St. Andrews Chronology and the chronologies provided periodically by E.F. Mickolus et al., have served as models for subsequent efforts. Rand efforts to build terrorist databases were initiated by Brian Jenkins in the early 1970s[2][3]. The Rand chronology was among the first real attempts to systematically build “data” on the basis of information from the publicly available news sources. The first Rand chronology covered 507 incidents in the 1968-1974 period, and it was eventually updated and expanded. Unfortunately, because this was a path breaking work, it increasingly tended to embrace other types of political conflict under the rubric of “terrorism.” This conceptual expansion tended to reduce its relative utility as a classification system, because terrorism became a rather shapeless concept. The problem was largely, “classificational.” In general, the more disparate concepts subsumed under a general category, the less useful that structure becomes as a means of organizing data.

Without doubt, the Rand-St. Andreu's chronology has provided the big picture of terrorist incidents. On the other hand, it does not generally provide the richness of detail required for a comprehensive, fact-based analysis.

The increasing use of Edward F, Mickolus’s work, beginning with Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979 (Westport. CT.: Greenwood Press. 1980) has gradually eclipsed the Rand chronology as an analytical database and reduced its effective use by social scientists. The Mickolus chronology was based on a Ph.D. dissertation effort at Yale University.[4]

Both the Mickolus chronology and the associated database, ITERATE, have demonstrated that quantitative techniques can be successfully used "to make sense out of huge amounts of seemingly unrelated information on terrorism.” Unfortunately, largely because of the nature of terrorist-oriented data, these objectives have proven to be difficult to achieve. Initially based on the Rand chronologies and material from the New York Times, the database eventually exploited over 200 sources. It became the basis for several innovative studies on global diffusion patterns of international terrorism, terrorist trends analysis, comparisons of terrorist campaigns and other foci.

Unfortunately, the best existing databases were either too all-encompassing or they did not consistently adhere to a tight operational definition of terrorism. For example, Mickolus included intuitively relevant activities, such as kidnappings, barricade-hostage situations, explosive and incendiary bombings, letter bombings, assassinations and murders, and aerial hijackings, in his definition of terrorism. But he also included other types of incidents, such as arms smuggling, police shootouts and occupations, thefts or break-ins, and conspiracies and sniper attacks, which do not fit the conventional understanding of terrorism.[5] In brief, Mickolus appears to have conflated a plethora of attack-like behavior into his definition of "terrorism." Although the Mickolus chronology attempts to provide the empirical basis for serious analysis, it appears to be greatly over-extended. Many of the 107 categories that the author has developed could be expected to gather scant data under most realistic collection scenarios, and would, therefore, have limited utility for practical analysis. Another problem is that the data have been divided inconveniently into a narrative section, a highly detailed chronology, and a quantitative section. Although the latter is available for separate purchase, it is not readily available as an off-the-shelf reference work.

Existing chronologies of terrorism have often tended to be a-contextual or politically onesided, and, because of their presumably factual format, they have tended to be misleading. They generally appear to constitute “harder” data than is actually the case - particularly after they had been transformed into quantitative computerized files. In addition, most of the existing databases have not been inclined to delve much below the level of first order international journalism as the main source. Very little terrorist data have been based on the intensive comparative efforts required to effectively check data across several sources for completeness or validity.

4. Methodology

A. Concepts and Definitions

The definition of terrorism invites considerable controversy among academics and professional specialists.[6] Indeed, much has been written on the definitional quandaries associated with the term “terrorist” and its associated misuses and vagaries. The well-worn refrain that “One man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” exemplifies the confusion.

In general, we would argue that a reasonable amount of definitional consensus already exists.[7] Most academic authorities agree that terrorism is violence perpetrated to achieve political objectives. It involves the deliberate use of shocking tactics or intimidation against victims in order to compel a targeted audience to do something they otherwise would not have done (e.g., to change its political attitudes and policies with respect to specific issues). Terrorist acts self-consciously violate the norms of common decency. In this sense terrorist acts are theatrical; they employ or target politically laden symbols in order to “violate” and manipulate the “audience” population and, thereby, affect certain key members of that audience, such as political decision makers.

Most definitions of terrorism imply that the phenomenon is, among other things, an extreme version of the genus: political violence. Certainly, terrorism is extreme when measured against the costs exacted on its victims, the ideological orientations of the true believers and the risks associated with actually committing the act by the perpetrators. In this conception, terrorism could be aptly characterized by and, indeed, measured by categorical attributes: the existence/number of victims injured/killed; the existence/proportion of civilian to military victims; the number of attacks per year; the brutality coefficient - the nature of the target and tactics employed; and the response engendered from the political system and the public in terms of policy/legislation/executive level national security counter terrorism programs.

Another implication of linking “terrorism" with social proclivities for violence is to suggest that it thereby has a common intellectual pedigree with the academic work, which has been done on that topic in sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology and history. Terrorism in this context has a literature and, presumably, an emerging conceptual framework of its own.[8]

We propose to use a working definition of the topic of terrorism, which focuses on the observable behavior of the activity. In this context terrorism is defined in terms of the actions employed by the perpetrators: terrorism is what terrorists do.[9]

Hence, the definitions used by Cobra Institute in compiling this chronology are as follows:

Terrorism is premeditated violence, or the threat of violence against non- combatant[10] targets by sub-national or clandestine agents calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm to bring about political or social change or to coerce a government, the civilian population or any segment thereof.

International terrorism means; terrorism involving, citizens of more than one country. This includes incidents in which terrorists go abroad to do their violence or they select victims or targets within their own country who have connections with a foreign state (e.g. diplomats, foreign business persons, offices or other facilities of foreign corporations) or create international incidents by attacking foreign visitors, airline passengers, personnel and equipment. It also includes all incidents wherein foreigners become victims of terrorist acts, regardless of whether they were the principal target of the attack or just persons in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Domestic terrorism is violence carried out by terrorists within their own country against their own nationals, and terrorism perpetrated by governments against their own citizens.

The implication of this working definition of terrorism is that the Cobra chronology is focused on what terrorists actually do to coerce or intimidate, not on motivational phenomena or why they do it. Although it may be possible to infer motivations from behavior, the emphasis in the chronology is on the latter. Thus, the relevant issue is that an act has political relevance, not why it has such, as opposed to criminal or military objectives, and that the act of violence or intimidation factually contravenes the norms of social decency. In this context it should be emphasized that some analysis of subjective orientations might be necessary’, such as the judgment of whether an act is “politically calculated" toward a certain end. but these assessments are largely categorical and intuitive. Thus, one would need to judge whether a robbery-hostage situation is an act of terrorism if the perpetrator demands to communicate with local authorities. In the example our assessment would be to define the action as essentially criminal, in spite of a certain tactically oriented political calculation by the robber. In addition, terrorists’ attempts to manipulate public reactions to the act of violence, through mass media and other tactics, are highly relevant, because terrorist violence is virtually always to some extent played out on a symbolic level in terms of its impacts on mass attitudes or "consciousness." From a behavioral perspective this emphasis on mass reaction by the perpetrators is evidenced in their choice of weapons and tactics and their effects and their close attention to public image and opinion.

This chronology focuses on international terrorism. With an important exception, it does not encompass indigenous-oriented terrorist acts against a country’s own citizens or institutions, unless the incident is assumed to have wider implications. It should be noted here that the above definition of international terrorism would also include acts by indigenous groups against domestic targets - if the incident involved foreign nationals as either perpetrators or victims. The purpose of this self consciously broad definition is to ensure that the category embraces all acts of international relevance, or acts which have clear international repercussions - regardless of the intentions of the perpetrators. The decision to include domestic incidents with foreign “involvement” is essentially a practical tactic designed to avoid the necessity of deciphering terrorist intentions and the definitional hairsplitting that invariably would accompany such an effort.

It is assumed here that the reader can benefit by the provision of relevant political context. If an international incident occurs in the midst of a domestic environment characterized by an ongoing insurgency, that information may well be of considerable value to the reader. Presumably, providing context on indigenous social and political conflict may help to establish the breadth and scope of the terrorism problem in a given environment, and it may facilitate the reader’s general understanding and analysis of the phenomenon. Thus, for example, Colombian insurgents’ attack on a police facility would probably not be included, but a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) attack on a pipeline probably would be included; such facilities are known (by Colombian terrorists) as American-based oil companies. By contrast, we are inclined to include major domestic terrorist events in the chronology, if they are judged to have sufficient international significance. However, we do not include referenced domestic incidents in the compilation of international terrorism statistics.

The problem of determining whether a particular incident was an international incident has sometimes been difficult to make. For example, the incident, which occurred in Omagh, Northern Ireland (Incident EUI98081501 as reported in this chronology) was clearly an incident of terrorism. It was committed in the context of existing local socio-political tensions and, clearly, the perpetrators were acting against their own nationals. However, following our own definition, the incident was judged to be one of “international” terrorism, because of the categorical involvement, in this case, of foreign nationals as victims even though these victims were not judged to be the principal targets of the attack.

B. Collection Issues: Source Reliability and Comprehensiveness

The problem of reliability required the use of a large number of sources for purposes of checking facts against other sources and comparing story themes for politically or commercially motivated slants or biases. The problem of factual inconsistencies in the reported “event” is ameliorated primarily, by crosschecking various accounts of the same incident. Although, in the real world, events will often involve an abundance of media coverage and a variety of media sources primarily for as long as the story is deemed to be newsworthy, the examination of several media newswire and newspaper accounts can at least facilitate a comparative assessment of story reliability and comprehensiveness.

Obviously, the more spectacular or appealing an event, the more coverage it garnered from the news media. Unfortunately, certain types of events, to include, virtually, all terrorist events, tend to precipitate media hyperbole or even abject sensationalism. Whether deliberate or not, the pressures of media attention during a terrorist event can lead to the unwarranted “skewing” of public perceptions or even the distortion of facts. In addition to these problems are temporal issues. Although early accounts of an event may provide the information required for a comprehensive narrative report, specific data (i.e., number of casualties, extent of property damage, etc.) often takes more time to emerge. Also, certain kinds of ephemeral evidence can dry up or “decay” over time as witnesses lose their memories of details or the courage and initiative to provide credible testimony.

C. Collection Procedures

The collection of data for this chronology also involved digging up the reports of separate events and tabulating reports for trend analysis. An initial question was: How many events had actually occurred? Another key issue was: What patterns were apparent in the changes over time? The collection task used publicly available, open source information. Several major news sources were routinely consulted: the National Newspaper Index, provided through Infotrak, a computerized library indexing system. This index was queried with various search terms, and a detailed bibliography was developed, which consisted of relevant articles from major national newspapers. The New York Times Index was used for the periodical listing of relevant articles by titles and dates. In many cases, this listing included a brief summary of the article itself.

While every effort was made to make the chronology as complete as possible, the reliability and completeness of incident reports are ultimately dependent on the quality of reports from the incident environment Another problem is non-reporting. Incidents, which were not reported, are not in the database. Unfortunately it is not clear what the scale of the non-reporting problem amounts to in a given time frame. Informal telephone discussions with individuals close to some likely targets e.g., oil companies facilities, support the assumption that a substantial number of terrorist events go unreported."

D. Sources

While research on the Internet enabled the use of various and numerous search terms, the Internet medium was not a panacea or a substitute for careful and comprehensive data collection. It was still necessary to identify sources on the criteria of relevance and coverage. Several professional online databases were employed to facilitate the search process. Lexis/Nexis allowed searches of full-text articles from major national newspapers. The World News Connection of the Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) provided full text, unedited translations of articles from major foreign newspapers, magazines and other sources from around the world. In addition, several hundred keyword and Boolean searches were performed against 300-plus news sources in an effort to identify events as well as to supplement or flesh out incident-specific information. The World News Connection also provided translated transcripts

“ On the functions and limitations of events data, see the introduction to Charles L. Taylor and M.C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2nd Ed. New Haven; Yale University Press, 1972, p 16. The authors emphasize that they made no claims to have coded all events that happened and assert that an event is more aptly viewed as an "event-report". The implication is that databases are fundamentally dependent on reports of events.

of foreign radio and television broadcasts, including the statements of official government sources and significant speeches by the political leadership. In addition to global search efforts, both regional-level and country-specific searches were routinely conducted and assessed. These searches used key words and information from major media indexes, compared these against other sources of information and repeated the checking process for purposes of accuracy and consistency.

Because of the highly political and tragic nature of terrorist acts, many reputable governmental and humanitarian organizations have established subject area data archives on the phenomena. Agencies such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, Amnesty International, Freedom House, and the U.S. Department of State publish annual, country-specific reports on various aspects of the issue, including human rights violations and practices. Information obtained from these reports expanded the scope of our inquiry by providing data concerning internal political unrest and specific incidents of major domestic terrorism and political violence.

Terrorist incidents were also investigated in over 300 national and international newspapers and newswires throughout the various regions of the world. Between 180-200 search terms were used in an effort to extract any and all available information concerning each reported event. In cases where significant data (other than a short descriptive summary of an event) was unavailable, especially for very remote incidents, partial information was usually deemed to be preferable to none at all. In these cases the procedure was typically to provide as much descriptive information as was available. Subsequent editions of this report will provide fuller descriptions and updates of event data gaps - as information becomes available.

Another factor in the collection effort was the clandestine nature of terrorism. The availability of reliable information on the perpetrators (i.e., their numbers, target country responses and justice system outcomes) was routinely hampered by authoritarian target country regimes. Indeed, on site representatives of the media, various human rights groups and even agencies of the United Nations were occasionally compelled to operate in an atmosphere of threats and intimidation. Such a strained atmosphere can be expected to cast an almost inevitable chill on information sources. Frequently, it simply precludes, or substantially inhibits, a full and proper investigation of a given incident. Another problem is reporter mobility. Travel within these areas is often restricted or impeded by military counterinsurgency operations, paramilitary- forces, guerrilla organizations and uncooperative host governments. Frequently geography can also be a problem, particularly when commercial transportation is limited or restricted. In some cases political unrest within a country is so extensive that reporting agencies are either physically unable to adequately cover the specifics of an attack or they are discouraged and unwilling to venture out into the field. These problems of geographical scale and unrest were often evident in areas within Angola. Algeria. Colombia and the states of the former Soviet Union, among others.

E. Selected References

In addition to journalistic reports. Cobra consulted the following major sources:

1. Patterns of Global Terrorism. April 1998 report. U.S. Department of State.

2. Political Violence Against Americans. 1998 report, U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council.

3. Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation. 1998, an annual publication of the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Civil Aviation Security.

4. Terrorism Update, a quarterly report on domestic and international terrorism published by the Anti-Defamation League.

5. Fundacion Pais Libre (Free Country Foundation) a non-governmental, independent advocacy group for victims of kidnapping in Colombia, annual kidnapping figures.

6. Terrorism Watch Report, a searchable archive of open source information on terrorist activity provided by Jane’s Information Group. Online.

7. Terror Attack Database. International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).

8. Voice of America (VOA). Provides transcripts of international news reports.

9. Risk Assessment Reports, Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS).

10. Media Worldwide - provides access to many online news sources covering every region of the world.

11. International Terrorism in 1997: A Statistical View, DC I Counterterrorism Center, March 1998.

12. Mickolus, Edward F. with Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism 1992-1995: A Chronology of Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997.

F. Incident Identifier Code

In this chronology each incident is given an eleven-character alphanumeric identifier code. The first two letters indicate the region of the world wherein the incident occurred.

AF - Africa

AS - Asia

EA - Eurasia

EU - Europe

ME - Middle East

WH - Western Hemisphere

The third letter establishes the incident as an international terrorist act (I) or a domestic terrorist act (D). The next six digits are the date of the incident (year, 98; month, xx; day, xx); the last two digits indicate the number of the particular incident for that date. For example, incident ME198012002 indicates that this was the second incident recorded in the Middle East on January 20, 1998 (but not necessarily the second incident to have occurred in real time); it was an incident of international terrorism.

Incident EUD98020601 is the first incident recorded in Europe on February 6, 1998; it was an incident of domestic terrorism. If either the day or the month or day of the incident, are unknown, the digits “99" have been used in the allocated date spaces.

G. Collection Criteria

Wherever possible data have been gathered according to a strict standard of relevance and validity. In some cases this collection standard has been waived for tactical reasons (i.e., to accommodate the inclusion of data which have either not been corroborated by additional sources or appear to conflict with other reports.) In such cases the specific issues have been noted and duly accounted for in the database. The following list constitutes the categorical items of major focus in the data research collection effort:

• Date, place and time of the attack

• Tactics and weapons used

• Identity of the perpetrators)

• Principal target

• Victim information

• Target country response

• International action taken (if known)

• Fate of the perpetrators) (if known)

• Justice system outcome (if known)

/. Date and Place of the Attack

Obviously, the chronological structure of the data emphasizes the time and location as key attributes of an event. In addition, this information provides a means of identifying the terrorist event for subsequent reference as is indicated above.

2. Tactics and Weapons Used

Tactics of the terrorists are described in terms of the following categories:

Armed Attacks

Arson

Barricade'hostage

Bombing/attcmpted bombing

Contamination Attack

Hijacking

Kidnapping and Hostage-taking

• Sabotage

• Significant Threat

• Other

• Unknown

3. Targets of Terrorist Attacks

The primal}- targets of international terrorism include the following:

• Asylum Seekers

• Aviation

• Business: facilities, employees

• Civilians

• Commercial Areas: business development facilities, marketplace, resorts

• Diplomatic: facilities, personnel

• Dissidents

• Foreign Institutions/non-business

• Foreign Nationals: workers, tourists

• Government: buildings, offices, personnel

• Humanitarian Agencies, workers

• Maritime

• Military: facilities, personnel

• Police, public safety

• Religious: facilities, personnel

• Schools

• Terrorists, activists

• Towns/Villages

• Transport (ground)

• UN Agencies, personnel

• Unknown

4. Identity of the Perpetrators

The key issue of identifying the perpetrator of a terrorist attack is an important component of virtually any report of an event, whether it is substantiated by credible witnesses or merely hearsay accounts by bystanders or local residents. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the reports do not constitute legal findings; media reports on allegations of responsibility are not criminal convictions.

5. Principal Target

The principal target of a terrorist attack is the main object of the attack. It is they who are supposed to learn the lesson of the attack, the political communication, which is presumably conveyed by the perpetrators through the commission of the act of violence. It is also important to distinguish the principal target from the victims, who may or may not be directly connected or even associated with the target, except that victims are on the receiving end of the violence or the threat of such acts.

6. Victim Information

Reports on terrorist acts typically provide any information available on event-related casualties or associated threats. Although this kind of information can be hindered by the confusion at the scene of an attack, it will eventually come to the foreground in media accounts. Occasionally, individual victims will refuse to cooperate with the media out of fear of reprisals or other personal issues, such as privacy concerns. When available, the nationalities of the victims were reported.

7. Target Country Response

Because the target country has been the object of an attack, it can be expected to forcefully respond to a terrorist action. Information on this response could be directed to domestic publics and international audiences - and the terrorists themselves. In addition, some types of responses of the military-national security variety may or may not be made public.

8. International Action Taken

Information on international actions will be provided as available. Obviously, some of the overt actions taken against a perpetrator will be made public, such as unilateral actions taken against Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and against states, which are alleged to support international terrorism. However, much of this type of political information will normally tend to lag considerably behind the actual event and will not typically be included in the event-driven chronology.

9. Fate of the Perpetrators

The fate of the terrorists is, of course, highly relevant, but one, which will not be typically evident until some time after the actual terrorist event. Nevertheless, the chronology sought to provide that information when it was available. In 1998. terrorists were either killed or captured in only about 15% of the incidents. This statistic highlights the need for a follow-up reporting effort, which describes the subsequent criminal justice process, such as subsequent investigations, arrests, trials or any other details of the alleged perpetrator’s career as a terrorist. Subsequent editions of this report will provide updates as the information becomes available.

5. Availability of Data

Substantial effort was made thru multiple source searches to obtain detailed data for each and every terrorist incident in each of the categories enumerated above. However, for many incidents some data were not found. These gaps were left as blank spaces in the chronology. This procedure was based on practical criteria of brevity and convenience for the reader.

It should be emphasized that the absence of data in the database does not indicate that a given categoty of data was either ignored or discarded out of hand. Quite the contrary, the collection process involved a consistent adherence to the specified criteria. Any information on relevant issues was culled accordingly and assessed for inclusion into the database.

6. Socio-political Background of Terrorist Events for 1998

In order to understand the intent, scope and implications of specific terrorist incidents, it is appropriate to understand at least the general background of political conflict and social unrest in a country and a region. In Chapter 3, which presents the 1998 terrorist findings on a regional basis, we have included a brief overview of the relevant social and political tensions associated with each region.'² A principal indicator of such tension is the recent history of conflict and political instability within a given society. Societies, which are heavily burdened by colonial or “neo-colonial" experiences or which have suffered recent experiences of war, domestic revolution or significant international domination could be expected to generate a degree of political “turbulence". The impact of such instability ranges from inchoate perceptions of cultural imperialism and social unrest to political leadership crises, the emergence of an ongoing domestic rebellion or even a full-blown revolution. Fortunately, only a small minority of countries, which fell under the sway of empire or colonial oppression, developed the kinds of tensions, which have precipitated modem terrorism.

Another indicator of tension or historical upheaval is the development of a marginal social type: individuals and groups who operate on the fringes of established society. In political systems under severe stress social types with few’ claims or links to the status quo may develop on the socio-economic margins, many of these casting around for new identities and a sense of purpose and adventure. Societies, which include such groups, may well be rife with intense social and political conflict, a heated political atmosphere when “revolution" is in the air. Such a political atmosphere attracts and precipitates collective risk-taking, personal danger and excitement, especially for young men, who initially have little to lose and who are often personally inclined towards violence. In such an atmosphere “terrorism” may be considered merely a tactical issue.

In the sections of this book on the political background of terrorism we forego for practical reasons serious consideration of the motivational issues, the subjective “why", which, asks what calculations terrorists might employ to risk committing terrorist acts. In lieu of that focus we address the material facts known to be relevant to their actual development. In this context we are therefore not involved in building a theory of terrorism. Nor do we examine the possibility of causal links between socio-political conditions or factors and violent behavior. Rather, on the basis of existing social and political theory and some empirical observations, we assume that these phenomena are related.

We also assume that terrorism is virtually never a senseless act. and that it does not merely pop out of a social vacuum. Terrorism often occurs in an environment of social violence (i.e., preceded by patterns of associated behavior - social conflict, such as riots, demonstrations, armed attacks). Therefore, such phenomena are presumably related to terrorism as “factors”, although the precise nature of the linkage is not clear. Clearly, social conflict cannot be said to constitute a sufficient condition of terrorism or to “cause” the phenomena of terrorism.

Although a closely woven theory of terrorism does not exist, it is nevertheless possible to suggest some of the promising approaches. In particular, social scientists emphasize the personal, social and political factors, which appear to motivate terrorist behavior. In addition, certain "intervening* factors, such as tensions emanating from the domestic and international environment, may condition or "permit" terrorism by providing the social structure within which it develops and the resources and environmental constraints within which it must operate.

However, we would expect to see terrorism emerge in an environment of violent conflict - and this observation is easily supported by examples from numerous case studies. For example, virtually all of the terrorist acts in the Middle East in the 1970s occurred in the general context of an ongoing series of wars between the Arabs and Israel, whether the terrorist acts were actually conducted for the sake of Palestinian nationalism or for some other ideologically inspired goal. In the more recent past, the cases of Hizballah and HAMAS terrorism emerged in the context of the perceived failure of secular institutions (i.e., the PLO and such Arab states) to redress the wrongs allegedly committed by the Israelis in the context of a fort}' year old dispute and in the wake of the resurgence of fundamentalist Islam under Khomeini’s revolution in Iran in the late 1970s.

Chapter 2. Global Overview of 1998 Findings

1. Approach

This section focuses on the major impacts of terrorism worldwide according to several objective criteria:

• Victim Impacts o Injuries o Deaths

• Incident Targets

• Incident Tactics

• Regional Patterns

• State Patterns

• Terrorist Group Patterns

Nine summary tables are used to summarize key patterns and to provide a macro perspective.

This overview emphasizes aggregate numbers in major incident categories: incidents, killed, injured, targets and tactics and active terrorist groups. In addition, it describes apparent statistical patterns, shorn of incident-specific detail. In this book the global overview is followed by regional reports, which further characterize the terrorist data collected for each region. The detailed incident-by-incident chronology for each region is contained in the appendices.

2. Perspective on Terrorism

For the general public as well as professional security experts, international terrorism was one of the most troublesome issues in 1998. It appeared to have a material presence in every region of the world and. increasingly, to threaten U.S. interests worldwide. In addition, worldwide terrorism in 1998 continued to take on the image of a more complex and dangerous identity, one that was less and less likely to be defined by moral norms and accepted international legal codes and more inclined to go after its enemies with a spectacular vengeance. Whether true or not, this image of a whole new kind of threat has emerged and persisted throughout the 1990s. Obviously, it is not a trivial issue.

Is this image of a vastly increased and technically challenging threat accurate or is it overstated, or simply wrong? One way to answer such questions is to examine the facts in the actual incidents.

The question at issue is: What did international terrorism look like worldwide in 1998? Our answer is both quantitative and personal. Although the total number of terrorist incidents was not the highest on record, the numbers of killed/wounded were unprecedented. Indeed, the statistics of 1998 indicate an active and destructive year. On the other hand, quantitative categories don’t tell the whole story, nor do they get at the personal impacts - the sufferings of the victims.

In 1998. the background of the victims was quite diverse: from obscure local residents who were in the proverbial “wrong place at the wrong time’’ to soldiers and diplomats involved in counter-terrorist campaigns or representing their country's diplomatic interests. But regardless of the relative levels of the annual toll from terrorism, the human realities are grim. One fact that comes through clearly is the quantitatively disproportionate suffering of incident victims--the overwhelming majority of whom typically had no necessary connection with either the intended target populations or the perpetrators. Thus, the Nairobi embassy bombing killed hundreds of Kenyan citizens who were, tragically, mainly victims of circumstances.

3. 1998 Global Overview Data

As stated above, statistics of 1998 compiled by the Cobra Institute indicate an extraordinarily active and destructive year for international terrorism worldwide. Figure 1 provides a summary of major findings for the year. In the 398 international incidents recorded, 1.346 people were killed, 5.474 were injured. These numbers reflect total casualties as reported by the international press and compiled incident-by-incident in this report. Many of these casualties resulted from the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These facilities, both located in congested downtown areas, recorded totals of 225 dead and 4.106 injured. Among the dead were 12 Americans.¹³

Although there were no acts of international terrorism on U.S. soil in 1998, Americans or American interests continued to remain high on the list of potential targets of international terrorism. In 1998, American citizens or interests were targeted in 168 incidents. This represents 42.2% of the total. Of the incidents targeting Americans, attacks on businesses accounted for 136 incidents, followed by diplomatic targets, which accounted for 13 incidents. Table 1 shows the global distribution of international terrorist incidents where American citizens or property were targeted. Also shown in this table is the distribution of American casualties, and others who were “victimized” as a result of attacks against American interests.

ⁿ These figures were taken from the "Report of the Accountability Review Board on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998", Dated, January 8, 1999, Admiral William J. Crowe, Chairman.

Figure 1

Highlights of the 1998 Global Overview of International Terrorist Incidents

• 398 incidents occurred worldwide.

• Most lethal year on record: 1,346 deaths.

• More people were wounded in terrorist incidents than any previous year: 5.474 injured.

• Two attacks on American embassies in Africa accounted for 225 deaths; 4,106 injured.

• 213 incidents involved significant property damage

• None of the 1998 incidents involved the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, nor other new or technically innovative tactics.

• 60 countries were targeted.

• 65 identifiable terrorist groups were active.

• Terrorist perpetrators were killed or captured in only about 58 incidents, 15%.

• U.S. nationals and property were the most frequently attacked targets worldwide: 168 incidents (42%).

• Favorite tactics in rank order were:

Bombings/attempted: 171 incidents (43%)

Armed attacks: 100 incidents (25%)

Kidnappings/attempted: 68 incidents (17%)

• Favorite targets:

Businesses/employees: 169 incidents (42%)

Foreign nationals/tourists: 56 incidents (14%)

Diplomatic: 29 incidents (7%)

Civilians: 27 incidents (7%)

• Terrorists' weapons of choice continued to be the car/truck bomb and the AK47 assault rifle or other small arms.

• Areas or regions with the most incidents were generally beset with insurgencies or other state-level security problems: (e.g., Colombia, Nigeria, Yemen.)

• Major motivations of the perpetrators, based on the ideology of suspect incident perpetrator group affiliation:

o Ethno-nationalist aspirations o Religious-based ideologies o Leftist revolutionary

• Terrorist group orientations in 1998: Specific issue foci:

  • Anti-regime

  • Anti-business

  • Anti-westem

  • Anti-United States

Terrorism's global reach is manifested by the geographic distribution of incidents. Terrorist incidents were reported in 60 countries. Table 2 shows the 9 countries experiencing the largest number of incidents. They accounted for 284 incidents. 71% of the worldwide total.

Table 1: Characterization of International Terrorist Incidents against American Targets

REGION	NO. OF INCIDENTS	CASUALTIES	DEATHS
Total	W/Casualties	American	Others/Unknown	American	Other
Africa	15	3	26+	4337	12	229
Eurasia	6	•
Western Hemisphere	96	4	2	153	1	77
Asia	6	3	•	7	•
Middle East	27	4	4+	35	•	10
Europe	18	1		2
Totals	168	15	32+	4534	13	316
Percentage of Global Total	42.2	3.8	.5	67	1	23.4

Colombia experienced the highest number of incidents with 104,26% of the world total. Colombia’s high incident count was largely driven by 77 oil pipeline bombings. Also, about half of the Yemen incidents were oil pipeline attacks.

The distribution and characterization of terrorist incidents in 1998 from a regional perspective are shown in Table 3. A total of 137 incidents or 34% of the total recorded in 1998 involved human casualties. Of these, 91 incidents resulted in the death of at least one person.

In addition. Table 3 indicates that 54% of the global incidents (213) resulted in property damage. Of these, 65 also produced casualties with 43 resulting in fatalities. Eleven abductions resulted in loss of property. In 148 incidents property damage was the only consequence.

Table 4 provides the regional distribution of the 1,346 global deaths and 5,474 global injured. Casualties suffered in Africa accounted for 75% of the world total: Asia accounted for 13%.

Sixty-five identifiable groups were active in international terrorist activity in 1998. In 73 incidents or 18% of all incidents the perpetrator was unknown, and in 7 incidents a lone individual carried out the attack. Table 5 lists the 10 reported most active perpetrators/groups in 1998 along with the number of incidents, which each is alleged to have committed.

One of the most disturbing facts is that, out of the 398 terrorist incidents reported in 1998, only 58 incidents resulted in the capture or death of the perpetrator (Table 3), at, or about, the time of the event. In the majority of incidents information regarding the fate of the perpetrators) remains unavailable. In a few incidents researched the perpetrators were apprehended weeks or months after the event. However, in most cases, indeed in 85% of all reported incidents the perpetrators) were able to escape unharmed.

Table 6 provides a breakdown of the 398 incidents by target. One hundred sixty-nine or (42%) of the terrorist incidents in 1998 were directed against business facilities and personnel. The majority of these were attacks on multinational oil pipelines and infrastructure facilities in Colombia. Yemen and Nigeria. The 77 attacks against the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline in Colombia were bombings conducted by the two primary terrorist groups in the region. FARC and the ELN. These groups consider this pipeline a U.S. target. The Yemen attacks consisted of low-level bombings and attacks with small arms fire by Yemeni tribesmen protesting a 40% rise in oil and basic commodity prices, which took effect on June 19, 1998. Cobra research indicates that 19-separate attacks occurred between 19 June and 31 December. Acts of sabotage against Yemen’s main oil export pipeline and kidnappings resulted from tactics employed by tribesmen to gain attention and extract demands from their government. The Nigerian incidents were characterized by armed seizures of offshore platforms, flow stations, and seizures of oil support and service

Table 2: Countries Experiencing the Largest Number of International Terrorist Incidents in 1998

COUNTRY	NO.OF INCIDENTS/NO.
KILLED	COMMENTS
Colombia	104/78	Includes: 77 oil pipeline bombings*: 42 foreign national abductions
India	50/245
Yemen	38/18	Includes: 19 pipeline attacks; 42 foreign national abductions
Angola	24/316
Nigeria	22/200	All 22 were attacks on oil infrastructure facilities
Greece	14/0
Israel	122
Russia	11/9
Uganda	9/17
TOTAL	284/885

Note: The 77 pipeline bombings were alleged to have been committed by FARC or by its rival, ELN. However, in every important respect these incidents appear to fit the definition of international terrorism: the target was owned by a foreign-based oil company, and the terrorists were reportedly inclined to view the ownership as American and the incident as an act against the United States.

Table 3: 1998 International Terrorist Incidents by Region

REGION	DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENTS	INCIDENTS WITH TERRORIST KILLED OR CAPTURED
No.	No. W/Casualties	W/deaths	W/property damage	No.	%
Western Hemisphere	120	6	3	90	3	2.5
Asia	70	59	38	31	9	13
Europe	54	12	5	33	10	18
Middle East	63	23	II	33	21	33
Eurasia	18	6	5	4	7	39
Africa	73	31	29	22	8	11
Total	398	137	91	213	58	15

Table 4: Regional Distribution of Terrorist Victims in 1998

REGION	CASUALTIES
No. Injured	No. Killed	Total
Africa	4316	817	5133
Asia	493	361	854+
Europe	364	42	406
Middle East	208+	36	244+
Western Hemisphere	87	78	165
Eurasia	6	12	18
Totals	5474+	1346	6820+

Table 5: Most Active Pcrpetrators/Groups Worldwide in 1998

PERPETRATOR/GROUP	COUNTRY	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Kashmiri Militants	India	39
Yemeni Tribesmen	Yemen	31
Nigerian Militant groups/perpetrators	Nigeria	22
UNITA	Angola	21
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)	Belgium	8
HAMAS	Israel/West Bank/Gaza	7
Revolutionary Organization 17 November	Greece	7
Corsican Separatists	France	5
Chechen Criminal Gangs	Chechnya	3
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) National Liberation Army (ELN)	Colombia	97
All other identified perpetrators	Global	85
Unknown	Global	73
Total	398

Table 6: Terrorist Incidents by Targets Worldwide for 1998

TARGET	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Business/Personnel	169
Foreign Nationals/Tourists	56
Diplomatic	29
Civilians	27
Aviation	20
UN Agencies/Personnel	18
Religious	14
Transportation (ground)	13
Humanitarian Agencies	11
Government bldg/Officials	8
Commercial Areas/Resorts/Markets	9
Police/Public Safety	6
Military	5
Foreign Institutions (non-business)	2
Dissidents	2
Town/Village	2
Maritime	1
Schools	1
Terrorists/Activists	1
Asylum Seeker	1
Unknown	3
TOTAL	398

Table 7: Terrorist Incidents by Tactics Worldwide for 1998

TACTIC	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Bombings/Attempted	171
Armed Attacks	100
Kidnapping/Attempted	68
Barricade-Hostage	17
Arson	12
Aerial Hijacking	10
Significant Threat (plot uncovered)	7
Sabotage	3
Contamination Attack	1
Others	6
Unknown	3
TOTAL	398

vessels by angry Nigerian youths protesting what they view as inequities and exploitation by foreign oil companies. These attacks. 22 in all. included one, which created a spill, which ignited, destroying several villages and resulted in 200 deaths. Many of these attacks involved the taking of hostages, and. in one instance, the kidnapping of 8 foreign employees of American and British oil companies. The total number of oil facility-related attacks worldwide was 118 or 29% of the total of all global incidents.

In addition to the numerous pipeline attacks in Colombia throughout the year, kidnappings of foreign nationals, often for ransom, continued to be a major problem. Cobra research indicates that, in 1998. forty-two foreign nationals were taken hostage in Colombia. This figure pales in comparison to the total number of abductions reported in Colombia at 2,216. Designated the kidnapping capital of the world. Colombia’s two main guerrilla groups, the FARC and ELN were responsible for over 60% of all kidnappings recorded for 1998. It is estimated that hundreds of millions of dollars in ransom are collected each year by these two groups to help finance their decades-old insurgency. Kidnapping is a relatively safe crime in Latin America with high pay-off and low risk. Less than 5% of kidnap cases arc resolved. Yemen, another high profile country for kidnappings recorded 42 foreign national abductions.

Table 7 provides a breakdown of the 398 global incidents by tactics used. Bombings or attempted bombings accounted for 171 of the 1998 incidents. This figure is followed by armed attacks which accounted for 100 incidents; kidnappings followed at 68. These three modes accounted for 85% of all reported incidents.

in cases where the nationalities of the victims have been reported, we have identified 74 separate nationalities victimized by international terrorism in 1998. Table 8 lists the five nationalities most targeted in 1998.

As stated above, Americans or American targets led the list of targets of international terrorism with 168 incidents. Next in order of frequency were attacks on government and civilian targets in the Himalayan region of Jammu-Kashmir in 43 separate incidents. The French were victimized in 21 separate attacks followed by the Israelis at 11. Kenya suffered the highest total number of casualties (i.e.. over 4,300 of its countrymen murdered or injured in the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi.)

Table 9 lists the 14 most lethal incidents of 1998. The U.S. embassy bombing in Nairobi, Kenya, leads the list with 213 killed.

Table 8: Nationalities* Most Targeted in 1998

NATIONALITY	no. of	TARGETED
American	168
Kashmiri	43
French	21
Israeli	11
Italian	10

* Reporting on approximately 60 incidents lacked information on nationality.

Table 9: Most Lethal Terrorist Incidents in 1998

DATE	COUNTRY	REPORTED PERPETRATOR	NO. KILLED
August 7	Kenya	Al Qa'ida	213
October 18	Nigeria	Ethnic I jaw Youths	200
August 7	Angola	UNITA	145
July 21	Angola	UNITA	105
October 18	Colombia	ELN	73
September 29	Sri Lanka	LTTE	55
May 21	Congo	Hutu Rebels	30
August 15	Northern Ireland	Real IRA (RIRA)	29
April 18	India	Lashkar-e-Toiba	29
April 23	India	Kashmir Militants	26
June 19	India	Kashmir Militants	25
January 25	India	Harkat-Ul-Ansar	23
April 21	Cambodia	Khmer Rouge	22
September 3	Angola	UNITA	20
Total			995 (74%) of all fatalities in international incidents

This is followed by the Nigerian incident described above with 200 deaths. The 14 listed incidents account for nearly three quarters of the total global fatalities for 1998.

4. Comments on 1998 Overview

Clearly, casualties associated with acts of international terrorism are on the rise as terrorists seek out less protected civilian and foreign targets. This was apparent in some of the more noteworthy incidents in 1998 where the victims were not always the principal targets. Highly visible, mass casualty attacks, such as those highlighted in Table 9, demonstrate both the tragic scale and the global nature of the terrorism phenomenon.

Another perspective is public impact. The consequence of terrorism can be meaningfully measured by the statistics of killed and wounded or the apparent weight ascribed to particular events by the media, informed publics and politicians. In the mid-1990s terrorism was often the talk of the day. It was prioritized in Presidential speeches, glamorized in Hollywood epics, chatted over the Internet and over many a cup of coffee. It was also the focus of legitimate new concerns by those who had read about the World Trade Center incident in N.Y. City (1993), Aum Shinrikyo’s nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway (1995) and Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City (1995). In 1998, terrorism was also paid special interest by the political emphasis on new programs to develop effective counter-terrorism measures and by the almost daily attention given to terrorism issues in the major mass media. On the most basic level, the perspective of the ordinary citizen in targeted countries like the United States, the major impact was what effect it would have on security check lines at the international airport, or increased taxes for counter-terrorism programs. For the thoughtful or paranoid, it could imply the nagging fear that some harm could come to a family member on a future international trip. Indeed, this kind of pervasive public fear and worry is a major objective of a terrorist attack.

A. Global Perspective

What did terrorism look like in 1998? Although terrorism appears to have been a tangled skein of unrelated, chaotic events, this impression is both inaccurate and misleading - and indeed, possibly even dangerous. The premise of this chronological examination is that terrorism has patterns, and that a close examination on the incident-level where things happen is well worth the effort - both for the sake of enhancing our personal security and for improving our understanding of the phenomena. Indeed, a close look at the emerging threat suggests that the image of chaos is illusory.

B. Regional Political Background

Because regional politics embrace both local and international arenas, it is useful to describe the main political issues in each area, which might be relevant to the issue of terrorism. Therefore, regionally specific social issues, political conflicts with major impacts on security issues and the use of political violence in any context are conceivably germane. In practice, for purposes of focus and brevity, the description of regional issues will stick closely to issues of relevance to the terrorists themselves.

One of the major factors in terrorist incidents is geographical and political proximity. Many of the terrorist groups in the 1990s appear to have been motivated by regional-local factors or issues which were non-ideological or even functions of direct historical experience. In contrast to earlier eras, when international terrorists from the left were motivated by abstract radical ideologies with international implications, the ethnic-nationalist and religious groups which dominated the scene in 1998 have generally focused on targets with high local and regional symbolic value. In most cases by virtue of his incident-related actions, the terrorist was attempting to “communicate" with a local.'national audience.¹⁴ An important exception was the alleged Al Qa’ida-sponsored attacks (i.e., Osama bin Laden) on U.S. assets in Africa. In this case the perpetrator appears to be targeting the most global entity (i.e., the United States) to “communicate" with the United States - as well as with his perceived constituency in the Islamic world. A significant number of incidents appear to have been aspects of a struggle involving the claims to national symbolic issues or resurgent fundamentalist religion.

Another set of factors involves the history of social and political conflict in the region and within the states themselves. Obviously, as political “actors”, terrorists hope to redress or at least draw- attention to issues, which are part of the current debate in the target country. The particular area of emphasis is the ideology and political orientation of the terrorists with respect to the target state or political entity and the specific bone of contention between these entities.

For a description of the major types of terrorist motivations in the 1990s, see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorise, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 45-66 and 87-130. According to the author, recent terrorist incidents were perpetrated largely by ethno-naticnalist separatists and religious-based groups.

However, other factors, such as religious orientations, the psychological dispositions of the leadership or the impacts of organizational issues, such as leadership succession, could also contribute to the motivations of such groups.

Further discussion of these regional issues is contained in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3. Regional Reports and Chronologies

This chapter provides regional reports, which further characterize the 1998 terrorist incident data compiled from the Cobra chronology. Each regional report contains a brief overview of the socio-political environment of the region followed by a summary of the significant highlights of the regional chronologies. The detailed incident-by- incident chronology for each region is contained in appendices 1 through 6.

Selected major domestic incidents are also contained in these regional reports. These are readily identified by their alphanumeric designation (D). Inclusion of selected domestic incidents is not claimed to be an exhaustively researched record of all major domestic incidents.

AFRICA

Socio-political Background

Africa was hard hit by terrorism in 1998. Because the region is a complex mosaic of subregions and states and home to numerous tribal and ethnic entities, social and political dynamics in Africa have often been strident in tone and violent in substance. A primary focal point for conflict was the economic underdevelopment of the area and the frustrations of some elites with the increasing secularization of the culture in modem institutions. Most of the countries in the region have been involved on some level in economic modernization programs and with concomitant political issues stemming from their emergence as independent political systems in the 1950s and later. Certain key issues stem from that period: a) the militarization of politics and military intervention, b) the failure of many regimes to adequately cope with economic development needs; c) the growing corruption of political life, and d) the frequent failure of the new middle class of experts and technocrats to effectively influence the political agenda in regimes often dominated by military prerogatives and personal corruption. In general, conflict in this context was often related to economic development issues associated with newly urbanized social settings, widespread poverty, economic dependency on agriculture, the emerging costs and unrest associated with environmental and health issues (e.g., the HTV/Aids pandemic), and, in some areas, the increasing conflict between traditional socio-political institutions, such as tribal and religious organizations, and "radical” modernizers.

Many African countries are also beset with irredentist ethnic-nationalist issues that are politically potent, because they appeal to mass aspirations for national prestige and identity building. Such ambitions can often become embroiled in the bureaucratic and economic interests associated with acquiring and developing new and disputed areas. In such contexts, in situations where a substantial component of the population felt denied of "legitimate” claims to a particular territory or citizen status - or a significant component of the ruling elite became personally identified with development schemes, substantial political pressure for domestic or inter-state conflict would probably develop. Unfortunately, these kinds of "irredentist” political frustrations and ambitions could engender increasingly violent collective behavior - and extreme reactions.[11]

All ten major conflicts in Africa since 1980 have been waged largely or entirely within one country and involved struggle between government forces and the armed forces of one or more internal resistance movements. Several African states are currently involved in civil wars or insurgent movements: Sudan. Mozambique. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda. Somalia and Angola. In addition, several states are involved in minor wars (i.e., Namibia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, and Chad.) Indeed, in the 1990s the countries of Africa have been beset with 20 or more violent conflicts per year. Many of these wars have had serious impacts for domestic and regional stability, particularly those involving the sub-regional giants of Nigeria, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Nigeria, for example, persistent resentment of the northern elite that runs the country means that the prospects for domestic order in that major African emit)- are not hopeful. In Sudan the inflexibility of both sides in the civil war means that most likely the war will simply continue or that the country' will eventually be divided.[12]

On the state and local level, the widespread lack of political institutionalization in many states has been an important factor in the frequent incidence of state failure, including in some cases, their effective dissolution. In the late 1990s, the states of Somalia, Sudan and possibly Sierra Leone appeared to be in decline and they persisted mainly as a confederation of tribalethnic entities on some sub-state level (i.e., lacking formally instituted political organization). The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism has provided ripe opportunities for the development of radical religious orientations and the development of a new version of religious-based militancy.[13]

Many of these conflicts provide the kinds of social unrest and socio-political marginality and the political conflicts associated with the development of political violence and terrorism. In this context although terrorist acts are not widely prevalent in Africa (i.e., 73 incidents in a region of major complexity, economic stress and status differentials and where incidents may be significantly under-reported) the region would appear to be ripe for terrorist potential.

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Fifteen nations in Africa accounted for 73 incidents of international terrorism in 1998. This equates to 18.3% of all reported incidents for the year. The countries where these attacks occurred and the number of incidents per country are listed as follows:

**Table 10: Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents by Country (Africa) **

COUNTRY	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Angola	24
Central African Republic	1
Chad	2
Democratic Republic of Congo	2
Ethiopia	2
Kenya	1
Liberia	I
Morocco	1
Nigeria	22
Sierra Leone	1
Somalia	3
South Africa	1
Sudan	2
Tanzania	1
Uganda	9

Africa suffered more casualties due to international terrorism in 1998 than any other region of the world, with 817 killed and 4,316 injured. This was due primarily to the mass casualty terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7 August. Those two bombings resulted in 225 people dead and over 4100 injured. Twelve American citizens died in the Nairobi bombing and 10 others were injured. Those that perished were embassy employees or their dependents. Seventeen persons, including Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden, have since been indicted in U.S. courts.

When the nationality of the victims was known our research indicates that 25 nationalities within Africa were victimized by international terrorism in 1998. Nationalities most targeted were: American (15), Angolan (6), Ugandan (5), and Italian (5). Attacks against American targets in Africa comprised 20% of all reported incidents. Of the 15 attacks against American interests. 10 were directed at U.S. corporations, 3 attacks were launched against diplomatic targets and the remaining 2 incidents were kidnappings of American humanitarian workers in Somalia.

Thirty-one of the 73 total incidents in Africa resulted in casualties. Twenty-nine of these resulted in fatalities where at least one person was killed. Twenty-two incidents, or 30% of the total, resulted in property damage. Of the incidents resulting in property damage, 17 of these also resulted in human casualties. Only 8, or 11% of all attacks resulted in the death or apprehension of the perpetrators.

The following three tables break down the distribution of African incidents by perpetrator, tactic and target.

GROUP	NO. OF INCIDENTS	KILLED	INJURED	KIDNAPPED	HOSTAGE
TOTAL	W/CASUALTIES
Allied Democratic Forces	2	2	5	9-
Al-Itihad Al Islam	I	6
Al Qa'ida	2	2	225	4106
Da’ud subclan of the Abgal militia	I	10
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda	2	12
Gov’t of Liberia (GOL) security forces	1	1	4	2
Hutu rebels	1	1	30
Lord’s Resistance Armv (LRA)	2	2	7	30	9
Moroccan Islamic Jihad group	1	1	10
Muslims Against Global Oppression	1	I	2	28
National Front for the Renewal of Chad	1	8
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	21	15	324	134	68	17+
Nigerian militant groups protestors	21	1	200	8	626-
Ogaden National Liberation Front	1	I
People in Action for the Liberation of Rwanda	I	13
Revolutionary United Front	I	1
Somali Salvation Democratic Front	1	2
Sudan People's Liberation Army	2	1	3	4	1
Ugandan National Rescue Front II	2	2	2
Union of Democratic Forces	I	4
Ugandan'Somali nationals	1
Unknown	6	2	5	3	l
TOTALS	73	31	817	4316+	144	643+

Table 12: Distribution of Incidents by Tactic

TACTIC	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Armed attack	28
Barricade/hostage	16
Bombing/attempted	7
Kidnapping	15
Sabotage	3
Significant threat	1
Unknown	3

Table 13: Distribution of Incidents by Target

TARGET	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Aviation (includes UN transport)	6
Asylum seeker	1
Business/employees	27
Civilian	4
Commercial areas/markets/resorts	1
Diplomatic	4
Foreign nationals/tourists	8
Humanitarian agencies/workers	9
Religious	2
Transportation (ground)	1
United Nations agencies/personnel	10

There were 20 identifiable groups involved in international terrorist activity in 1998 (Table 11). Six attacks were committed by groups or perpetrators unknown and one incident, an aborted plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Uganda, led to the arrest of 18 Ugandan/Somali nationals supposedly with links to Osama bin Laden. Ugandan authorities arrested this group when they tried to enter that country' from Kenya.

African countries suffering the most incidents of international terrorism for the year were: Angola (24), Nigeria (22), and Uganda (9) (Table 10). The Angolan incidents were characterized by armed attacks on United Nations Observer Mission to Angola (MONUA) transport vehicles, personnel and other international relief agencies and workers by elements of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Indeed, UNITA military forces throughout the year have targeted innocent civilians by attacking villages and seizing areas previously returned to government control. One of the most violent attacks occurred in the village of Bula in Lunda Norte province on 22 June. In that incident over 200 people were massacred as UNITA forces looted and set fire to homes. On 1 July the UN Security Council imposed financial and trade sanctions on UNITA for failing to comply with provisions under the Lusaka Protocol, a comprehensive peace agreement signed by the government of Angola and UNITA representatives on November 20, 1994. These sanctions, which included a ban on diamond exports and the freezing of UNITA overseas assets, did little to curb guerrilla military activities.

In July, a foreign-owned diamond mine located in Lunda Norte province was attacked by UNITA forces. This attack resulted in over 200 casualties. They included UN personnel along with members of other international relief agencies. UNITA’s systematic campaign of violence has severely hampered, and in some instances completely halted UN and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. By year’s end this number had exceeded one million. Another mass casualty attack by UNITA occurred in the diamond mining area of Malanje province during the weekend of August 8-9. In that attack 145 civilians were killed, at least 3 who held foreign citizenship.

The Cabindan Liberation Front - Cabindan Armed Forces (FLEC-FAC), a separatist group fighting for control of Angola’s oil rich Cabinda enclave, kidnapped 12 people in two separate incidents on 23 March and 22 April. Three of those abducted were Portuguese nationals. The Portuguese men, all employed by Mota & Company, a Portuguese construction firm were released unharmed in June. It was not known whether a ransom had been paid to secure their freedom.

The West African nation of Nigeria, with its poor infrastructure and soaring unemployment rate, continued to be strife tom throughout 1998. Fighting between rival groups over disputed ownership of land and tension within the ethnic Ijaw communities over oil export revenues has kept the country in a state of political unrest. In 1998 the disruption to oil production severely crippled Nigeria's economy.

While oil production in the Niger Delta region generates much of Nigeria's revenue, the region as a whole has not benefited from the wealth. This is due in part to years of government disorganization and corruption. During 1998 angry Nigerian youths protesting against inadequate compensation, environmental degradation caused by oil spills and hydrocarbon pollution and the lack of employment opportunities for area residents often targeted the major oil companies operating in the region. Our research has identified 22 separate incidents where Niger Delta activists have attacked or occupied foreign oil company compounds or vessels and in some cases threatened and held for ransom employees, of various corporations, in an effort to draw attention to their cause.[14]

Firms operating in the Niger Delta, Nigeria’s main petroleum producing region are; the Anglo-Dutch Shell oil company, U.S.-based Chevron, Mobil and Texaco, the French corporation Elf and the Italian owned Agip. Shell, the largest multinational oil company operating in Nigeria, was forced to reduce its output due to militant activities and ethnic strife throughout the year. An incident, which drew international attention, occurred on 18 October when an act of sabotage on an above ground oil pipeline touched off an inferno near the town of Jesse. The fire, which destroyed local villages and surrounding cropland, resulted in approximately 200 deaths. Some press reports claim the death toll reached 700. Militants demanding money, jobs and more adequate political representation have attacked Western oil installations in southeastern Nigeria repeatedly during the year.

Along with acts of sabotage, hostage taking and the kidnapping of foreign national employees of these multinational oil companies has been another frequent occurrence in the oil rich Niger Delta region. During 1998 over 600 employees of multinational oil companies were held hostage in Nigeria. On 11 November armed Ijaw (Nigeria’s fourth largest ethnic group, who occupy most of the Niger Delta region) youths abducted seven foreign nationals and a Nigerian working under contract with the Texaco oil company. The oil workers included three Americans, one Briton, one Croatian, one Italian, one Nigerian and one South African. The kidnapper’s demands included jobs and a larger share of oil related money invested in economic development projects for their region. All 8 hostages were released unharmed on 17 November after negotiations with local government officials and the oil companies. Although an argument can be made that the incidents cited here appear more criminal than terroristic, they were included in the chronology because they fulfill the requirements as set forth in our definition of “international terrorism”.

The East African nation of Uganda recorded 9 incidents of international terrorism in 1998. Groups responsible for international terrorist activity during the year were the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Ugandan National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF). All of the aforementioned groups were responsible for at least two incidents of international terrorism during the year. On 4 April, the Nile Grill restaurant and the outdoor cafe at the Speke hotel, both located in Kampala, suffered bomb explosions that killed 5 persons and injured at least 9 others. Ugandan authorities suspect that members of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) were responsible for these attacks. The ADF, which operates in western Uganda on the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was responsible for numerous attacks against civilians in 1998. On 8 April members of the ADF were responsible for two attacks along the Congolese border. In those incidents the victims were dragged out of bed and summarily shot. Thirteen people were killed, nine wounded and thirty were abducted from nearby villages. One of the deadliest attacks of the year occurred in June when over 100 ADF rebels set fire to the Kichwamba Technical Institute near Kabarole. Eighty students were killed in that attack. Another 60 people were reported missing and feared abducted.

In 1998 the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continued its campaign of murder and kidnapping in northern Uganda. The LRA attacked civilians, destroyed villages and kidnapped children to fill their ranks. In April, elements of the LRA operating from bases in southern Sudan crossed into northwestern Uganda and attacked a group of civilians in the town of Gula injuring 2, kidnapping 3 and destroying 35 homes. Also, in November approximately 30 rebels from the LRA attacked a World Food Program (WFP) convoy killing 7 persons and injuring 28 others. Five officials of the WFP were taken hostage in that incident.

Another rebel group, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) claimed responsibility for the 25 August bombings of three civilian passenger buses in western Uganda. These well-coordinated attacks, which killed 30 persons and injured 17 others, occurred just five days after the U.S. retaliatory strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan. This action on the part of the U.S. was publicly praised by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.

In August, bomb threats against the U.S. embassy and other targets in Kampala led to the arrest of 18 Ugandan/Somali nationals with alleged ties to Osama bin Laden. Four of those arrested were charged. According to Ugandan officials an attack on the U.S. embassy in Kampala was supposed to be simultaneous with the 7 August east African attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

Along with acts of sabotage, hostage taking and the kidnapping of foreign national employees of these multinational oil companies has been another frequent occurrence in the oil rich Niger Delta region. During 1998 over 600 employees of multinational oil companies were held hostage in Nigeria. On 11 November armed Ijaw (Nigeria's fourth largest ethnic group, who occupy most of the Niger Delta region) youths abducted seven foreign nationals and a Nigerian working under contract with the Texaco oil company. The oil workers included three Americans, one Briton, one Croatian, one Italian, one Nigerian and one South African. The kidnapper’s demands included jobs and a larger share of oil related money invested in economic development projects for their region. All 8 hostages were released unharmed on 17 November after negotiations with local government officials and the oil companies. Although an argument can be made that the incidents cited here appear more criminal than terroristic, they were included in the chronology because they fulfill the requirements as set forth in our definition of “international terrorism”.

The East African nation of Uganda recorded 9 incidents of international terrorism in 1998. Groups responsible for international terrorist activity during the year were the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Ugandan National Rescue Front 11 (UNRF II) and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF). All of the aforementioned groups were responsible for at least two incidents of international terrorism during the year. On 4 April, the Nile Grill restaurant and the outdoor cafe at the Speke hotel, both located in Kampala, suffered bomb explosions that killed 5 persons and injured at least 9 others. Ugandan authorities suspect that members of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) were responsible for these attacks. The ADF, which operates in western Uganda on the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was responsible for numerous attacks against civilians in 1998. On 8 April members of the ADF were responsible for two attacks along the Congolese border. In those incidents the victims were dragged out of bed and summarily shot. Thirteen people were killed, nine wounded and thirty were abducted from nearby villages. One of the deadliest attacks of the year occurred in June when over 100 ADF rebels set fire to the Kichwamba Technical Institute near Kabarole. Eighty students were killed in that attack. Another 60 people were reported missing and feared abducted.

In 1998 the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continued its campaign of murder and kidnapping in northern Uganda. The LRA attacked civilians, destroyed villages and kidnapped children to fill their ranks. In April, elements of the LRA operating from bases in southern Sudan crossed into northwestern Uganda and attacked a group of civilians in the town of Gula injuring 2, kidnapping 3 and destroying 35 homes. Also, in November approximately 30 rebels from the LRA attacked a World Food Program (WFP) convoy killing 7 persons and injuring 28 others. Five officials of the WFP were taken hostage in that incident.

Another rebel group, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) claimed responsibility for the 25 August bombings of three civilian passenger buses in western Uganda. These well-coordinated attacks, which killed 30 persons and injured 17 others, occurred just five days after the U.S. retaliatory strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan. This action on the part of the U.S. was publicly praised by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.

In August, bomb threats against the U.S. embassy and other targets in Kampala led to the arrest of 18 Ugandan/Somali nationals with alleged ties to Osama bin Laden. Four of those arrested were charged. According to Ugandan officials an attack on the U.S. embassy in Kampala was supposed to be simultaneous with the 7 August east African attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

Asia

Socio-political Background

Asia has experienced terrorist attacks primarily from ethnic-nationalist and religious- based groups. Although left wing-oriented ideological terrorism does not seem to have affected Asia, several Asian states are indeed likely candidates for terrorism. The areas of Kashmir, India, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, parts of Indonesia and the southern islands of the Republic of the Philippines are politically unstable and rife with social conflict. In recent years each has experienced a significant degree of terrorism.

In most of these cases terrorism developed in the context of the emergence of an indigenous insurgency, occasionally with considerable involvement by interested foreign entities. Of course, the relative assessment of responsibility for such instability or oppositionist violence is typically dependent on the perspectives and interests of the relative stakeholders. Thus, for example, India accuses Pakistan of financing and aiding the Kashmir insurgents; Pakistan denies that allegation and accuses India of warmongering. In the case of Indonesia the current instability has been a long time coming, a consequence of 35 years of a military-led autocracy with domestic roots.

Asian terrorism in the 1990s was inextricably linked to the insurgency movements from which they stem. During this period the number of incidents by year indicates, by State Department reports, a fairly consistent average of about 25-30. Thus, one possible implication is that the frequency of terrorism is presumably correlated to the dynamics of the “insurgent” conflicts and may not be subject to the perturbations or biases of personal leaderships or simple counter-terrorist measures.

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Cobra findings indicate Asia suffered 70 incidents of international terrorism in 1998. This figure represents 17.6% of all reported attacks for the year. This appears to indicate a substantial increase over prior U.S. State Department findings. As previously noted, international terrorism in Asia appeared to be largely a product of domestic insurgencies or a by-product of other significant internal conflicts. The states within Asia experiencing international terrorism in 1998 and the number of incidents per state are listed as follows:

Table 14: Distribution of Incidents

COUNTRY	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Afghanistan	3
Bangladesh	1
Cambodia	3
India	50
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Pakistan	6
Philippines	3
Sri Lanka	2

19 Flashpoints and Force Structure, op cit, pp.117-130.

The states of India and Pakistan accounted for 80% of all international terrorist activity in Asia during 1998 and 87% of all casualties. Only Africa suffered more casualties during the year than Asia. When the nationalities of the victims were known, our research indicates that nineteen different nationalities were victimized by international terrorism in 1998. The nationalities most targeted were: Kashmiri (43), Indian (7), American (6), Pakistani (3) and French (3). By far the hottest area of terrorist activity was India with 50 incidents reported. This was due to the ongoing insurgency in India's Himalayan region. Our research has reported 43 militancy related incidents in Jammu and Kashmir during 1998. The incidents reported are not meant to serve as a total picture of all terrorist activity occurring in this region throughout the entire year but merely reflect the major acts of violence as reported for the period by the international media. Of the 50 reported incidents occurring in India, 31 were armed attacks, and 16 were low-level bombings of civilian and government targets. Most of the armed attacks w'ere killings of civilians, including the massacres of Kashmiri villagers.

On 18 April armed militants attacked a Hindu village in the Udhampur district killing 29 of its residents. An eyewitness to the camage identified the gunmen as mainly Afghani and Pakistani. In another incident occurring on 5 May unknown Muslim extremists shot and killed five members of a Hindu family in the border district of Poonch in Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmiri militants were also suspect in the 16 November grenade attack on a crowded marketplace in the Anantnag district. That attack killed two people and injured 38 others.

In southern India election related violence claimed the lives of 54 persons and injured 200 others at a Bharatiya Janata Party’ (BJP) political rally on 14 February. Members of Al- Umma, a Muslim fundamentalist group, were responsible for activating 17 bombs in various locations throughout the city of Coimbatore. It was later discovered that the explosions were part of a conspiracy to assassinate the Interior Minister L.K. Advani. Just days prior to this incident an assassination plot against Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral was thwarted by police in the city of Jalandhar. Police recovered a consignment of explosives including RDX from a Sikh militant, who revealed ties to the International Sikh Youth Federation, an Indian Sikh extremist group whose primary targets are Indian officials and government facilities. The suspect was subsequently arrested by Punjab police.

The ongoing insurgency has been a constant source of friction between India and Pakistan with daily battles between Pakistan based guerrilla groups and Indian security forces in Kashmir. According to our data the “group” responsible for the most incidents was the Kashmiri militants. This category refers to the dozen or so non-specific militant groups in that arena of conflict who have engaged in reported terrorist acts. These groups are related to Islamic fundamentalist organizations in Pakistan who have declared a “holy war” against India. It is estimated that between 1200-1500 militants are fighting in the Jammu-Kashmir region. The majority of these, around 800 belong to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, a pro-Pakistani, religious oriented Muslim group. This group, the largest separatist group in Kashmir, has been at war with India since about 1988. It is interesting to note that Hizbula, as it is known, did not conduct reported international terrorist activities in 1998.

The Indian and Pakistani governments each claim that the intelligence service of their mutual adversary' country is responsible for the terrorist activity perpetrated against their respective territories. Both governments deny these allegations. However, reports in 1998 continued to substantiate the claim of official Pakistani support to militants fighting in Kashmir. The roots of the conflict are religious and nationalist. The ancient rivalry between Hindus and Muslims was the basis for the partition of India in 1947. and perceptions of the respective foreign treatment of religious minorities is an ongoing issue between the two countries. Both widespread rioting and competing claims to Jammu and Kashmir accompanied the British withdrawal that year. Since the 1949 ceasefire, the status of predominately Muslim Jammu and Kashmir has remained largely unresolved. India has accused Pakistan of attempting to subvert the region through the sponsorship of insurgent groups operating in the area and the Indian and Pakistani armies confront each other with a wide array of forces, to include special operations types as well as trained insurgents. At several historical junctures serious border clashes have occurred between the armed forces and several of these engagements have resulted in major political crisis. In the five decades since British colonialism three wars have been fought between the two countries. Ominously, the ongoing conflict is also a major reason for the nuclear weapons acquisition programs of both India and Pakistan.

Of the 70 total incidents recorded in Asia, 59 or 84% resulted in casualties. Thirty-eight of these resulted in the deaths of at least one person. There were 31 incidents in Asia resulting in property damage. Of the incidents resulting in property damage 27 involved casualties and 16 of these involved fatalities where at least one person was killed. Only 9 or 13% of all attacks resulted in the death or apprehension of the perpetrators.

The following three tables break down the distribution of Asian incidents by perpetrator, tactic and target.

Table 15: Distribution of Incidents and Victims by Perpetrator

GROUP	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	KILLED	INJURED	KIDNAPPED	HOSTAGE
Total	W/Casualties
Abu Sayyaf	2	8
Bangladeshi tribal group	1	I
Baluchistan Student’s Federation	1	1	I	33
Bodo Separatist	1	1	20	5
Harkat ul-Ansar	1	1	23
Harkat ul-Mujahedin	1	1	19
Islamic Defense Force	1	1	4
Kashmiri militants	39	39	136	401
Khmer Rouge	2	1	22	15
Lashkar-e-Toiba	3	3	45	5
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	2	1	55			21
Moro Islamic Liberation Front	1	13
Revolutionary Workers Association	1	1	1
Sipali-e-Sahaba	1	I	1	1
Taliban militia	I	J	9	1
Activists (unknown)	1
Afghan (unknown)	2	I	1	1
Asylum Seekers (Acehnese)	1	1	1
Unknown	8	5	30	57
TOTAL	70	59	361+	493+	22	54

Table 16: Distribution of Incidents by Tactic

TACTIC	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Armed attack	39
Arson	2
Bombing/attempted	21
Hijacking (aerial)	2
Kidnapping	4
Other	2

Table 17: Distribution of Incidents by Target

TARGET	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Aviation	3
Business/employees	5
Civilians	21
Commercial areas1'markets^resorts	3
Diplomatic	5
Dissidents	2
Foreign institution (non-business)	1
Foreign nationals	6
Government buildings/officials	2
Maritime	1
Military	3
Police/Public safety	5
Religious	1
Towns/Villages	2
Transportation (ground)	9
United Nations agencies/personnel	I

As previously stated American citizens or property were targeted six times in Asia during the year. Four of these attacks were perpetrated against U.S. businesses while two of the reported incidents were directed against the U.S. embassy compounds in India and Malaysia. The Malaysian incident involved eight Acehnese asylum-seekers who forced their way into the American embassy in Kuala Lumpur. Once inside the compound, they began assaulting anyone who approached them. One embassy official was injured before the eight Acehnese nationals were subdued and placed under arrest by embassy personnel.

Pakistan recorded 6 incidents of international terrorism during the year. The most lethal attack occurred on 7 June when a time-delayed bomb detonated in an eighteen-car passenger train traveling from Karachi to Peshawar. Twenty-six people were killed and another 45 were injured in the attack. Pakistani authorities believe the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the Indian intelligence agency was responsible for this and other recent bombings. While incidents of international terrorism claimed 29 lives in Pakistan in 1998. internal political violence and acts of domestic terrorism claimed over 1.000 lives in Karachi during the year.

Other high casualty incidents in the region occurred in Cambodia and Sri Lanka, each involved in ongoing domestic insurgencies. In late April, twenty-two Vietnamese nationals were murdered and fifteen were wounded near Tonle Sap Lake in central Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge, which suffered significant losses during the year and virtually disbanded in 1998, allegedly conducted the attack. Reportedly, the son-in-law of the current Khmer Rouge leader, Ta Mok, was the leader. The attack occurred one week after the death of former leader Pol Pot and may have been intended to destabilize elections slated for July 1998.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who have been waging a 15-year war for an independent Tamil state on the Indian Ocean island of Sri Lanka, continued to attack civilian and government targets in a campaign, which has claimed over 55,000 lives. Considered by many to be the most ruthless and sophisticated terrorist organization in the world, the LTTE was responsible for a number of high casualty incidents during 1998. On 5 March a bus exploded in the capital city of Colombo, Sri Lanka, killing 36 people including three children and a police officer. The bus had been involved in a hit and nm accident, and authorities suspected that it might have been originally focused on a motorcade of government officials. The presumed terrorists involved were killed in the attack and two accomplices were subsequently arrested. On 29 September following a warning issued by the LTTE to halt all air service to and from the city of Jaffna, a civilian airliner, Lionair flight 602 was shot down shortly after take-off from northern Jaffna peninsula. The aircraft was carrying 48 civilian passengers, mainly Tamil, along with seven crewmembers, four of whom were foreign nationals. All 55 persons on board were killed. The plane’s wreckage was located on 1 October near the island of Iranaitivu, an area under LTTE control.

EURASIA

Socio-political Background

Eurasia includes the countries of the former Soviet Union in the Caucasus and the energy rich Central Asian states. It includes several areas of considerable political unrest and some cases of outright political opposition in guerrilla movements. The major problems of the area are a lack of economic stability and weak political institutions. In some cases, indigenous conflicts are associated with irredentist nationalist frustrations and growing political extremism. States or areas of concern are: Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya. Although several of these countries have made some headway in the economic sphere, progress has typically been costly and sporadic; and much of it may have been more apparent than real. In addition, these states or regions have a major problem in the dissipation of viable political institutions associated with the demise of the Soviet Union. Although many of them have been able to provide some basic government functions, that performance was frequently a consequence of ad hoc adjustments and short term sell outs to corrupt business or "mafia” interests. The upshot of this kind of short term-focused political "survivalism” has lent itself to public alienation and disinterest, and also perhaps at some point to right wing reaction.[15]

Throughout the 1990s the states of Eurasia experienced numerous incidents of terrorism as a function of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the instability of a post-Soviet hegemony, an interregnum period that replaced the “totalistic” law and order of the Soviet state with a political system that is neither democratic nor authoritarian. In general, the Russian system was characterized as a loosely knit confederation of several elements: a) the former-apparatchiki, b) the semi-privatized, heavily leveraged bureaucratic enterprises, and c) the criminal empire moguls and d) a political organization that has neither a clear economic model for development nor a willful and convincing political leadership. Thus, states of the area were largely adrift in the 1990s. Many of these states wanted desperately to be simultaneously more democratic and more “capitalistic”, but virtually none of them had the self-confidence or the political and economic resources to pull it off. What remained was often a political system that worried primarily about system survival - on a short-term basis. In this context several political groups opted for extreme measures in pursuit of opportunistic goals of irredentist nationalism.

Terrorist Findings for 1998

In 1998. the region of Eurasia experienced 18 incidents of international terrorism. In the years since 1990, the states of Eurasia have probably experienced a greater growth of international terrorism than any other region. This is undoubtedly reflective of the catastrophic demise of the Soviet Union. It also speaks to the considerable ethnic unrest in the area and the stridency within which some of these issues are felt.

As stated above, the states of the former Soviet Union accounted for 18 incidents of international terrorism in 1998. This represents 4.5% of the total attacks for the year. The breakdown by country is as follows in Table 18.

Table 18: Distribution of Terrorist Incidents by Country

COUNTRY	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Armenia	1
Georgia	5
Russia	11
Tajikistan	1

Of the 18 total incidents kidnapping was the “modus operand?’ in 10 or 56% of events involving 24 victims, 20 of whom, were known foreign nationals. The remaining 4 victims, nationalities unknown, were members of the UN observer mission in the breakaway region of Abkhazia. Four of the victims, British employees of Granger Telecom were found beheaded on 8 December. The victims, three Britons and one New Zealander were kidnapped in Grozny, Chechnya on October 3, 1998. In addition to the aforementioned kidnapping, which claimed 4 lives, there were 5 other incidents involving casualties. Of these, 4 incidents involved at least 1 fatality, with 12 total fatalities for the entire region.

Of the 12 deceased, 5 were employees of the United Nations, including 4, who were members of the UN observer mission in Tajikistan, killed outside Dushabe while on patrol. The remaining victim, a Polish UN staff member, was killed by a lone assassin during an armed attack in Georgia. Of the 3 remaining fatalities one was a Chechen taxi driver who lost his life when terrorist’s made an armed attack on his vehicle and abducted the occupants, three Turkish citizens, on 21 January. The other two victims were members of a security detail assigned to protect Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. They were killed during an armed assault on the president’s motorcade on 9 February. This failed assassination attempt also accounted for two of the six persons injured by regional terrorism in 1998. On 21 September an armed attack wounded 3 UN observers and their Abkhaz driver in Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia. The injured included two military observers from Bangladesh and a UN employee from Nigeria.

Four of the 18 recorded events involved property damage. American- owned businesses or citizens were targeted in 5 of the 18 attacks. In 7 of the 18 incidents reported, the perpetrators were killed or captured at, or about, the time of the event.

In general, 18 nationalities were victimized by international terrorism in 1998. The alleged perpetrating parties responsible for these attacks are listed below. Also included is a distribution of incidents by tactic and target type.

GROUP	NO.O	F INCIDENTS	KILLED	INJURED	KIDNAPPED	HOSTAGE
Total	W/Casualties
Chechen criminal gangs	3	1	4	3	•
Chechen separatists	1	1	1	3	•
Tajikistan's Islamic Opposition	1	1	4
Zviadistes	2	1	2	2	4	•
Lone militant	1	1	1			•
Unknown	10	1	4	10	•
TOTAL	18	6	12	6	20	•

Table 20: Distribution of Incidents by Tactic

TACTIC	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Bombing/attempted	4
Armed attack	4
Kidnapping	10

Table 21: Distribution of Incidents by Target

TARGET	NO OF INCIDENTS
Business/employees	3
Diplomatic	2
Foreign nationals	3
Government buildings/officials	1
Religious	3
UN agencies/personnel	6

EUROPE

Socio-political Background

Europe endured a total of 54 terrorist incidents in 1998. Some of these were only marginally involved in international issues. However, incidents in several areas involved the deliberate use of foreign nationals or foreign-owned interests. For example, several incidents occurring in the former Yugoslav states of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo-Serbia were defined as international.

Europe also experienced the growing worldwide trend away from terrorist operations of the ideological left for radical objectives towards ethnic-nationalist-based terrorist groups with irredentist claims for “recovering" their lost identities, prestige, land or other historically forsaken assets. Thus, many terrorist incidents were perpetrated on the basis of a non- ideological, single-issue quest to project a local or regional issue (i.e., nationalism) of a particular area back to the forefront of public concern.

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Europe in 1998 experienced 54 incidents of international terrorism. Without question this figure supports the observation that European terrorism is diminishing in gross terms from its heyday in the 1970’s. On the other hand, the downward turn may only affect the terrorism of the radical left type. However, ethnic-nationalist terrorists e.g., the IRA, the Basque separatists, the Greek November 17 Group (albeit with some residual radical trappings) and others continue to pursue their respective causes. The breakdown by country' for the 54 international terrorist incidents in 1998 is as follows:

Table 22: Distribution of Incidents by Country'

COUNTRY	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Greece	14
Turkey	8
Belgium	7
France	5
Latvia	4
Italy	3
Spain	2
Yugoslavia	2
Albania	1
Czech Republic	I
England	1
Germany	1
Hungary	1
Northern Ireland	1
Poland	1
Republic of Serbia	I
Switzerland	1

In Europe throughout 1998 twenty-six nationalities were victims of international terrorism that left 42 people dead and 364 injured. Nationalities most targeted were American (18), French (10), Turkish (6), and Israeli (3). Of the 18 attacks on American targets. 14 of them were against American corporations. American targets comprised 33% of all attacks occurring throughout Europe in 1998. Twelve of the 54 total incidents recorded in 1998 resulted in casualties. Five of these resulted in fatalities where at least one person was killed. Thirty-three incidents or 61% of the total resulted in property damage. Seven of these attacks also resulted in casualties. Only 10 or 18% of all attacks resulted in the death or apprehension of the perpetrators. The following three tables break down the distribution of European incidents by perpetrator, tactic and target.

GROUP	NO. OF INCIDENTS	KILLED	INJURED	KIDNAPPED	HOSTAGE
Total	W/Casualties
Animal Liberation Front	8
Arsonists of Conscience	I
Arsonists of Social Unity	1
Corsican Separatists	5	1	2
Kosovo Albanian rebels	1
Kurdistan Workers Party'	3	2	7	109+	2
Real Irish Republican Army	2	1	29	220
Revolutionary Nuclei	2
Revolutionary Organization 17 November	7
Revolutionary- Peoples Salvation Party- Front	1
Revolutionary Subversive Faction- Commando Unabomber group	1
Russian Nationalists	1
Lone Militant	4					297
Unknown	17	8	6	33	131
TOTALS	54	12	42	364+	2	428

Table 24: Distribution of Incidents by Tactic

TACTIC	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Bombing/attempted	28
Firebombing/Arson	9
Armed attack	5
Hijacking	5
Significant threat	5
Kidnapping	1
Contamination attack	1

Table 25: Distribution of Incidents by Target

TARGET	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Business/employees	23
Diplomatic (facilities, property, persons)	9
Aviation	6
Foreign nationals/tourists	6
Government buildings/officials	3
Commercial areas/markets, resorts	2
Humanitarian agencies/workers	2
Military	1
Police/public safety	1
Unknown	1

Bombing was the most common terrorist tactic in Europe in 1998. Bombings, attempted bombings and firebombings accounted for 37 of the 54 total recorded attacks. Armed attacks accounted for 5 of the incidents with aerial hijackings occurring 5 times throughout the year.

Four of these hijackings occurred in Turkey and were committed by lone individuals.

The fifth incident involved a Spanish airliner. In that incident 131 people were held hostage. In all 5 incidents a total of 428 people were detained against their will by the perpetrators). In all cases the hijackers were arrested or killed by authorities. Eventually, all of the hostages were freed unharmed.

Twelve groups were responsible for 33 of the 54 reported attacks. Seventeen attacks were committed by groups or perpetrators unknown. Four attacks were committed by lone individuals. Of the attacks committed by identifiable terrorist groups the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) was responsible for 8 incidents. Six of these attacks were firebombings of American and French restaurant chains in Belgium, which caused property damage but no injuries.

Two attacks, which occurred in Italy, were directed against ‘•Nestle”, an international food and beverage corporation. In one of these attacks two popular brands of cakes were contaminated with Racumin, a rat poison. This forced the company to remove all affected products from the shelves of over 1.000 stores. This action cost the company millions of dollars in lost revenue. The other attack occurred in May. In this incident several Nestle delivery vehicles were firebombed, causing property damage but no casualties. The Revolutionary' Organization 17 November (RO17N). Greece’s deadliest terrorist group was responsible for seven attacks all targeting American businesses. All of these attacks resulted in property’ damage with no casualties reported. A total of 14 incidents of international terrorism w^rere recorded in Greece throughout 1998. This was more than any other European country' experienced in the same period. An anarchist group calling itself the “Revolutionary Nuclei” claimed responsibility for two bombings on 29 December. Two foreign owned banks suffered heavy damage in those attacks. Anarchist groups also targeted Greek government offices, clinics and vehicles belonging to the French and Italian embassies.

In France. Corsican separatists staged several attacks against French government offices and public safety facilities. The most noteworthy incident, however, occurred on the French Mediterranean island of Corsica on 6 February, when Prefect Claude Erignac was assassinated. Erignac. who was killed in the port town of Ajaccio, had been on the island for two years and was the French government’s most senior representative.

Turkey recorded 8 incidents of international terrorism in 1998. Four of these incidents were hijackings of commercial airliners by lone individuals. In all cases the perpetrators were killed or captured by security forces. All 297 hostages aboard these aircraft w-ere freed unharmed. The Kurdish separatist group, the PKK, continued to employ bombings and kidnappings in their struggle for Kurdish sovereignty throughout 1998:

• On 4 June the PKK kidnapped a German tourist near the Iranian border. The victim was released unharmed 5 hours later.

• On 10 April, nine people including 3 foreign nationals were injured when a bomb exploded in a park near the Blue Mosque, one of Istanbul’s most popular tourist sites.

• On 9 July, seven people were killed and over 100 injured when a bomb exploded in a tourist market. Two PKK members confessed to the bombings on 18 August. Ten foreign nationals were injured in this attack.

The PKK continued its attacks on the Turkish military. Following the apprehension of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in Italy on 12 November the group carried out several suicide bombings.

On 17 November a major disaster was averted when a female suicide bomber detonated her explosives prematurely, killing herself w’hile injuring 4 others. Her apparent target was a military convoy. A few weeks later a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device near a military bus in the eastern Turkish city' of Van injuring 22 persons and killing 1. Most of the injured were soldiers and students.

Turkish authorities had some notable successes in dealing with terrorism throughout the year. Operations launched by security forces have considerably reduced the effectiveness of PKK operations in Turkey. Throughout the year Turkish security forces have killed or captured over 2100 terrorists. Further erosion of terrorist forces occurred following the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in Italy on 12 November and the surrender of PKK field commander Semdin Sakik in northern Iraq in March. Both of these events dealt a major blow to the guerrilla movement.

Despite the Good Friday accord between Catholics and Protestants, Northern Ireland continued to suffer needless bloodshed. The Real IRA (RIRA) and several other nationalist splinter groups continued to engage in terrorist activity. On 1 August a car bomb ripped through a shopping district in Banbridge injuring 35 people, destroying shops and damaging over 200 homes. This was followed by the worst single attack in the history of this troubled region. On 15 August a 500 lb. car bomb exploded in the market district of Omagh killing 29 people and injuring over 200. Among the dead were a Spanish child and teacher from Spain. Both attacks were attributed to the RIRA who were responsible for a number of other bombings and mortar attacks during 1998. The group is also suspected of planning to earn' out a bomb attack in London in July. The plot was foiled by authorities who arrested and charged 4 persons with conspiracy and possession of explosives. Over 3200 people have been killed in the British province of Northern Ireland since 1969. Other groups suspected of terrorist acts are the Protestant Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), the Continuity IRA, and the Irish National Liberation Army. The LVF has been implicated in a series of arson attacks on 10 Roman Catholic churches in Northern Ireland and other firebombings in early July.

The Northern European country of Latvia recorded 4 incidents of international terrorism in 1998. The Israeli embassy was the target of a bomb threat by an anonymous caller in April. After a careful search of the building police found no explosive device. In October members of an anti-terrorist unit destroyed a package at the embassy believed to have contained an explosive device. No one claimed responsibility for this incident. Another attack against Jewish interests occurred on 2 April, when a bomb blast broke windows and damaged doors at a synagogue in Riga, the capital of Latvia. The attack was linked to a 16 March reunion of World War II Latvian SS veterans. No one was injured in this attack. On 6 April a Russian ultranational group was suspected when a bomb exploded near the Russian embassy in Riga. That incident caused no injuries, but severely damaged 4 diplomat-owned vehicles. The bomb was apparently placed in a stone refuse container opposite the embassy. The embassy had received prior threats of an impending attack.

Western Hemisphere

There were no incidents of international terrorism in the United States or Canada during the year. The countries of the Latin American upper cone or Peruvian-Andean region were most affected by international terrorism in 1998. States in these regions have struggled with revolutionary terrorism for decades. The following regional report focuses on Latin .America.

Socio-political Background

Non-state political violence in Latin America is primarily a consequence of radical opposition movements of the left - and reactions by the rightist opposition. In general, neither motivations involving ethnic-nationalism, nor religious fundamentalists have garnered much interest in the region - although the Liberation Theology movement has attracted some radicals opposed to the traditional collusion of the Church with established political interests.

Latin America is beset with several major domestic conflicts that have a direct bearing on the development of terrorism. In the Andean states of Colombia and Peru, terrorists are frequently involved in insurgency movements aimed at the overthrow of incumbent regimes and the effective transformation of current political agendas. Throughout the region political systems are under severe pressure from recurrent economic problems, including widespread poverty, a substantial dependence of some states on the illegal international drug trade and the growing expectations and frustrations of an increasingly urbanized and otherwise “dislocated" population.

Many of the states of the region have poor records on civil rights, and military establishments occasionally intervene in civil affairs. Paradoxically, military institutions are simultaneously major proponents of system stability - and major actors in any crisis situation. Widely held perceptions of political corruption and the general lack of political legitimacy of many regimes are shared by substantial components of the population, including the young, the intellectuals and the mobilized urban poor. This situation of radical alienation and confrontation has gradually generated a long-term political opposition, one, which thinks routinely in terms of revolution. In addition, in several countries of the region this opposition has generated a cadre of significant numbers of people willing to risk their lives and forego conventional lifestyles in favor of revolutionary commitments. Unfortunately, revolutionary commitments and radical lifestyle changes has often implied a willingness to employ violence, and this orientation tends to become the target of reactionary oppression by the police and security experts - sometimes culminating in full blown government reprisal campaigns. Indeed, such legacies of violence may well become the instigator or role model for yet more violence in Latin America.[16]

Ironically, in spite of high levels of systemic strain on incumbent political regimes and considerable economic pressure on the leaderships of the region, most experts agree that Latin America in the 1990s is involved in a slowly developing process of democratization. This development is assumed here to be partly a function of the tendency of the masses in Latin America to reject the old politics of the military dictators and the landed elites, the caudillos, in favor of new political forms. In addition, because of the abject failures of socialist role models in the Soviet Union and much of the Third World, the cunent search for new political formats tends to focus on experiments with democratic institutions and capitalist enterprise. On the other hand, many of the peoples of Latin America, but especially the disaffected young workers and intellectuals of the urban poor and middle classes, do not identify with the presumed opportunities of democracy and capitalism; they tend to suspect that both are somehow inclined to conspire to oppress and exploit the masses of the Third World.

Terrorist Findings for 1998

Countries within Central and South America accounted for 120 incidents of international terrorism in 1998. This equates to 30% of the years total. The countries where these attacks occurred and the number of incidents per country are listed as follows in Table 26.

Table 26: Distribution of Terrorist Incidents by Country

COUNTRY	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Argentina	I
Brazil	2
Chile	2
Colombia	104
Ecuador	5
Guatemala	1
Nicaragua	1
Venezuela	4

The Latin American country of Colombia experienced more incidents of international terrorism than any other country in the world and more than the combined country totals for any region of the world. Bombings or attempted bombings were by far the most prolific terrorist tactic and accounted for 87 or 73% of all attacks in Central and South America. This was followed by kidnappings with 26 separate incidents reported. Our research indicates a total of 42 foreign nationals kidnapped in Colombia alone in 1998.[17] Colombia continues to lead the world in reported incidents of kidnapping. Of the kidnappings in 1998 the majority were financially motivated and carried out by guerrilla groups, whose primary targets were foreign corporation employees and tourists. Less than 20% of all Colombia’s kidnappings in 1998 were staged for political reasons.

When the nationalities of the victims were known our research indicates that 16 different nationalities were victims of international terrorism in Central and South America in 1998. The nationality¹ most targeted was American. Ninety-six of the 120 incidents recorded involved American citizens, or property. Of these. 86 attacks were launched against American businesses/employees. Only six of the 120 recorded incidents involved casualties. Three of

these involved fatalities. These 6 attacks were responsible for 78 deaths and an additional 87 persons injured. In an attack on 23 March, 4 persons were killed and 14 were injured when members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), kidnapped 27 people. The victims included 4 Americans and 1 Italian. Most of the hostages, including the 5 foreign nationals, were subsequently released. Upon his release, the Italian captive told reporters that the rebels were seeking $5 million (US) in ransom for the release of the .American tourists, who had been on a bird-watching expedition at the time of their abduction. It was not known if a ransom had indeed been paid prior to the release of the American tourists. On 21 April, an unidentified assailant shot and killed an American missionary near his home in western Bogota. The foreign missionary and pastor of the Southern Baptist convention died as a result of his wounds a short time later in a nearby hospital.

Throughout the 1990s Colombia has been by far the most frequent site for terrorist attacks against U.S. targets. Most of these attacks have centered on the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, a multinational venture between Ecopetrol, the state run oil company in Colombia, and U.S. Occidental Petroleum Corporation, along with other foreign oil firms. The 480-mile long pipeline runs from the Cano Limon oil field near the Venezuelan border to the port city of Covenas on the Caribbean coast. The primary mode of attack on the pipeline over the years has been bombing by rebel groups protesting what they view as excessive involvement of foreign multinational corporations in Colombia’s oil industry. Since the pipeline began operations 13 years ago most of the attacks have been conducted by the pro-Cuban National Liberation Army (ELN), the nations second largest guerrilla group. In 1998, however, there has been a sharp escalation in attacks due to the involvement of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who in 1998 announced that the country’s petroleum industry and the foreign companies, which operate these facilities, are to be considered military targets. This activity, popularly referred to as “petroterrorismo”, occurred 77 times throughout the year. It caused serious environmental damage in Colombia and cost Ecopetrol millions of dollars.

The number of attacks at 77 has been verified through various published governmental and oil industry' reports. This includes the publication, “The Oil Daily” and the State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998”. This number was further confirmed in a telephone conversation with a representative of Occidental Petroleum Corporation. Cobra was able to obtain incident-by-incident details on only a handful of attacks. Apparently, the bulk of the incidents although reported by the international press did not provide specific and detailed information concerning each occurrence. Therefore, incident data sheets for 76 pipeline bombings could not be prepared for inclusion in this chronology.

Although these attacks usually occur in unpopulated areas there have been instances where people were injured and in some cases killed. On 26 March, an American and two British nationals working on a British Petroleum oil well in eastern Colombia were injured when leftist rebels set off an explosion near the sleeping quarters of the crew. This marks the first time in its 11 years of operation that rebels have targeted the British Petroleum Company. Another pipeline explosion, which killed 73 people and injured 60 others, occurred on 18 October. This attack, which took place in a small town in the northwestern state of Antioquia, was linked to the ELN. A fire, which broke out after the explosion, engulfed a hamlet where most of the victims were sleeping. A large number of injured were children who were taken to nearby district hospitals. Preventing these attacks is almost impossible because Colombia’s army simply does not have enough manpower to patrol the entire length of the nearly 500-mile pipeline. Guerrilla activity has prompted several oil firms to cease onshore operations in Colombia entirely. The following table is a breakdown of attacks by year on the Cano Limon - Covenas oil pipeline:*^

YEAR	NUMBER OF ATTACKS	DENTED	RUPTURED
1990	23	8	15
1991	60	43	17
1992	62	33	29
1993	38	20	18
1994	45	22	23
1995	46	17	29
1996	45	20	25
1997	64	28	36
1998	77	27	50
1999	79	27	52
TOTALS	539	245	294

In the thirteen-year operational history of the pipeline repair costs due to guerrilla sabotage have been estimated at $238 million (US) and the value of lost output is estimated at more than $1.5 billion (US). In 1998 alone over 225,000 barrels of crude oil have been spilled.

Of the 120 total incidents recorded in Central and South America, 90 or 75% of these, involved property damage while 4 of these involved casualties. Of the 90 incidents involving property damage, 77 involved damage to the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline. The pipeline was ruptured 50 times and dented 27 times due to guerrilla sabotage during the year. In only 3 incidents were the terrorists or perpetrators captured or killed, at or about the time of the attack. This represents only 2.5% of all reported incidents for the entire region.

Five identifiable groups were involved in international terrorist activity in 1998. One attack was attributed to an unknown criminal group, 16 attacks, were committed by groups, or perpetrators unknown and 1 attack, a commercial airliner hijacking in Nicaragua, was committed by a lone individual.

The following three tables break down the distribution of Central/South American incidents by perpetrator, tactic and target.

^M Personal Communication with Occidental Oil Company representatives, June 1998.

Table 27: Distribution of Incidents and Victims by Perpetrator

GROUP	NO. OF INCIDENTS	KILLED	INJURED	KIDNAPPED	HOSTAGE
Total	W/Casualties
Front for the Defense of Pastaza's Interest	2	6
Leftist Revolutionary Armed Commando’s for Peace in Colombia	1	1
National Liberation Army	7	2	73	63	9
Popular Liberation Army	2	23
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia	14	1	4+	14	48
Criminals (other)	1	2
Lone militant	1					21
Unknown	16	3	1	10	6	22
TOTALS	44"	6	78	87	95"	43

Table 28: Distribution of Incidents by Tactic

TACTIC	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Armed attack	3
Bombing/attempted	87
Hijacking (aerial)	2
Kidnapping	26
Significant threat	1
Other	1

²⁴ The FARC and ELN were responsible for an additional 76 pipeline attacks bringing the total attacks in Latin/South Aaerica to 120.

²⁵ The FARC, ELN, EPL, FDIP, and CARIPCC were responsible for 1,385 kidnappings in 1998. Of these, 42 individuals were foreign nationals.

Table 29: Distribution of Incidents by Target

TARGET	NO. OF INCIDENTS
Aviation	4
Business/employees	89
Diplomatic	2
Foreign Institutions (non-business)	1
Foreign Nationals	21
Religious	3

MIDDLE EAST

Socio-political Background

The Middle East is a vast and geographically complex area that hosted the birth and development of several major civilizations and three major religions and is currently the venue for some of the world’s most dangerous, and intractable political disputes. Although several conflict areas in the region have been under intense negotiation for many years, most notably the Arab-Israeli dispute, the promise of a peaceful and enduring settlement has yet to be realized in many of the areas of contention. In addition, the development of a new. post-peace plan “order” is probably not likely to fully placate or stifle the extremist groups that have assumed tendentious and unyielding positions over the years.

A major consequence of the inability to obtain closure in this dispute has been the spawning of several extremely violent terrorist groups dedicated to opposing Israel’s interests, and to eliminating the influence of the western powers in the region. Several of the extremist secular groups originated in the aftermath of the Six Day Way (1967) and the frustrations of dealing on unequal terms with less than reliable Arab state powers in an environment dominated by Israeli military superiority.

Since the early 1980s new groups have emerged to rival the dominant secular groups of the previous era. The Shiite group Amal emerged from the Israeli incursion in Lebanon in 1982 in vigorous opposition to Israel’s occupation of Lebanon and in active conflict with Israel’s Christian proxies in the area. This group eventually came under the influence of Syria, and has been an active participant in the multi-faceted struggles among the opposition groups in the area ever since.

Of major consequence in the region was the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It eventually resulted in the emergence to prominence of various Iranian-influenced Shiite-oriented proxy groups, such as Hizballah, and other Shiite groups located in Lebanon and in territories in Israel (west bank of the Jordan river), such as HAMAS. All of the Shiite opposition groups focused primarily on the eradication of Israeli influence in Arab territories. Another motivation was the desire to check the influence of the United States in the region. In addition, some groups were motivated by religious or ethnic-nationalistic motivations to check the influence of the west and its culture of secularization and “decadence.”

One unique aspect of most of the contemporary terrorist group orientations in the Middle East is their sparse concerns (in the 1990s) for radical ideologies or economic welfare issues. Nevertheless, some terrorist group political orientations are clearly indicative of the strength and attractions of local issues and indigenous political identities on both state and sub-state levels. In general, the region is beset with a complex set of political, social and economic conflicts and, indeed, military tensions, which have resulted in the development of considerable political opposition to incumbent regimes and. in reality, to the established political order. A major consequence of such chronic political tension has been the emergence of extremist groups that routinely employ terrorist tactics against that order and the social and political supports, which are perceived to be part of that system.

On the regional level, issues, which have precipitated violent conflict in the region include:

In 1998. the Middle East experienced 63 incidents of international terrorism. These resulted in 36 killed and 208 injured. Approximately 33 of these incidents involved significant property damage.

Issue Highlights: Observations

Since 1992, major terrorist events in the region have included the following representative events:

o Religious-oriented radicals have attempted to inflict maximum public damage on Israeli interests. These groups are under the influence and probable support of Iran’s revolutionary' regime. They include: HAMAS (in the West Bank area) and Hizballah (in Lebanon).

o Secular radicals opposed to the peace process act to underscore their outrage and to challenge PLO authority'. They include:

o Amal, Hizballah, HAMAS and other Shiite or Shiite-influenced groups, have steadfastly opposed Israel’s presence and the presence of western powers in the region, particularly in the Levant.

o Middle East terrorism was often most prominent and dominant in terms of both numbers of incidents and magnitude of particular events

o Terrorist incidents of Middle East origins have also involved remote, non-regional locations, presumably because targets of high symbolic value are more vulnerable or “softer” than in the more obviously targeted areas. Examples are:

Another venue for budding terrorist groups has been Egypt, the original home of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist group that emerged in the 1920s to counter the perceived decadence which seemed to be emerging from continuing contacts with western state and economic entities. More recent manifestations of the Brotherhood and its successors have commenced a campaign against western influence and political dominance.

o Some terrorist incidents have a practical economic objective: to inflict economic or political costs on the principal target. Attacks on tourists in Yemen, many of which are designed to express tribal outrage at unfair or inadequate treatment of social needs and inflict political embarrassment on the central government, have resulted in little government efforts to right the perceived social slights and economic injustices of the indigenous tribes.

o Significant numbers of recent major incidents of Middle Eastern origin involved U.S. interests, facilities and personnel:

Of particular interest in 1998 were terrorist developments in Algeria and Lebanon:

Political violence in Algeria has steadily increased since March of 1992. At that time, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was outlawed as a legitimate political party by the military-backed regime. The FIS, which emanated from a network of 8,000 mosques and social and welfare

...

Appendix 4. Europe: Chronology of International Terrorist Incidents (1998)

...

Incident Identification Code: EUI98092401

Event Criteria

Year

Month/Day

Time

Region

Country

City/Location

Group/Perpetratorfs)

No. of Terrorists/Perpetratorfs) Tactic

Principal Target Weapons Used Victims

• Injured

• Killed

• Kidnapped

• Detained (hostage)

• Missing

Nationalities of Victims Fate of Terrorist$/Perpetrator(s) Property Damage Justice System Outcome Target Country Response

Intemationai/UN Action

1998 0924 unknown

Europe

Germany

Hamburg unknown unknown

Significant threat/plot uncovered

U. S. consulate

None reported

Security around the U.S. consulate was increased with all access to the area sealed off.

Event Description

More than one hundred German police officers were deployed to the U.S. consulate in Hamburg after receiving information from a "serious source" that a terrorist attack was imminent. Police cordoned off the area around the consulate and a police boat patrolled the waters nearby. There were no plans to close the offices. Investigators would not divulge information as to the source of the threat. Security was tightened at U.S. installations worldwide after the 7 August bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Incident Identification Code: EUI98012601

Event Criteria

Year

Month/Day

Time

Region

Country

City/Location

Group/Perpctrator( s)

No. of Terrorists/Perpetrator(s)

Tactic

Principal Target

Weapons Used

Victims

• Injured

• Killed

• Kidnapped

• Detained (hostage)

• Missing

Nationalities of Victims

Fate of Terrorists/Perpetrator(s)

Properly Damage

Justice System Outcome Target Country Response

Intemational/UN Action

1998

0126

12:00 am

Europe

Greece

Thessaloniki

Revolutionary Subversive Faction-Commando

Unabomber group unknown

Bombing

Multinational business (American)

Liquid gas canisters w/fuse

Third floor offices and a video club.

Thessaloniki police added an additional 1.000 officers to its security patrols.

Event Description

The offices of Hewlett-Packard, a multinational computer firm, located in downtown Thessaloniki were damaged when two explosive devices detonated on the third floor complex. A third device, located on the fourth floor, did not explode. The previously unknown Revolutionary Subversive Faction-Commando Unabomber group claimed responsibility for the attack in a phone call to a state run television station. The group is known to support American “Unabomber” Theodore Kaczynski.

[1] United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998, Washington, D.C.: April 1999, p 3.

[2] Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, et al. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories end Literature, Revised, Expanded and Updated Edition, Amsterdam, Oxford and New York, Transaction Books, 1988, p.158.

[3] Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson "International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974," Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, R-1597-DOS/ARPA, March 1975; Brian Jenkins, et al. Project on International Terrorism, The Rand Corporation.

[4] Edward F. Mickolus, "Statistical Approaches to the Study of Terrorism," in Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger, Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York: John Jay Press, 1977, pp.209-269.

[5] J Schmid, op cit, p 145.

[6] Ibid, pp. 1-32; See also Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 13-44, for a recent treatment of definitional issues, especially the section on, "Distinctions as a Path to Definition," pp. 41-44.

[7] Schmidt, op cit. See the authors' compilation of terrorist definitions in "Appendix B: A Selection of Recent Governmental and Academic Definitions," pp. 32-38.

[8] Opinions vary widely on the current status and potential of the emerging field of “terrorist studies". However, Charles Wilber has argued for more attention to the resolution of definitional and data issues. “We need more precise and extensive data (not conjecture) on the various terrorist episodes plus voluminous data on practitioners. If we could then extract some common elements we might be able to begin on theory construction." See Charles G. Wilber, Contemporary Violence: A Multi-disciplinary Examination, Springfield, Illinois, Thomas, 1975, cited in Schmid, op cit, p 129.

[9] This follows the Rand definition of terrorism, and, in particular, its emphasis on the “nature of the act." See the discussion in Bruce Hoffman and David Claridge, “The Rand-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism and Noteworthy Domestic Incidents, 1996," in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1998), p 139.

[10] Includes civilians, military personnel who, at the time of the incident, were unarmed, or were not on duty. U.S. State Department Report - Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998, op cit, p 18. In this work, we have used the term "unarmed or not on duty" to mean individuals who are in a non-combatant or in a peacekeeping role.

[11] Ibid, pp.46-47.

[12] ’•* Strategic Assessment 1997: Flashpoints and Force Structure, Washington, D.C., National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997, pp. 157-168, esp. p 158.

[13] Ibid, p 158.

[14] The Nigerian incidents listed in this report are not all-inclusive. The incidents cited were the major outbreaks of violence against oil companies and personnel, as reported by the international press. Also, due to the lack of available data for specific oil infrastructure related attacks, individual data sheets are not provided for 3 of the 22 Nigerian incidents.

[15] Ibid, pp.13-26, for a general description of regional issues.

[16] Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1970, p 219. See also pp. 176-177. Gurr concludes that "collective violence breeds collective violence". For a general assessment of security issues in the Hemisphere, see Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995, pp. 83-96.

[17] Of the 42 foreign nationals kidnapped in Colombia in 1998 Cobra was able to obtain information on 26 abductions involving foreign citizens. Fourteen additional foreign nationals were taken hostage for whom no information was available.