Action Directe

It is a pleasure to acknowledge the contribution of many people to this text, 1 would first of all like to thank Professors Ross Rudolph, Steven Hellman and Robert Albritton at the Department of Political Science at York University, for their support, encouragement annd criticism. Ross Rudolph in particular patiently provided advice and encouragement throughout the preparation of the document despite his highly charged schedule. Steven Hellman supplied invaluable assistance through our discussions about the framework of the study, the peculiarities of France and its politics, and his own experience in Italy, He later provided detailed criticism of my drafts that helped me re-work and refine the raw 'trial runs’. In terms of research, I owe a great debt to Pierre-Marie Giraud of Agence France Prcsse in Paris for his patience, kindness and openness, I had a free run of all AFP documentation relating to Action directe. Without his assistance, my research would have taken much longer and been less complete.

While conducting research and writing in France between 1986 and 1990, I was able to discuss my work with several persons whose views helped me understand AD’s significance: Professor Alfred Grosser at the Institut d’etudes politiques de Paris; Daniel Hermant, director of the Institut frangais de polemologie at the Hotel National des Invalides; Professor Franqois Furet, director of the Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales; and Dominique Rohn of Les Editions du Seuil. I also greatly benefited from the thoughtful comments of Dr Kenneth Robertson of the Graduate School of European Studies at the University of Reading and the encouragement of Professor Paul Wilkinson of the International Relations Programme at the University of Aberdeen. Dr Robertson and Professor Wilkinson read an early draft of Chapter 5 that was later published in Terrorism and Political Violence.

The gestation of my research pre-dated my travel abroad and graduate studies. Dr Claudia Wright of the Department of Political Science at the University of Winnipeg provided intellectual and personal inspiration and infected me with her interest in revolutionary movements. Dr Arthur Kroker, now at the Department of Political Science at Concordia University, stimulated my interest in political theory and intellectual audacity. Arthur provides students with an intellectually stimulating environment and a sense of freedom of the life of the mind. Dr IL Vincent Rutherford,

now retired from the Department of History' at the University of Winnipeg, became a good friend, teacher and firm advocate of[4]Operation Bootstrap’ (it works, Vince!). Dr Randi Warne of St Stephen’s College at the University of Alberta is an old friend with a sharp intellect and great sense of humour who said: ‘Hey, why don't you study one of those groups anyway?’ In addition, I would also like to thank Dr Shannon Bell and Dr Gad Horowitz, Francois-Pierre Le Scouarnec, Pcta Mathias, Barbara Shearer, Joanna Barker, Hugh Cawker, Marion Brcdin, Tamara Crist, Laurent Le Floch and Sheila Block for support, advice, patience and encouragement

I would also like to thank the institutions that provided me with financial support at various points in the time that led up to the present text* The University' of Winnipeg provided a bursary' and teaching assistantships from 1977 to 1979. The Birks* Jewellers Family Foundation paid my tuition fees from 1977 to 1987. The Faculty of Graduate Studies at York University' supplied assistantships during my residency. The Canadian Department of National Defence granted a scholarship that allowed me to travel to France for initial research from April to July 1984. Hitch-hiking through Provence, Languedoc-Roussillon, Midi-Pyrenees, the Massif Central, the Loire Valley and Brittany may not be a classic research method, but my knowledge of French language and culture grew on this foundation. York University’s Lamarsh Research Programme on Violence and Conflict Resolution also provided a grant to travel to France. Dr Desmond Ellis, then Lamarsh director, encouraged me to go ahead with the project* Columbia University’s Council for European Studies gave a small grant to attend its biannual conference in Washington DC in March 1990 and present a paper onzfrt/tw directs

Finally, I would like to thank Martin Chochinov, who has nurtured many more things than he perhaps realizes. His intellectual acuity, emotional centredness and proof-reading spurred me on in the final stages.

Montreal, 18 March 1993

Abbreviations

A2 - Antenne2

AD - Action direct?

ADi - Action direct? international?

ADn - Action direct? national?

AFP - Agence France Press?

AR - Affiche rouge

ATIC - Association treA/ri^ue de /’importation charbonniere

BNP - Banque national? de Paris

BR - Frigate Posse

BRB - Brigade de repression du banditisme

BW - Black War

CCC - Cellules combattantes communistes

CDP - Cause du peup/e

CFDT * Confederation fran^aise democratique du travail

CGT - Confederation generale du travail

CIRPO - Conference international? des resistances cm paj[j]s occupes

CLER - Comites de liaison des etudian/s revolutionnaires

Clodo - Comi/e liquidant ou dctoumant les ordinaleurs

CNPF - Conseil national du patronat franfais

CPSU - Communist Part}' of the Soviet Union

DPS - Detenusparticulierement signales

DST - Direction de la surveillance du territoire

EEC - European Economic Community

ESU - £/udiants socialisles unifies

FAHR - Front arm? honiosexuel revolutionnaire

FARL - Fractions armees revolutionnaires libanaises

FEB - Federation des entreprises beiges

FER - Federation etudiante revoluiionnaire

FHAR - Front homosexuet d'action revolutionnaire

FN - FrorH national

FRAP - Front revolutionnaire d’action proletarienne

FTP - Francs-tireurs partisans

GARI — Groupes d action revolutionnaires internalionalistes

GBGPGS - GroapeBai’oanfne-GdawsA’-Faris-CaafewaZa-Sa/wdor

GIGN - Grouped’intemmtion de lagetidannerienatioJiale

GP - Gauche proletarienne

GRB - Groupe de repression du banditisme

INLA - Irish National Liberation Army

JCR feunesse commtiniste revolutionnaire

LCR - Ligue communist# revolutionnaire

LO - Lutte ouvriere

MIL - Mouvement iberique de liberation

MLF - de Liberation des Femmes

MPPT - Alo/awtenZ tin parti des travai Hears

MRP - Afonvemen/ republicain populaire

NAPAP - Noyaux armes pour l’autonomiepopulaire

NRP - Nouvelle resistancepopulaire

OCI - Organisation communist# intemationaliste

ONI - Office national de rimmigration

PCF - Parti communist#fiangais

PCI - Partita Communisto Italiano

PCMLF - Parti communiste mamste-leniniste de France

PCR - Parti cotnmiinisie r&o/utionnaire (marxiste-lemnisle)

PS - Parti socialisle

PSU - Parti socialist# unifie

RAF - Rote Anne Faktion

RG - FmeignemenZs generaux

RPR - Rassemblementpour la Repttblique

SAT - Societe Anonyme de Telecommunications

SEMIREP - Societe mixte de renovation du quartier Plaissance

SFIO - 5m/o»yron^se de Z7n/en^Zio?z^/e o^riere

SONACOTRA - Sodete National# de Constructions pour les Travailleurs

TGV - train de grande vitesse

TRT - Telecommunications radioelectriques et telephones

UDF - Union pour la democratic franfaise

UEC - Union des etudiants communistes

UEO - Union de LEurope Occidental#

UJCml - Union des jennesses rommunistes - mams/es-ieninisres

UNEF - Union nafionate des etudiants fran^ais

L'TA - Union des transports aeriens

VLR - Five la revolution

1 Interpreting Terrorism: A Case-study of Action directe

'Brothers, when the time of triumph comes, with good fortune from both worlds as our companion, then by one single warrior on foot a king may be stricken with terror, though he oivn more than a hundred thousand horsemen?'[1]

The following study centres on explaining the emergence of a violent revolutionary protest faction in a stable Western political system. The explanation focuses on the group Action directe (AD), which was active in France between 1979 and 1987. It will demonstrate that AD’s ideology’ was based on rational motives that were derived from a reading of the context. In general, this analysis outlines AD’s values and goals to ‘take into account the sense that the actors themselves give their actions, and the constraints or norms (even if they are monstrous) to which they are subject'.[2] The discussion will also show that AD’s rational character did not help the group achieve the ends it set for itself. Most existing literature on terrorism does not help us understand AD since, by attempting to ‘generalize’ and compare, it is too broad to account for the specificities of one case. The French context is moreover extremely problematic for analyses based on the assumption that terrorism is a sign of instability'. France is a stable democracy in which violence appears on an episodic basis.

Several conclusions about the problems in the literature on terrorism guide this discussion. First, a general explanation of terrorism is not considered possible at this time since the analytical value of the term is limited and not applicable to a wide range of phenomena. ‘Terrorism’, as Jenny Hocking points out, has a general character that deters effective differentiation and explanation:

Terrorism is not a neutral or purely descriptive term. In die sense that its understanding is based on perceptions of legitimacy structured according to a bench-mark of political and social ‘normality’, ‘terrorism’ is an ideological construct.[3]

In the second place, this discussion is guided by the view that case-studies, not existing analyses of terrorism, are the most promising path towards a satisfactory examination of the significance of terrorist violence* To this end, the text focuses on a case that superficially resembles the so-called terrorist threat, but that is in fact quite different: AD was more endangered than were French institutions or society* Third, this text views an examination of motives as an effective means to explain ‘unpredictability’, a factor that is often cited by analysts of terrorism. Terrorists may articulate rational bases for action. In view of the fact that AD carefully articulated its motives and its attacks expressed goals,

A narrow perception of terrorism as essentially indiscriminate would consequently remove assassinations and the murder of specific ‘symbolic’ individuals from the realm of terrorism . . . much of the activities of terrorist groups . * . (have) been built upon a selection of targets chosen specifically for their position within the political and economic systems.[4]

Fourth, the discussion views the treatment of revolutionary terrorism as an aberration to be a misapprehension that equates ‘political violence with a single form of such violence - terrorism; and then implies, or assumes, that all terrorism is “revolutionary” or “aimed at the overthrow of governments”?[5] Finally, the text regards labelling terrorism as ‘indiscriminate’ to be missing the point The assumption implies that ‘terrorism’ has a single definition and ignores how violence ‘must be highly discriminate in order to provoke the type of response desired'?[6] Neglecting motives, obsession with left-wing revolutionaries, ignoring state terrorism and fixating on the arbitrary and random are all endemic to the literature on terrorism.

The development of a general theory of terrorism would certainly help to improve social science treatment of political violence in general. However, such a possibility is not imminent. The state of social science knowledge of many kinds of ‘terrorist’ groups is so limited that even comparisons between the so-called ‘Euro-terrorists* of the 1980s is hampered by lack of careful observation* What is known about the Italian and German wings of the phenomenon, especially that they emerged from broader social movements, immediately distances them from AD. Today’s analyses most often dissect terrorism into components that are compared across contexts. The resulting cross-casc analyses of specific aspects of terrorist violence hinder the development of a general theory because they fail to provide ‘frames of appreciation, cognitive maps, concept packages, and methodology' to comprehend complex phenomena that cannot be understood through decomposition into easier-to-analyze subelements’?[7] In the worst instances, analysts denounce terrorists as psychopaths, qualify their violence as new and extraordinary, and characterize terrorism as episodic, dysteleological, incoherent, abnormal and unacceptable. ‘Terrorism’ is characterized as ‘omnipresent’ and specific threats are rarely described as manageable or less than catastrophic. If incidents are unprecedented, analytical attention should turn to the ‘sets of ideas ..[that] . . . posit, explain, and justify ends and means of organized political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given order’.[8] If the effects of terrorism are unpredictable, examining the motives in a specific case might help explain why this is so. An examination that focuses on a revolutionary political faction (AD) in a stable Western society (France) circumvents the problems inherent in interpreting terrorism. Procedures based on simplification and comprehensive approximation are premature since few individual incidents of ‘terrorism’ have been sufficiently examined. The resulting analyses are theoretically impoverished, lack contextual substantiation, exhibit poor taxonomical development and generalize on the basis of insufficient data.

At an early stage of theory-building, intensive examinations have limited applicability: ‘a single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalization’. Accordingly, the present study identifies the peculiarities of one group in order to respond to the lack of contextual research, poor taxonomical development and premature generalizations in existing literature. It draws its force from the fact that ‘intensive study and empathetic feel for cases provide authoritative insights into them’.[9] By isolating one example and avoiding comparison, the examination is a ‘basic data-gathering operation, and can thus contribute indirectly to theory-building’ ?° Rather than trying to define regular relations between cases, the study aims to formulate hypotheses for subsequent interpretations[11] The interpretation is in this sense ‘hypothesis-generating’ since it provides contextually specific ‘generalizations in areas where no theory exists yet’.[12] Although AD is not necessarily comparable with other cases, the study may ‘uncover relevant additional variables that were not considered previously ... or refine the definitions of some or all of the variables’?[13] Owing to the lack of well-researched examples to compare, examining one case is a research strategy that may

stimulate the imagination toward discerning important general problems and possible theoretical solutions . . . [It] ties directly into theory-building, and therefore is less concerned with overall concrete configurations?[14]

However, at the same time, a case approach does have limits, especially in relation to conspiratorial political factions. The latter are by definition difficult to examine since they operate without the mass relays that characterize contemporary Western political behaviour. Given the difficulties in observing a conspiratorial political faction like AD on a firsthand basis, the method selected for this study focuses on an ideological framework and symbols that ‘legitimize in morally unquestionable postulates the predatory use of such bargaining weapons as groups possess’.[15] AD used ritual violence as a way of symbolically communicating its goals and views to the French political system. These symbols are closely related to politics since:

every political act that is controversial or regarded as really important is bound to serve in part as a condensation [summarizing] symbol. It evokes a quiescent or an aroused mass response because it symbolizes a threat or reassurance,

Symbols are tools that distinguish ‘complex and undifferentiated feelings and ideas, making them comprehensible to oneself, communicable to others, and translatable into orderly actions’.[17] In AD’s case, metaphors such as ‘capitalism’, ‘revolution’, and ‘crisis’ gave its acts coherency, orientated strategies, and connected its ideology to French political traditions. The general orientations set by French political history are crucial to understanding AD. As in all political cultures, French ideologies are:

sets of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in a political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity ... A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system. * ,[18]

Like other Western political organizations, AD used ideology in a ‘struggle to embody a new politics and a new society’.[19] However, unlike other political groups, it infiltrated the dominant symbolic order in an effort to ‘sacrifice’ the system and employed symbols for their ‘drawingtogether, intensifying, catalysing impact upon the respondent’.[20] Its ‘ritual’ violence is thus best explained in political-ideological terms that clarify ‘political acts remote from the individual’s immediate experience’.[21] These terms help to avoid the assumptions that human behaviour is uniform, that violence always has similar results, and do not ignore different intensities, types and meanings. Traditions and symbols help to delineate AD’s attempt to ‘relate lower-order meanings to higher-order assumptions, or to “ground” more surface-level meanings to their deeper bases’.[22] In the following discussion, AD’s ideology will be set in the context of extremeleft traditions that structure ‘particular culturally provided sequences of stylized actions’.[23] Extreme-left traditions shaped a revolutionary ideology in which attacking capitalist collaborators was conceivable. The persistence of these traditions in French history encouraged AD’s belief that it had a potential following and was providing a needed protest function. Accordingly, the group’s vocation was based on themes that the extreme left had discarded. This vocation effectively made the group a degenerated version of gauehis me.[24]

The weaknesses in the literature on terrorism are obvious in several of the approaches frequently employed. Psychological interpretations have been widely used. They are often based on theories of frustrationaggression and relative deprivation, although neither theoiy is now used widely by psychologists. Frustration-aggression theory is based on the idea that ‘aggressive behaviour always presupposes foe existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression’?[25] Rather than verifying the claim by referring to specific cases, analysts have developed an approach that allegedly illustrates the deviant nature of political terrorism. Lawrence Freedman argues that frustration leads terrorists to believe that violence releases superhuman and extra-normal powers?[26] Frederich Hacker says they are deeply disturbed, non-political ‘justice collectors seeking remedy for injustice by unrestrained legitimation of all means used in the sendee of their cause’?[27] J. W. Clayton claims that frustration makes terrorists vulnerable to defeatism and leads to ‘overly high expectations of an idealized order’.[28] Other analysts use relative deprivation theory to balance the psychological bases of frustrationaggression theory with sociological insight. Ted Gurr argues that social conditions may amplify conflict if they raise expectations without increasing foe capacity to fulfil them?’ Gurr’s relative deprivation theory focuses more squarely on motives and rational concerns than does frustrationaggression theory. However, it offers no substantive explanation of significance because it lacks reference to active terrorists?[30] Although examining active terrorists might confirm its claims, the explanatory value of frustration-aggression theory is now limited by difficulties such as participants’ memories, their ‘editing' of events and accounting for conflicting motives.

Another set of theories is based on a systems theory approach. These analyses view terrorism as a product of poor normative integration and inadequate government response to social problems. Yezekiel Dror says an ‘inadequate institutionalization of inputs’ leads to violence. He argues that democracies must learn to respond to extra-normal pressures that are ‘both a danger of failure with immediate and long-term consequences and an opportunity to re-assert the requisites of a viable democratic capacity to govern’.[31] Similarly, Chalmers Johnson argues that terrorism results from 'the degree and nature of a social system’s dissynchronization and of the quality and timelessness of the efforts of its ruling elites to rectify the dissynchronization’?[32] However, he adds that where 'moral communities’ shelter individuals from random violence and supply clear social roles, terrorist violence is ‘a form of tyranny, not something to which people can become accustomed and thereby orient their behaviour’?[33] Another systems approach argues that terrorism results from a weak international order and the influence of non-Western values. These analyses allege that state intervention and international support underpin modern terrorism?[34] Claire Sterling, for example, contends that the USSR assisted ideologically amenable terrorists during the 1970s and 1980s: 'the whole point of the plan was to let the other fellows do it, contributing to Continental terror by proxy’?[35] Her rhetoric exaggerated the threat and was not based on systematic evaluations of cases. In many contexts, terrorism has not threatened democracy or international order?[36] Some analyses argue that modem terrorism has especially lethal potential because contemporary democracies have loosened social control. They advocate limited access to communications, transport, weapons and information technologies as a way of preventing nuclear or 'hi-tech* terrorism?[37] Other analysts argue that terrorism exposes the dangers of open, reasonable responsive democracies. Yonah Alexander argues that by providing information and ways to attract attention, equal access and pluralism increase the potential for violence?[38] His explanation stresses the irresponsibility of techno-terrorists and assumes that all governments use technology responsibly. However, it seems unlikely that terrorists would annihilate the political system with reference to which they articulate demands.

Another category of theories focuses on rights and ideologies. The best-known analyst of this school is Walter Laqueur, who links terrorist violence to socially transformative ideologies. Laqueur’s analyses set the paradigm for most literature on terrorism. He argues that the modern and left-radical variant of terrorism in many ways resembles tyrannicide, regicide and revolutionary conspiracy. Laqueur agrees with Anthony Quainton’s view that modem terrorism’s unrestrained behaviour, indiscriminate targeting, multinational networks and failure to attack dictatorships make it a refinement on age-old tactics of intimidation, intrigue and assassination?[39] In this light, Laqueur believes that examining motives is not important:

’left-wing’ and 'right-wing* terrorism have more in common than is usually acknowledged. Terrorism . .. was Fascist in the 1920s and 1930s but took a different direction in the 1960s and 1970s. In actual fact, however, underlying both ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ terrorism there is usually a free-floating activism - populist, frequently nationalist, intense in character but vague and confused.[40]

Irving Horowitz echoes Laqueur’s attitude toward motives. He says treating “radicalism” as a rerival of participatory democracy' and “terrorism” as a simple resort to violence is to miss the essential multinational mix'.[41]

Several other theories of rights and ideologies do assess the significance of motives. However, these interpretations also define ‘terrorism’ broadly and make sweeping generalizations about post-1789 Western politics that render specific contexts superfluous. Noel O’Sullivan says that terrorism is a consequence of the ideological politics that emerged during the French Revolution: ‘the modem enemies of limited politics never appear in that role but always present themselves as the champions of “the people”, of “true liberty”, and of “true democracy”’[42] His view is similar to that of Hannah Arendt, who argues that de-sanctifying the human values underlying Western law led to violence and threatens individual rights: ‘ the means overwhelm the end. If goals are not achieved rapidly, the result will be not merely defeat but the introduction of the practice of violence into the whole body politic.’[43] Paul Wilkinson also examines motives. He calls terrorism ‘inherently indiscriminate’, ‘essentially arbitrary and unpredictable’ and a denial of‘all rules and conventions of war’. He links terrorists’ ‘hideous and barbarous cruelties and weapons’ to motives such as transcendental ends, regeneration, catharsis, just vengeance or greater evil.[44] Wilkinson says these motives reflect the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon, ‘philosophers of terrorism’, whose

almost mystical view of violence as an ennobling and as a morally regenerative force has been widely diffused among revolutionary intellectuals. So too has their advocacy and championship of terrorism, Sartre claims that revolutionary violence is ‘man re-creating himself.[45]

Similarly, Moshe Amon claims that terrorism emerged from the ‘ramshackle world of Western civilization, where religion is in a state of crisis and many established myths are losing their meaning and significance’.[46] He says that violence results from our civilization’s loss of coherence and continuity.

Overall, explanations based on assertions about long-term tendencies that affect modern Western civilization do not provide an effective framework to examine specific details or contexts. In particular, they provide no basis to explain violence that is non-revohitionary, provocative or protestoriented. Since generalizations draw their persuasiveness from a comparison of cases, the latter type of violence needs substantiation through research on specific examples[47] The above literature does not proceed in this fashion. It is based on an indiscriminate identification of‘terrorism’ across diverse settings that obscures difference. In so doing, it ultimately hinders explanation by failing to distinguish typologies that are ‘different from every other, both in content and in organization’[48] A comparison of cases should be preceded by research on factors such as ideology, history, international conditions, and organization. Without these foundations, the above theories explain the impact of terrorism better than they evaluate its significance. A general explanation would have to account for the different results shown by a cursory examination of apparently similar cases. Uruguayan terrorism, for example, led to ten years of military authoritarianism. The Italian extreme-leftists who emulated it actually helped to strengthen democracy. A general theory would help explain why democracy was strengthened in one context but weakened in another. It would also account for groups that do not try’ to overthrow governments. Beyond this, the wide variety’ of cases throws the possibility' of formulating a satisfactory general theory into doubt. Ignoring such issues, most analysts link terrorist violence to the unexpected. Laqueur contends that modern terrorism ‘is directed almost exclusively against permissive democratic societies and ineffective authoritarian regimes’/[49] His comparison ignores context and the relative rarity of truly lethal terrorism in Western democratic systems.

Not all the literature on terrorism is hampered by broad generalization. Some analysts have provided insights that were used to develop the approach employed in this discussion. In particular, the approach is based on Furet’s argument that the threat of violence seems palpable; ‘where power is abstract, government occurs through impersonal norms, and complex procedures exist to substantiate a popular presence, the terrorist substitutes the concrete universe of incarnated power/[50] This study is also informed by Edwy Plenel’s view that examining motives and ideology may help ‘take the exact — social, political, ideological - measure of the phenomenon'.[51] Peter Merkl, by responding to the weakness of general explanations with specificity, helped substantiate Plenel’s general statements. Identifying five types of violent groups in Weimar Germany,[52] he notes that ‘lumping them together in one category of violence against feeble public order is not very helpful . .. attempts at revolutionary uprising ... [are] . . . obviously different from assassinations and call for different approaches’.[53] In addition, this discussion was substantially aided by Hocking’s criticism of existing theory and Robin Wagner-Pacifici and Robert Drake’s case-studies of the Italian Red Brigades (BR)/[54]

The single greatest weakness in social science treatments of political violence is the lack of conceptual tools. Particularly marked at the level of taxonomical categories, this failing has retarded theoretical development. Although the violent factions we refer to as Terrorist' have long plagued political life, they have rarely been systematically examined due to two factors. In the first place, mass movements, representative government and democracy are the central concerns in modern Western political thought. Factional violence was always discussed in classical political thought, but largely written off as an anomaly after the late eighteenth century. Secondly, as AD itself illustrates, the secretive character of small conspiratorial groups does not lend itself to systematic examination. AD’s small size, lack of mass support and emphasis on elite action made it more like a pre-modern political faction than the formal-legalist organizations that preoccupy modern political science. As a result, analyses of terrorism are methodologically crippled.

The weakness of most analyses has been exacerbated by confusion over the term ‘terrorism’, In most analyses, Terrorism’ is defined as a technique: 'the use or threat of violence to effect change in the body politic’?[55] However, applying the definition to a wide variety of undifferentiated phenomena ignores differences between cases in favour of general explanations that cannot sustain close scrutiny. As a result, the types of political violence incorporated under the rubric Terrorism’ include: the Jacobin terror, suppression of the Paris commune, Russian nihilism, Nazism, the Algerian FLN, the Khmer Rouge and the Lebanese Hezbollah. The vocabulary to differentiate them remains underdeveloped. Beyond indicating that violence is employed to secure generally political goals, Terrorism’ cannot help explain the significance of particular organizations in specific environments. In some cases, violence seriously menaces socio-political order. In others, its impact is symbolic rather than lethal. Despite this, many analyses persistently view Terrorism’ as a threat to the state, ‘the primary symbol of political legitimacy, the focus of popular loyalties, and the basis of international order’[56] The seriousness of this claim dictates that it be validated with reference to specific goals, motives and context. In all its incarnations, Terrorism’ needs to be distinguished from officially sanctioned violence. The latter is allegedly manageable, manipulate and ‘nothing but the continuation of policy with other means’[57]

Violence is a regrettable, inevitable and persistent part of the Western tradition. Many forms of violence are sanctioned by the distinction that Judeo-Christian culture imposes between social and political violence. The separation disempowers specific groups and, for example, makes violence against women, homosexuals and visible minorities routine. In contrast, ‘political violence’ draws attention because it attacks patriarchal order. Research on family abuse, sexual violence and peace studies is now extending knowledge about violence. However, this research does not show that violence is increasing, only that its depth and range are finally being systematically examined. Analogous gaps in historical knowledge hampers many examinations of social and political violence. Extended social sendees and communications, for example, have unveiled previously tolerated sexual and family violence. However, the lack of long-term information about these phenomena limits evaluation in the same way that the lack of attention given 'terrorism[57] impedes general explanations of significance and character, What can be said is that the impact of'terrorism’ outstrips that of home, school and workplace violence.[58] Yet, theories of terrorism generally do not distinguish typologies of violence. They characterize a wide selection of types of violence as lethal and so amalgamate terrorism with cataclysm. In fact, the threat can only be clarified by surmounting‘continuing confusion about its [terrorism’s] general significance for modem political life, and in particular about its relationship to the democratic states?[59] The task could begin by distinguishing a range of types (fascist, neo-Nazi, Marxist-Leninist and anarchist) and demonstrating the significance of national symbols.[60]

The ultimate impact of terrorist violence lies in its violation of Western beliefs about democracy and representative institutions. This impact overwhelms our knowledge that ‘terrorism’ in the West is infrequent by comparison to the rest of the globe and other historical periods. Many analyses confound ‘terrorism* with ‘civil unrest’, ‘protest’ or ‘sabotage’, even though the threat is not especially lethal:

the number of Americans killed inside the United States in 1985 as the result of terrorist attack was two ... the total number of US civilians killed abroad between 1973 and the end of 1985 was 169 ... more Americans were killed by terrorists in 1974 (22) than in 1984 (16)?[1]

Examinations tend to ignore that ‘the actual amount of violence caused by international terrorism has been greatly exaggerated. Compared with the world volume of violence or with national crime rates, the toll has been small’?[2] Terrorism has an intense, non-physical, emotional and abstract impact, but this does not necessarily mean that individuals or society are vulnerable. In France, terrorism is a small portion of criminally motivated deaths and injuries.[65] Although the average French person is more likely to be raped, robbed or injured on an expressway, terrorism elicits a strong public reaction because it violates symbols of everyday continuity and security.[64] Terrorism leads to a sense of insecurity that arises from ‘an identification with the fate of actual victims to the extent that victims are interchangeable, but does not stem from an analysis of the statistical frequency of attacks’/’[5] However, a widespread impression that French society is increasingly violent has been accompanied by,

a significant regression in criminal violence . . . the evolution of violence has not at all followed the dramatic course that the dominant alarmist discourse would lead us to suppose ... the frequency of murders and assassinations is extraordinarily weak; the mortality rate due to homicide is about one for every' one hundred thousand persons (in traditional patriarchal societies, the rate was as much as fifty[r] times higher).[M]

AD has been selected for examination precisely because it is a case in which terrorists threaten socio-political order or indicate significant system dysfunction to a much lesser degree than initial impressions suggest.[67]

Method

This discussion focuses on one case of political violence in a Western system in order to discuss its rational bases and political character. AD is ‘rational’ in the sense that it consciously chose to behave in a certain manner derived from historical antecedents such as blanqutsme** The discussion begins with an overview of French political history' in order to show that political violence is a chronic element in that context. After this, the analysis shows that AD’s motives and goals follow French revolutionary’ traditions. The group was trying to carry' out a protest ‘role’ finked to changes that were under way in French political culture in the 1970s and 1980s. These alterations turned AD’s revolutionary project into a parody since its goals were not relevant to public debate. As a result, AD failed to menace political order and remained a fringe phenomenon. The recourse to a case approach thus reveals the group’s contradictory' status: AD was not a lethal threat to France’s socio-political order, but drew' on a long tradition of violent opposition to the establishment of the day.[69] The triple focus of the study is designed to avoid the pitfalls of existing analyses. The discussion concentrates on: (1) contextual information and specificity'; (2) political changes that set the scene for violence; and (3) the character of one organization. The first section outlines the French revolutionary' traditions that reduce politics to physical struggle and provided numerous, and recent, precedents for a rational course of action. The context set the stage for forms of political violence that are either strategic or tactical. While tactical violence secures specific ends, such as national security, independence or revolution, AD used violence strategically, It viewed force as an end in itself and aimed to create fear.

The specificity of AD’s case does not provide hypotheses to test against other examples or measure equivalency.[70] As a result, this analysis does not offer a generic explanation of political violence. The exclusive focus on French political traditions elucidates specific debates and influences. The single-case approach isolates the themes that help to substantiate AD’s rationality, such as extreme-left debate on how to battle capitalism. The approach, which made this highly specific ideological interpretation possible, was selected as the only methodology that could clarify the centrality of ideological motives for political violence in France. Ideology is the key that clarifies how AD used 'premeditated and purposeful violence ... in a struggle for political power[1].[71] AD’s goals and motives were motivated by a distinct political tradition[72] that is imbued with universalist values and reflects a unique historical experience. France is one of few Western political cultures that continues to view values derived from a specific historical experience as universally valid. The sense of historical-cultural superiority' that imbues France is another element that makes it difficult to compare AD to its fellow ‘Euro-terrorists' in Italy and Germany. In the latter two cases, the experience of fascism provided a markedly different set of conditions and attitudes toward the political system. AD’s choices were shaped by a political culture in which symbols, legitimacy and institutions emphasize

departure from men’s daily routine, a special or heroic quality in the proceedings they are to frame. Massiveness, ornateness and formality[1] ... are presented upon a scale which focuses constant attention upon the difference between everyday life and the special occasion.[73]

AD emerged in a period in which ideologies were changing and political consensus growing. The alteration was a highly significant one in twentiethcentury' French political history'. It was embodied by the Mitterrand presidency, a focus on the EC, racism, immigration and the social power of money, and expressed by terms such as altemance, cohabitation and

Like the extreme-right Front national (FN), AD believed that the shift was a threat to an authentic set of national values. Both groups feared marginalization, distrusted politicians, were deeply anti-American and tried to exploit racism, anti-immigrant sentiments and fear of EC integration.

This discussion characterizes AD as an extreme-left protest faction with a revolutionary vocation. The group contradicts many assumptions about violent political organizations in the literature on terrorism. Accordingly, this text argues that the group is always very left-wing and very French, which limits the possibilities for comparison with other seemingly similar samples. Rather than focusing on comparison, the argument concentrates on a political micro-culture, its meanings, and transmission of the central elements of those meanings from a more ‘elaborated’ host political culture. The resulting discussion focuses on how AD concluded that armed opposition was necessary, evaluates its threat and goals, and aims to elucidate a taxonomical category. AD’s early attacks were a symbolic protest. Deadly assaults on human beings only became systematic after five years of operation. Early AD (1979-82) was preoccupied by the proletariat. Later, /letion direct? national? (ADn) was preoccupied by national issues and behaved like a group of politicized criminals. Tirtrcw direct? international? (ADi) had an international orientation, methodically assassinated individuals and wanted to ‘reconstitute’ the proletariat at a global level. Both sections mirrored French society and, significantly, did not deviate from national ideological-political themes. As a unit, AD recapitulated national ideological traditions. It even split due to differences over national and international influences that also divided the mainstream left. Both ADs believed that revolution was historically necessary and inevitable and that human productive and technological capacities made egalitarianism a social and political imperative. To achieve its end, AD targeted a new global order. It was inspired by May 1968, the wartime resistance movement and French extreme-left traditions, but failed to attract a pool of like-minded groups. Their absence doomed AD’s emulation of May 1968 and made it anything but a ‘popular force’. ADi tried to circumvent this weakness by posing as an early stage of revolutionary struggle, However, it appeared just as exlra-parliamentary organizations lost steam and the mainstream left rose to power.

2 French Traditions of Political Violence and Protest

The following discussion clarifies the bases for the direct action tactics that AD adopted by outlining the main contextual factors that shaped its stance toward the host political system: the revolutionary tradition in French politics; the 'classic’ political order of the Third Republic; and the Fifth Republic consensus. All three influences provided the foundations upon which extreme-left terrorism took root in the late 1970s. Through an outline of these influences, the rise of extreme-left terrorism can be referred to French concepts of political legitimacy, the Actors, objectives, capabilities and certain stable aspects of the environment that attend the application of capabilities’? As a result of the above influences, AD adopted a revolutionary 'vocation’ that was explicitly linked to protest traditions and a distinct idea of legitimacy. Revolutionary opposition to the political establishment has in fact long functioned as an unexceptional component of the 'exceptional’ political culture formed through France’s original and complex history.

The influence of the 1789 revolution

Distinct geographical, historical and cultural influences shaped France’s political traditions. At the most fundamental level, a history of strong central authority shaped protest against a state that usually functions as 'no mere instrument of a sovereign general wall nor an arbiter among people but a positive good in itself, the bearer of values greater than the sum of individuals who made it up’.[2] The political system made little provision for independent cultural, social or political organization. Post-revolutionary institutions moreover generally embodied very specific notions of prestige, education and status:

The bourgeoisie triumphed through a battle, and the battle explains both the continuation of industrial development as an element of bourgeois drive and the energy with which the bourgeoisie defended itself against any push from the new lower class, the proletariat. The aristocracy has offered a long and heated resistance: hence both the bitter cqualitarian suspiciousness which pervaded French society and the deep impact which the aristocratic values nevertheless made on the bourgeoisie and even on workers’ attitudes?

The dramatic break of 1789 rendered all subsequent political regimes prey to revision by revolution* Without the unifying symbol of a monarchy, both right and left traditionally viewed legitimacy as conditional and historical, an attitude that endowed public life with a radical capacity that AD believed it could still exploit in the 1980s. In the traditional political culture, both ideological camps also bore mutually exclusive concepts of legitimacy that

are fundamentally built on the opposition betw een the partisans of a hierarchical society and the supporters of an egalitarian one ... a main line in French political life, even though its criteria evolve and the equilibrium varies.[4]

In French political culture, Anglo-American reformism has long appeared as one stance among a group of alternatives. Political struggles were often resolved by force in the nineteenth century. Both the extremeright and extreme-left repeatedly used violence to secure their interests and make themselves heard.

From 1789 to 1914, no government is acceptable for all citizens. Two irreducible legitimacies confront one another. A large part of the country remains faithful to the monarchical principle of the old regime: it wants a king who could take up again the dynasty that was driven from the throne in 1792. Another part is impassioned by the new principle of national sovereignty: it calls for power based on universal suffrage and public freedoms. They slaughtered each other as much for political regimes as class interests/

Despite the association of revolutionary change to the year 1789, the victoty of republicanism over its anti-republican and ultra-royalist opponents did not occur until about 1880. Many parts of the left were by this point deeply suspicious of the political establishment and the practice of compromise. For its part, the right did not trust left-wing intentions, and focused on the example of the 1793-94 terror:

The two camps were not only opposed over national management and development, but also over fundamental values. Between the Enrages ['fanatics’] and the Ultras ['ultra-royalists’] there was no common ground, only a mutual wish to finish one another off?

The left was locked out of power and actively persecuted in 1794,1815, 1848 and 1871. When it did form a government, it tended to turn on its enemies.[7] The radical dichotomy between right and left that AD later insisted upon was hardly aberrant. On the contrary, it has been one of the most persistent features of the post-1789 political culture. At the same time, French society remained ‘profoundly conservative in its modes of organization and its models of human relations . . . with a taste for revolt and a long tradition of utopian protest[1] .* The centralized state inherited from the old regime and reinforced by Napoleon combined with revolutionary predilections for political utopianism. Public institutions were fragile, and became even more so if the status quo did not entail sociopolitical advantage for certain political players. As AD did later, frustrated groups turned to sustained, rhetorically radical, and physically violent protest. Dramatic action, a method legitimated by the revolution, became a favourite tool for testing the strength of the authorities? If the state could not reinstate order, participants demanded better institutions. The resulting political culture was characterized by:

addiction, not merely to revolutionary talk, but to violence (to a degree considerably superior to what could be found even in industrial relations). In other words, the degree of willingness to observe the rules of the game when results fail to give satisfaction to the claims of the ‘political strata’ is low?[0]

Post-1789 French political culture was also influenced by the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In particular, his focus on the allegedly direct democracy in the Greek nourished the ideal of a small, self-sufficient republic based on untutored participation. Nostalgia for organic community links and the consensus loss after 1789 led to the use of classical Greek symbols to legitimize authority. Rousseau’s ideas were also translated into policy. The Comite du salut public" prescribed the creation of rational social and political institutions: ‘in the interest of the people the state was to be interventionist, offering social services; it was to plan and guide the institutions of the country, using legislation to lift up the common man’.[13] The principles in the Declaration des droits deThonme™ were to be secured by education?*

Utopian egalitarianism thus had long-term influence on attitudes toward the political system. A split between left-wing advocates of liberty and equality in the 1790s further multiplied ideologies. Both wings of the left thereafter spread ideas that synthesized wnth traditionalist and modernist social concepts in an ambiguous manner:

France is perhaps the only country' in Europe that never really accepted the great break, the great intellectual, scientific and political reversal carried out in Enlightenment Scotland toward the end of the eighteenth century, a reversal that wanted itself to be-and really was - the birth act of modernity. Economic science, utilitarian philosophy and the political theory of liberalism all appeared at this time.’[5]

In France, left-wing movements based on libertarian and egalitarian ideas competed with other groups that had traditionalist values. Left-wing nostalgia for a small-scale political order resulted in ambiguous attitudes toward religion, the family, mass migration, political representation, technology[7] and urban industrialism. By referring authority' to a romantic vision of the classical Greek city[7] states, revolutionaries tried to create a consensus, However, this classicism was hardly ‘modernist* since the economic, social and cultural management of an imperfect, changeable and unacceptable nature contradicted the static equilibrium of the smallscale republic. The juxtaposition of tradition and modernization with liberty[7] and equality[7] greatly influenced perceptions of legitimacy?[6]

The 1789 revolution spawned a group of ideologies: jaabimsme, bonapartisffle, u/tra-roj'a/fcme, orlfanisme, b/anquiswe, socialism and republicanism?[7] These ideologies were not always easily distinguishable. Bonapartism, for example, blended rightand left-wing elements into an imperial style, foreign adventures and populist grandiosity. Republicanism varied greatly. Liberal republicans respected the will of Ie but feared social disruption. Democrats were sensitive to popular susceptibilities and less afraid of disruption. Republican social reformers, on the other hand, idealized populism. Each faction refused to be dominated by the others. These divisions in turn contributed to the formation of yet more splinters. All the while, counter-revolutionaries, socialists and, later, communists alternatively assumed the protest role. Opposition groups rarely formulated solutions to problems. Typically, they attempted to do just what AD later tried: paralyse public life and discredit the establishment. Political, social and economic problems were supposed to be solved by a central authority[7], as they were to have been under die old monarchy.

The spectacle itself is part of the whole drama of French authority, for the leader’s act is performed in a way that perpetuates nonparticipation - both because of his own way of turning the show into a monologue addressed to the whole people, instead of channeling the structured participation of his supporters cither in totalitarian or in democratic Tace-to-face* organizations, and because his insolent ‘personal power’ confirms his adversaries in their own purely negative association and in their distrust of strong leadership?[4]’

Modernization exerted a profound influence on political behaviour by spawning fundamental social and ideological differences. Throughout the nineteenth century, groups supported regimes on the basis of social changes that they made. Institutions were always fragile because "social consensus was not enough - a political consensus was missing; there was no agreement either on the objectives for which political power is to be used, or on the procedures through which disputes over such objectives can be resolved*.[20] Leadership and national authority fluctuated between periods of "routine’ authority, deadlock and immobility. If inertia developed, it was typically surmounted by a charismatic political hero who articulated a new consensus. Ironically, the mutable political culture was not as fragile as institutions and governments. Attitudes towards politics were unaffected by the many reorganizations of public life. The rationalist activism of political groups and France’s geographic location provided interior and exterior pressures that prevented a complete paralysis of public life. Further complicating the scenario, post-1789 ideologies coexisted with pre-revolutionary Roman legal, Catholic, feudal and absolutist traditions. Monarchists and republicans agreed that an interventionist state should safeguard France’s international stature. Since it established a minimal consensus and divided society less than other regimes, republicanism was slowly consolidated as the dominant public ideology. A republican regime excluded fewer groups and so alleviated the impact of alienated sectors that could seek revenge on incumbents. On the positive side, all of these influences endowed the state with historical flexibility (since alternatives existed) and structured the revolutionary-counterrevolutionarydispute:

all of nineteenth-century French history could be considered as the history of a struggle between the Revolution and the Restoration, through certain episodes that occurred in 1815, 1830, 1848, 1851, 1870, the Commune and 16 May 1877. Only the victory of the republicans over monarchists at the beginning of the Third Republic conclusively signified the victory' of the Revolution throughout the country.[21]

Because they viewed regimes as imperfect preludes to authentic revolution or counter-revolution, many participants were profoundly suspicious of authority and jealous of individual rights. Although society' was highly stable and the state powerfully centralized, popular discontent occasionally culminated in upheaval:

conflicts between individuals in a group or between groups will be much less resolved than stifled, "arbitrated’, perhaps temporarily assuaged, and quite likely perpetuated, by resort to higher authority'.

When protest occurs, it often expresses the same institutional intolerance of conflict in reverse, through demands for radical and definitive settlement or through dreams of frictionless harmony.[22]

These divisions had long-term effects on the political culture in which AD later developed. The left is still divided between libertarian and egalitarian interpretations of socialism. The radical egalitarianism that influenced AD is most directly associated with Auguste Blanqui. The rise of blamjuisme under the Second Empire set a significant precedent:

What was important for Blanqui was to take power and impose revolution on the rest of France through a Parisian dictatorship. To achieve this, he did not count on the working class at all since he did not judge it mature enough, but rather on a team of professional revolutionaries, devoted body and soul to the Cause; the labouring classes would then become the support for this revolutionary dictatorship, which would apply communist principles and spread them abroad.[23]

Repeated alternation between empire, restoration, constitutional monarchy and republic produced many political models. From 1789 to 1880, controversies over institutions and values repeatedly led to violence. Regimes were established in reaction to their predecessor:

During the nineteenth century, each new regime fundamentally repudiated its predecessor, set itself up on its debris and drew its legitimacy from this rejection - even if, by doing so, it referred itself to the regime before the preceding as in a game of leap-frog: the Restoration with the old regime, the Second Republic with the Convention, Napoleon III with the Empire, the Third Republic with the French Revolution/[4]

The 1789 revolution generated ideologies that still resonate in national political life. the most important ideological product of 1789,

was hn effect the party of the French Revolution... A radical was one who professed a loyalty towards the French Revolution that was analogous to that of royalists for their king*.[25] The Jacobins used the nation as a new political symbol. Under their influence, Trance has ideas as a means of expression and sign while under the king it had persons, whether physical or moral, as its means of expression and sign ... The French nation is a missionary nation, bearing a message/^ The nation was a symbol of political unity, rights and equality that replaced the ancient link between the monarch and people. The nation placed the people above monarchical privileges based on region, class, occupation, religion and economics. The Jacobins were egalitarian, individualist and rationalist: ‘the real Jacobin can be recognized since, from time to time, he says to himself: “I am clearly the only pure one”?[27] By using the people and nation, the Jacobins anchored nationalism and republicanism in public life. The nationalist view of language, custom and religion transformed traditional divisions into foci for unity. The revolutionaries used the symbol of the nation to rally the population to defend France against foreign invasion. In doing so, they also broadened their legitimacy: ‘the Revolution started by preaching fraternity among peoples, and a common crusade against wicked governments . . . [but). . . ended, however, by confining true fraternity to Frenchmen and French subjects’?[8] Jacobin universalism soon conflated humanity with the nation, 1789 with republicanism, and tied revolutionary ideals to a historical state. To replace social rank and productive or territorial associations, the Jacobins organized clubs that spread republican and nationalist ideas: ‘learned societies conflicted with natural or interest groups insofar as men met there to discuss, criticize, stir ideas, act through ideas*.[29] They launched a pan-European revolutionary crusade against oppressive aristocracies in the name of equality, liberty and fraternity.

Like Jacobinism, socialism joined the French ideological constellation after 1789. Socialist thought was strongly affected by the idea that the revolution evinced the inevitable rise of the masses. Saint-Just said socialism introduced ‘happiness ... a new idea in Europe’.[30] Jacobinism and socialism combined into an egalitarianism that advocated ‘a minimum of happiness for everyone, the potential for everyone to know those goods proper to human existence’.[31] The clash between this socialist egalitarianism and traditionalism placed religious and metaphysical quarrels at the centre of public life.

The socialist ideal is never exhausted by the realization of a particular end, while radical ideals underwent a crisis that still continues as a result: neither is the Christian ideal exhausted by a particular success, such as the life of a saint . .. While radicalism seeks to more or less peacefully eliminate religion, socialism aspires to replace it.[32]

The disestablishment of Catholicism accompanied the articulation of secular government principles and pushed several groups into a counterrevolutionary stance?[3] The ideological, institutional and educational struggles that ensued from the loss of consensus in 1789 were a pattern that later conditioned AD’s attitude towards political action and the system as a whole?[4]

77?£ classic French regime: 77?e Third and Fourth Republics

The Third Republic expressed the classical post-1789 political balance: institutions were accepted as a workable compromise. However, the regime was nor based on a viable consensus. The threat of revolutionary revision was ‘provisionally’ suspended and the Third Republic became the most long-lived post-revolutionary regime. Deeply rooted in political, social and cultural attitudes, political institutions coalesced the haute bourgeoisie^ lower middle class artisans, shopkeepers and peasantry. All of these groups favoured pre-industrial values and were averse to ‘modernist’ techniques and pragmatism?* However, the coalition was ill-adapted to urban industrialism. It resisted economically based decision-making, viewed work as a social activity, and preserved values such as the family, thrift, historically accumulated prestige and individualism. As a result, new technology was adopted reluctantly, labour-intensive methods were favoured and industry concentrated on the production of luxury goods. The new industrial labour force and bourgeoisie were pushed into opposition to the regime. They aroused the establishment’s fears of losing interests, positions, ‘old freedoms’ and ‘inherent rights’?[7]

To minimize change and avoid potential upheavals, Third Republic political institutions restricted the executive, excluded socio-economic alternatives and precluded dominance by any single parry. Hierarchy and political immobilisme[3]* were masked by equalitarian rhetoric. Plebiscites perpetuated a myth of the people and focused attention on change. The repeated resolution of crises fed a belief that the regime, though imperfect, was better than the available alternatives. At the pinnacle of power, charismatic figures periodically addressed monologues to the nation and perpetuated norms of non-participation:

the leader, an outsider who breaks in when the routine has broken down and the rituals have crumbled, has the double prestige of rebellion and prowess; he is the man who reasserts individual exploits after and against the impersonal, anonymous greyness of routine authority ?[9]

Counter-revolutionaries and the extreme left continually attempted to upset the Third Republic social equilibrium?[0] Intellectuals viewed revolution and the progression of national consciousness as principles that governed development of collective life. Under the influence of socialism and nationalism, political thought became a ‘quest for new general systems ... the recapturing of master}' over history by finding its intellectual key’?' Intellectual protest centred on universal human goals:

The republican tradition, even and especially when it wants to integrate modernity; in fact more or less consciously refuses the break that Anglo-Saxons entirely acknowledge. We fully saw this concerning political forms: the principle of government by the people was always superimposed over simple 'guarantees’ of individual rights/[2]

Opposition attitudes also reflected immobilhme. Direct parliamentary conflict was rare since the concerned parties were either physically absent or entrenched in maximal positions. Long negotiations that entailed questioning positions and compromise were associated with 'selling out’. Deadlocks were not resolved by recourse to principles but by appeals to charismatic authoritarians (such as Boulanger, MacMahon, Clemenceau and Petain):

conflicts are referred to a higher central authority . . . power is delegated to it so that the drama of face-to-face personal relations can be avoided bin only in order that, and as long as, the exercise of power from above remains impersonal and curtailed both in scope (subject-matter) and intensity (means of action) by general rules, precedents, and inhibitions.[43]

In many respects, the regime was profoundly anti-democratic and authoritarian. The episodic character of routine and influence of charisma hampered the development of political movements based on mass mobilization. Many social groups remained on the political fringe until the early 1930s. At the same time, the differentiation of behaviour into degrees of compromise or opposition to the regime gave resilience to the Third Republic political culture. To this day, the French distrust definitive solutions and 'managerial’ government.

Crisis, as a privileged means of bringing about change, may indeed be considered as the basic cultural trait conditioning the Frenchman’s favourite style of collective action. In the strategy[7] of human relations to which the French are accustomed, this style is characterized by a deep and constant opposition between the individual and the group: the group is perceived and experienced as an organ for defence and protection whose activities can only be negative, while it is for the individual himself to find new means of self-assertion/

Only on foreign policy issues did the Third Republic successfully establish a consensus that synthesized national history'. This was possible because all groups had 'the same identifying belief - that France was a pace-setter for the rest of the world’/[5] Foreign policy was based on a Roman ideal that also affected the old regime: belief that military' power and extent of national territory reflected influence and greatness* Military defeat and annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 provoked deep uneasiness, fear of Germany and led to alliances as a way to ensure territorial integrity and prestige. After the First World War, the French even supported appeasement, a British Ton[1] policy that contradicted national interests, due to fatigue and reluctance to prepare for another war. The ensuing disaster ended the Third Republic and threw France’s international credibility into serious doubt.

In setting up the post-war Fourth Republic, the French were obsessed by restoring their credibility and independence of action. The principles that underlay the new republic thus reacted both to Vichy and the Third Republic. The constitution attempted to block the charismatic embodiment of power by a new Petain by making the Assemblee Nationale the centre of government and by instituting universal suffrage (absent in the Third Republic)*[46] Nationalism was discredited as a political symbol and replaced by democracy. The right was tainted by collaboration even though the wartime resistance movement acknowledged that the Nazis exploited a mostly passive nation and that 1944 was a human, not French, victory. The once marginal PCF embodied resistance and liberation. Unity was provided by de Gaulle. Even though he left direct political activity in 1946, condemned party machinations and claimed he was external to political games, de Gaulle founded a powerful right-wing movement. The SFIO (Section franpiise de I'biternatimiale ouvriere- French section of the Workers’ International), MRP repiMaiinpopulaire-Popular Republican

Movement, a small progressive Catholic party) and PCF governed in coalition from 1944 to 1946. This tripartisme*' declined as the national emergency faded and political in-fighting and US anti-communist pressure grew. Under the leadership of Guy Mollet, the SFIO opposed PCF Stalinism and allied with the non-Gaullist right. The centre-Ieft MRP wanted socio-economic change but was constrained by its anti-Marxist progressive Catholic electorate/

The French state meanwhile urgently needed new institutions, public support, systematic reconstruction policies and a consistent foreign policy. Socio-political tension rose over inadequate housing, transport, poor access to higher education, weak unions, uneven modernization/'[1] and a political system that disenfranchised a large minority. It grew throughout the 1950s. The absence of foreign policy consensus made France dependent on US military and financial patronage. Many transformations were started in this period: (1) decolonization; (2) new military—civilian relations; (3) renewed nationalism; and (4) development of consensually based institutions* New policies focused on economic reform, the EEC. force de frappe/" industrial and urban modernization, and international economic competition. Renault was nationalized. The PCF and CGT {Confederation Generate du Travail - General Workers’ Confederation) participated in planning. The CNPF (Conceit National du Patronat Francis - National Council of French Employers), a pre-war centre of anti-unionism and anti-modernization sentiment, was discredited by collaboration. However, conservative and liberal Third Republic politicians rapidly upstaged the ‘modernizers’ and immobilisme returned in the 1950s. Traditional business thus benefited from Marshall Plan investment while state sectors failed to lead development. These factors confirmed extreme-left views that nothing had fundamentally changed and representative government simply masked capitalist domination.

After 1924, Third Republic politicians had routinely ruled by decree to circumvent conservative Senate majorities. The practice was effective but discredited democratic institutions. Fourth Republic institutions were designed to overcome this problem by ending factionalism and reinvigorating part}’ competition. Unfortunately, aside from Pierre Mendes-France’s government (June 1954-Fcbruary 1955), inertia persisted and right-left competition did not lead to consensus. A ‘regime of parties’ favoured parliamentary intrigue over national interests. It generated a diffuse and inconsistent authority that depended on alliances: 25 governments rose and fell between 1946 and 1958?[1] Cabinets were unable to concur over problems and solutions.[52] High-priority policies were shelved to presen e coalitions. The Fourth Republic became vulnerable to discontent, especially after the extreme-right re-emerged in the 1950s.[5]' By selectively supporting or resisting re forms, a number of social sectors effectively sabotaged institutions, Army leaders, for example, were generally republican, but believed decolonization threatened national prestige. The prospect of withdrawal from Algeria mortally wounded the Fourth Republic. Army traditionalists believed that they had to protect civilians from terrorism in Algeria and provide balance for domestic instability, incoherence and crisis. Contradictory government policy, lack of alternatives and cabinet and parliamentary fiascos hardened their resolve. Politicians followed two contradictory paths:

One is the war matched with repression: abroad, it leads to Suez while domestically it brings them to tolerate torture. The other response is the search for a diplomatic solution that does not call itself one and that, from the corridors of the UN to the ‘good offices’ of the US, passing by Rabat and Tunis, seems bereft of a clearly defined objective?[4]

The public feared a neo-Francoist coup and petainisme^ but also ‘drastic changes in France’s economic and international positions’[56] to accommodate a diminished international stature, colonial crisis and US indifference.

The Fifth Republic

Initially fashioned on the basis of de Gaulle’s criticism of the previous two republican regimes, the Fifth Republic was consciously designed to resolve the contradictory tendencies in post-1789 French political history. This effort explains why Fifth Republic institutions aroused the long-term hostility[7] of both extreme-left and extreme-right groups. In particular, it mixed elements that both groups opposed - an ‘authoritarian’ presidency and parliarnentarianism. The regime also explicitly attempted to polarize political stances and forces, a factor that explains the vehemence of protest movements such as^cAfwk'and the FN. Aside from propelling de Gaulle into power, ‘the two fundamental purposes that underlay the establishment of the Fifth Republic were most certainly to resolve the Algerian problem and to remake the state’/[7] The new institutions were initially identified with de Gaulle and the Gaullist movement, and were openly used to weaken the left:

the Gaullists were above all concerned with establishing institutions and procedures which could be both efficient and autonomous. Their critique of parliamentarianism was essentially that the Third and Fourth Republics had been too divided and weak to control the production, consumption and international functions which the state needed to assume out of necessity in an advanced capitalist society' operation within a complex w[r]orld economy.[515]

Only after the Algerian war ended in 1962 did direct presidential elections incorporate mass participation into political institutions. Legitimacy was then enhanced by separation of powers, clarification of presidential authority and establishment of a Cwtseil cousfiuui&tif/e/F Before this, it was unclear whether the Fifth Republic was a personal vehicle or hybrid: Tor years this constitution was the object of gloss “exegeses” that reduced it neither to a parliamentary nor to a presidential regime’.*[0] The regime was unusual in French political history since it sought ‘to transform neither human nature nor society'. The consensus included the main leftand right-wing political groups, excluding only extremes’/[1] In one sense, the new republic was orlearuste (a French version of the nineteenth-century British political system) because it blended institutional primacy: ‘an intermediary between a limited monarchy and the classic parliamentary regime, of which the 1830 Charter and Louis-Philippe d’Orleans are a very good example’.[62] Most significantly, the new constitution drew political conflict off the street. After two centuries of struggle, the regime institutionalized right-left coexistence by making

theoretical ‘cohabitation’ possible. De Gaulle, in 1964, rejected a pure presidential system because (a) in France, it was likely to lead to a paralysis of power, to an insoluble deadlock between President and Parliament, and (b) it would in fact result in a weak President, capable of governing only by yielding to the ‘will of the parties[1]/[5]

The left was pushed out of power for 20 years due to de Gaulle’s charisma and its association with the Fourth Republic* The PCF weathered the shock relatively well[64] but the SFIO, Radicals and MRP fell apart/’[5] The PSU (Parti socialist? unifie - Unified Socialist Party) claimed the left-wing contes tataire™ heritage, intellectually challenging the regime and mediating between the mainstream and extra-parliamentary left/[7] All the while, the ncw[f] institutions decreased revolutionary rhetoric, parfiamentarianism, policy paralysis and suspicion.

De Gaulle and his supporters have attempted to control and channel these processes of political change in two ways* The first of these has been to continue to attack the foundations of the traditional system; the second has been to construct partial alternatives especially geared to take advantage of the changing circumstances/*

All political parties changed after the Asscmblee Nationale was weakened by new legislative procedures, votes of confidence and the end of parliamentary supremacy. The left’s revolutionary orientations diminished after it made a strong 1965 presidential challenge and gains in the 1967 legislative elections* However, left-wing reformism helped spark gauchisme, an extreme-left movement that rejected compromise with Gaullism/[9] introduced new issues (feminism, environmental

ism, regionalism and gay rights) and was embraced by Maoist, Trotskyist and anarchist organizations: 'multiple, protean, ready to confront each other, each incarnating the true revolution in relation to which the others are traitors’.[76] However, the Fifth Republic proved able to integrate discontent: contraception, abortion, urban reform, open government, decentralization, regionalization and telecommunication reforms soon became mainstream policies.[71]

ultimately failed because the French people rejected classbased politics and revolution. In their place, the Fifth Republic offered political alternatives in the late 1960s and 1970s. The change was soon reflected in party structures. The SFIO and Left Radicals merged into the PS. Jacques Chirac’s followers formed the Rassetnblemenl pour la Republique - RPR - Rally for the Republic), which was ideologically and organizationally inspired by Gaullism. The Union pour la DArwcratie Francis? (UDF - Union for French Democracy) coalesced liberals and the centre-right.[72] These changes to part}' organization complemented post-war modernization by altering the party system, public institutions, and foreign and defence policy?[3] The evolution of the international economy now limited unilateral domestic policy choices and made consensus an indispensable base from which to secure national economic well-being?[4] This is why the new multipartisan Gaullist consensus, by minimizing the role of parties, soothed a public that was disillusioned by 1940 and the Fourth Republic, By defining national goals, de Gaulle expressed a widespread view that the Third Republic style of parliamentarianism, 'floating on a deeply divided people, in the middle of a terribly dangerous universe, revealed itself in no condition to ensure continuity in public affairs[1].[75] The widespread public desire for continuity was thus integrated into political life as never before since 1789. De Gaulle's system forced parties into blocs:

The power and stability of government was built on the existence of a disciplined majority in parliament that would remain in place until the deputies’ mandates expired. Possessing the Executive and controlling the Legislative, it draws its power from electors and returns it to their hands in the next ballot. Having the means to act, it cannot evade the responsibility for results/'

In the Fifth Republic, parties must collaborate to capture the centre of power: the presidency." The system is a ‘separation of powers with a strong head of state who is an arbiter’, a 'parliamentary regime that is finally made to function correctly’.[7]* Electoralism and the promise of power thus discipline parties: 'the originality of the Fifth Republic is therefore equally to have sketched out the structure of an opposition that, on the eve of some elections, could be thought to be about to take power’. ' As the left realized it had a chance of winning power, its systematic opposition to Gaullism gave way to a strategy of electoral competition.

Unlike the Third and Fourth Republics, the Fifth Republic is based on a separation of powers. It has been called 'a new form of "mixed government”, for which, from Aristotle to Montesquieu, political philosophy has long wished’/" Although the National Assembly is modelled on the British House of Commons, ‘government does not originate in Parliament’/[1] The president appoints government leaders, but retains legislative and cabinet prerogatives: ‘The game of parliamentary formations is not in itself so different from that which it was under preceding regimes; but the source of power is no longer in the game and this difference, deliberate and imposed in all details by the 1958 constitution, is absolutely essential.’**

Unlike their predecessors under previous republican regimes, directly elected Fifth-Republic presidents arc the centre of political life. The office is

placed 'above the parties’ and empowered to represent effectively the unity rather than the diversity of the national community ... the text of the new constitution puts the office of the president first among the organs of government, immediately after the tribute to the principle of popular sovereignty/[3]

The president 'heads’ government and the nation, sets policy orientations, but does not directly govern/[4] The office retains exclusive prerogatives over defence and foreign policy to guard 'national interests’. To prevent partisan politics from overriding national interest, de Gaulle injected institutions with a strong dose of authoritarianism. The system thus blends bonapartisme (a populist mix of Louis XIV’s traditionalism and Jacobinism) and orleaniste constitutional monarchism. The president is able to set a public 'mood’ while cabinet defines concrete policy. Although presidents are in principle 'non-partisan[1], they effectively have the prerogative to exclude certain issues from political debate. Finally, for the first time in French history, institutions are guided by a 'Constitutional Council that ensures that legislators respect the essential principles’.[85] Created to prevent rule by decree and protect citizens, the Council is a move away from Roman-Napoleonic legal traditions in which rights arc subordinate to law. Under the Fifth Republic, ‘the law loses its sacred character and constitutes a category of legal acts’5[1]

Due to its authoritarian aspects, the left feared that the new regime would make de Gaulle a new Napoleon, Boulanger, MacMahon or Petain. However, since the left could only systematically oppose de Gaulle by cooperating with die traditionalist right, its daily actions often contradicted rhetoric: 'the socialists are in principle in the opposition, but the General’s [de Gaulle’s] Algerian policy wins them over rather ofren’/[T] Pushed into an opposition 'ghetto’, left-wing ideology stagnated: tit views itself as hope. In fact, hope is always a bit messianic.’[815] Any opportunity to exercise government responsibility that would have moderated ideology was excluded by Gaullist centralization/[9] Despite this, the left gradually came to accept institutions as 'neutral’ mechanisms for social, political and economic change and evolved into ‘forces for proposal, support or antiestablishment activity, electoral shift workers more than the centre of power. The contrast with previous republics, whose history[7] is confused with that of party doctrines, alliances, ruptures and setbacks, is profound.’[90] The left realized that compromise was the only way to counter Gaullist charisma and the General’s ability to provide the stability' that the French so sorely wanted:

De Gaulle’s independent foreign policies attracted much tacit leftwing support, especially within the Communist Party . Gaullism also appealed to a quite different left-wing strain which could be called the 'modernizers’. De Gaulle and progressive left-wing technocrats had similar approaches to the problems of nationalization of industry, state economic plannings and economic growth?[1]

The opposition parties were for a long time only able to unite temporarily over specific issues. The force defrappe for example, was an

occasion for the crystallization of all the different oppositions to Gaullism. Firstly, it mobilized all those who were opposed to the atomic weapon: at the same time, the scrupulous left and the financial right. The scrupulous left joined this group because atomic weapons and atomic disintegration are not very pleasant perspectives for humanity[7]. The financial right opposed the force because it is extremely expensive. It also mobilized those opposed to the general's policy of non-integration: therefore the opposition of all ‘Europeans’. And finally, in a more general manner, the force mobilized the opposition of those who were anti-Gaullists and against the Elysee’s policies?[2]

The Fifth Republic pushed the poujadistes* and extreme right military' that plagued the Fourth Republic to the political fringe. Algerian independence moved the army to France and removed the physical base for the anti-republican military faction. After this, military[7] reforms encouraged a technological elite (as in the force de frappe) over conventional forces. Aristocratic army leaders were replaced by pro-Gaullist ones. Several other sources of traditional extreme-right strength were weakened after church-state relations were codified, financial aid granted to religious schools, fiscal reform increased economic competition and the moderate right consolidated into a Gaullist party.

One of the principal bases upon which de Gaulle forged a consensus was through a type of political philosophy that articulated a 'national vocation’. Uis idea was to provide a foreign policy that would diffuse the dangers of revolution, Americanization and communism. De Gaulle believed that a state-based world order would soon render blocs and alliances obsolete. His international policies strove to sidestep the bipolar post-war world order by concentrating on decolonization, development of French nuclear capabilities, the EEC, ties to underdeveloped states, detente and independence from the US. The international commitments that were to ensure French greatness included a military presence in Africa, special ties to Quebec and enhancement of la francophonie. Traditional anti-German nationalism was replaced by pragmatism, trans - Rhine rapprochement and scepticism over US efforts to 'manage’ conflicts.

The strategy reinterpreted the system of foreign alliances that the French turned to in order to offset German militarism after 1871. De Gaulle believed that Anglo-American entente was now marginalizing France internationally. France’s exclusion from post-war conferences, UK-US nuclear cooperation, Roosevelt’s animosity (coupled with a proposal to dismember France) and failure to neutralize Germany seemed to substantiate his view in the public’s eyes.

After the Second World War, the Soviet Union was regarded by a large majority in France as the primary 'liberator’ of Europe. The Americans, on the other hand, were feared and resented ., . [this attitude] continued to hold good on the left until the mid-1970s and the end of the Vietnam war*

Realizing that he could exploit left-wing anti-Americanism, de Gaulle argued that the Anglo-Saxon alliance had helped prepare 1940. As an alternative, the EEC would help France counter-balance the superpowers with a regional network. I Ie rejected full EC integration, but developed an entente with Adenauer to serve as the basis from which an internationally active France could secure European stability. Anglo-American collusion was to be offset by Franco-German cooperation: 'if General de Gaulle had a fundamental idea, it was “no integration”. There was a no less fundamental second idea: “no subordination to the United States”.’[95] Nationalism appealed to those on the left who saw the EEC as antisocialist and capitalist.

Left-wing concern centred, as it had since 1871, on Germany, The SFIO advocated integration, European defence and reconciliation with a democratic Germany. The anti-German and nationalist PCF spearheaded an opposition to the EEC that slowly declined under electoral pressure ‘from the virulent denouncement of the United States’ (and, by extension, West Germany’s) hegemonic intentions of the 1950s, to the more subdued and more cooperative approach of the 1970s’?[6] The PCF gradually realized that the EEC might counter US economic muscle and give France some middle-power leverage. The left understood that diplomatic and strategic options were limited and unilateral foreign initiatives even less tenable. Overall, de Gaulle used vanity and economic self-interest to set a foreign policy consensus. He recognized limits by making foreign policy a symbol of Trench autonomy and the accountability of authority' within France, not a permanent threat of disruption’?[7] Above all, de Gaulle exploited a fear of decline. Before 1940, the French believed that their cultural mission was to 'civilize’ colonies rather than exploit them for economic motives. The right viewed colonialism as a natural vocation for die oldest nation-state. The left identified France with 'civilization’. The public believed that France’s ‘superior’ culture was positive and humane until the assumption was swept away in the Algerian struggle. De Gaulle’s vision thus promised to

increase France’s standing in the world, ensure her a minimum of independence and freedom of manoeuvre in her international relationships, shelter her drive for social and economic progress at home, inculcate a sense of national identity’ and national interest in die body politic, reinforce and legitimate the new institutional structures of the 1958 Constitution?*

As part of the vision, Franco-Soviet links were improved in the belief that overlapping ties, rather than increasing the possibilities of conflict, as the Americans believed, would in the long run reduce those possibilities by strengthening the sense of cooperation and political responsibility of individual nation-states with closer proximity to the needs and interests of their own peoples?[4]

Socialists and conservatives knew that detente and an international ‘good guy’ image masked domestic authoritarianism.[10]" Articulated 30 years ahead of its time, die Gaullist ‘expectation that the bipolar international system would crumble, allowing NATO and the Warsaw Pact to disintegrate, was not borne out by events’.[101] Foreign policy ambition was limited by cost. Gaullist defence policy was more successful, especially after left-wing opposition to the force de frappe diminished. While the PCF argued that nuclear weapons threatened humanity[7], class struggle zmrf the USSR, the ‘pacifist’ SFIO thought they were unavoidable. Divergent views, poor military connections and an officer caste hostile to left-wing values hindered development of coherent policy alternatives.[102]

Throughout the 1960s, the Fifth Republic was closely associated to de Gaulle, Only his retirement convincingly demonstrated that the ncw[r] institutions would survive: ‘under de Gaulle, the Fifth Republic was a face; under the presidency of Georges Pompidou, it w as an institution . , . this proved that institutions that had been based on one man’s prestige could function with ordinary personnel’.[103] De Gaulle’s departure accompanied a relative decline in the socialist and nationalist themes prominent in his political language. In the early 1970s, economic expansion overrode other concerns. After Georges Pompidou’s presidency, and despite energy[7] shortages, debt and austerity, it was clear that French political culture had become ‘Gaullist’. De Gaulle’s institutional, defence and foreign policy accomplishments were uncontested. Political compromise replaced regionalism, protest and the disjuncture between society and state. The non-Marxist left formed new alliances to end the right-wing electoral stranglehold. The move was anathema to the traditional extreme left, but Fifth Republic institutions had demonstrated to the public and most participants that they were flexible. Under Mitterrand, the moderate left proved that the regime had room for perceptive, organized and innovative parties of all stripes. The PS managed to galvanize public support over issues that de Gaulle had not solved, A good example is centralization, which gave the nation 'the impression of being subjected ... to an authoritarian bureau-technocracy that takes no or little account of. . . grievances and that experiments in the dark’?[04] The PS thus decentralized and strengthened civil rights after 1981 while accepting and reinforcing de Gaulle’s vision of France. Reserve over Soviet-US arms reductions and lengthy French-EC negotiations over Renault, for example, exhibited a Gaullist concern for national interest and showed the vitality of the ideology of greatness. Repeated reference to a national vocation in the 1989 bicentennial illustrated its importance in Mitterrand’s policies. In fact, Mitterrand succeeded by embracing de Gaulle’s legacy. Without de Gaulle,

France would not have received the capitulation of the Reich and Japan along with the Big Three. France would not have 'special rights’ over Germany. It would not have one of five permanent seats, with the veto it entails, in the UN Security Council ... It would not have a nuclear force. Its army would have probably been incorporated in a European defence community under American command, and it would have some time ago abdicated a large part of its sovereignty to a European confederation.[105]

Political change between right and left was a source of paralysis and acrimony in the Third and Fourth Republics. It encouraged extreme-left and extreme-right dogmatism and violence. AD focused on this tradition rather than examining how attitudes changed under die Fifth Republic. In the 1980s, altemance^ strengthened institutions, and public scepticism of authority declined.[107] Few electors trusted political parties in the 1950s: 'in August 1958, according to an IFOPpoll, 95 per cent of the French said the Fourth Republic worked badly because "governments change too often”, 88 per cent because "there are too many parties in Parliament”?™ In the 1980s, most voters identified with a party?[09] The number of parties fell from 14 to four between 1958 and 1982. The decline w[r]as encouraged by Fifth Republic institutions. Improved administration, an end to immMisfne, public confidence and increased participation also decreased political passivity and led to broad agreement over the functioning of institutions?’[0] After left and right successfully shared power in 1986-88, differentiation by traditional criteria was difficult:

France has experienced in turn Giscard’s Colbertism, Mitterrand’s socialism, Fabius’s pragmatism, and Chirac’s neo-liberalism. This gave birth to a contagious scepticism regarding doctrines and mythologies, totems and taboos. Alteniance has killed off any residual gullibility' about politics.’[11]

Jean-Marie Le Pen and Andre Lajoinie were the only presidential candidates who opposed and consensus in 1988. Neither could

hope towin in an electoral system in which success hinges on incorporation rather than exclusion:

Symbolizing socialism, rhe Republic and a form of humanism, Francois Mitterrand seeks to incorporate individuals into the political process rather than exclude them from it. Jacques Chirac docs this as well, as the inheritor of a very pragmatic form of Gaullism - that is, like that of Georges Pompidou - and as prime minister; so does Raymond Barre by mixing a statesman-like style with a Gaullist temperament and personal references; finally, so does Michel Rocard by personifying a moderate, gradualist and open social democrat. In 1987, the main candidates’ campaigns must appear more civil than military’; no one can cut a figure without exorcising the spectre of an excluding society?[12]

In the 1980s, conciliation replaced aggressive rhetoric. Groups were still jealous, uncooperative, exclusive, and led by charismatic figures. However, the PCF experience demonstrates how inability to compromise threatened to push parties to the fringe. A multipartisan recognition of the international constraints on policy[313] limited differences to style rather than substance. Beyond this, consensus developed over the need for growth, improved quality of life, and an independent foreign policy. The populist and Bonapartist RPR still focused on leadership, law and order and plebiscites, but was an ‘electoral party’ that ‘openly accepts mass democracy, group solidarity, challenges liberal individualism, that is, accepts discipline in order to achieve an objective’.[114] The Gaullist leftism of the PS stressed a strong presidency, weak parliament, coalitions and bloc unity'. Its ‘modernist’ policies centred on state competition, global capital linkages, market economics and a civilizing vocation.[115] National income and social hierarchy were altered by EC integration and global economic pressure. However, the educational issues raised in 1968 (myopic focus on literature, philosophy and history', neglect of technologicalcommercial programmes) and student unrest were unresolved. Riots crippled Jacques Chirac’s presidential ambitions after his government tried to decrease university places and increase educational hierarchy.

Social rigidity was now diluted by economic concerns: ‘the French agree on one point: economic growth is a necessary[1] purpose. Almost nobody, except a minority of intellectuals and gauc/tirte students, challenges this goal.”[1]* The absence of calls for socialism in the late 1980s was striking:

Although there were two million unemployed as opposed to 800,000 at the advent of the Front populaire_y class struggle remained less violent, and workers* patience was greater since they were at the same time less overwhelmed by toil and insecurity, and more conscious of die distance between the desirable and the possible.[117]

The PS advocated a guaranteed annual income and public housing. It only used nationalization to generate investment capital or preserve politically valuable jobs: ‘a comparative analysis ... of the French private and public sectors shows . . . that. . . national control of a large industrial and banking sector is indispensable to ensure harmonious development’

Despite the fact that it emerged in a political culture whose norms, values and institutions were widely accepted, AD understood that consensus has traditionally been episodic and tied to charisma. At the end of the Mitterrand era, the validity[7] of its view is increasingly evident The PS, for example, is now divided. Moreover, in spite of the massive PS losses in the legislative, regional and cantonal elections, the right-wing opposition is not an entirely coherent alternative. The ‘traditional right* (RPR and UDF) could still be seriously challenged by the FNJ[19] Since 1976, the once omnipotent RPR has lost both its dominance over the system and its hold over the right-wing electorate. Adding to these setbacks, the 1986-88 Chirac administration was a serious failure. In the 1990s, racist incidents and anti-immigration sentiment encouraged lepenisme.' The FN protest movement has attracted rightand left-wing minorities that also oppose the consensus. As a result, the right has to fight to retain FN voters. The FN has taken over the protest role once occupied byffladnites. Unlike the latter, the FN has successfully exploited themes such as fear of instability[7] in eastern Europe.[121] Another example of how consensus has affected the system can be seen in the PCF. In 1984, losses to the PS, discomfort with ministerial responsibility and alienated militants eased the PCF out of government. Its traditional electorate subsequently abstained or backed the FN[122] and the party developed serious internal divisions. In October 1989, for example, former minister Charles Fiterman openly demanded new policies and led a refondateur dissent movement that exposed the isolation of PCF leaders. Despite this, Georges Marchais said that the Eastern bloc had an ‘overall positive record’, minimized its ‘crisis of development, and claimed that ‘the capitalist crisis is a systems crisis’.[123]

Rank-and-file outrage over PCF ties to Nicolae Ceausescu did little to change the part}because:

no ideological debate whatsoever could emerge within it [the PCF] . ,. the part}[7] no longer has an ideology. Perestroika provokes real fundamental debates in which ‘Brezhnevians’ openly confronted ‘Gorbachevians’ and vice versa within sectarian or tiny communist parties such as those in Portugal or West Germany; but perestroika entered the PCF as into a vacuum. The departure of militants at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s explains why this occurred. The replacement of seriously trained leaders who were sometimes very partial to the Soviet model with young members having an uncertain political background and who do not view the Soviet Union as a reference point greatly facilitates Mr Marchals* task.[124]

The above examples indicate that part}' fragmentation will continue as the Mitterrand years end. However, the characteristics of the postMitterrand years arc not yet clear. Le Pen and Jacques Delors are the only truly charismatic figures on the political scene.

In the 1 980s_t the PS ‘modernist’ vocation centred on US technology, marketing and management: ‘a certain celebration of efficiency and economic modernization but nothing more’.[125] Mitterrand deftly adapted Gaullist grandeur to altered circumstances.[32]'[1] Foreign policy continued to focus on mediation between the USSR and US. The changes in Europe after 1989 brought the traditional concern for stability to the fore and made NATO ties even more valuable. An independent Third World policy, ties to former colonies, la framophonie, Franco-German entente and criticism of US foreign policy have less international impact. German reunification and EC integration may ensure stability, but further diminish French influence. The result has been a more ‘Atlantic[1] defence posture.[127]

A crucial difference from de Gaulle’s presidency was the decline of heroic politics under Mitterrand and its replacement by a ‘modernist* symbolic and policy consensus.[1211] While the opposition regularly denied governments legitimacy in the Third and Fourth Republics, only the FN resorted to such terms, Mitterrand argued that the public has to choose between extreme-right traditionalism and a ‘European’ France. He realized that the FN ‘embarrasses the right and, because of this, serves the left, which does not hesitate to use the juxtaposition to allege that there is “growing convergence” between the extreme right and right’.[129] By allowing the incorporation of most ideologies into institutional politics, the regime decisively altered protest and violence. Large parties are still attacked by groups like the FN and ecologists at a local, regional, national and European level, but the protest 'function’ has shifted. The extreme right has appropriated issues that previously galvanized the extreme left: immigration; foreign policy; domestic priorities; defence; and neocolonialism. Protest moved off the street. Violence became inappropriate because institutions were seen as responsive. Both the FN and AD responded to a decline in ideological politics. AD was motivated by egalitarian communism, fear of an authoritarian mainstream left, and opposition to capitalist-directed socio-economic change. Like the^^/mto, AD believed that the parliamentary left served wealth, privilege, the US and multinational corporations. Like the FN, it opposed Americanization, the EC, NATO and a changing society. Unlike the FN, AD did not move its protest into the political mainstream, where the former began a rhetorically violent challenge to the establishment. AD remained on the fringe and tried to use utopian egalitarianism for revolutionary ends. It charged that the PS ‘sell-out’ justified its violence. By labelling compromise 'cooptation’, AD recalled the traditional egalitarian communism and revolutionary radicalism that have long been present in national politics J[30] However, AD emerged in a political context in which

change occurred in an institutional framework on a regular basis, as the product of system mechanics, not the negation of the system. It was decided on two occasions by the electorate. It thus encourages institutionalization by allowing the regime to belong to everyone. The regime is detached from a conjunctural majority and a given idea of how it should work,[131]

The discussion below demonstrates that AD’s concerns were contradictory. They were anachronistic, but anticipated many mainstream issues. Overall, AD’s effort to draw on the extreme-left traditions set in 1789 and the Third, Fourth and Fifth republics gave its action an anachronistic quality. Unlike previous revolutionary factions, AD’s references to tradition revealed its social and political isolation.

3 The Elusive Formula: Gauchistne, May 1968 and Action directe

AD drew its belief that socialism could be achieved through an armed struggle under the leadership of a revolutionary vanguard from gauchisme and the ‘near revolution[5] of May 1968. The latter event in particular spawned an anarchist-tainted Maoism that inspired AD. Gauchisme was a variety of non-conformist extra-parliamentary extreme leftism that appeared in France in the 1960s and 1970s. Its proponents were distinguished by their focus on what were then new social issues, opposition to traditional forms of organization and hierarchy (especially the established socialist and communist movements and the example of the USSR), a focus on youth as a social vanguard, and advocacy of direct action techniques, including violence. Gauchisme was the dominant French extreme-left protest movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Its heterogeneity' was a reaction to the mainstream left’s homogeneity, sectarianism and ineffectiveness* Gauchiste ideological and organizational ecumenicism expressed an effort to rearticulate left-wing principles in new social conditions*

The gauchiste movement did not have a uniform or straightforward impact on the French left, in part because the ideological and organizational precedents for gauchisme had long existed on the extreme left. The Trotskyists in the Organisation communiste intemationaliste (OCI - Internationalist Communist Organization), for example, had previously espoused nonconformity. Although it also took on the burden of Trotskyist legitimacy and orthodoxy, the OCI opposed Soviet communism and the PCF before gauchisme appeared. Other Trotskyists in Fotx (VO - Workers’ Voice) also severely criticized Soviet socialism but were less harsh on the PCF. VO[1] was directly influenced by Bolshevism, clandestine activity and the East Europeans who founded it in 1938* They considered French Trotskyism social democratic and faction-ridden. VO agitated in Renault plant unions after the war. Another group of nonconformists was the Trotskyist Ltgue amwiuniite revolutionnaire (LCR - Revolutionary Communist League), created when Pierre Frank gathered post-war PCF dissidents to prepare for a new conflagration* The group saw some advantages in the Soviet system and believed that the PCF had some independence. Together, these Trotskyist groups perpetuated longstanding extreme-left traditions of nonconformity. They were one foundation ofgaudiisme in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

In the 1950s, other varieties of left-wing dissent fed on widespread dissatisfaction with the parliamentary left. The SFIO government adopted policies for industrial restructuring, economic modernization and retention of colonies by military force. A scattering of organizations and individuals objected that this accommodated capitalism and contradicted left-wing principles. The Algerian conflict then blurred traditional ideological divisions between the SFIO and right-wing parties because the war was not

a 'pure’ left-right confrontation. Many prestigious representatives of the secular and republican left, who served beyond measure in the Front pvpu/ai re- Spain, the resistance, anti-Stalinism - fully took up the cause of maintaining Algeria in the French Republic from the first day for Jacobin, patriotic and universalist motives?

The Algerian War devastated the SFIO and the left as a whole. The SFIO was pushed into opposition after de Gaulle’s coup d'etat and never regained credibility. Without credible anti-Gaullist rivals from 1958 to 1965, the extreme left began to articulate the growing frustration and rebelliousness of youth. A mass of young people believed that the mainstream left-wing parties did not represent their needs and aspirations. Despite his relative success in the 1965 presidential campaign? young leftwingers were suspicious of Mitterrand because he had been an SFIO interior minister during the Algerian War. The mainstream left moreover lacked the charisma and policies needed to attract supporters of radical political and social change. Its momentum was again lost after 1965 since ‘no cogent issue appeared to cement more firmly the coalition of left-wing parties’? However, a number of issues were available. Gaullism brought economic growth and political stability, but not social and cultural flexibility. The young were crowded into poor education facilities and faced dismal employment prospects upon graduation. Their discontent lent itself to ideologically radical alternatives.

Not only the SFIO facilitated the rise ofga«fAw?^. The PCF was the largest left-wing party in the 1950s and 1960s. It inadvertently encouraged non-conformist youth organizations in the early Fifth Republic by refusing to discuss Stalinism and international communist pluralism, issues that interested young leftists. The PCF wanted to preserve hierarchy and party unity: ‘in fact, from 1961 until the beginning of the 1970s, the French communist party held “Stalinism” in check’.[5] Party leaders were uncomfortable with Khrushchev’s repudiation of Stalin, a leader they had loyally followed. When Khrushchev demanded a denunciation, they were confused and avoided debate as much as possible; ‘it was necessary to condemn the unworthy father without renouncing either his blood or his breed*? The 1962 Sino-Soviet split exacerbated patty' tensions and encouraged w[r]hat became French Maoism. Chinese fidelity to Stalin and charges that deStalinization was elitist attracted the support of some party members. The PCF was caught between a double commitment to Stalin and the CPSU. Many members saw Stalin as a symbol of the wartime resistance movement and Soviet anti-Nazi struggle in spite of his errors. They thought that Chinese Maoism w as more faithful to communist tradition since it in some ways resembled the wartime resistance movement: it was republican, condemned party politics, distrusted parliamentaiy democracy, and viewed capitalism as a betrayal. Maoists tried to exploit a faith in revolution, national self-sufficiency and revolutionary unity that had been strong in the left-wing resistance movement.[7] They argued that capitalism abandoned French communists during the war in the same way that it threw Stalin to the Nazis. Franco-Chinese friendship associations spread these views in the PCF and went on to form the Parti communiste marxisteleniniste de France (PCMLF - Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of France) after 1964.

Together, the SFIO and PCF pushed groups of restive politicized youth into organizations like the Union nationale des etudiants fran^ais (UNEF - National Union of French University Students). The UNEF had marshalled a dynamic student opposition movement to the Algerian War and gave coherency to a disparate group of ‘communist militia irregulars, unruly children of a Church in permanent crisis, radicalized Protestants, Jews who were living the impossible mounting of the Shoah, but had no words to express it’/ The anti-war movement structured criticism of the establishment left and provided organizational experience. The UNEF helped students organize a legitimate pressure group, [£]a political actor capable of intervening on the basis of a methodical analysis of“each lived reality of all citizens’”? The UNEF was ‘the first organization that dared defy de Gaulle after the shock of 1958’Unions and the media (especially newspapers) gave it support. The UNEF’s influence declined after the war was settled in 1962. However, its articulation of a national moral conscience set a precedent for student activism. The once orthodox and subservient Union des etudiants communistes (UEC - Union of Communist University Students) tried to fill the void after the UNEF declined. The former experienced ‘a mass break with French-style Stalinism’[1]' and began to debate Stalinism and the Sino-Soviet split:

We started to find the Thorez apparatchiks singularly conformist and boring. Their lethargic legalism, grey discipline, total absence of imagination, absolute reverence toward the Soviets, contempt for internal democracy, refusal to debate issues that agitated the communist movement from Cuba to Beijing to Rome, concrete intellectual conformism, absolute closure to modern life, and aggressively imposed petit-bourgeois morality all rapidly detached youth from the line and diverted them dangerously toward other ideological poles. Basically, the PCF seemed to participate in its own manner in the old authoritarian and archaic French society.[12]

Trotskyists, ‘Italians’ and Maoists flocked to the UEC between 1963 and 1965. When they were eventually expelled, the other PCF factions and remaining (pro-Chinese) Stalinists were discouraged and outraged. The heterogeneous dissident movement multiplied into a number of grew/wewfo.[13] As a result, the extreme left could be said,

in the second half of the 1960s, to be composed of revolutionary' ‘ideological families’. Thus, in addition to the PSU, which consistently refused to impose upon its members ideological conformity' and remained . . . a roof organization encompassing almost all the existing ideological trends of the left, there existed the Trotskyist family, the ‘Marxist-Leninist’ family [the pro-Chinese or Maoist] and other groups and intellectual circles of less defined character?[4]

Progressive PCF youth could shop between Trotskyism, Maoism, Castroism, the PCI and Third World revolution. These left and right ‘deviations’ gave gaucJiisme both libertarian and totalitarian tendencies.

Dissidence also grew in SFIO and left-wing Catholic youth organizations. Independent socialist and SFIO-PCF dissidents who were fed up with left-wing malaise and the Algerian War founded the PSU in 1960. Many SFIO members had opposed the Algerian war. Others were mendesisles, followers of former Prime Minister Mendes-France. Another group came from the independent left Tribune du communism? (Forum of Communism) or the Catholic left. Maoists, Trotskyists and anarchists joined these organizations as well. PSU disclosures about torture, disappearances and other human rights violations during the war rocked the left. By criticizing the war, post-capitalist society and bureaucratic centralization, the PSU attained considerable intellectual clout. It later filtered ideas between the left-wing parties and gauebisres. It adopted ‘revolutionary^ ideals that became typical left-wing themes during the 1960s and 1970s.

The UNEF, UEC and PSU provided the ideological and organizational foundations for They also continued national political traditions

by posing as enlightened vanguards dedicated to educating and intellectually improving the common people. Their ‘youth’ focus expressed the generational-ideological shift that occurred in the 1960s?[5] The^rou/TOtWtf rejected electoralism:

Readers of Althusser, Gramsci or Sartre, progressive Christians or anarchists, they were - more or less - tortured by a complex of illegitimacy) the fatality of being bastards: only the messianic class, the working class, die anti-capitalist class by origin and destination, could - one day - despite the ‘revisionist’ lullaby, despite the shackles of‘bureaucrats’, receive and copy their rebellion

The gauc/n'stes advocated direct, unfettered participation and declared that ‘universal suffrage is a trick by bourgeois power’.[17] Despite profound internal dif ferences, they were distinct by virtue of ‘on the one hand, the revolutionary[7] character of their objectives, which were as much cultural as political, and, on the other hand, by their style of action’.[18] Given their origins, gauchistes were particularly opposed to PCF accommodation with the Fifth Republic regime. They turned to controversial issues that the mainstream left ignored, such as the Vietnam War, the university[7] and die status of the capitalist worker. Because they believed that direct action best responded to institutional politics, lacked the unified organization

and programmes that would have provided clear alternatives?[9] Despite much agitation, organization and discussion, gauchisme was entirely marginal until May 1968.

May 1968

The post-war period of social, political and cultural change culminated in May 1968. National and international events in 1967 and 1968 fuelled a belief in revolutionary direct action.[20] Domestically, a series of nation-wide wild-cat strikes increased tension. Student protests in Nanterre then ignited an apparent revolution:

the student rebellion became fully juvenile and social, bringing in high-school students, young workers, agitating the intelligentsia, bringing in the working world by means of a large general strike that paralysed the state for a month. In short, French May ’68 was a generalized explosion in a society that was agitated by no economic or political crisis whatsoever?[21]

The evenements[22] synthesized a combination of pressures:

a rapidly expanding university population which was faced with an authoritarian educational system and was provided with inadequate facilities; an entrenched conservative political regime backed by equally conservative social elites; a powerless opposition Left; an apparently sclerotic Communist Party . . . and an increasingly heterogeneous and fractured international Communist world.[25]

The student population rose from 175,000 in 1957-58 to 500,000 in 1967-68, Educational institutions were overloaded, job competition increased, and students experienced a sense of marginality' and insecurity that was articulated This generation did not passively accept

conditions since it ‘no longer perceived [unemployment] as a periodic event in a blindly operating economic cycle but as a “culpable” and therefore “actionable” failure on the part of the political-administrative direction’?[4] Tension also rose as large numbers of workingand lower* middle-class students received advanced education for the first time, This magnified difficulties in a university system organized according to ‘an old, outdated concept of hierarchy and authority’?[5] In response, one group of students was drawn to revolutionary radicalism: ‘in fact, it was in utopian and non-constructive experience that they built a future for all of society’?[6] However, most students and the rest of the population were ultimately not interested in utopian political change. Labour unions, teachers, civil sen-ants and students demanded concrete social transformations. When de Gaulle accepted responsibility for the rigid system and promised reform, many returned to private concerns and so legitimated ‘bourgeois’ institutions.

A series of savage student-police battles nevertheless encouraged extreme-left faith in violent direct action. One part of the extreme left saw such violence as pedagogical. It thought that police brutality revealed the repressive nature of the regime. Another group viewed force as a tool to respond to state violence. Student and strike self-defence units were organized to serve as security' services at demonstrations. Still another group believed that self-defence was an individual responsibility. All three groups believed that violence had not been properly used in May 1968. Influenced by Fanon and Third World revolutionaries, gaw/iistes argued that violent direct action would facilitate the seizure of power by a revolutionary vanguard, that is, by student organizations led by an extremeleft social and political avant-garde. They transcended the UNEF anti-war struggle and conceived ‘a form of organization that aimed to insert politics into everyday life’?[7] They were obsessed by the ‘central role of intellectuals in revolutionary struggle’[28] and claimed to be a revolutionary elite acting in

the name of the people. The TrotskyistJ[r]^m^

(JCR) and Maoist UJCml (Union des jeunesses communistes - marxistesleninistes - Union of Communist Youths - Marxist-Leninist) enthusiastically adopted the idea that^r<9«/?w5mZej could instigate socialist revolution:

As an avant-garde dictating the positions that the student and worker base should adopt on the 'revisionism’ of the French communist part}’... and the strategy of national and international revolutionary struggle, JCR leaders followed the extreme-left student political traditions ... In fact, it seems that the UJCML had, towards general members at least, a dogmatic attitude, that of an organization possessing the correct Marxist-Leninist line and authorized to teach it as a master would to disciples.[29]

The May movement gave the gauchistes an opportunity to present a new form of activism that they believed was untainted by ideology and tradition. They stressed the ‘legitimacy’ of the revolutionary cause over ‘legality’ (the regime). The May movement provided a complex set of coincidences. When the gauchistes later tried to use themes from May 1968, they were unable to recapture the mix of populism and groupuscule activism. The May movement had quickly receded and ‘normalcy’ returned. The link between student and social protest was broken by 1969.[30] Despite gauchiste efforts, ‘serious basic debates centred on an institutional analysis of the university and its links to society did not manage to impassion more than a small minority of revolutionary militants’?[1] One group of gauchistes tried to recreate the conditions for socialist revolution for five years after 1968. They believed that the outburst of radical French political utopianism in 1967-68 resembled the radicalism of the 1789, 1830 and 1848 revolutions, the Commune, 1917 army mutinies and the wartime resistance movement. However, May 1968 had low revolutionary impact since the social bases for such transformation were absent: ‘the “radicalized fraction’’ of the working class, whose presence at the side of traditional unionists the gauchisles had guessed - and exaggerated - became one of the great myths inherited from May. Gauchismechased the dream for ten years afterw ards.’[32]

Since it focused on the inevitability of revolution, anarchism strongly influenced gauchisme. It also nourished the gauchiste aversion to democratic centralism:

There could be no question of a revolutionary party acting as the guardian of class consciousness. Far from impregnating the masses with organization can only be the expression of the spontaneous consciousness of workers. Against party communism, gauchisme opposes council communism.[33]

By means of anarchism, ‘the importance of differences of race, sex, language and culture that relate neither to economics nor to a dialectic of I force’[34] was transmitted to gauchisme. Anarchist workers’ councils also allayed gauchiste concerns about the stagnation of revolution in bureaucratic organizations. Many gaudiistes were interested by Anton Pannekoek’s theory of councils, which rejected bureaucratic communism and emphasized ‘everyday life’ and the ‘humanization* ofworkers. Pannekoekargued that the Russian Revolution only fostered state capitalism while workers’ councils ‘on the one hand represent the management method (economic< political) of socialist society and on the other an organ of revolutionary struggle that appears at a given historical stage, through which the proletariat hauls itself up to the consciousness of its tasks’?[5] Pannekoek argued that revolutionary' workers’ councils would reconcile political-economic, | specialist-producer and worker-worker divisions, Since they believed that councils had appeared in May adopted Pannekoek’s theory

of anti-capitalist direct action

outside the bourgeois forms of opposition (parliamentarianism, ministerialism) and outside socialist party paths (unionism, partisan politics). Pannekoek is persuaded that since capitalism is becoming more and more brutal and the proletariat more and more mature, ( wild-cat strikes and factory occupation will henceforth constitute its essentia] weapons?*

Pannekoek said authentic revolution would be consciously constructed through workers’ actions. He hoped that mass knowledge would add a spiritual dimension to revolution. His voluntarism and focus on spontaneity' fitted the late 1960s’ mood much more closely than did Marxist materialism.

Pannekoek’s concept of direct action also had a strong effect: ‘direct expression, direct action, direct exchange between diverse popular movements replaced the long-winded disputes between the Fourth and Fifth republics?[37] The concept provided justification for confrontations with extreme-right groups, PCF security' services and labour unions. Frequent clashes with police reflected the extreme-left obsession with revolution. Gauchiste influence was strong among university and high-school students, certain companies, some unions and the information industry?[3] Selfmanagement, zgauchisle project to overcome divisions between civil society' and institutions, was eventually adopted as PS policy, reluctantly recognized by the PCF and became a left-wing rhetorical standard. However, the diversity that made gauchisme original was fatal; ‘each revolutionary combat was differently conceived: we collided en route. Given that the enemy is so close, the shocks are harsher?[39] After May 1968, many gauchistes were ‘crazy about the proletariat’ and gave ‘the working class the

main role in the coming revolutions so as to prepare it for its historic mission. Workers * * . were so present in our fantasies that it became necessary for all of us to meet;’[40] Although many gauMstes soon realized that the messianic class was not interested in revolution, they continued to champion revolutionary direct action.

The rfw 22 mars'" was the most original group. It

was led by Daniel Cohn-Bendit. While Trotskyists and Maoists drew on left-wing ideological and organizational antecedents, the 22 mars resembled North American activism and perhaps best corresponded to the urban society France became in the 1960s, The group’s orientations and methods were closely linked to May 1968; ‘the dynamic.. . came from its talkative, joyous, aggressive, innocent, overexcited and audacious spontaneity’.[42] For its part, the 22 mars was influenced by anarchism and silualionnisme. The latter radically attacked hierarchy in universities in particular. It described them as ‘hothouse factories for lowerand middlemanagement’/[3] reacted to a university system that was ‘a

sausage-machine which turns out people without any real culture, and incapable of thinking for themselves, but trained to fit into the economic system of a highly industrialized society’.[44] Its ideas appeared after a group in the University of Strasbourg UNEF and AFGES federative

getterale des etudia/zts de Strasbourg - General Federative Association of Strasbourg Students) released [l]Sur la misere en milieu eludianl\ an anarchist, Dadaist and surrealist attack on the Gaullist regime, capitalism, the university, PCF and unions. The text dismissed the extreme-left as ‘Bolsheviks’ and ‘militarists’, but aroused their interest by expressing

mistrust towards existing authorities in a way that no other single document had. It told the groupuscules some profound truths about their own intellectual hypocrisy and their submission to futile revolutionary symbols without serious thought. It did not do so, however, in the name of the system or the established anti-system. On the contrary, it managed to ‘out-delegitimize’ all rival groups/[5]

The anti-traditional and anti-hierarchical message in situationnisme mixed with nonconformist criticism of the social and political establishment that had already been ‘greatly accelerated by the war in Vietnam, which struck many students and intellectuals as utterly scandalous, not only because it represents an attempt by the Americans to dictate to the rest of the world, but also because the “socialist” bureaucracies are prepared to stand by and let it happen’.[46] The 22 mars and siluationnisme thrust a belief that social, political and cultural order had to be fundamentally reconsidered into national and international awareness.

The 22 mars said revolutionary unity would be forged by direct action/[7] Cohn-Bendit advocated a non-Leninist revolution: ‘no form of organization whatever must be allowed to dam its spontaneous flow. It must evolve its own forms and structures?[48] The revolt gained momentum ‘when the mass sit-ins began outside the closed faculty, concretizing the theme of the “critical university” which thus acquired a fully French (not imported) quality’.[43] Cohn-Bendit put students into direct contact with German student radicals. When Rudi Dutschke was wounded in Berlin on 11 April 1968, French students were strongly affected. Coming close on the heels of the deaths of Guevara and Martin Luther King, the incident fed a view that counter-revolution was under way and violence was credible. CohnBendit endorsed a variety of methods for direct action and revolutionary agitation: [£]a host of insurrectional cells, be they ideological groups, study groups - we can even use street gangs’.[50] Although situatiofwisme rejected Leninism, Trotskyism, Maoism and Guevarism, it drew all groups together by claiming a ‘Marxist’ perspective based on the ‘examples of the Paris Commune, the 1905 Soviets, Catalan workers’ experiments in May 1937, They viewed the proletariat as the only revolutionary' class, without at the same time rigorously defining it.’[51] May 1968 was seen as the first of a series of strikes rather than a single event. However, anti-hicrarchical ideology and profound hostility' to organization did not give 22 mars the means to sustain struggle and it faded along with May’s euphoria. Antihierarchical ideals and concepts of a self-directed mass movement were exploited by others; 'that which remains are the JCR’s rigid Leninist structures and rhe strong mythological structures of Maoist doctrine’.[52] The 22 mars fundamentally influenced gauchisme by linking radical student politics to social unrest. The group believed that a burgeoning youth culture and diffuse optimism[55] made revolution imminent ‘through direct mass action with the young, the students and the activists playing the role of the detonator or of the catalyst of the workers’ revolution’.[54] Such optimism was based in syveeping criticism of

the mechanisms of constituting and transmitting knoyvledge and ideologies through institutions (such as the university), criticism of the process of manipulation, division and social hierarchy brought about by the possession of knoyvledge and ideologies, struggle against the ideologies that ‘intellectual managers’ are encouraged to support (scientism, technique, professionalism).[55]

Finally, the Uruguayan Tupamaros also fed the gauchiste obsession yvith revolution since they appeared to link causes in the West and the Third World. Tupamaro urban terrorism seemed to respond to post-1968 lethargy' despite the fact that the group’s

guerrilla [activities] did not really begin until after their liquidation as a political and military[7] force, and the setback left Uruguay subjected to a ferocious military[1] dictatorship that emerged out of the struggles it incited. But, at the time ... the Tupatnarvs was none the less bedside reading for many militants who saw, in these revolutionaries from beyond the ocean, the realization of their own desire to struggle for their people, to be loved by them, to lead them to victory: there could be no more sincere internationalist fraternity to set the world ablaze in political and emotional solidarity.[56]

The comparison between France and Uruguay seemed logical in a context that was still influenced by revolutionary utopianism.

By the early 1970s, the active gauchiste organizations were anarchist,[57] Trotskyist[53] or Maoist.[59] However, their methods were marked by ‘violent dispute by action committees, demonstrations, small papers or incendiary[7] tracts’.[60] The limit of gauchiste appeal was visible when the extreme-left attempted to enter political institutions. Its electoral peak was in 1969, when LCR leader Alain Krivine received 236,000 votes and PSU leader Michel Rocard got 814,000. By 1972-73, ‘the university and high-school movement ran out of steam. The rise of the union of the left, rebirth of the Socialist Party, and the appearance of an electoral solution transformed the conditions for political intervention?[61] The impact of gauchwne was consecrated by the 1973 PS-PCF common programme. It advocated abortion on demand, improved social and labour legislation, democratic economic planning, decentralization, press liberalization and stronger civil liberties. However, the programme also officially ended the gauchiste pretension to represent the only authentic force for social and political change. Accordingly, in 1973 and 1978, the gauchiste and extreme-left vote declined to 3.6 per cent. In the 1979 European elections, gauchiste candidates were absent and the extreme-left vote fell to 3.1 per cent. In June 1981, it declined to 1.3 percent. PSU leader Huguette Bouchardeau then joined the PS cabinet. The extreme-left vote rose in 1986 and 1988, but plunged to 0,23 per cent in the June 1988 legislative elections. Soon after, former PSU leader Michel Rocard was named Prime Minister and ecologist Brice Lalonde became Environment Minister. In the June 1988 European elections, the extreme-left (Lutte ouvriere, the Mouvement pour un parti des travailleurs - MPPT - and PCF dissident received

2.42 per cent of the vote. Gauchisrne was thus influential, but domes ticated by proximity[7] to power. It had significant attitudinal and cultural impact in professions such as teaching.[62] Gawctoes also radicalized labour militancy. Occupations and management lock-ups spread through unions and extended to truckers, small shopkeepers and police unions. Through the

PSU, gauchisme also influenced the ecology and anti-nuclear movements.[63] It inspired Corsican, Breton and Occitan nationalists, feminists (through the Mouvemenl de Liberation des Fetmnes - MLF - and Mouvement pour la Hberte de l’awrtement et de la eontraeeption) and gays (who formed the Front arme homosexuet revo/uiionnaire).

The transmission o/gauchiste ideas through Trotskyism and Maoism

Although Trotskyism and Maoism were in some ways antithetical to gauehiste ideology, both were affected by it in different ways. Maoism was more strongly influenced and subsequently played a more direct role in transmitting the gauehiste heritage to AD. The effect of^noA/swon French Trotskyism was less radical and varied between three organizations. The OCI was less touched. Emphasizing ‘principles’ over ‘tactics’, the OCI opposed the May movement and urged students to dismantle barricades. It had traditional views on sexuality' and women’s rights. The OCI was also leery[r] of self-management due to the latter’s association to CFDT (hence; Catholic) unionism. VO also urged students to adopt a working-class perspective in 1968 and not view youth as a vanguard. Renamed Lutte ouvriere (LO) after 1968, it used overt and clandestine tactics but rejected gauehiste direct action. LO subordinated sexual and women’s issues to class struggle and viewed self-management as ‘petit bourgeois’. LO did not adopt the ecological message of^noAisw. It viewed industrial development as a pre-condition for revolution and argued that safe nuclear energy could increase production. LO contested legislative and municipal elections. It nominated Arlette Laguiller in the 1974, 1981 and 1988 presidential elections. The frankiste LCR, which supported the Algerian FLN and influenced the UEC, was most affected bygawc/n'yw^ and 1968. LCR leader Alain Krivine joined the group because of its anti-war stance. He was UEC Sorbonne section leader before helping to create the ‘Guevarisf JCR. The youth-orientated JCR adopted gauehiste and ”68* issues. It also advocated military unionization and conducted propaganda on military bases. JCR barricades were prominent in May 1968, when the group was aligned with 22 mars and the UNEF. Having renamed itself the Ligue cominuniste after 1968, the JCR had

a solid and well-developed organizational structure, a wellformulated ideology, and a prestigious place within what might be called the ‘new revolutionary' International’ composed in general of all those groups who became, in the late sixties, the challengers of the existing order. But the main asset of the Ligue has probably been Krivine himself, a very energetic and eloquent personality.[64]

The LCR appeared after the Ligue communisie was banned in 1973. It viewed issues in tactical rather than strategic terms in order to prevent the splinters that plague French Trotskyism and avoid Soviet-style ‘bureaucratization’. The LCR was very gawcAiste. It tolerated factions, guaranteed factional representation on executive bodies, freely circulated all viewpoints and allowed public disagreement with majority decisions. Sympathy groups in factories, neighbourhoods, universities and high schools paralleled the main organization. The LCR advocated worker councils to control the workplace and state in a period of co-management after armed revolution. The group wanted to progressively institute selfmanagement to give workers time to learn economic-administrative skills. The LCR viewed technology as a potential liberation from mindless labour. This ‘qualitative’ orientation w[r]as its hallmark. It adopted feminist, gay and anti-nuclear issues in the 1970s and consistently saw[p] youth as a social vanguard. The LCR also actively supported Third World revolution, especially the Vietnamese struggle against the US. It rejected guerrilla warfare after 1977. LCRgawrfmwtf included direct action tactics, frequent demonstrations and violence against fascists and racists. Krivine ran for president in 1969 and 1974.

Maoists were more intimately connected to gauchisme than were Trotskyists. Many splits occurred among Maoist groups over the best way to oppose capitalism, imperialism and the mainstream left, French anarchist and labour traditions influenced Maoism in contradictory ways. In particular, references to spontaneous mass strikes (in 1936 and May 1968) contrasted the hierarchical authoritarianism in Maoist theory.[65] However, Mao’s ‘mass line’ suited French political traditions because it called for direct links between revolutionaries and the population. Maoists ‘coexisted’ in the UEC until they were expelled in February 1966. They then formed the UJCml. They found the PCMLF too rigid and its middleaged militants less appealing than the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ (GPCR). The Red Guard movement strongly affected the UJCmL It paid little attention to pre-May 1968 tensions until the GPCR prodded it into increased activity. The UJCml initially tried to mobilize the working class in factories. During May 1968, it argued that barricades should be removed until working class support was secure. After May ended, a ‘liquidationist’ UJCml majority’ said the regime survived because the group had been obsessed by an ‘elitist’ and ‘petit-bourgeois’ view of workers. The group then split. Members either joined the PCMLF, turned to textual study or experimented with new[r] political forms and ideas. The latter, called maoistes or maos, were strongly affected by They had several

ideologies and strategies. Two noteworthy ‘anti-hierarchical’ Maoist groups were Prve la revolution (VLR - Long Live Revolution) and Gauche proletariate (GP - Proletarian Left). VLR tried to organize Citroen plant workers for revolutionary action and played a significant role in the post1968 cultural explosion. It focused on sex, women’s liberation and homosexuality as part of an examination of'everyday life’. After the VLR journal Tout explicitly examined homosexuality, lesbianism and free love, a scandal led to the group’s dismantlement.[6]*

The second Maoist group, the GP, was called because it

advocated tactical spontaneity. The GP and its newspaper, La Cause du peuple (CDP - Cause of the People), appeared in autumn 1968, Like other gauchistes, the GP rejected Leninism and was obsessed by the evenanaits: 'what we learned in May ’68 was that the working class can think and provoke thought.’[67] The GP believed that the Fifth Republic was weak and ripe for revolution. May 1968 was seen as the

first stage in the revolutionary process in France . . . The mass strike and mass violence in Spring 1968 are part of the revolutionary' process . . . These events are only meaningful if they are understood as a stage of this process, resolutely turned towards socialism,[w]

The members of 22 mars soon joined the GP. The two organizations shared

weak structures - in reality, non-Leninistand a taste for spectacular and symbolic action, the most typical of which were, in Spring 1970, distribution of free Metro tickets to workers - as a protest against fare increases - and the 'pillage’ of the luxury food store Fauchon in the name of immigrant workers in shanty-towns?[9]

The GP said youth rebellion was valuable since ‘it provoked the working class to take up its historic mission as the universal class’.[70] Its position was based on an interpretation of the GPCR and the Vietnam War:

For the first time we believed, a people had been able not to take power, but to criticize the mechanisms through which power, even if popular’, ceaselessly escapes those in whose name it is exercised only to be turned against them . . . For the first time, we believed, a people had found themselves capable of guiding those who claimed to lead them, rather than letting themselves be led.[71]

Belief in the working class did not prevent the GP from conducting violent 'exemplary action’ against the government, PCF and labour unions.[77] The group argued that action was needed after May 1968 since gauchistes were isolated and subject to 'bourgeois manipulation’ through the apparent success of legal social change. The GP response supported any action that would ‘enlarge the field of opposition between legitimacy and legality’.[73]

The GP believed that conditions would allow revolutionaries to by-pass the Soviet model of revolution. It declared that, for the first time in 50 years, revolutionaries ‘once again command historical evolution’?[4]

Faithful to French communist tradition, the GP tried to mobilize the working class. This led directly to conflict with the government, Renault management and the CGT. It also organized secondary' school students, pointing to the example of a brutally repressed high-school student demonstration that had occurred on 11 November 1940. To foment nonarmed local, regional and national violence, GP strategy championed ‘intended violence, justifying itself by clear-cut symbolism of struggle and civil war’?[5] The GP said that France in the late 1960s resembled the France of 1943. Its statements had a military tone:

everything will be conceived in terms of war. Taking up the slogan: [£]We are all partisans’, born at Fiat in Turin, where it was only a moment of rebellion, the GawcAeptf/etarawne sees itself as the seed of the wartime resistance movement, in a universe wherein the State and its repressive forces represent the Nazis, and the PC-CGT are the collaborators?[6]

GP factory agitation sought to pick up on existing sabotage and so-called management ‘terrorism’. Committees organized violence against Metro fare increases, price rises in Renault company restaurants, and differential factory salaries. The GP said all workers should develop equal competency[7] and receive equal pay. It provoked confrontations with supervisory personnel and the CGT that climaxed in Pierre Ovemey’s murder?[7] All of these acts fitted its belief that revolutionaries had to lead a new[r] resistance movement: ‘armed struggle is part of the tradition of proletarian resistance in France. Anti-Nazi armed struggle still strikes deep roots in the presentday working class, nourished by the deeds of the FTP partisans - Partisan Sharpshooters)?[78] The GP vision recalled Saint-Just: ‘from the beginning: Justice is the Revolution’?[9] When the government arrested CDP editors and banned the GP in March 1970, the ‘ex-GP’ appeared. In 1970-71, the ex-GP organized action committees in enterprises and schools. Daring acts occurred in the name of the rights of Renault workers, immigrants, peasants and convicts. Jean-Paul Sartre gave the CDP considerable legitimacy by serving as editor and explaining that for the GP ‘theory[7] follows practice’.*[0] Although Jean-Luc Godard, Simone Signoret, Jane Fonda and Frangois Maspero publicly stated support, the GP gradually alienated extreme-left sympathy.

The GP opposed price increases, supported egalitarian job tactics and physically attacked racist supervisors to encourage greater Arab and African immigrant worker militancy. It drew attention to immigrant housing, decrying shanty-towns (in PCF-run Argenteuil), squats, ghettos and foreign worker residences. After the Six-Day War, the GP tried to appeal to North African workers by supporting

the Palestinian struggle: the State of Israel shall be swept away, the Jew[r]s will not be persecuted. We exalted Fedayin actions without nuance. El Fata and the FDLP are similarly applauded, American imperialism, Zionism and bourgeois Arabs are amalgamated in the name of the just liberation war?[1]

A GP rural programme sent militants to assist protest by smalltown merchants despite charges that the latter were petit-bourgeois and poujadisle. In the name of decolonization and indigenous struggle, the GP also aided the Breton and Occitan independence movements and farmer protests. The ex-GP realized that farmers were under government and EEC pressure to expand or quit farming. It argued that farmers’ spiritual relation to the land could not be incorporated in the classical Marxist theory of alienated factory work. Although the GP thought Stalinist collectivization responded to rural problems, it concluded that farmers needed to decide this for themselves. Prisoners’ rights also became an important area for agitation. Arrested GP members claimed political prisoner status. The organization Secours rouge*[2] and prisoners’ families arranged demonstrations. Trials were used to publicize prison conditions. In 1970, 30 GP hunger-strikers demanded political status, the abolition of solitary confinement, improved visiting rights and better conditions. The government granted them access to certain facilities and recognized the political nature of slogans painted on w alls. GP and Maoist prisoners led a series of prison revolts in 1971-72.

The GP never claimed responsibility for incidents. It maintained that antagonisms resulted from capitalism. ^Although critics responded that it lacked an intelligible ideology', GP theory had several discernible elements. Above all, the GP and ex-GP were anti-hierarchical. They aimed to reshape political power and severely curtail government-society intermediaries through ‘direct democracy based on power mechanisms - decentralized pow[r]er mechanisms in enterprises and all areas of society’?[3] They also argued that practice guides theory[1] and that no Marxist or Marxist-Leninist precept was unassailable. They tried to base concrete political action on Mao’s view that

in social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing away in human knowledge... The movement of change in the w[r]orld of objective reality is never-ending and so is man’s cognition of truth through practice?[4]

Rejecting hierarchy and leadership, the GP believed that revolutionaries needed ‘to link their leadership closely with the demands of the vast masses, and to combine general calls closely with particular guidance, so as to smash the subjectivist and bureaucratic methods of leadership completely[1],[85] In this light, Leninist parties were considered isolated from people’s interests. The GP drew radically egalitarian conclusions from Mao’s statement that ‘to die for the people is weightier than Mount Tai[5]/[6] However, its effort to ‘sene the people’ distorted Mao’s mass line. The GP sought to follow rather than formulate a mass line* The organization thought that permanence and hierarchy were qualities that contradicted any movement that temporarily attempted to aid the masses. Hierarchy was seen as a capitalist tool to control through work, salary and race. In rejecting hierarchy, the GP also repudiated class categories. It believed that technological innovation perpetuated capitalist hierarchy, the division of labour, alienation and inequality. The GP drew[r] on Mao’s concept of ‘configuration of the struggle’. It said ‘the people’ were fundamental to struggle and set its actions in a general war against exploitation. The view[r] resulted from criticism of the UJCml in 1968, The GP concluded that all struggle against the established order, whether by lumpen-proletariat, immigrants, youth, farmers, shopkeepers, nationalists or workers, should be supported since they fostered revolutionary consciousness* The position was drawn from Mao’s view that ‘man, in varying degrees, comes to know[r] the different relations between man and man, not only through his material life but also through his political and cultural life’?[7] Wageearners and underpaid workers who supported capitalism were labelled enemies* The GP was unsympathetic to security personnel, subway workers and police in an attempt to revive a radical Jacobin focus on ‘the people’.

GP non-traditional methods were based on a ‘mass line’ in which:

all correct leadership is necessarily ‘from the masses, to the masses’. This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action.[83]

GP praxis was based on a concept of ‘qualitative' struggle. The group supported all challenges to the socio-political system since they ‘throw into question an entire section of prohibitions upon which bourgeois society functions’.[89] Given that ‘whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it’,[90] certain struggles were judged to be more advanced because they were ‘illegal’. Any transgression of the ‘bourgeois capitalist state’ was positively evaluated, Confronting the PCF, PS and labour unions was favoured since these organizations were seen as tools of domination. ‘Creative* struggles such as self-governing committees and student occupations of university faculties were also used. By refusing ‘the rules of the game* and using illegal acts, the GP tried to oblige the state to show its repressive teeth.

The Nouvelle resistance populaire (7VRP)

The GP argued that revolution needed encouragement by a disciplined avant-garde and ‘while awaiting the conflagration, the revolution remained ideological and symbolic’.[91] It carried out dramatic raids on luxury stores to catch public attention and raise tension. Within its world-view, ‘revolution was like theatre, a show that depicted the war to come’?[2] The GP also used ‘working class’ targets to increase tension between strikers, employers and the government. It focused on workers since the Chinese revolution taught that this method was ‘a shortcut, an instrument for accelerated learning’?[3] As a result, the GP was not as socially representative as the ‘May Movement’, whose participants eventually accepted, adapted or resigned themselves to more traditional activism. As their self-appointed inheritor, the GP ignored divergent interpretations of /es eveneffierits. As Hamon and Rotman note,

TheyinZ misttndersfanding ofMay relates to its initial improvisation. A spontaneous, libertarian, weakly politicized, individualist, modernizing current without a specific project donned the garb of quintessendaily ‘professional* gawAihnr: the escapees from the crises in the UEC, JEC and UNEF who grafted their heritage and archaisms on a movement that did not at all resemble them, but which urgently needed their unfaithful means of expression?[4]

Like the Italian BR, the GP insisted that ideology was an ‘immunization against a refutation of the grounds for armed struggle through shared experience’?[5] Violence increased after the GP created the NRP to carry out guerrilla-style acts. The NRP moved the remnants of May and gauchisme even further from any social movement since ‘the GP recruited on the fringes and used nearly delinquent yobbos in its actions’?[6] In fact, tin* NRP resembled more closely die organization and targets of the faun iHi/wliiiii' (NAPAP Aniu'd Nui lei Im

hipill'U hllhHNIIII I illlll U < lIl Hl II dill pi I I dlnp plill|lq

we were not a mass movement; we were a few militants who tried to act in conformity with the will of the masses, but who were all the same only an organization.> . we had to project an image of what the people would be like later, after taking power; and what they would do is punish the guilty, although they would try to re-educate most of them?[7]

One of the NRP’s earliest acts was the kidnapping of national assembly deputy Michel de Grailly on 26 November 1970He was soon released. However, the group radicalized further when Overney’s murderer received a light sentenceCroupe Pierre Overney then kidnapped Renault executive Robert Nogrette on 8 March 1972 to show[r] ‘that the Maoists would not leave a crime unpunished, that they would retain their ability to initiate’.[93] Police pressure, left-wing renewal, the Munich Olympic massacre and Chilean coup soon convinced GP leaders that guerrilla violence was inappropriate and would lead ‘inevitably and very rapidly to total destruction [of the GP]’.[W] The powerful appeal of Latin American guerrilla warfare faded as the GP and NRP realized what the Chilean MIR had helped provoke:

Allende’s assassination was the final blow... It was not sufficient to incriminate the martyred president’s legalism. The role of small armed groups, extreme-left adventurism and the MIR needed to be considered. Neither a political position that respected traditions nor semi-clandestine movements were able or knew how to prepare working class self-defence?[00]

Realizing that ‘the masses will not win militarily’ and that ‘armed struggle is a murderous utopia’,[101] the GP decided to abandon revolutionary violence. Convinced that they were redundant and never having conceived the GP as a permanent organization, the Maoists had little difficulty accepting self-dissolution. They saw that ‘the alternative was nowbetween terrorist escalation and dissolution’?[02] However, a ‘lumpen-proletariat’ NRP rump clung to the myth of armed struggle and only disarmed after show-downs that ‘parodied the climax of a Western film’?[03] Although many members then moved into the culture industry,[104] the GP’s revolutionary ideals were adopted by NAPAP and AD,

In its brief existence, the GP incorporated several elements of French egalitarian socialism:

In its refusal to fetter workers with a hierarchical political organization and its emphasis upon action and clear cleavages within the induMiinl plnnf itself, if resembled the thought of the French anarchoM mill illlhl ihm N < umigcs Surd In 1 hr value which it placed upon rural life and the relationship between land and the people who work it, it shared the sentiments of the Genevan Rousseau and the French anarchist Proudhon. It shared both Proudhon’s distaste for hierarchical authoritarianism and the negative view of the division of labour held by the French utopian thinker Fourier.[105]

Like revolutionaries in 1789, 1830, 1848, 1871 and 1944, the GP took up arms in the name of social equality'. Its references to the people recalled 1789 and radical Jacobinism. Although it rejected the idea of a vanguard, the GP attempt to enlighten the masses was a form of revolutionary’ elitism that resembled blanquisme. However, France in the late 1960s and early 1970s was not revolutionary’. The GP criticized society' and called for ‘authenticity’, but did not inspire mass revolt. Armed struggle did not suit conditions. Indeed, despite its enormous impact, even May 1968 w[r]as not revolutionary'. The discrepancy between May 1968 and revolution eventually incited the extreme left to re-evaluate its methods and goals. Former gaudiistes asked whether May was a ‘sad diversion, modern insurrection, betrayed revolution or the original phase of class struggle’?[104]

French society' was less rigid after May 1968, but still tied to a market economy. As gane/zisme waned, West German and Italian extreme-left ideas encouraged a minority to believe that violence could compensate for left-wing complicity with the establishment. These autonomists developed out of anarcho-communist university' groups in the early 1970s.[507] Committed to radical socialist transformation and hostile to organization, the autonomists ‘are still influenced by situationism. They strongly criticize ganc/iisfe, Trotskyist, and Maoist movements or the PSU, and reproach them for their old-style analysis, and bureaucratic and inefficient practices?[1]^ Their rejection of traditional politics and the PCF, hostility to social norms and faith in revolutionary violence transmitted a gatwhiste style and disposition to AD. The autonomists were:

inheritors of the cultural dissent of the 1970s. They are very suspicious of party’ politics as a whole and work preferably in local associations or in parallel, underground structures: communes, environmentalist groups, including the very few who are tempted by terrorism, .

The autonomists believed that the extreme left ‘dumped[1] nonintellectuals when offered an establishment role. The autonomists advocated violent revolutionary’ direct action to combat this hypocrisy, but conditions had domesticated their potential clientele. PCF, Trotskyist and Maoist groups had channelled dissent into their organizations. The absence of severe social or political crisis effectively deradicalized, and even depoliticized, many extreme leftists. In any event, the autonomists and later groups overestimated the GP rejection of French left-wing traditions. The GP stance was much less radical than that of, for example, Ulrike Meinhoff. The GP unquestioningly placed the French working class on a pedestal. The history of the German working class precluded this since it includes both the KPD and the Nazis and so militates against ‘populism’. GP idealism eventually curtailed the drift to violence in favour of traditional radical ‘pedagogy’?[10]

GdwcAisw never regained popularity. The multiplicity of social and political groups that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s rejected utopianism and tried to integrate change into existing structures:

the women’s movement, ethnic minorities’ movements, radical tradeunionists (the CFDT ‘basists’ especially in the public sector, new general practitioners’ and lawyers’ unions etc.), immigrant workers and ‘second generation’ immigrants, sexual minorities, radical culture associations (from artists to residents’ associations such as the Confederation syndicate du cadre de vie), communes, squatters, conscripts, and, after 1974, ecologists - were exclusively concerned with a sectional aspect of society and with the task ofchanging radically their own lives, of experimenting with totally different forms?[11]

Only a fringe remained faithful to gauchisme and held onto the view of May 1968 as a n ear-revolution. Rejecting Leninism and attacking the USSR and PCF as hierarchical and rigid were no longer radical. International and domestic conditions removed revolution from serious discussion. The post-war boom evaporated and France became a full-fledged ‘consumer’ society. Cohn-Bendit now explains 1968 as part of a generational shift: ‘w[r]e were the first generation to experience, through a stream of images and sounds, the physical and daily presence of the entire world’?[11] The gauc/iistes reintroduced ‘“ultimate ends”, proposing to do away now with any form of market economy and w[r]age slavery[7] and started even to question the value of science and of progress itself?[15] However, their radicalism did not ultimately encourage revolutionary politics so much as usher forth a mass-marketing ‘Bourbon Restoration’.

Leur</em> legates me mollassan, leur discipline grise, teur absence total? d'imagiuaiion, teur reverence absolue a Vegard des Strcietiques, leur mepris absolu de la democratic interne, tear refus des debuts qui de Cuba a Pekin en passant par Rome agitaient le mouvement aimmuniste, leur conformism? infelfertued tfw beton, leur fermature absolve d la vie moderne, leur morale pettee-bourgcois? agres- Jt'vflrtfltr impose?, tout cela detachait raptdemenl les jeunes de la ligne et les foisait deriver dangereusement vers d'aulres pales ideologiques, Au fond, lePCF semblait participer d sa manierede la vieille societe firan^atee, autorilaire fl archatque.’ Laurent Joffrin, Aid/ 65? Histoire des evettements (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1988), p.4 L

4 The History of Action dire etc. From Gauchisme to Nihilism

An examination of AD's history clarifies its factional character and how personalities influenced its development. It also provides an outline of attacks and shows how they corresponded to social and political developments. In addition to the Jacobin, socialist, egalitarian, revolutionary and Bonapartist traditions set by French political history, AD was influenced by groups that were active in the 1970s and by national and international events. Despite demonstrably clear roots in French political tradition, AD was out of touch with the political realities that pertained during its period of activity. AD was influenced by the ideologies, members and methods of Group es d'action revoliilionnaires iiiternationalistes (GARI - Internationalist Revolutionary Action Groups) and NAPAP. Both GARI and NAPAP linked AD to French political history in different ways. GARI provided an international perspective rooted in the Spanish Civil War that strongly influenced ADi (the Paris faction). NAPAP was a child of the post-GP period that especially served as the ADn (the Lyon faction) to May 1968. Finally, this chapter outlines AD\ different phases: 1979-81; 1982-84; and 1985-87,

Both GARI and NAPAP foreshadowed AD’s goals, orientations and personnel despite their separate locations and influences. GARI was based in south-western France and was particularly active in the Toulouse area and Spain between 1972 and 1979. It was strongly influenced by the anarchist traditions that anti-Franco Spanish Civil War refugees brought to France, Many Spanish expatriates who had fled into southwestern France after the Spanish Civil War continued to oppose the Franco regime. This diaspora incarnated an ideal of armed struggle for social justice. From a living, legitimate source, the ideal was grafted onto a regional culture in which nonconformity and the memory of the wartime resistance movement were strong. In effect, Spanish anarchist militancy combined with local resentment of Paris-based government that stretched from the Cathar rebellions in the thirteenth century to Jean Jaures* radical socialism. Although anarchism did not solely

determine GARI’s orientations, its impact was intensified by May 1968.

Organizationally, GARI developed directly out of the anti-Franco Mouvenienl iberique de liberation (MIL ~ Iberian Liberation Movement)* When MIL member Puig Antich was killed by Spanish police on 7 April 1974, the shock radicalized the other members. They formed GARI, swearing to eliminate all states and power, especially ‘the Franco movement and its accomplices'.[1] GARI communiques treated Spanish and French leaders with humour and derision. Like many French extreme-left groups at that time, GARI rejected Leninism* Its leader was Jean-Marc Rouillan? Militants included several children of Spanish refugees who had settled in the Toulouse region? GARI tried to force the French and Belgian governments to change their policies towards the Franco regime. In 1974, the group machine-gunned a Spanish consular vehicle in Toulouse. A letter sent afterwards to the Spanish Prime Minister declared: ‘Bastard . , . Today we machine-gunned your car to show you and your government that w[F]e have arms and are ready to use them?[4] After this, GARI sabotaged a railway that led from France into Spain. On 3 May 1974, it kidnapped the Paris director of the Bank of Bilbao, Balthazar Suarez, to draw attention to ‘Francoist repression in Spain’? He was soon freed unharmed. GARI also undertook robberies in Brussels, Toulouse and Paris.

GARI employed a strategy oFeconomic sabotage’ of resource and tourist industries to fight the Franco regime* This effort embodied anarchist methods that centred on demonstrating the ascendancy of ‘social’ over ‘legal’ pow[r]er* As part of the campaign, electricity pylons that carried powder from Spain into France were repeatedly damaged; explosions in a HautesPyrenees village disrupted the 7h»r Frawe; buses earning Spanish pilgrims to Lourdes w[r]ere hit by arson; Spanish tour buses in Paris were attacked with plastic explosives; and railway stations on the FrenchSpanish border were hit by explosions, although these were more a form of harassment than a danger to the public. However, when Rouillan placed a bomb on a school roof near Toulouse’s Spanish consulate, 11 firemen w[r]erc seriously injured* Another explosion seriously hurt a police bomb’ disposal expert.

GARI financed itself through robberies in Beziers and Toulouse until police inadvertency stopped members Michel Camillieri and Mario Innes Torres over a minor traffic violation in September 1974. They were soon imprisoned and investigators virtually dismantled GARI. Rouillan, Cuadrado and Delgado were arrested in December. In 1975, group activity declined to a single attack on the Paris Palais de Justice? With its members in prison, GARI was saved from complete destruction by a legal technicality* In March 1976, the Cour de surete de VEtaf ruled that GARI had not threatened state authority, the charge being the only one then available to prosecute terrorist acts. The government had to begin a new investigation. Exploiting the government’s embarrassing position, GARPs remnants threw Molotov cocktails at a Spanish consular and cultural centre in Montpellier to protest against the detention without charge of the three militants. Since it did not have a legally binding case, the government freed Rouillan, Camillieri and Innes on 25 May 1977.

May 1968 and the GP influenced AD more directly through the Parisbased Maoists in NAPAP. The group had few known members: Frederic Oriach,[8] Jean-Paul Gerard, Michel Lapeyre,[9] Pascal Trillat and Regis Schleicher?[0] NAPAP’s first action was a murder attempt on the Spanish military attache in France in 1975. The target, if not the assassination method, resembled those of GARL In 1976, NAPAP murdered the Bolivian ambassador in France, Colonel Joachim Zentano Anaya, who had participated in the murder of Che Guevara. NAPAP undertook the act to establish credibility as a revolutionary group. It murdered Renault vigilante Jean-Antoine Tramoni on 23 March 1977 J[1] The act drew directly on GP history and traditional extreme-left opposition to the Fifth Republic. The effort to establish credibility also motivated sabotage at Renault and attacks on the offices of the Confederation fran$ai$e du travail. However, because NAPAP was an isolated faction, it was incapable of mobilizing the mass support needed for revolution. A leading member, Oriach, was soon arrested, convicted and imprisoned. In October 1977, NAPAP planted a bomb near the home of Alain Peyrefitte. The latter was minister of education in May 1968, Giscard d’Estaing’s justice minister in the 1970s and an editorialist for the right-wing dailyLe Figaro, By targeting Peyrefitte, NAPAP clearly tried to wave the gauchiste banner. Oriach was freed in March 1980, but again arrested in July as he, Gerard and Lapeyre attempted to bomb the Paris offices of the West German railway. In 1981, the three were once again freed.

AD’s formative years: 1979-80

Given its dual organizational and ideological roots, it was fitting that AD began as a loose network of groupusades that shared general extreme-left orientations. The groupusades had names like Clodo (Comite liquidant ou detoumant les ordinateurs\ Jeune Taupe, Casse-Noix and that were selected to reflect this fact?[2] The practice also set a precedent. Throughout its existence, AD attack units were named to reflect current events or motives.” In the late 1970s, AD’s early members were usually too young to have participated in May 1968, were unemployed, but educated.

Most of their elder gauchiste peers were by this point using other political methods if they were still active. A group of AD militants that appeared in court in 1980 included a student, a plumber, a pharmacist, a type-setter and several bank employees. The group's initial ideology mixed the anarchism and Maoism of GARI and NAPAP. The^wzcAftte idea of selfdefence was used to justify attacks. However, AD’s ideology was in general a fairly standard Marxist interpretation of society. Like its gauchiste predecessors, AD condemned the * colonial and imperialist’ state, employers, French policies in Africa and real-estate speculation. Early attacks focused on symbols rather than human beings. AD wanted to use symbols in order to combat apathy and corruption. This was the era of the Bokassa diamond scandal, the PS-PCF failure to win the 1978 legislative elections, cynicism, Coluche and a sense of ra; le bol.™ In retrospect, the period signalled the demise of^ftedn/ftwe, which mixed economic liberalism, US-style political marketing and profound socio-cultural conformism.

At the time of AD’s aj’ipearance, groups of politically frustrated youths who called themselves ^autonomists' were regularly attempting to provoke violence. They wanted to create an illusion of revolt and protest against the lack of serious political debate by both the left and the right. The autonomists expressed several attitudes, some of which fed AD’s later division into two organizations. One group of autonomists sought to emulate foreign radicals, usually the Italian BR or West German RAF. Another focused on French traditions and justified violence by references to the wartime resistance movement Both groups wanted to

avoid the errors that they believed were inherent in the other’s orientation. A third group of autonomists consisted of foreigners who were temporarily residing in France, but who belonged to other European radical organizations. Separate locations in Lyon and Paris furnished another source of AD’s division. The Paris group, led by Rouillan and Nathalie Menigon,[15] attacked the Ministry' of Cooperation on 18 March 1978. The Lyon group, led by Andre Olivier,[16] machine-gunned CNPF headquarters on 1 May 1979. Believing that their predecessors had above all failed owing to poor organization, both groups carefully prepared their attacks to compensate for lack of support. They turned to robbery[7] in order to finance operations. An August 1979 robbery' netted 16 million francs from a tax collection office. The mix of Italian, Spanish, French and GARI activists who carried out the robbery illustrates the typical extreme-left blend of the late 1970s. Of course, robberies were not seen as a replacement for more strictly political acts. In September, AD bombed a Ministry of Labour annexe, SONACOTRA Nationale de Constructions pour les Travailleurs - National Company of Buildings for Workers), the Caisse professionelle de preuoyance des salaries (Workers’ Compensation Board) and Delegation regionale pour Pemplois d'lle-de-France (Ile-de-France Regional Employment Commission). The facade of the Ministry of Labour was machinegunned. All the attacks were designed to show that AD supported workers and immigrant labourers. These issues had also motivated the GP.

Police reaction to AD was firm and rapid. Schleicher was captured in February 1980. In the same month, the group attacked the Direction regionale du travail et de la main-dtetvre (a government agency for immigrant workers), the fmmolriliere de construction de Paris (Paris Real Estate Construction), SEMIREP de renovation du quartier Plaissance -

offices for Paris-region real-estate), the Direction la surveillance du territoire (DST - the French FBI) and the Grow/te d'intervention de la gendarmerie nationale (GIGN - an elite SWAT squadron), Cooperation Minister Robert Galley’s empty office was also machine-gunned, During this incident, several witnesses saw Menigon calmly fit a new clip and continue firing after her automatic weapon jammed. Police subsequently rounded up 28 suspects, including several BR militants wanted in connection with Aldo Moro’s murder. AD then attacked Toulouse police headquarters. A pattern of government response and AD retaliation set in after indictment of 15 group members by the Cour de surete de I'Etat in April. The Toulouse offices of Philips Data Systems were struck the next day, AD claimed that military secrets were hidden in company computers. The group rendered the equipment inoperable, at a cost of 2.5 million francs to Philips. Clodo targeted the Toulouse offices of CII Honeywell. Soon after, the city’s Palais de Justice and the Ministry of Transport in Paris were hit. In striking out at law-enforcement agencies, political figures, real-estate speculation, and ‘hi-tech’ enterprises, AD’s attacks exhibited considerable coherence. However, the group seemed to lose its strategic bearing when the University of Rennes and Orly-Ouest air terminal were bombed in June. The latter attack injured seven cleaning personnel who belonged to the class that AD claimed to be defending. Perhaps realizing these strikes were counter-productive, AD then turned to organizational matters. It seized passports, identity cards and materials used in preparing identity papers from a local police station in Paris.

Despite efforts to weld AD’s disparate elements into a coherent unit, the entire period crashed to an end when police grabbed Menigon and Rouillan in an ambush on 13 September 1980. The remaining AD members machine-gunned the Ecole militaire, but were even more isolated and disorientated with their leaders under arrest. The Paris group undertook no acts of violence between September 1980 and December 1981. Although several incidents bore AD’s ‘signature’, the group denied any link to them. The Gnwpf

(GBGPGS), for example, set 16 bombs between December 1981 and

February' 1983?[7] When Francois Mitterrand was elected to the presidency in May 1981, it seemed that any remaining motives for extreme-left violence were gone, /X post-election amnesty pardoned AD prisoners who had not shed blood or committed felonies related to state security?* Despite similar amnesties by Georges Pompidou in 1969 and Valery[7] Giscard d’Estaing in 1974, the right-wing opposition said that this showed laxity on the part of the PS with regard to law and order and a willingness to endanger the lives of law-enforcement officers. Initially, terrorists who had attempted to kill police officers were not freed, Menigon remained in prison because she had fired her pistol at officers during her arrest. The PS amnesty was a calculated risk. Its supporters later said that the amnesty' separated AD from imprisoned autonomists and a budding prisoners’ rights movement that could have given it a sociological base. The examples of Italian terrorist prisoners and AD’s prison agitation in the late 1980s give this argument considerable weight (see below). d'itis traction (public prosecutor) Jean-Louis Bruguiere noted that some AD members dropped out of the group after 1981. Rouillan moved to a squat in La Gouttc d’Or, a Paris neighbourhood inhabited by Arab, African and other minority immigrants. The area’s cheap housing contrasted with the gentrification and sky-rocketing rents found elsewhere in the city. In a building in which Rouillan then lived, police later found arms that had been used to attack the Israeli embassy. This indicated that AD leaders rejected left-wing reformism and wanted to rally a movement for revolutionary' change. Rouillan and Menigon seem to have considered establishing a legal community and an immigrant-rights organization, but then decided that the PS government was a greater threat to revolutionary' ideals than a right-wing one. Like the members of the Lyon group, they decided that the PS-PCF had become social-democratic pro-American sell-outs.

The Paris organization slowly regrouped. It carried out a series of mischievous acts that recalled gauc/nsme and GARI. However, the assaults steadily became more menacing and indicated far-reaching plans. One of the first was the theft of PS secretary' Lionel Jospin’s car from a car park J[lJ] After this, ten people were injured when militants attacked the Paris Intercontinental Hotel to demand the liberation of imprisoned activists. An anti-goinfrerie (anti-piggery) strike on the La Tour d’Argent restaurant vandalized the ground-floor entrance. Twenty people left behind a tract from Wows’. The group 'Radiate/ (Bom bears aitonyrnes pour la defense des incarceres tres excites par Robeiyf* then attacked the Toulouse Palais de Justice. Overtly terrorist tactics began to appear. Wows’ set fire to a Paris Comite de probation (Probation Commission) annexe and vandalized a statue of Saint-Louis in Vincennes. ‘Gawm’, in a got/c/mte style of attack assaulted a fine foods store and painted the stock.[21] A Comite unitaire de defense des prisonniers politiques (Unitary Committee for the Defence of Political Prisoners) invaded the editorial offices of the newspaper Quotidien de Paris and demanded that the morning edition include a page about the prison hunger strike. Fifty people occupied AFP (Agence France Prase) offices and released a news item that falsely reported the death of a hunger-striker. The Comite Riposte d la repression en Algerie (Algerian Repression Reprisal Committee) occupied LeMonde offices. On the day of Anwar Sadat’s murder, AD supporters invaded the sets of the FR3 television station during a programme about him.

Despite mounting violence, the hunger strike tactics of AD prisoners were very effective. Menigon was released from prison after 20 days without food?[2] She was told to return to court for judgment, but disappeared into clandestine existence until 1987. After her release, Rouillan participated in the occupation of a vacant building along with the Association des ouvriers-paysans du 18eme arrondissement (Worker-Peasant Association of the 18th arrondissement), an organization representing neighbourhood squatters. Other AD militants moved into Turkish immigrant squats. The influence of GARI began to decline. Attacks became more deadly, made less and less social ‘commentary[1], and began to threaten openly that violence would escalate if the group’s demands were not met. A good example of this trend were the four butane-gas cartridge explosions that hit symbols of consumer luxury at the end of 1981. A Rolls Royce dealer, the expensive Train Bleu toy shop, the Bolinger brasserie on the Place de la Bastille, and a Burberiys clothing store all suffered damage.

Violent as they were, the incidents were only the beginning of the radicalization of the Paris group. The two organizations’ different orientations became obvious in 1982, when they split into autonomous units. The Paris group emerged as ADi, It slowly forged its West European and Middle Eastern links into a functioning network. The Lyon wing, ADn, concentrated on the same types of targets as the original group, later adding others linked to apartheid. It generally had a more ‘traditional’ approach. In contrast, ADi began to see imperialism as the great danger to revolution and started an assassination campaign io combat ‘world imperialism’. Its units were named after revolutionary ‘celebrities’ in the US, Ulster, the Middle East, West Germany and Italy. ADn occasionally referred to world imperialism but largely concentrated on France. For distinct reasons, both groups regarded the Mitterrand presidency as a travesty of French left-wing values. In true gauch refashion, ADn attacked Mitterrand for his role as a Fourth Republic interior minister. Increasingly disgusted with former gauc/ristes who became political and business leaders, ADi abandoned such criticism and portrayed Mitterrand as a US stooge.

As it developed its international network, ADi started to hit geo-political targets,

ADi and ADn were less vulnerable, but even more ‘factional[1] after their 1982 reorganization. Units were modelled along the lines of resistance movement cells of five or six members who seldom met. Militants adopted cover lives and timed attacks to reflect constraints. AD leaders believed that French police were off-duty at weekends and scheduled actions accordinglyAbout 40 robberies during 1982-84 financed the operations of both sections and provided them with military training. The windows of their Renault 20s bristling with weapons, neither organization any longer hesitated to shoot or kill to defend itself. Heightened militancy was also displayed when both groups participated in FARL (Fractions armees revolutionnaires hWmues - Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Fractions) attacks on an Israeli defence ministry commercial mission and a wellknown Jewish delicatessen in Paris, and in the murder of Israeli diplomat Youri Barsimantov. Police then discovered an arms depot[25] that led to the arrest of Joelle Aubron and Mohand I lamami?’’ Some of the weapons had been used in FARL attacks[25] as well as to murder police informer Gabriel Chahine/* Chahine’s murder foreshadowed later ADi violence and revealed a determination to avenge perceived wrongs. Realizing that the 1980 arrests resulted from disorganization and poor logistics, ADi moved to cut off loose ends. The first was Chahine, a former member of AD’s wwiowe” who became an informer for the Benseignerncnh;ge/ieraux (RG). Release from prison, a new political climate and re-evaluation of the struggle’s 'needs[1] thus propelled an increasing ‘professionalization[1]. In a crude parody of what it saw as ‘legality’, ADi henceforth executed death sentences.

A second phase in AD’s ideological development was linked to changed international conditions. Concern over ‘Americanization’ was stimulated when US President Ronald Reagan attended the Versailles summit. In May 1982, AD sympathizers were found distributing a tract calling for ‘armed demonstration[1] against his visit.[28] The tract was a taste of things to come. Opposition to US-led European ‘homogenization[1] later became a major ADi theme. It motivated explosions that were set at the EcoIe americaine, European World Bank headquarters and IMF offices by the Unite combattante Farid Benchellal. The assaults were prototypes for later ADi and ADn actions. Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon strongly affected AD and led to intensified cooperation with FARL. The latter set an explosion under a US embassy car in Paris that killed two police bomb specialists. The logistical involvement of AD was confirmed by captured arms and explosives. Ex-GARI militants Camillieri, Grosmougin and Chibaud were then traced to a FARL bomb that had exploded under an

Israeli diplomatic vehicle and injured 51 people.[29] More AD-FARL connections were established when Oriach and Christian Gauzens[30] were arrested. Authorities seized 40 file-cards containing information about Jewish businesses in Paris. A letter by Oriach was discovered in which he specified his role in FARL attacks?[1] Despite FARL ties, however, ADi and ADn were now divided. They split completely and permanently in August 1982. Olivier’s group began independent operations, ADi articulated its new orientations into goals: a 'political military front"; opposition to NATO-controlled homogenization; links to foreign terrorists;[32] BRstyle assassinations; and ties to Third World revolution. Several members of Italian COLP joined ADi’s new 'international’?[3]

Action direcle nationale

ADn launched its independent operations with a series of bloody robberies. It had committed many in the Lyon-Saint Etienne region between 1980 and 1982 under the name/l^c/zf w/gt’ (AR - Red Poster)?[4] After 1982, AR was dropped in favour of the name 'AD’. AR and AD Paris had cooperated and coordinated actions, but never merged. Each had distinct views regarding the use of violence and choice of targets. Unlike ADi, ADn never turned to systematic assassination. Decentralized operations had suited both groups’ belief that structures were a problem in themselves rather than a solution. The split confirmed Olivier in his position as the group’s revolutionary guru. His relationship with Maxime Frerot[35] shows that he demanded and received devotion. His authoritarian personality' dovetailed with Maoism and had also probably hampered cooperation with AD Paris?[6]

More financially orientated than the Paris group, AR brutally treated anyone in the path of its bank robberies. The group’s attitude directly transposed the GP view that police personnel and minor officials were 'enemies of the people". Henri Delrieu was killed in the first AR bank robbery[1] in October 1980. In March 1981, Frerot assaulted an employee in a Credit Lyonnais bank. A policeman was killed in one Paris BNP robbery. A bank employee was stabbed in another that seized only 400,000 francs. In a Societe Lyonnaise bank robbery, AR escaped with 40,000 francs but shot police brigadier Guy Hubert. In December 1981, Frerot attacked another Credit Lyonnais employee. Still later, a BNP manager was stabbed. AR also engineered a bomb scare in a TGV (train de grande vitesse - bullet train). After ADn emerged, the pattern continued, In July 1982, Frerot shot a bank cashier in the temple. A bank client was shot in the stomach in July 1983, Police general Guy Delfosse was murdered by Olivier, Joelle Crepet[37] and Frerot in a March 1984 BNP hold-up?* The

Lyon group claimed that its cruelty was revolutionaiy, that policemen and bank employees were allies of capitalism, and that financial operations and symbolic attacks were the same, After the split, the Lyon section continued to use the methods employed in 1979-82 (bombing public buildings in Paris and hold-ups in Lyon). In a 1982 robbery, it added political content by forcing a bank manager to display a list of demands to journalists. The Lyon group opposed 'Americanization[1], condemned the Versailles summit and invasion of Lebanon, and established FARL ties, but did not frame its actions in a comprehensive reinterpretation of conditions. AR’slast acts were to spray gunfire at the Paris Bank of America in May 1982, threaten the American Legion branch with a bomb in June, and bomb three Lyon companies for their ‘links to colonialism’ in July.

ADn strove to show its anti-imperialist credentials in response to Israel’s Lebanese invasion. The stance was not original at all, since the French extreme-left strongly criticized Israel after the Six-Day War. However, the intensity of ADn’s techniques bears mention. A July 1982 attack hit two Israeli companies: Bank Leumi and Ganco. The Unite combatlante Marcel Rayman machine-gunned an unoccupied Israeli diplomatic car and bombed the Discount Bank (a subsidiary of the former Rothschild Eurofleenne des Banques) in August. Unite combaitante LahouariFarid BenchellaP hit the Nemor company, a Jewish-owned business that it accused of trading with Israel, An explosion severely injured a passer-by at a firm that imported citrus fruits, Cirrus GMBI of Israel* A demand for immediate Israeli withdrawal from Beirut was painted on a nearby wall* If this did not occur, ADn threatened to kill 'Zionist* financiers and propagandists. The offices of the extreme-right monthly Alwitfe were then severely damaged by an explosion set to demonstrate ADn solidarity with the Palestinian people. The paper supported the Israeli invasion,

The anti-imperialist themes of 1982 were superseded by French military and foreign policy targets In 1983-84. The shift coincided with the PS 'move to the right’ after a disastrous debut in state economic management in 1981-82. In August 1983, ADn attacked the offices of the PS and the defence ministry to protest against their African policy and demand withdrawal from Chad. The Sendees techniques de construction navale (Technical Sendees for Naval Construction) and de la

marine natiemate (National Navy Career Documentation Centre) were hit, as was the prestigious Cercle militaire officer club. In November, other attacks struck the Mmaw rfWwWand the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. ADn explained the attacks as a response to collusion between religious institutions and military authorities. French imperialism was targeted by the ADn Commando Hienghene in December 1984, when it hit RPR and Eif-Aquitaine offices/[0] Elf-Aquitainc owned shares in Le Nickel, the largest mining company in New Caledonia, In the meantime, the arrest of Emile Ballandras removed a seasoned militant and so prepared the ground for ADn’s eventual dismemberment,[41]

In 1985, ADn targeted national organizations and firms linked to South Africa and racism. Powerful blasts rocked the Bank Leumi, Office national de rimmigration (ONI - the government immigration agency) and Minute. Others struck Paris IMF headquarters, Telecommunications radioelectriques et telephones (TRT - Radio and Telephone Telecommunications) and the /i/wwyw/fe Telecommunications (SAT - Telecommunications Limited, specialists in infra-red equipment). The latter two firms had defence ministry contracts. On 4 September, powerful bombs hit companies linked to South Africa,[42] injuring two people and causing serious material damage. The attack tried to integrate ADn into the anti-apartheid movement shortly after demonstrations against French investment in South Africa. At the same time, ADn began systematically to attack leperrisme, which had burst onto the political scene after the June 1984 European parliamentary elections. The group bombed the Aton de la Radio, the television network Antenne-2 and the Haute autorite de Taudiovisuel in October 1985 to protest against radio and television appearances by Le Pen. The Afa/stM la Radio explosion created a one-metre hole in a concrete facade and destroyed three trucks. Six storeys of windows were shattered atziw/Ctiftf’-Z The Haute autorite de Taudi&visuel[4i] explosion was a protest against Le Pen's appearance on a respected current

affairs programme, L "heure de verite. The attack by Commando AhmedMoulay damaged vehicles and broke windows over a 200-metre radius?[4] Apartheid was again targeted in October. Explosions hit the airline Union des transports aeriens (UTA) and the shipping firm

Commando B. Moloise declared that the attack was a protest against the hanging of a black activist in Pretoria.

In 1986-87, many observers expected yet more violence, but ADn was dismantled, The heavily-armed Olivier and Bernard Blanc[4]* were arrested on 28 March 1986. About 150 kilograms of documents seized at the time publicly confirmed the separate existence of ADn. Crepet was arrested as she flushed a bundle of burnt papers down a lavatory in her apartment, where police discovered ADn’s ‘archives’/[7] The material led to the arrest of Pascale Turin/[4] Jean-Pierre Succab[49] and Alain Eket/° By 1986, investigators knew that ADn resembled a charismatic sect and had little connection to ADi. They also realized that it was more ideologically ‘conventional’. ADn concentrated on the ‘colonialist and imperialist French capitalist state’. Wien not robbingbanks, it undertook symbolic attacks in the 197980 AD style. ADn regularly conducted political actions in Paris and armed hold-ups and murders in Lyon after 1982-83. Its national focus helped police learn more about its operations: carefully prepared hold-ups; avoidance of telephone contact; episodic ties between members; and independent cells.

In a final blaze of defiance, ADn’s remnants soon struck at South Africa-related targets. Bombs exploded at Thomson computer andyftr /iquide offices in July 1986.[51] State-owned and the ONI were

also bombed to protest against the expulsion of illegal immigrant workers by the Chirac government. AirMinerve flew 101 persons to Bamako, Mali on 18 October 1986. It was one of France's largest expulsions of illegal foreign workers to date. In November, explosions at Peugeot, Total petroleum company and the Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann industrial group caused severe material damage. The bomb at Peugeot dug a 50-centimetre hole, broke windows and metallic door covers and destroyed building facades. Commando Clarence Payi-Sipho Xulu[51] said the attack was a protest against French support for apartheid. The act coincided with a private wit to France by South African President Botha.

At large until November 1987, Frerot’s determination and skill aroused serious concern. In April 1986, he murdered the Black and Decker France director, Kenneth Marston (a British national), in Lyon. He then bombed Lyon American Express and Control Data offices. Slogans nearby read: *US go home'. Unsure of Frerot’s intentions, authorities were shaken by a May explosion at a Paris police station. The perpetrator wrote 'Insecurity and death to cops’[53] on a wall. In July, Frerot and Gilbert Vecchi planted a 10-kilogram bomb in Brigade de repression du banditisme (BRB - Banditry Repression Brigade) offices in central Paris. It killed division inspector Marcel Basdevanc, seriously wounded four policemen, and injured 20 other people.[54] Investigators quickly arrested persons known to assist and shelter Frerot.[55] A car-bomb killed Alain Peyrefitte’s chauffeur in December. Police then arrested Vecchi, who said Frerot was living in squats in north Paris. Police believed that he was trackingjudge Bruguiere. In January 1987, a security guard found a live grenade hanging on a nylon string in front of Bruguiere’s apartment door?[6] Frerot was finally captured in Lyon on 27 November 1987[s7] as he tried to steal a Mobylette in an underground car park. Security guards later testified that they were only saved by the poor quality of his hand-gun. However, Frerot did not resemble a vicious killer and seemed to have been a terrorist despite fragility' and self-contradiction. He had avoided capture for some 20 months by renting an apartment in central Lyon, relying on the help of female lovers, and getting money in bank robberies. He had a typed list of targets with him that included Fabius, Jospin, Guy Lux, Charles Pasqua, Maurice Papon, Bernard Pons and 100 other public figures. Beside Charles Hernu’s name were noted his car licence plate numbers and arrival and departure times from work. By Edgar Pisani’s name were written down the stores he patronized, the timing of his apartment building hall lights and his car ignition key number. When Chirac visited Lyon, Frcrot noted his helicopter landing time, the make-up of his escort and flight number. On 28 December 1987, Bruguiere received a letter from ‘AD’ that wished him a ‘Merry Christmas 1987k It promised another Christmas in 1988 only if he stopped investigations.

/Irtw/i directe miernaiitmaJe

GARPs influence predisposed ADi toward more systematic international links. Ties to the Belgian CCC were discovered after Menigon was severely injured in a car accident in the company of its leader, Pierre Carette.[38] ADi-CCC ties came fully to light in 1984. The targets and style of 13 CCC attacks between 2 October and 11 December 1984 closely resembled those of ADi: Belgian political parties; an air base; Litton Business International;[59] and three foreign companies working for NATO. ADi denied any connection with the CCC but Belgian police assumed that it provided assistance. COLP member Rizzato’s death on 14 October 1983 indicated yet more links to the Euro-terrorist network. The French government outlawed AD after a bloody FARL attack on the Rue des Rosiers. A serious hunt for ADi militants, arms and hide-outs began. In September 1982, explosives Avere found at a rural commune and about 20 AD militants were arrested. Militant Eric Moreau[60] barely escaped capture and Oriach, who came out on the ADi side of the split, w as arrested in October/[4] The rest of ADi committed no acts of terrorism between 18 August 1982 and August 1983, but several incidents occurred. Police officers Emile Gondry and Claude Caiola were shot on 31 May 1983 while attempting to check identity papers on the Avenue Trudaine. An area resident had unknowingly rented a nearby studio apartment to ADi members that was serving as a hide-out. Her testimony substantiated charges against Schleicher and Claude and Nicolas Halfen/’[2] A warrant of arrest was issued after Rouillan claimed responsibility for several attacks in an August 1982 internew with Liberation. Another warrant was issued for him and Menigon in connection with the July 1983 robbery[7] of the ‘Aldebert’ jeweller.

NATO, the French Defence Ministry and military[7] equipment suppliers were ADi’s main targets in 1984. Its once eclectic methods and orientations w ere increasingly supplanted by calls for impassioned acts. In this way, the group resembled more and more other West European terrorists. This ‘internationalization[5] and rapprochement to RAF methods and ideology[7] continued. Inge Viett, an important RAF figure in hiding in Paris, began to help the group. In January 1984, the arms manufacturer PanhardLavessor was bombed in protest against French intervention in Chad,[63] In February, Paris police arrested Italian extreme-leftist Vincenzo Spano on the same day that the BR and FARL murdered American general Leamon Hunt, chief of the Sinai multinational force, in Rome. The assassination was a model for subsequent ADi attacks.[M] In July 1984, the QwZre de HecAere/jes r/ i/f Constructions Afe/fc (Naval Construction and Research Centre) was bombed by Commando La/ionwri lurid BencAella/. The Institut Atlantiqne des Affaires Internationales (Atlantic Institute of International Affairs) and a building housing NATO pipeline management offices were hit by Commando Ciro Rizzuto. In August, a bomb injured six passers-by at the European Space Agency just 48 hours before the tenth/lriflw satellite was launched from Kourou, French Guiana. Police found die acronym AD and Rizzuto’s initials on site. Soon after, a 23-kilogram car-bomb was planted near the West European Union (WEU), an organization that ADi denounced as an imperialist tool. Menigon telephoned neighbourhood police, the rescue service and AFP to warn of an impending explosion, but was not taken seriously. Police towed away the car for violating traffic laws and only located the bomb four days later. The explosives were part of an 800-kilogram stock stolen in Ecaussines in Belgium. In another strike at the military industry, Messier-Hispano-Bugatti computer services and the Marcel-Dassauk company were bombed in October 1984. In December, an RAF attack on a West German NATO military college failed, but led investigators to another 24 kilograms of explosives from Ecaussines.[65] ADPs international ties evolved steadily into an alliance with the RAF.

The authorities kept up the pressure on ADi. Twice, Rouillan and Menigon were nearly captured. On 4 February 1984, they barely eluded a police drag-net. In March, they took a Belgian police inspector hostage in order to escape arrest. The incident proved that they used Belgium as a refuge. This close call led to a major operational change. In March 1984, the four ADi leaders moved to a farm called Le Gue Girault in Vitry-auxLoges near Orleans, which served as a base until their arrests in 1987. The contrast between the group’s hide-out and its orientations is striking: while it broadened its international scope, ADi settled into everyday life in rural France. However, ADi militants already in prison used a new arena of action. Their prison activities, which soon helped to provoke a prisoners’ rights movement, resembled those by other terrorist prisoners in France, West Germany and Italy. On 15 September 1984, Schleicher, Helyette Besse, Spano and the Halfen brothers went on hunger-strike to protest against isolation conditions and to demand visiting rights. They sparked a ripple of agitation that slowly spread through the facility. By 4 October, 635 prisoners were refusing to eat, in solidarity. Four of the five hunger-strikers stopped their protest on 24 October when a court allowed family visits. Claude Halfen refused to eat until 28 October to protest against the arrest of his girl-friend, Paula Jacques.

ADi activists not in prison steadily increased rhe level of international coordination. They were outraged that the PS was pursuing economic austerity, closer NATO ties, EC integration and Franco-German cooperation, On 15 January 1985, ADi and the RAF proclaimed a coordinated campaign against NATO and Franco-Gcrman cooperation. A communique declared that a ‘West European guerrilla war’ would compensate for the lack of ‘authentic revolutionary strategy*’ in the West European ‘imperialist centre’. The two groups believed that attacks on NATO structures, military bases, strategists, plans and propaganda constituted a ‘proletarian political strategy in modified political circumstances’. Their call for a guerrilla struggle was justified by reference to Euro-missile installation, WEU renewal, the setting up of a French rapid action force, NATO arms cooperation, discussions on West German force de frappe participation and French reintegration into NATO. The two groups began a strategy of steadily paced and precisely targeted violence that was backed by an international coordinating structure. Although a focus on NATO and Americanization reflects traditional West German extreme-left preoccupations, ADi was also reacting to the new domestic political consensus that groups like it traditionally abhorred. In this sense, its alliance was motivated by a coherent analysis of events. In 1985, France refused a Soviet demand to count its arsenal along with the West. Instead, France announced a new multi-warhead submarine that doubled its nuclear muscle. At the same time, a rapid action force came into service. The force made France the potential manager of a European theatre of war. ADi was clearly alarmed that the PS was diluting national independence. As such, French ‘Euro-terrorism’ was distinct from its populist, proletarian and Third World-oriented antecedents. It tried to integrate contemporary' international and domestic tensions into a revolutionary perspective. Organizationally, the ADi-RAF alliance attempted to compensate for the capture of 18 ADi militants after 1984 and lack of support. The group turned to international links to stabilize operations in the face of‘globalization’.

Coordinated Euro-terrorism had direct results. A CCC bomb exploded at a Brussels US Army social centre and killed an American guard. On 1 May 1985, the CCC killed two firemen when it bombed FEB (Federation des entreprises beiges - Belgian Enterprise Federation) headquarters in Brussels.*[6] In December, it attacked a NATO military oil pipeline control room in Belgium and the Agence cimtre-Europe d'exploitation (which managed Belgian, French, Luxembourg, Dutch and West German NATO pipe-

lines). AD prisoners again went on hunger-strike to support imprisoned West German terrorists. The Portuguese ‘Popular Forces of April 25’ fired mortars at three NATO frigates in Lisbon harbour. It also exploded bombs at a Portuguese air force base that destroyed the cars of West German military personnel. A communique demanded the base’s dismantlement and the departure of the personnel. In France, the ADi Commando Elisabeth-von-Dick assassinated General Rene Audran on 25 January’ 1985.[67] The general was director of international affairs at the defence ministry, in charge of French arms sales, contract negotiations and international arms cooperation. In February, the RAF Patrick O'Hara Commando™ killed Ernst Zimmerman, CEO of the military[1] engine and turbine manufacturer Aftftorew and Turbinen Union Muenchen GmbH, In June, the ADi Unite combaltante Antonio Lo Musico™ fired shots at Henri Blandin, the army auditor-general and director of special investigations. In August, the ADi-RAF George Jackson Commando bombed a US air force base in Frankfurt-Rhin-Main* Two Americans were killed and 11 people were injured.[70]

ADi’s internationalist phase neither sparked wider support nor sheltered the group from firm legal response. In fact, police investigations moved abroad. In June 1985, Bruguiere protested to Algeria that it was not cooperating in his search for Hamami and had not responded to an international warrant. He was soon allowed to pursue investigations in Algeria, but found no trace of Hamami. He learned that Algerian authorities had opened a file on Hamami after 1982, twice questioned him, and placed him under surveillance after French investigations established his role in the Avenue Trudaine shootings. Algeria promised legal action. Other international legal efforts led to arrests. RAF member Ingrid Barabass, spotted in Paris shortly before Audran’s murder, was arrested in Frankfurt in July 1985. Belgian police arrested four CCC militants in December.[71] They discovered that links between ADi and the CCC were personally maintained by Mcnigon and Rouillan. Their finger-prints and photos were found in two Brussels apartments belonging to Carette. Despite these tics, the CCC was not simply an adjunct of ADi. Investigations also spread to ADi’s domestic support. Material which

openly supported the extreme-left, Third World movements and AD, was seized in July 1985.[72] AD’s ‘financier’, Meyer Azeroual, was arrested in October.

ADi reacted to these arrests with a further escalation of violence. The victory of the right-wing opposition in die March 1986 legislative elections provoked a new series of attacks. The Commando Christos Kassimis[71] fired shots at CNPF vice-president Guy Brana in April, seriously wounding his chauffeur. Eye-witnesses heard machine-gun fire followed by three isolated shots. They said the assailants' weapons jammed. Brana was targeted because of his CNPF post, work as a Thomson naval armaments engineer, and membership of the CNRS (CrizZre national de la recherche scientifique - National Scientific Research Centre) industrial relations committee, Fifty people were questioned after the attack. Several were imprisoned after being found guilty of possessing arms and explosives. On 18 April, the public prosecutor began investigating Dr Jacques Darmon and Hamid LallaouiT Investigators discovered about 1,700,000 francs, five pistols, four revolvers, a rifle and ammunition in Darmon’s apartment, but could not substantiate charges.[75] On 23 April 1986 the Chirac government tried to intimidate an alleged AD network. Liberation offices were searched and journalist Gilles Millet (who had interviewed Rouillan in 1982) was detained. PSD (Vendredi, Samedi, Dimanche) journalist Marc Franceletwas held without charge.

Despite the pressure, ADi kept up a steady pace of attacks and robberies. It stole 88 million francs from a Banque de France in Saint-Nazaire, In May 1986 Commandos Christos Kassimis and/^f Kepa Crespo Ga/knde[n] attacked Interpol headquarters in Paris. A security' guard was wounded by machine-gun fire and a bomb seriously damaged the building exterior. A 12-kilogram bomb exploded outside OECD headquarters in July. Renault chief executive officer Georges Besse was murdered on 17 November 1986. He was shot by two women in front of his Montparnasse home. Besse had played a prominent role in France’s nuclear industry*, especially as head of the COGEMA nuclear company from 1976 to 1982. He accomplished a business turn-around at troubled Pechincy and was appointed Renault CEO by Prime Minister Laurent Fabius in January 1985. Besse helped stabilize a key public enterprise and rectify PS economic management in a crucial period. As a top administrator for ADPs hated reformist foes, he drew special wrath. Commando PierreOverney said his murder was parr of the ‘West European offensive’. ADi international connections and the Euro-terrorist phenomenon were then at their height. The group proclaimed solidarity with Libya after the US air strike on Tripoli and briefly appeared to be beginning independent operations in other European countries. On 9-10 April 1986, Air France offices in Lisbon were bombed while the French consul and the Institut Frarujais received threats.

The other organizations in the Euro-terrorist networks were also busy. CCC prisoners[77] went on hunger-strike on 9 May. They protested against prison isolation and demanded regular meetings, uncensored correspondence and the right to wear Chilian clothes. In June, two Americans and two Irish citizens were arrested in Le Havre as they tried to smuggle arms to Ireland. Arms destined for the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) were found in a camping vehicle that had been shipped from Los Angeles. ADi member Alain Pojolat was arrested in connection with the find. In Munich, Siemens co-director Karl-Heinz Beckerts and his chauffeur were killed by the RAF Commando Maria Cagol in JulyWest German police feared that the RAF was beginning a protest campaign over the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. ETA or IRA involvement seemed probable due to the attack’s sophistication. In October, the director of the West German foreign ministry policy branch, Gerald von Braumniuelh, was killed in Bonn by the "West European Revolutionary Front’. All of these incidents demonstrated hardened militancy and professional logistical preparation.

On 12 February 1987, a 26-pagc communique claimed responsibility' for Besse’s death and situated ADi at the heart of the 'Western’ revolutionary struggle, Authorities and the public feared that ADi violence would amplify in 1987. However, Rouillan, Menigon, Aubron and Georges Cipriani[74] were arrested at their farm and ADi was effectively decapitated. Along with arms, explosives, documents and money, police found plans to: (1) kidnap a leading industrialist who would have been held hostage in exchange for Schleicher; (2) attack a nuclear installation; and (3) assassinate public figures such as Robert Hersant, Alain Gomez (Thomson CEO), Jacques Amisonrouge (ex-third-in-command of IBM USA), Michel Droit or CNPF leaders.

Throughout their history, both sections of AD constantly sought support. Their failure to find support was largely because their political stance, while faithful to extreme-left traditions, was out of touch with contemporary realities. Unlike GARI and NAPAP, AD was formed after it was clear that the protest focus set by May 1968 and the gauc/iistes had shifted and that extra-parliamentarianism was generally in decline. Ignoring these facts, AD tried to secure the support it believed was latent in society. Eventually, the group split over disagreements as to how[r] to proceed. The Versailles summit played a role in this evolution since the Paris group used it as an opportunity' to specify its views on the US. After the split, both groups continued to look for an issue to muster support. This led ADi to coordinate actions with West German, Belgian and Italian organizations?[0] Ironically, the arrest of ADi had more political impact than did most of its actions since politicians used the group to show the toughness of their law and order policies?[1]

As shown above, AD and its progeny had legitimate roots in French extreme-leftism, Ideological motives played a cardinal role in the development of the organizations and their terrorist campaigns. However, the history' of the group also demonstrates that the two organizations lost touch with the evolution of the populist traditions that nurtured them. Rather than admitting that revolutionary tactics were inappropriate to conditions in the late 1970s and 1980s and engaging in a re-evaluation of goals and methods, the group embraced ‘revolution’ as an article of faith and brutally tried to force events to conform to its vision. Despite several dramatic incidents, the relatively effective dismantling of AD shows the folly of a revolutionary ideology that fails to examine soberly its potential support and proceeds in an elitist fashion. The following chapter, which focuses on the ideologies of the two groups, shows how they justified the strategy.

5 The Ideological Trajectory of Action directs. Radicalization and Violent Protest

Vive le terrorisme! Enfin la France s 'relate!"

The following discussion of AD’s ideology' specifies the links between AD[T]s ideology, French political culture and the revolutionary tradition. First, it elucidates how the revolutionary origins of the host culture were interpreted by the group, outlines why AD viewed violence as a logical course of action, and shows how the organization evaluated changes to and within French political regimes* Second, the discussion traces the evolution of AD’s ideology and demonstrates how it influenced the original group’s split into two organizations* The evolution, which covered three phases (1979-81,1982—84 and 1985-87), reveals the national and international foci that underlay AD actions. The split was certainly influenced by personalities and geographic location, but received crucial impetus from belief systems. Third, the examination provides a foundation from which to analyse the link between ideologies and the actions of both groups. In ADi’s case, the motives underlying its decision to use assassination will be specified. ADn, as will be shown, remained ideologically closer to French extreme-left precedents. The analysis shows that both organizations had rational motives, but ultimately misjudged contemporary French political realities*

Both sections of AD advocated the revolutionary transformation of French society[7]. However, conditions imbued this principle with a particular character. An examination of approximately 200 pages of AD documents shows that its attempt to mobilize a social group that would embody revolutionary transformation became a ‘search for a revolution*. The texts outline AD’s purposes and notion of political power, and analyse French and international conditions. Although AD tried to justify violence as an extension of French left-wing traditions, its ideology' demonstrates that the group was less revolutionary and more protest-orientated than initial impressions suggest. In addition, both groups had motives that evolved over time. ADi’s ideological evolution culminated in an assassination campaign. It was never a strong movement that threatened the establishment, only a marginal organization that sought a social ‘carrier’. ADn decided that violence should embody the radical tr aditions of the extreme left, but often veered into brutality'. Desperate for support, both groups ignored the fact that violence ‘should not take the place of the political purpose, nor obliterate it’.[2] ADi hoped that terrorist tactics would attract a group willing to engage in revolutionary[7] guerrilla warfare. However, its increasingly deadly campaign juxtaposed a growing political consensus. The conditions for guerrilla war did not exist and die Fifth Republic further solidified under Mitterrand. As a result, ADi’s violence came to express its fringe status more than a threat The group physically menaced officials in government, international organizations and business, but neither institutions nor the regime itself. The disjunction between AD’s analysis and conditions was rooted in nostalgia and political romanticism. AD, even more than its gauchiste predecessors, devoted its energies to a class that was uninterested in revolution.

In 1979, and May 1968 still appealed to some groups. The

original AD recognized this and tried to attract support from the autonomists, which it hoped would be a new revolutionary class.[3]1 laving observed the development of an Italian autonomist movement, AD’s leaders thought there was potential to use fringe groups to radicalize the political situation. They believed that the Italian move toward a left-right consensus (the ‘historic compromise’) was analogous to the PS-PCF union of the left and that autonomists might similarly radicalize French politics. AD set up a loose network structure that emulated the GP. The network was also designed to attract autonomist support by expressing socio-economic discontent and protesting left-right collusion. French political circumstances in the late 1970s facilitated ideological and organizational heterogeneity[7]. AD believed that violent groups like the autonomists could be springboards for revolution in a changing situation. The view was again influenced by Italian groups that concentrated on

the experience of proletarian youth associations. These associations were communes set up by squatters in certain neighbourhoods of big cities; young proletarians thus organized territorially and experimented with forms of collective-life-m-transformation/

On the basis of analogies it drew between France in 1979 and Italy in 1976-77, AD tried to ‘accelerate’ political events. However, a desire for acceleration blinded AD to several factors. Primarily, the group ignored the fact that Italian autonomists and the BR had contradictory[7] tactics. In particular, the Italian autonomists

refused to see the military organization as an autonomous political body or as an ‘armed party’. The strength of the Red Brigades is thus directly proportional to the weakness of the Movement. . . terrorism created a situation of crisis for the revolutionary movement, or rather inserted itself into a pre-existing crisis of the Movement/

More seriously, AD misjudged French conditionsIt interpreted the cynicism of the late 1970s as grounds for a revolutionary' movement. The error can be explained by a myopic concentration on Italy, the RAF, Third World liberation movements, May 1968[h] and Roui Ilan’s personal experience.

AD’s 1979—81 ideology stands out from the more elaborate justifications for violence that ADi later developed. To attract the autonomists, AD focused on the daily difficulties of working-class youth and immigrants: unemployment, rising prices and scarce housing. High-technology was added to its list of concerns in 1980, After attacking CII-Honeywell officers, Clodo said computers are ‘the favoured tool of people who dominate. They serve to exploit, to document, to control and to punish/* AD explained domination as the logical consequence of the French imperialist system. The view was repeated after DST offices were bombed in 1980: ‘After Kolwezi, Gafsa, Djibouti, etc,, Barbes sends you greetings. Signed: Action directed The message linked domestic conditions to foreign policy in Zaire, Djibouti and Tunisia.[111] It attacked Giscard d’Estaing’s African policy, an area that is a traditional presidential prerogative. The close link AD drew between internal and external policies was expressed in reference to ‘Barbes’, a colloquial manner to refer to a poor Paris neighbourhood with large Arab and African communities, Barbes-Rochechouart. AD believed that domestic problems and neocoionial ties were part of the imperialist system of domination. A bonjour from Barbes was intended to remind the government that real human problems and significant unrest existed in its Parisian backyard,

[{]Communique numero 77[1] released after an attack on the Ministry’ of Cooperation, had the same focus. The ministry" administers French government programmes in Africa. The text again cited Gafsa and Djibouti and added Djamena (Chad) and Bangui (Central African Republic) to argue that French army presence in these cities ensured ‘the prosperity of the neo-colonialist merchandise and labour trade’/[2] Decrying the ‘civilizing mission[1] that underlies African policy, AD charged that ‘the entire French policy stinks’/[1] It described the civilizing process as the work of French police, stating that all ‘those who bludgeon have the same face’ at home and abroad?[4] Like the GP, AD called for revolutionary acts everywhere against the French state (‘the slave-trading state’) in order to assist a global struggle against the French imperialist system: "to struggle against French imperialist policy in Africa is also to struggle against the entire range of French state institutions’?[5]

‘Communique No.2'[b] was a more radical text that was released as more violent AD attacks occurred. The text negatively evaluated the new PS government Referring to the jail conditions of Gilles Collomb, an AD member held in isolation,[17] AD said that ‘the Socialist state pretends to have ended arbitrary treatment, but imposes isolation on Gilles because he claims political prisoner status’?* The group said claiming political prisoner status was ‘refusing consensus’?’ The point of view reappeared in later communiques. AD charged that the ‘annihilation of imprisoned proletarians is a fact in today’s social democratic state’[20] and made the administration indistinguishable from previous right-wing ones. The charges expressed AD’s conviction that the PS government was impeding and discrediting radical social ideals. Combating the PS subsequently became central to AD*s evolution, including the Lyon-Paris split. The two wings disagreed over the implications of a PS administration. Both were profoundly suspicious of the parliamentary left, as the revolutionary left has been since the Third Republic.[21] The distrust was based on a belief that political reform is "false’ and that installing a regime based on popular sovereignty' is the only ‘authentically’ revolutionary' course of action. The Paris group believed the PS was betraying the working class much as the leftand right-wing establishments had always abandoned the ‘people’. The divergent interpretations were fundamental to the 1982 split.

idevtogy of Action directe nationale

ADn was less ideological and more dangerous to the general public than ADL Its actions included many robberies. xADn favoured an issue-based approach over a comprehensive analysis of conditions. Between 1982 and 1987, ADn concentrated on issues such as decolonization, the Middle East conflict, French militarism and imperialism, and racism. The orientation continued the original AD ideological trajectory. AR[22] tracts supported decolonization: ‘we use arms to expropriate capital for the benefit of struggles for total decolonization’?[3] AR demanded independence for French overseas territories and an end to paternalistic African ties: "all of France demands liberty and independence for the Polish people. What about French overseas departments and territories and African countries?’[24] ADn later opposed the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Its support of the Palestinians was mixed with anti-Semitism. ADn demanded an ‘immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli fascists’, and said that ‘if the Palestinians arc driven from Beirut, we will kill Zionist financiers and propagandists’?[5] Opposition to Israel and the US motivated attacks on Israeli, American, Jewish and extreme-right targets. At the same time, ADn attacked PS offices and the Ministry of Defence to show opposition to French colonialism and the military. These targets were regular and became ADn’s ‘signature’. ‘Indochine, Alg&ie, . . . Tchad?' linked French intervention in Chad to post-1945 South-east Asian and North African colonial wars and asked whether French colonialist troops were heading for a third defeat.[26] ADn’s demand for a withdraw al from Chad implicitly attacked Mitterrand’s African policy. ADn believed he was US manipulated and a traitor to left-wing principles: ‘after his Cancun farce, his godfatherstyle African tours, the little dictator from the Elysee has struck once more. Throwing a boomerang is a dangerous game/[27]

Attacks on Mitterrand continued in ‘D 'Oum-Chalouba au ChoJTavialion fran$aisepourstiit son entreprise criminelle',[1S] which criticized French policy in Lebanon: ‘as in all French-speaking colonies, the French army sets itself up in a foreign country and dares to invoke legitimate defence! The Nazis used the same arguments when they occupied France and struck out at anti-fascists of all nationalities.’[29] The text charged that French, 2^merican and Israeli imperialism was identical France’s security, police and military forces w[r]ere amalgamated into a repressive system in which the state ‘hunts down immigrant workers in France and conducts dirty wars thousands of kilometres away from Paris’?[0] Unlike foreign intervention, AD charged, domestic repression was ‘clean’. Like the BR, ADn hoped that terrorism would provoke the state into revealing its authentic character. The group called for a halt to racism and deportation of immigrant workers, withdrawal of French troops from Chad and Lebanon, and the liberation of all revolutionaries from French jails?[1] The focus on racism and immigrant workers accompanied the rise of FN support that culminated in its June 1984 European election breakthrough.

In 1983, ‘Opprimes de tons les pays: Get up, stand wp*?[n] explicitly linked Mitterrand to the military:

Tonton (Mitterrand) is there. And he knows how to sing a song of promises. Do you remember what followed the Cancun speech? - French-American-Zionist preparation of the Lebanese invasion - the Versailles summit comedy to cover up the start of the invasion - the French army landing in Beirut - military invasion of Chad?[3]

Beyond characterizing all imperialists as similar, ADn drexv little systematic connection between French policy and international structures. It viewed France as a colonial po^ver that obsessively clung to the vestiges of its past glory[T]. Mitterrand’s effort to rearticulate foreign policy was simply seen as evidence of his ‘sell-out’ to the US. The French state was seen as the same vehicle that had served wartime collaborators. ADn opposition to militarism extended to religious institutions, perhaps because of their high profile under Vichy, After bombing Paris diocesan offices and a Seventh-Day Adventist church, ADn declared: [£]war-mongering lovers of crusades calm down! No to Pershing and other “cruise” missiles. If the Catholic Church wants bombs, it’ll get them!. . .’[?4] This attempt to join the then widespread protests against the installation of Euro-missiles was particularly pathetic since it had no social basis. France was the only West European country’ in which an anti-Euro-missile movement did not develop.

ADn opposition to colonialism was expressed in Wotav/Zf-Ca/Afow Guerre de dosses'. The text declared support for the Kanak[M] fight against the exploitation and spoliation of their land by French settlers. It contrasted the Kanak struggle with the domestic opposition to granting immigrants municipal voting rights, ADn noted that French settlers in New Caledonia participated in an independence referendum and tend to vote RPR and FN:

Racist mayors, in the name of a mysterious holerance threshold[1] (I!), declare there are too many immigrant workers... coloured ones.. . in their districts. What can be said about the situation in New Caledonia, where 50,000 whites are installed without ever even having asked for at least a RESIDENCY PERMIT from the 60,000 Kanaks?[36]

ADn used the controversy to denounce Mitterrand again, ‘the little dictator who is sick of Chad’,[37] and the PS. Drawing a parallel between its support of the Kanaks and the Yellow-traveller’[31]* supporters of Algeria, ADn said that ‘some French gave their support to the Algerian FLN. We give ours to anti-colonial and anti-capitalist popular struggles.’[39] ADn argued that French colonialism was the work of a political and business elite dominated by Jews, characterizing the Elf-Aquitaine-owned SLN mining company as ‘a former property of the Rothschild mafia’,[411] Although anti-Semitism motivated many of its acts, ADn believed that supporting Third World peoples made it anti-racist. The text donnes d’un

point devue de dasse aux radstes de France et d'ailleurs: Touche pas a mon pote travailleur imntigre, d mon pote kanak, tdiadien, libanais, palestinien, etc.. ?[41] claimed that government policy towards Lebanon and South Africa resembled a domestic system based on:

judicial cover-up of racist crimes by the police in France;

firing and expulsion of many immigrant workers;

the racist policy of DUFOIX (head of the ONI) and the ONI (family reunification more precarious than ever, graft between Renault and the ONI regarding the nationality of African workers and therefore throwing into question assistance for repatriation, etc. . .);

opening French television studios, under police protection, to LE PEN, the Nazi, torturer of Algerians;

meetings held by this racist trash, once again under police protection.[41]

ADn said Mitterrand’s role in 'the great butchery in Algeria’[43] could only be redeemed by revolutionary' praxis and banning the FN. His implicit racism was allegedly expressed by the ONTs 'racist policy towards immigrant workers’, French backing for Israel’s 'Zionist exactions against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples’, and the role ofAfowteas 'one of the most virulent points of transmission of racist (Zionist, colonialist, antiimmigrant) propaganda in France’.[44] mewe camfcaP[45]

went further and paralleled the above to apartheid, ADn argued that by means of common policies:

The French and South African states are ready to do anything to hold on to their domination over the peoples they exploit. They are armed states. The French imperialist state maintains tens of thousands of military personnel on a war-footing at many points around the world.[46]

The group said French intervention in Chad and Lebanon was the same as the South African campaigns in Angola and Mozambique. It also compared housing conditions in France to those in South Africa:

Racial and class contempt determine the conditions for daily survival.

In France: overcrowded slums in the cities, and Sonacotra hostelbarracks and dormitory towns in the suburbs serve as precarious housing for immigrant workers.

In South Africa, there arc townships for black workers. The principle is identical. It is the principle of the GHETTO.[47]

In this light, ADn explained its violence as a response to growing French-South African ties Tollowing the rise to power of French social democracy’/[8] It said the links exemplified how the PS betrayed the left. After itemizing French involvement in the South African diamond, gold, banking, car, nuclear, military and uranium industries, ADn concluded that 'the ghetto blacks finished off by Pretoria begin to die in Parisian ministries’.[49]

Anti-racism was also used to justify opposition to lepenisme and assaults on the de la Radio and /Intone 2, ‘A7 radio, ni tele pour Le Pen'^ recalled that, despite an ADn demand for a ban on the FN, the latter was still legal and was now invited onto radio and television?[1] ADn said Le Pen’s function in French politics was to: (1) measure how far Avar’ against workers, immigrants and the colonized could go; (2) divide workers between racists and non-racists; and (3) be a sacrificial lamb’[2] preaching the French army’s warlike values. ADn said Le Pen’s media appearances legitimated and aided racism: 'the death of young immigrants in France is the result of what is said and what is done’?[1] Attacks on the media continued after publication of a Liberation interview with the son of a man Le Pen probably tortured to death in Algeria. *1957: RAS., 1985: RAS. ’ f R.A.S.: Nothing to report/)[54] mocked military parlance to advance ADn’s view that racists were killing and maiming as the PS tried to 'domesticate’ Le Pen through media access. The view underlined differences between the two ADs. Focusing on Vichy and petainisme, ADn argued that Le Pen was a counter-revolutionary who exemplified the French establishment’s reactionary character. ADi opposed Le Pen, but argued that 'imperialist’ projects conditioned domestic affairs.

Anti-racism also motivated an assault on Chargeurs-Reunis and UTA after black activist Benjamin Moloise was hanged in Pretoria and Kanak activists Machoro and Nonaro were murdered in New Caledonia. ADn charged that the latter killings ‘do not seem to be crimes for the socialdemocratic humanists since Badinter [PS justice minister at the time] covers them up by refusing to order an investigation’?* It claimed that violence against the companies modestly compensated for the pain that French capitalists inflicted on domestic, Kanak and South African workers. Similar anti-racist themes reappeared in 'Acs capitalists blancs fetent leur liberte'* which appeared after Mitterrand and Ronald Reagan jointly rcdedicated the Statue of Liberty[7] in New York City. Deploring the fact that 'the Franco-American couple has a champagne toast with the blood of blacks from Pretoria or New York townships’,[57] ADn said the ceremony only celebrated French subservience to the US and 'false[5] freedom:

Freedom for the Rambos who prepare class war: the NATOThomson agreement.

Freedom for the French capitalist state to assassinate the Chadian, Kanak, Caribbean, Corsican, Basque peoples thanks to the execuhonors in the G.I.G.N., G.A.L. and the army.

Freedom for 120 French enterprises and banks to collaborate with the fascist South African state.

Freedom for torturers in colonial wars.

Freedom for the fascist Le Pen and his spokespersons.

Freedom for the criminal Duvalier.

Freedom to return to the good old Vichy methods: informing and strengthening the police state, hunting down immigrants.

Freedom for bosses to lay off still more, always more.[5]”

Compounding ‘false liberty[1] cohabitation confirmed that the PS had ‘sold out’. ADn demanded tough measures against South Africa and the release of French political prisoners (that is, AD members) rather than a ‘social democratic/RPR media comedy’/* justified

violence as a response to the increased authoritarianism that allegedly resulted from cohabitation. ADn substantiated its claim by citing police brutality towards minor offenders: ‘in France, land of the white man's rights, we kill because people’s features offend us’.[61] Interior minister Charles Pasqua’s tough anti-terrorist legislation was particularly decried. ADn lumped him, the PS and employers together as a unit that enforced bourgeois domination.

’Oh a press? le citron, on pent jeter la peau'[hl] asked ‘from which countries did our armies ask for visas in order to colonize and massacre in Indochina, Algeria and Madagascar?’[61] The text directly linked Mitterrand and the PS with the extreme right:

Our African and overseas department and territory Bantustans make up a considerable reserve of new slaves. Deported to the land of ‘freedom’. Exploited by employers. Shot at on sight by the Le Pens. Thrown into detention camps already inaugurated by the fascist Mitterrand during the Algerian war/[1]

'L apartheid fa commence en France^' said again that violence responded to Franco-South African ties: ‘Colonial Europe, bulk with black, yellow, Arab and Indian sweat and corpses, conceived its offspring in the seventeenth century: South Africa. The white capitalist interest in pillage and massacre is the same in Paris as in Pretoria/[66]

ADn compared France’s colonial wars in Vietnam, Algeria and Madagascar to apartheid. It claimed that French presence in Africa and the Middle East was similar and that ‘apartheid is only one face of fascism’.[67] French votes at the UN and investment in South Africa allegedly revealed the true nature of the PS. Mitterrand and Chirac maintained global links ‘in memory of Petain’.[68] ADn said that denying voting rights to immigrants, imposing work visas on foreigners, expelling 1,700 illegal aliens between September and November 1986, and giving visas to Angolan rebel Jonas Savimbi, Botha and Jean-Claude Duvalier made France no better than South Africa. Even worse, ‘the media have supported white capitalist crimes against humanity[1] since the Indochinese wars[1]?[9] Throughout, ADn focused on French imperialism and its historical antecedents. The ‘traditionalism’ of its orientation is striking in comparison to the global perspective of ADi outlined below.

The ideology ofAction directe internationale

Tour un projet communis te[1] and ‘Sur Timperialisme americaitT™ set out ADi’s more far-reaching strategic and organizational orientations. The texts appeared just as ADi was aiding FARL attacks on Jewish and Zionist targets.[71] Tour unprojel communiste* presented a comprehensive analysis of political conditions. The group said an ideological response was needed to counter ‘the fantasies of hack journalism that is always eager for an “international plot” and some "kid from a good family who has turned out badly”’?[2] ADi attempted to rearticulate a revolutionary' stance in the context of a left-wing administration under a ‘Gaullist[1] regime. It called the PS-PCF government ‘socialist power mixed with a few Stalinists’?[1] Tour un projet wmmumste' concentrated on three sets of issues; (1) revolutionary organization and unity; (2) imperialism, employment and housing, and government attitudes to capitalism; and (3) the conditions for fulfilling a communist project. The group moved issues such as neo-colonialism, unemployment and immigration into a global context. At the same time, ADi reiterated GP concerns about the need for a social movement to back up revolutionary[1] groups. Like the early GP, ADi believed that a social movement would only develop after organized revolutionaries demonstrated that anti-government protest was viable and created an organization ‘capable of giving impetus to the revolutionary' movement in developed capitalist societies run by social democrats[1]?[4]

Tour unprojet eommunistd argued that Marxist-Leninism and anarchism are the models for left-wing revolution and that each had strengths and weaknesses. In hierarchical Marxist-Leninist parties, professional revolutionary leadership compensated ‘working class inability to go beyond trade-union consciousness and free itself of reformist and bourgeois ideological temptations on its own’?[5] For its part, anarchism gave revolutionary struggle dynamism through ‘spontaneity’ - or its present forms: creativity, desire . .. informal personal contacts, appropriation of daily life, concrete practice’?[6] ADi said the problem was that the two approaches polarized revolutionary action between bureaucracy (Marxist-Leninism) and disorganization (anarchism). It advocated workers’ councils to remedy ‘social democratic sinking into right-wing reaction or Stalinist “communism”*?[7] It did not consider the seizure ofinitiative orpropagation ofan idea by a minority of militants as a problem. On the contrary[1], it thought the approach challenged authority and accustomed individuals to participation. The position echoes the GP’s anti-hierarchical ideals. The group’s analysis was a form of neo-Maoism that contradicted French political traditions of individual passivity and recapitulated a penchant for enlightened elitism. It was also a variety of utopianism Typical of the French extremeleft fringe. ADi claimed that its positions reflected material restraints and a need for collective and individual self-development. Although it recognized that workers’ councils would probably not emerge following terrorism, ADi said it was organizing for a later revolution and hying to head off a counter-offensive against revolution ‘at the moment when the class enemy concentrates all of his strength and when his satellites encrusted in the movement try' to break it or divert it into a siding’ ™ ADi said terrorism simply concentrated on the essentials of revolutionary[1] struggle/[9] Although terrorist violence, ‘in effect, is not a thing that can be appropriated, but a moment in a process’,™ it is an unfortunate consequence of struggling against the bourgeoisie:

Violence is there, self-legitimated, since it is the logical form of expression for those humiliated and ridiculed by the mechanisms of the capitalist mode of production; and it is not only a desperate reaction born from misery, it is a hopeful action that aims to surpass exploitation and domination through revolutionary practice, /lefion direrte and all who share its reasoning are part of this process of rebellion/[1]

Unlike the GP, ADi argued that the alternative to violent struggle was obvious in the fate of the Prague Spring and Allende. It recognized that communism could not be built by guns, but insisted that weapons would guarantee survival. ADi believed that armed intervention in daily life would protect workers, ‘where the masses experience the dead-ends of their existence today and invent the forms of refusal that will underlie the organization of tomorrow’/[2] Like the GP, it supported regional, neighbourhood and workplace struggles by the exploited and oppressed. ADi described French imperialism as ‘the supreme stage of decaying capitalism”[13] whose decline stemmed from its internal contradictions: ‘dominant toward the Third World, dominated in relation to the EEC and American multinationals’/[4] The group said that the Leninist concept of imperialism centred on a handful of states that pillaged the world was inadequate and had been superseded by:

A system of determinants centred on technological pow[r]er and the dcculturation of the dominated through a Westernized model of production and consumption. With technology’ transfer, developing countries go indefinitely into debt and accept being governed by managers and technicians from developed countries or natives trained in their universities, which is sometimes worse . . . if Western cultural norms have succeeded in crushing all resistance, the popular classes will have acceded to it while sacrificing their entire lives to the dream: the residents of Latin American shanty-towns often possess a TV and a pick-up, sometimes even a car; at the same time, their children die of hunger and adolescents turn to prostitution in rich neighbourhoods/[5]

ADi said the global political economy was transformed after the US deliberately encouraged the 1970s petroleum crisis by the 'shutdown of the international monetary system to guarantee its power and stabilize the domination of developed countries’/[6] The result was allegedly a series of dominant-dominated negotiations that reproduced sterile managementtrade union talks and created an international economic supervisory system:

The key institution is the IMF, which among other things inspired Pinochet’s policies or the Turkish generals in the recent military takeover - 'the liberal change of direction’ - or again the draconian conditions that led the Italian government to ‘clean up’ the economic situation that resulted from the 'rampant May’ of 19 69 /[7]

In the new global order, nuclear, agro-industrial, electronic and computer developments have strengthened global imperialism, In its former African colonies, France already had structures for control. ADi charged that Soviet-US collaboration exacerbated underdevelopment since the 'superficial industrialization it entailed is turned towards the metropolises, obstacles to development are renewed and only immediate profit is favoured’/’ Domestically, ADi said, French capitalism negatively affected employment by encouraging speculation. The 1970s economic crisis obliged enterprises to cut employment, badly hitting women, minorities and older workers. Responsibility" for job creation was left to the government, whose ETT de travail temporaire - temporary work

enterprises) programme only demolished the 'right to work achieved at such great cost, while barring any possibility of a political programme made for workers’/[9] France’s entry into international economic competition in 1966-67 demonstrated that capitalists pursue their own interests. Companies relocated to the Third World, introduced high technology and reduced jobs through automation. In this light, ADi believed that the PS was continuing the work of right-wing governments: 'it is not the socialists who will really change things since their watchwords are rationalization and competitiveness’/[0]

ADi focused on housing issues since their connection to work conditions were seen as a base on which to build support: 'capitalists attack proletarians’ lives in the factor}, they pursue them into their neighbourhoods by demolishing their traditional habitat and all the class solidarities attached to it’?[1] In fact, the demolition and transformation of older Paris neighbourhoods under Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterrand and Mayor Jacques Chirac have profoundly changed the city. The Parisian working class was traditionally powerful because of the city’s high concentration of industry, housing, highly—ski lied workers and unionization: 'class struggle was physically written on the territory and architecture, with the bourgeois, their beautiful homes and grand boulevards in the west; in the east, the workers, their “ancient habitat”, the maze of little streets where they lived in misery?’[2]

Global competition, costs, automation and new housing have drastically altered Paris demography over the past 30 years. Most of the working class and industry have moved to the suburbs, away from traditional sites of labour conflict?[3] The move produced considerable stress, particularly since the freeing of older buildings fuelled real-estate speculation. ADi argued that the city’s high apartment vacancy rate showed that property' owners do not care about housing and iet rot perfectly habitable older lodgings that rapidly become, quite naturally, damaged, unhealthy, and have to be demolished in the name of urban hygiene’?[4] It added that insufficient public housing starts exaggerated speculation.

ADi used this analysis of imperialism and immigration, employment and housing, and living conditions to judge the PS-PCF. The group argued that, after the 1960s, an incoherent world economy was founded on ‘cynicism and contempt towards workers, peasants and students, and the generous distribution of gold to the financial oligarchy and higher state employees’?[5] The PS-PCF would not improve matters since European social democracy was a failure. ADi said that this was proved by the Front populaire, the Nazi extermination of the SPD and the fact that power structures are not altered by social democrats:

the economy remains completely dominated by the laws of capitalism and nationalization will not change a thing - is Renault not one of the spearheads of globalizing French capitalism, one of the promoters of the techniques of nationalization - capitalist modernization of the work process, a centre for social experimentation by employers?’*

ADi said improved planning, industrial policies, banking practices and employment regulations only reinforced French capitalism and excluded political or moral changes to economic behaviour. ADi vowed to fight an ‘orientation that only aims or leads to renewal of a productive mode that has crushed human life and dooms it to nuclear or ecological suicide[1].[97] Condemning PS housing, industrial and regional development, education, communication, media and immigration policies, ADi argued that positive social change could not occur through capitalist economic ‘restructuring’. This process only meant that the entire 'political class therefore fully plays the card of change within continuity and we can be sure that slander trill fall on those who advance a communist plan[5]/ ADi evidently did not believe that it would succeed, but felt validated by French revolutionary' traditions.

The final section of TWr un projet communist? concentrates on the 'forms of struggle’ needed to transcend Marxist-Leninism and anarchism. ADi criticized post-May 1968 anti-authoritarian ideologies as die expression of social groups (students, teachers, social workers and activists) that are unrelated to production. ADi said it could not support activism that favoured non-work, refusal to work and ‘a pro-situationist perspective that centres on celebration, games, the community, sexuality, etc.’.[99] It argued that such attitudes divided the anti-capitalist struggle into abstract categories and obscured revolutionary interests, and in this way served capitalist interests. ADi’s remedy was to develop ‘non-autlioritarian’ factory and neighbourhood organizations that would use armed struggle to affirm the interests of the exploited and oppressed/[10] Factories were therefore a 'privileged field of battle’ since they focused the struggle on restructuring (lay-offs, increased work pace, new control mechanisms, reduced job security) and facilitated worker self-organization. Like the LCR/’[1] ADi said technical and organizational skills would strengthen 'authentic proletarian internationalism[1] and coordination with Third World movements.

Capitalist restructuring w[r]as a central ADi concern. The group held that renewed economic growth, automation and computerization contradicted worker interests, strengthened exploitation and led to the decline of West European worker radicalism in the 1970s and 1980s. It argued that these changes detracted from the fight against international capitalism:

The present stakes for revolutionary organizations centre on understanding and being able to engineer a convergence of all struggle towards overthrowing the existing order. It is, for us, the communist project in the sense that Karl Marx said: 'Communism is the real movement that abolishes the existing state of things? The decisive thrust of the communist project will be the transformation of mass illegality into armed struggle.[102]

ADi advocated revolutionary violence as a response to restructuring and declining radicalism. ‘Political intervention’ in factories and neighbourhoods through ‘illegal forms’ was seen as a way to circumvent bourgeois limits on proletarian aspirations. Illegality also provided an opportunity ‘to bring about the appearance of mass illegality and coordinate it under the form of a counter-power’An anti-establishment movement would develop when workers realized that: (1) a military-political network to enlarge counter-power was needed; and (2) illegal force was not an end in itself and voluntarism and adventurism should be avoided. ADi called armed struggle the ‘new mass work, not only defence and reprisal, but the continuous anticipation of a movement’,’[04]

'Sur /'huperia/iSHie anteneaiff contended that the Versailles summit was the occasion for 'elaboration of a new global economic order”[05] in which the US redirected French foreign policy to suit its interests. Although the text reacted to a specific event, it also outlined positions on market deregulation, crisis management and emergence of the ‘new system of accumulation that gestated during the crisis’?[04] ADi said the US restructured the global division of labour in the 1970s and 1980s. It believed that the 1974-75 petroleum shock epitomized a global economic struggle. In the early 1980s, ADi argued, the US ruthlessly responded to new conditions. After a new crisis created a ‘world capitalist system’,[107] US economic weakness was obvious through its poorly mechanized tertiary sector, ‘more rigid norms and rhythms, [and] the collectivization of the productive process to blur the relationship between salary and individual effort’.[108] Increased costs had by this point destroyed the US lead in productivity, diminished its portion of global reproduction, shrivelled its multinationals’ share of global investment, helped Japanese and European firms rise to the top 100 international companies and weakened exports.[IW] The US responded by investing in the Third World and encouraging agriculture and advanced technology. ADi concluded that this ‘transition to a new system of accumulation and new model of global regulation”[10] made armed struggle necessary, especially since post-1960s movements used inadequate methods:

The assimilation of violent rebels like the Black Panthers and the industrial integration of the counter-culture, the normalization of deviances like drugs or homosexuality indicate that protest, if it does not attack the roots of capitalist power, can occur without major damage.[n]’

Taken together (they were published at roughly the same time), 'Pour un projet commumsfe* and *Sur rimperialisnie antericain[9] defined ADi orientations from 1982 to 1984 and set the ground for its assassination campaign. Following these guidelines, ‘Mm, wmiaftants juifi d'Ariion direct? . . said Israeli diplomats were ‘the police of US imperialism’.[112] Opposition to the new global divison of labour and absence of organized workers’ movements were used as the immediate justifications for violence. At another level, ADi was anxious to overcome its political isolation. It therefore announced ‘concrete goals’ based on general orientations set out in August 1982. The goals were: to develop a ‘political military front’ to oppose NATO-led European homogenization; to build links to likeminded organizations; to target individuals; and to act in solidarity with Third World revolution. The direct implications were soon revealed when the World Bank and IMF were attacked in order to oppose European homogenization.

By 1984, it was clear that ADi was grimly determined to battle against capitalism at all costs. au point No.2\ for example, stated that the police were entirely responsible for the Avenue Trudaine shootings: ‘two policemen did not foresee the results of their reaction. They bear die entire responsibility for the consequences?[113] ‘Mise au point No.3’ contended that extreme-left terrorism resulted from a West European social balance based on ‘the contradiction between die international proletariat and the imperialist bourgeoisie’?[14] The views of imprisoned ADi militants also hardened. /initiative du regroupement des nii/itants revoiutionnaires detenus (premiere partiey called arrest and imprisonment an

attempt to depoliticize our collective identity by reducing it to an individual criminal identity. It is an attempt to depoliticize the instrument that fundamentally characterizes our revolutionary existence: armed struggle for communism. To struggle against the attempt to annihilate politically our revolutionaiy subjectivity and against the forms through which this annihilation occurs, that is, through mystification, repression and isolation, is to struggle for the appropriation of social and communication space between ourselves and between the outside world and ourselves?[15]

ADi said the PS rejected revolution and refused to give AD prisoners political status because it accepted ‘bourgeois hegemony’. Imprisoned AD members thus had to resist the destruction of their human and political identities. The term ‘terrorist’ was seen as a further attempt to destroy revolutionary movements; ‘the entire Western bourgeoisie now uses the term against those who struggle for freedom and who, in this struggle, express an irreconcilable rupture with imperialist interests’?[1]* Spano said ‘terrorism’ referred to illegal groups, ‘the only context where it is possible to express oneself autonomously’?[17] He argued that demanding political status would draw[r] working-class prisoners into ADi’s struggle: a first step, even if partial, in the direction of practical criticism of the policy of prison differentiation, since it opens the possibility of a link (even if only at a level of general communication) between the struggle of revolutionary militants and the rest of the imprisoned proletariat.’[lS]

Since it saw European homogenization as equally threatening to the working class and prisoners, ADi argued that "the objective existence of militant revolutionary struggles in prison and the condition of the metropolitan proletariat detainees make the struggle one and the same*.’[14]’ Imprisoned ‘proletariats’ and militants joined the victims of bourgeois subjugation J[20] The point of view was echoed by other AD prisoners. Helyette Besse[121] demanded political status, family visits, unification of ‘revolutionary* prisoners, the right to hold meetings, an end to isolation conditions and denounced the extradition and deportation ofnon-Frcnch activists.[122] Schleicher said the prisoners’ hunger-strike was meaningful as ‘part of the overall framework in which the proletariat again takes an offensive to organize its freedom’?[21] Detention was ‘capital’s plan to individualize forcibly our identity'*, ‘the moment of unification between basic resistance and an organized offensive between the interior and exterior fronts’.[124] The prisoners said their ‘combat’ was jointly conducted ‘with our comrades in the Ped Army Faction[1]}[25]

Criticism of prison conditions accompanied increased ADi attacks on NATO and ‘Adanticist’ targets. An attack on the /nstitiif Allantique des Affaires Internationales allegedly hit a ‘cell for imperialist thought and propaganda’, ‘a point of practical convergence between various sectors of international capital, so-called scientific research and its military application’.[126] According to ADi, the institute’s directors, members and financing revealed its imperialist character:

The management is entirely American, enfeoffed to NATO. At the highest levels of the institute, representatives of transnational capital are found; thus Italy is represented by Fiat CEO Agnelli. Financing is done by private and state enterprises, the latter including Credit xAgricole, Elf-Aquitaine or Renault, but NATO ensures the main financing?[27]

ADi asserted that institute research on industrial restructuring, missile implantation and European military-economic unification was part and parcel of NATO strategy. Such activities illustrated the need ‘to attack and upset the imperialist system at all command levels’?[2]* ADi dropped any reference to domestic social revolution in favour of defeating ‘imperialist projects’, understanding that the global context and lack of social support excluded it from the political agenda* Its response was to attack the representatives of capital physically and expound a political position in unison with like-minded European groupsThroughout, ADi believed that revolutionary consciousness could only develop through violence: 'only by simultaneously developing class strength and victories will we develop the consciousness necessary for further victories’?^

Attacks on French defence ministry computer services and the STAR industrielk del'armament - Industrial Supervision of Armament) continued this political line* ADi declared that the SIAR was 'in charge of technical supervision and financial payments for armament orders given to industry'’[130] and epitomized the 'intensification of arms spending at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s’?[3]' The group viewed militarism as 'the life-preserver to which capitalism clings each time its inherent system strengths teeter on the abyss of crisis’.[m] It concluded that French complicity in Western military modernization justified terrorism* Beyond this, Euro-missile implantation demonstrated the futility'of peaceful protest in a system based on militarism, psychological warfare and industrial restructuring* Since economic restructuring revealed weakness, terrorism was the 'only response to the tendency to imperialist war’?[33] Violence blended working-class interests and a political challenge; 'the crisis of the system’s economic foundations combines with a crisis of political domination’*[134]

Combating 'imperialist’ institutions also motivated the ESA attack. Schleicher denounced the Ariane programme as a 'practical base to apply the imperialist strategy of domination of NATO and its enfeoffed flunkey, the French state’?[35] Ariane work by armament manufacturers Matra and Thomson maintained France’s 'overseas ideological empire’ and nuclear and rapid deployment forces. action amtre EEuropean Space Agency’ argued that the ESA 'allows inter-European contradictions and any weakness that could result to be surpassed’*[136] ADi said the US cynically encouraged the ESA to manipulate European communications technology'. It listed a series of projects that allegedly embodied US domination of Europe:

Marees 'observation’ and 'communication’ satellites: civil and military mobile naval telecommunications;
ECS, European Communications Satellite: point-to-point liaison between fixed terminals;
Telecom 1: military[1], inter-enterprise and civil telecommunications and computer data transmissions;
Skynet: British military[7] telecommunications programme that employs the telecom platform;
Intelsat: American-conceived global organization, geostationary satellite communications;
Spot: preliminary earth observation system;
Syracus: radio-communications system using a satellite made for the national navy;
Ers: tele-detection satellite;
Samro: exclusively military observation satellite (project frozen in 1982 due to lack of funds); real possibility that it will reappear due to Franco-German agreement.[137]

ADi said the mask of 'science[1] hid the military ends of projects that resembled 'Nazi medical experiments, atom experimentation and American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, chemical experiments during the Vietnamese War , . . the 'scientific’ use of torture during the Algerian liberation war right through to sensory deprivation todayADi claimed that it was opposed to the military use of science, not to pure research.

The next institute to be hit was the WEU. It was selected for its participation in global restructuring[119] and its role in integrating

all European countries into the Atlantic block, in particular through resolving the problem of the former Axis countries: Germany and Italy. The enemies of yesterday needed to be reunited since, as Churchill expressed it: 'In cutting down Nazism, we killed the wrong pig? In the name of capital, the Soviet Union became the principal enemy.[140]

The 'European and Atlantic[1141] WEU was called a centre for continental and PS defence thought and planning. Its projects covered 'Atlantic interests, which consist in making Europeans pay for defence and letting capitalist interests develop capital through the arms industry[7]?[41] Revolutionary communists had to fight this trend and overcome 'scattered, isolated communist tendencies ... a uniquely tactical perception, of workerism’J[43] Strikes against arms manufacturers Messier-HispanoBugatti and Dassault were also undertaken to 'place our struggle in an overall offensive strategy. The end is to construct an armed proletarian strategy' against the extermination being carried out by Dassault and its consorts.’[144] Dassault arms sales in die Vietnam War showed that its role in imperialist strategy' was 'exactly that of post-World War Two French capital’.[145] Dassault was denounced for its participation in:

projects essential to the integration process at a European level: the ACX, the fighter plane of the 1990s jointly produced by European partners (Germany, Spain, Great Britain, Italy) and representing a ‘fabulous’ market of 800 planes, - the military use of space in which

Dassault already actively participates by its close collaboration with Aerospatiale, supplying the Ariane pyrotechnic system through which it hoped to remain central by studying the ‘Hermes’ European space shuttle.[1]™

ADi said Dassaulfs ties to ‘Christian Lenzer (member of the CDU, the West German Christian Democratic Parly ), member of the WEU Assembly standing committee on scientific issues’/[47] linked it to homogenization. Messier-Hispano-Bugatti, for its part, worked ‘together with the defence ministry' for European and American arms factories (Mirage, Jaguar, Boeing and MacDouglas)’.[14]*

ADi’s focus on internationally-linked organizations ultimately propelled it into its final phase (1985-87). ‘Pour/'unite des revohitionnaires en Europe de I’ouesf confirmed its internationalization and alliance with the RAF by proclaiming a joint offensive against NATO and Franco-German cooperation. ADi henceforth dedicated itself to a ‘West European guerrilla war’ against NATO. It called this an ‘authentic revolutionary strategy’. The group contended that its struggle was crucial due to ‘the centrality of Western Europe to imperialist redeployment, a consequence of the breach opened in the balance of power by the liberation struggles of peoples on the periphery’J[49] ‘Pour runite des reuolutiomiaires en Europe de I'&uest' was a caricature of ADi’s early vision of a broadly based anti-capitalist movement. The final product was not a French revolutionary movement, but a Euroterrorist network impelled by new ‘essential tasks for the communist guerrilla in Western Europe’.[150] ADi described EC integration as an ‘attempt to weld European states into a homogeneous structure, a solid bloc that would be completely integrated into the core of imperialist power: NATO being the most advanced structure of domination’.[151] The new vision ignored ADi’s lack of support in favour of claims that it acted out of international solidarity. ADi and the RAF proclaimed that they were opposing a broad imperialist offensive on: (1) assaults on Asian, African and Central American revolutionary' movements; (2) rising Western military' spending and political coordination (Euro-missile installation, WEU renewal, French rapid deployment force development, NATO arms cooperation, discussions over West German force de frappe cooperation and French reintegration into NATO); (3) common Western counterinsurgency strategies; and (4) US-led electronics and arms technologies research and production in Western Europe. They described US economic moves in Europe as a grab for global control by the ‘imperialist block - USA, Japan, Western Europe’.[152]

The two groups jointly began to attack NATO military bases, strategists, plans and propaganda to point the way to a ‘West European proletarian political strategy in changed political conditions’?^ The strategy signalled increased violence, ideological coherence and international coordination. ADi joined a Euro-terrorist network made up of Portuguese, Belgian, Greek, Spanish and West German terrorists to attain ‘the material transformation of proletarian internationalism dictated by present circum* stances’?[54] It dropped any effort to claim domestic support, but did refer itself to national politics. The group’s new combativeness was dramatically illustrated by Audran’s murder, which ADi said eliminated an individual central to an imperialist institution. Such individuals were reified into ‘imperialist objects’. The assassination concretized a ‘revolutionary front in the West European metropolis’’[55] because Audran was NATO’s ‘main link in the Defence Ministry'; the person responsible for arms coordination, and marketing throughout the IEPF (Independent European Programs Group), a NATO structure, and the CIEEMG (Cabinet Committee on War Materials Exports)’.[m]

ADi argued that Franco-German cooperation was the tip of the iceberg of the imperialist offensive and European homogenization since the two countries divided tasks according to ‘US imperialist strategy : France with its geostrategic influence and jWc de frappe, West Germany with its economic and financial strength and its army (quantitatively, NATO’s largest)’.[1]'’[7] In this context, the PS brought‘European countries increasingly strong international links by in fact enlarging economic and military manoeuvring room and by guaranteeing that European defence propaganda would neutralize protest and the contradictions created by US domination through its military' structure in Europe, NATO’?[5]*

‘Revendica/ian de /attaque amt re /e FAI/ ef /« Basque mondial^ said both organizations aided world imperialism by preparing the Bonn summit and catalogued a series of events as proof:

World Bank and IMF meetings in the USA

symposium of NATO industrial groups in Brussels

OECD and EEC meetings

WEU assembly

Venice international conference on technological development and employment etc . . ?[59]

ADi claimed that since the Bonn summit would be followed by an acceleration of imperialist strategy', it called for a response: ‘communism does not develop through radical positions in texts. It is conceived in an accurate analysis of situations and the implementation of a practice capable of resolving and going beyond them.”[611] Revolutionaries must ‘never retreat before the enormity' of their goals’?[41] To further this principle, TRT and SAT were hit. TRT was the leading European manufacturer of altimeters, instruments that determine aircraft altitude. The company was reproached as

the developer of the radio-altimeter for Cw'se nuclear missiles, Aerospatiale Euw/s, those who outfit mixed NATO missiles, and, more precisely, in collaboration with Messerschmitt (xMBB), for J&Iand missiles

the most qualified researcher in the area of optronics, the spy observation sector that will soon provide NATO with a highly precise military information system?[62]

The other firm, SAT, was attacked because it developed infra-red locating systems with military[1] applications?[6]’[1] ADi condemned both firms for collaborating in the development of SMT modulaire thermique - thermal modular system) for military vehicles and research on MIRA night-sighting devices for Milan anti-tank missiles.[164]

A second assassination attempt directed at individuals working in imperialist institutions was then aimed at Blandin, who,

as army chief inspector . * . [has been] one of the main persons in charge at the Ministry of Defence since the social democrats took power; he is more precisely Hernu’s right arm in applying plans to restructure and integrate NATO forces, the armed forces and the war industry?[65]

As ADi explained in the au jonma! rcuolutionnairc “Zusanimeii

/Campfen” (“Combat! re ememble*)\[u] this attack represented a decisive clarification of its ideology that responded to ‘the acceleration and crystallization of old projects in one: Eureka’?[67] ADi said that Eureka was the culmination of Franco-German cooperation and showed that homogenization now extended beyond NATO and the EC to Switzerland, Sweden and Austria?[6] The group argued that France was fully integrated into this network:

its arms systems follow NATO norms and its defence and attack । positions are planned in Brussels, at the Atlanticist organization’s headquarters in order to be inter-operational with the member countries of the military command, in fact integrating the French

army to NATO strategic attack forces. In addition, close FrenchI West German military cooperation creates ‘a real Franco-German pillar within the alliance’?[69]

ADi supplied a list of French links to NATO: development of Aero- । spatiale missile technology; negotiations to extend France’s nuclear umbrella over West Germany; support for US Persian Gulf operations; connivance with NATO industrial programmes; and creation of a European defence study group* ADi said SDI and Eureka research by French state firms 'underlines France’s offensive position in the development of imperialist strategy’.[1]™ Eureka was labelled a US-directed political-military project with dire ‘consequences’ for the West European working class:

it is a question of simultaneously restoring the solvency of the financial system in industrialized and Third World countries so as to relaunch investment, the race for profits needed for greater exploitation, by reorganizing work through the computerization and automation of production sectors J[71]

ADi said European cartels maintained US supremacy. It added that nationalization of the French armament, electronic, computer, robotic, aeronautic, nuclear, chemical and agro-industrial sectors after 1982 was part of a broader process of technological and industrial concentration. The newly nationalized sectors complemented existing public sector banks and industrial groups. ADi said imperialist market internationalization necessitated attacks on ‘central links’[1]™ as a ‘qualitative leap towards formation of the West European guerrilla movement, a new phase in the development of an authentic revolutionary' strategy’,[175] The attacks on Audran, Blandin, Brana and the Frankfurt air base were part of this strategy. 'Communique No.T called Brana a prominent agent ‘of French economic and industrial policy in the development of overall imperialist strategy’.[174]

’Commw/ft/Hc explained that the Interpol attack added ‘by its force and reach to the acquisitions and objective resolutions obtained”[75] by the campaign. Strikes on the Inslitut Atlantique, Frankfurt air base, and the entire ‘West European guerrilla’ were said to be resolving problems, even if‘this is still not clearly seen by the whole of the revolutionary[7] movement’.[176] The assaults expressed the ‘unity of revolutionaries in Western Europe’ and ‘a political-military revolutionary strategy”[77] that gave new coherence to anti-imperialism. Specifically, it broke ‘the “inexorably” chaotic aspect to which the French extreme left harnessed itself during 15 years of revolutionary promises in institutionalized rebellion, signs at demonstrations, treasonous renunciation, and alibis in criticism’.[17]" Striking at Interpol allegedly hit a point at which the differentiation between the dominant and oppressed was clear. ADi claimed that Interpol was an organization that epitomized the conflict between the masses and counterrevolutionary forces. In its eyes, Brana represented and directed

the public industrial sector/employers’ organization/business part}* bloc, motor of the general ‘anti-crisis strategy that stands for formation of combines, industrial and technological concentration, Rcaganite

market economy, flexibility, social deregulation, individualization of salary'policies, anti-worker repression in and outside of the factory.[1]™

ADi described Brana as a prototypical technocrat of contemporary capitalism who could ‘transform imperialism into technocratic imperialism*/™ He threatened the international working class by contributing to West European horn^enization under both rightand kh-wing gQ'.ernrncriU, both of which subordinated France's public sector to the private one and imperialism. Even the Chirac government's privatization programme was not a ‘disruption in the centrality' of the public industrial sector and its relations to technological and industrial concentration, these denationalizations will simply be a new step in the homogenization of Western Europe’/[81] The group argued that restructuring of the private and public sectors was a preparation for war. It believed that this was irrefutably demonstrated by the fact that the Tokyo summit ‘was preceded by two months of intensified war against “terrorism[1]* with a flash point: the bombing of Libya’.™[2] At the same time, events in Angola, Israel, South Africa, Haiti and the Philippines were cited as evidence that imperialism was adjusting to local conditions. In this light, ADi said revolutionary violence against Interpol hit ‘NATO’s police section and one of the main instruments in American intervention policy: the doctrine of low-intensity' conflicts. This includes three forms of military' intervention: classical counter-guerrilla, active defence against “terrorism”, and support for anti-communist guerrillas/™[3]

Interpol’s centrality to imperialism was allegedly proven when American John R. Simpson became its president after the US called for global antiterrorist action. The appointment of Briton Raymond Kendall as Interpol secretary-general also confirmed its role in information coordination. While anti-terrorist measures repressed workers, ADi said, NATO-led coordination facilitated ‘super-specialized police units, its bunch of paid informers, the army in the police stations of large cities, repeated searches in the ghettos, attacks/bloody provocations/assassinations organized by the secret services and bodyguards of all types’.[184]

After hitting the OECD, ADi declared that the anti-imperialist offensive ‘must be conducted consciously, concretely and as widely as possible in the same direction so as to concretize, develop and go beyond present victories’.[183] Tocreate effective West European communist organizations,

we must not only fight bourgeois forces, but annihilate and go beyond the unhealthy reactions encrusted in the revolutionary movement, which create even more separations, barriers and frontiers by those who advocate organization for its own sake, who only invest in action for its own sake, these militarists thirsty for notoriety; little ‘bonzes’ in search of an audience?[86]

The passage was aimed at ADn’s robbery campaign and Olivier’s posture as a Maoist guru within the I ,yon group. ADi charged that ADn neglected method and systematic work in favour of a ‘radicalism of the bazaar [that | repTCVjits nothin/ hut hc incorrigible attitude of th p* titr oour/^oisif perpetually trying to turn what little aciroij it engager in into quick profit’?*[7] ADi cited its own attack on the OECD as a more serious form of militancy that hit the coordinators of imperialism who were involved in ‘the formation/coordination of the strategies of international capital and the policies of the imperialist network of states against the pressures coming from the economic accentuation of the crisis_> growing antagonism and international proletarian struggles’.[1]”[8] ADi feared that ADn would only provoke police action that would ultimately threaten its own campaign.

Determination to strike surgically culminated in the murder of Georges Besse. The act was intended to put ADi at the heart of the ‘Western revolutionary struggle’ by hitting ‘at the very heart of the strongest contradiction within the general consensus on pacification and exploitation’,[189] The murder also ended an offensive for the ‘reconstruction of class in Western Europe’[1911] that forged links to other Euro-tcrrorists, Assassinations were part of what ADi termed ‘the acceleration and accentuation of class antagonism’J[91] This pressure was also evident in Franco-German security' coordination: ‘bloody repression, police provocations, institution of villainous laws, and the questioning of workplace rights*?[02] ADi hoped that France’s 1986-87 student demonstrations and SNCF strikes meant that its message had reached a wide public. It hopefully viewed the protests as a rejection of capitalist selection that would completely throw into question the very' substance of the economic policy of rationalization and imperialist concentration. The common element (refusal of‘merit’ and capitalist selection, around which battle rages and which counterpropaganda attempts to drown and suffocate in the most complete media confusion) was too dangerous because it expressed a deepened reflection and action against the upholders of the capitalist mode of production?[93]

Hopeful that social unrest heralded new conflict in Western Europe, ADi argued that the bourgeoisie disguised class war as criminality ‘bereft of any objective sense in the general and specific political situation*?^ In reality; all social unrest was a struggle ‘ending in the annihilation of one or two sides’?[95] For a ‘revolutionary avant-garde’[194] like ADi, the deportation of foreign workers made international class struggle objectively necessary?[97] Besse was killed because of his importance in international restructuring and his role as 'die advanced element of bourgeois repression of the workers’ movement’.[19]* The group believed that he would not easily be replaced: ‘the negotiations after the Besse assassination showed by their length (more than a month) that super-experts on restructuring are in short supply’.[199] His role in restructuring was in any event obvious at Renault, a firm that has long been a laboratory for French management techniques:

Renault, social display window, exemplary political myth of consensus, of pacification through consumerism, of access for all to ‘material happiness’, took on a character that went beyond the simple construction of cars, armed vehicles or robots, ‘Exemplarity’ is but one of the multiple forms of the capitalist will to pacify and integrate the proletariat into the capitalist model?[00]

Because Renault was ‘after 1945 continually ... at the heart of the central contradictions of the capitalist mode of production[1],[201] Besse was central to the French and global economies. By attacking Besse, ADi thought it attacked a central organism in the national and global economy, which was a means to ‘brutally insert the representation of worker power into the heart of their [capitalist] strategy and thus to make their entire project more fragile in its different facets, and to construct the consciousness necessary to develop proletarian politics’?[02] Seeing its struggle as international, ADi positioned itself as a pivotal element in the French workers’ movement. Being unable to revive a domestic revolutionary movement no longer mattered, since ADi now had an international network: ‘the communiststruggle includes and inserts the centrality of workers’ struggle into the overall struggle developing against global exploitation and oppression’?[03] ADi now described itself as an ‘aspect’ of the workers’ movement, ‘conscious of the necessities and ends of the general class struggle movement’?[04] It argued that armed struggle was part of working-class movements until communist parties and unions dropped it after the Second World War. Violence re-emerged in West Germany and Italy owing to revolutionary concentration on proletarian needs. In France, the 1968 revolutionary movement veered ‘into the new philosophy and liberated journalism[1]?[05] ADi believed that it was redeeming an error and violently reconstructing an authentic working-class struggle?[0]* This hermetic logic held long after any potential support had disappeared.

AD ’s ideology and political violence

The three phases of AD’s ideological development were 1979-81, 1982-84 and 1984-87. The group’s behaviour, motives and use of violence varied in each period. By 1987, the two ADs had little contact with one another.

In fact, each criticized the other with mounting bitterness, sarcasm and contempt. The schism stemmed from divergent analyses of conditions, evaluations of their impact on revolutionary organization, and strategic conclusions. The split was a microcosm of the classic divisions in French political culture. Many issues that AD raised entered mainstream politics before, during or after its active period: nationalism, European integration, anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, anti-Semitism and tier-mMdiwie. Several of these concerns traditionally divide the left and right while others internally differentiate the left. Their presence in AD’s ideology was part of its effort to attract attention and support. The group cast a wide ideological net that mirrored changes under way in France. Anotable difference between ADi and ADn was their networks. ADi participated in a Euro-terrorist network that became a chronic political and security[7] nuisance in several West European countries in the mid-1980s. ADn never had the ideological coherence of ADi, but survived by good organization, robberies and intimidation. The importance of organization for terrorists was driven home when Rouillan and Menigon were captured in 1980. Both groups were ultimately dismantled because of the firm bipartisan policy of left and right. The political elite realized that AD was lethal.

Both ADi and ADn condemned Israel and the US because of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Both used ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘anti-Zionist’ rhetoric. 'Snr I"nN/ferialfsmearr/erieaffi[9] went further and specified ADi’s views about the reorganization of global economic classes. It saw the Lebanese invasion as part of this process. ADi further argued that resource extraction, biological and pharmacological research, agri-business and high-technology were intimately connected to militarism. After Rizzato’s death and the capture of Spano, ADi’s Euro-terrorist network was exposed and the group bared its teeth on the Avenue Trudaine. ADn continued to focus on die PS and the military[7]. After 1982, both organizations were ideologically and organizationally re-equipped to oppose the PS administration. By 1984, ADi’s ideology" was sharply defined. It became more violent after it declared a guerrilla war on European Americanization. It targeted the Western militaiy and organizations that conceived, facilitated or undertook military coordination and research because it viewed them as symbols of US dominance. In the same period, ADn attacked the RPR and ElfAquitaine to show that it opposed the French establishment. Although ADn texts linked French and American imperialism, the ‘defeat of imperialist projects' was not a central goal. It viewed French imperialism as the primary threat to its ends while internationalist ADi conceived revolution in Western Europe as an extension of the global struggle. ADi and the RAF thus selectively assassinated individuals as a complement to Middle Eastern, southern African and Latin American revolution. Their struggle concentrated on world imperialist centres, US interests in Western Europe and global domination.[207] Finally, ADi threatened key public personalities.[2]™ In contrast, although ADn murdered Marsden and bombed the Paris judicial police headquarters, these events occurred after most of the group was already in custody.

Taken as one unit, the scope and implications of AD attacks steadily expanded. As both groups’ respective personalities crystallized and their orientations clarified, they became more violent. After 1982, an increasing number of precise human targets were selected. Appendices 5.2 to 5.5 (pages 182-5) illustrate the relationship of AD’s ideological development to violence.[209] The charts distinguish AD’s violence according to type and categorize it by quarry, intensity’and cadence. Bombs, for example, are considered to be a more intense form of violence than are machine-gun attacks. Political motives are clarified by differentiating premeditated from unpremeditated killings. ADi’s political assassinations were aimed at a specific audience. Unpremeditated murders, like ADn’s murder of Guy Delfosse, had indirect political motives. These charts are designed to highlight the merits of ideological interpretations of French political violence. In particular, they show that assassinations were linked to radicalization. Evaluating ideological motives is crucial in evaluating the threat of French political violence. AD’s threat was statistically negligible, but examining the levels and types of attacks helps to verify the claim that terrorist violence threatens the state. Appendices 5.2 to 5.5 show that AD’s acts had relatively insignificant material impact and suggest that they are best evaluated in political terms. The public considered AD dangerous because it knew that domestic political violence could be destabilizing. In fact, AD directly attempted to exploit rising unrest in the period before the 1986 legislative elections. The presence of left-wing revolutionary terrorists mobilized parts of the right-wing electorate, discouraged the left and may have compensated opposition losses to the FN. Law and order were thus central to the Chirac campaign and his government’s 1986-88 legislative agenda. The right knew that AD embarrassed the PS.

Appendix 5.2 shows that attacks increased in two separate periods: 1979-80 and 1981-86?[10] In 1979-80, AD tried to inspire autonomist revolt. From 1981 to 1986, ADi’s ideology radicalized and both groups reached the height of their activity. The rising curves generally correspond to political changes. Although AD tried to resurrect youth and extreme-left revolt in 1979-80, it decried the PS-PCF and tried to draw out what it thought were latent revolutionary tendencies after 1981. Appendix 5.3 focuses on one form of violence: small-arms attacks?’[1] It shows the impact that ideological radicalization had on AD’s method. The group initially used small arms against material targets, but later turned them on human ones. Small arms were frequently used in 1979-81, during AD’s less radical, less violent, more ideologically eclectic and organizationally formative phrase. The use of small arms decreased as ADi radicalized. Their use rose when AD attacked international targets and faced tough antiterrorist pressure. Appendix 5.4, which focuses on bomb attacks from 1979 to 1987, can be similarly interpreted.[212] Bomb attacks increased, decreased and accelerated according to right-left political changes. ‘Political* targets like ministries and international organizations were bombed more often than were, for example, banks. Bomb attacks decreased in 1981-82. The pace increased after 1982 and especially in 1983-85, when the group tried to exploit the unrest over unpopular PS austerity budgets. Bomb attacks decreased when the right returned to power in 1986. AD apparently began to prepare for an anti-terrorist onslaught, re-evaluate goals, and try to force the government to act first.

Appendix 5.5 focuses on murders, which are typically used to illustrate the terrorist threat to society?[11] AD’s murders are simply not comparable to groups like ETA or the IRA since the numbers are small, but it did threaten specific individuals. When the number of murders is juxtaposed to ideological radicalization, a relationship between political motives and killings is demonstrable. AD murders were initially minimal. In the early 1980s, however, ADi decided that murder was a valuable tool and it became a regular feature of group activities. Appendix 5.6 shows, especially by illustrating the dramatic increase in murders after the AD-RAF alliance, that the group’s ideological radicalization and deadliness are linked?[1]* ‘Tactical killings’, unpremeditated murders during bank robberies that have no directly political motives, rose dramatically in 1980-81 while the Paris group was in jail. ADn apparendy increased robberies to finance operations and reorganization. Murders during robberies declined in 1982, while the group engaged in a debate that ultimately divided it. After the split, murders increased in 1983-84, reflecting a determination to fight the PS. Both groups continued to seek better material-financial foundations. After 1983-84, murders during robberies dropped as both wings returned to their political agendas,

AD’s political danger was posed late in the history[7] of both groups. Political murders only rose in the period leading up to Both

groups charged that the PS was treacherous and that it was about to betray socialism by sharing power with the right. The only politically motivated murder before 1985 ‘settled accounts[1] with police informer Chahine. In 1985-86, ADi explicitly turned to political assassination. Overall, ideological change accompanied increases and declines in premeditated and unpremeditated murders. When AD ideology was less rigid, its murders were usually unpremeditated, tactical or, in its own terms, ‘defensive*.

When ADi’s ideology was more defined and its enemies more clearly specified, political murders increased markedly. Overall, AD’s political terrorism was more threatening when it radicalized. The curves of premeditated and unpremeditated murders cross in 1982, following condemnation of the PS and the internal schism.

Foreign policy and defence issues were important to both sections of AD. The preoccupation is entirely understandable in light of French history and the enduring role of grandeur. The latter especially demonstrates how political violence might emerge in France. Since foreign policy and defence issues were a corner-stone of the Fifth Republic consensus, they might initially appear to be an improbable basis for extremism. However, AD reacted to the mainstream left's acceptance of the Fifth Republic, market economies and efforts to integrate France into the NATO system. The lack of response to AD’s call for revolutionary action demonstrates that the consensus was strong and that a left-wing revolution was unlikely. The rise of extreme-left fringe violence against a reformist left-wing government suggests several questions for further exploration, Would a PCI government that accepted NATO have provoked Italian extreme-left terrorism in the 1980s? Is the analogy in some way applicable to the struggle between ETA and the Spanish government? Would negotiation of an Ulster settlement provoke terrorism in Britain or Ireland by a dissatisfied rump? Would increased US defence spending under a Democratic administration provoke terrorism? Would a comprehensive peace settlement lead to indigenous extremist violence in Israel?

In addition to expressing an extremist reaction to reformism, AD’s ideological evolution juxtaposed specific policy. Its early period corresponded to the rise in anti-Americanism that accompanied the Reagan administration and the Euro-missile debate. No significant French group reacted negatively to Mitterrand’s endorsement of Euro-missiles in a 1983 speech to the West German Bundestag. French opinion on defence and foreign policy was at the time quite homogeneous. It was based on several shared views: that the French military was an expression of the ‘nation*; suspicion of Soviet intentions; anti-communism; and a desire to anchor West Germany solidly in a Western defence system. Ironically, Mitterrand’s speech fuelled ADi’s campaign against the PS by confirming the group’s worst suspicions. Ties to NATO became a central justification for ADi’s armed violence. While residual anti-Americanism is a potent fringe issue in France, commitment to the Atlantic alliance is no longer a serious bone of contention. A 1984-88 military plan referred to the USSR as the adversary for the first time. De Gaulle avoided doing so to highlight national independence, short-circuit the PCF and portray France as a great power. The rapprochement to NATO corresponded to ADi’s radical and most deadly phase?'[5] Both groups justified their acts with reference to the PS. Although the right said the left was ‘soft* on terrorism, the PS government increased security, anti-terrorist task forces and intergovernmental co-ordination. Finally, AD’s ideology suggests that ‘terrorist groups’ may be multifarious and contradicts the notion of a monolithic world network. The two ADs posed different threats, French extreme-left terrorist factions seem as schismatic as other political organizations.

ADi’s strike at the ‘heart of the military-industrial complex’ mixed nihilism and Stalinism. The group rejected any possibility that authentic social change could result from reformist tactics. The absolute nature of its rejection recapitulated some elements of Sergei Nechaev’s nihilism. Nechaev viewed the revolutionary' as ‘a doomed man’, a disinterested, uninvolved, unsentimental, unattached, propertyless, nameless individual who shed convention in order to embody revolution. The image is strikingly similar to ADi’s view of itself as a socio-political avant-garde. Like Nechaev, AD viewed revolution in terms of images: the future; hope, and the people. It saw revolution as the only valid motive for action and the sole justification for violence. In Marxist-Leninist language that reflected its French extreme-left origins, AD tried to shed any ‘external[1] emotional or personal constraints that would hinder revolution. It also despised die existing order. AD followed Nechaev’s maxim: ‘should he continue to live in it [society], it will be solely for the purpose of destroying it the more surely’.

[54]

6 Conclusions

Justum enitn est be/lum quibus necessarian?

(Even[r] war is just if it is necessary'.)

As this discussion of AD demonstrates 'terrorism* poses serious difficulties for analytical approaches to political violence that are based on legalinstitutional frameworks and aim to produce theoretical generalizations. A focus on laws and institutions leads many analysts to view violent political factions as features of‘underdeveloped’ or pre-modern political systems. Within such a framework, violent political factions are indeed anomalous and unpredictable. However, AD’s case shows that revolutionary' factions can develop in a stable Western system and that analyses must avoid a reflexive adoption of normative judgments about violence. Disciplines such as political science tend to accept uncritically the notion that representative institutions, market economies, public education, universalist ideologies and independent judiciaries are guarantees of peace, order and libertyAnalysts accordingly assume that violent direct action was anachronistic and call unsanctioned violence unnecessary', unreasonable and retrograde, A fear that factions would try to remake societies into predetermined images thus displaced empirically based analyses of behaviour, ideologies, organizations and environment. Ironically, pre-modern political thought directly examined factional evidence. Several theorists even argued that direct action could be justified if it were used to resist tyranny. In contrast, terrorism oversteps the taxonomical bounds of contemporary political analysis, By focusing on violent methods rather than groups and using ‘terrorism’ to refer to groups or individuals with whom politicians, journalists and analysts simply disagree, many analyses generally perpetuate the confusion. One way around this problem might be development of a vocabulary to describe and differentiate low-level violence and the groups that employ it. This vocabulary' could facilitate classification. At present, the term ‘political terrorism’ is vague, obscures context and encourages analogies between dissimilar groups, such as the South African ANC and Italian BR.

By focusing on one case, this analysis explains how a violent revolutionary faction emerged in a stable Western setting. AD’s motives were rational, if empirically misguided. The group argued that violent direct action was less odious than the prospect of abandoning revolutionary ideals. It referred itself to the revolutionary roots of French political culture and later regime changes to endow its violence with a specific significance. Traditionally, the French used violence to test incumbents and draw attention to dis* content. After the mainstream left whole-heartedly embraced the Fifth Republic, AD leaders tried to exploit a traditional view that national regimes are ‘historical’ and subject to revision. However, its revolutionary campaign underestimated the regime, its level of public acceptance, and the stabilizing effects of European and international influences. In short, the revolutionary tradition was superseded by events. At the same time, AD drew its inspiration from French political history. Its revolutionary ideology was sustained by extreme-left traditions and the recent example of gauchisme. Altogether, these factors gave AD a peculiar character, In particular, despite condemnations of the Fifth Republic and French international ties and calls for a renewed left-wing AD’s ‘revolutionary[1] character was ambiguous.

Contusions relating to theories of terrorism

Although terrorists in Western societies usually fail to pose a lethal menace to political systems, violent factions still emerge in certain circumstances. If these groups are as contextually conditioned as AD’s case suggests, die analytic utility of‘terrorism’ is not very high. AD shows that a group may fracture from within and recapitulate macro-political cleavages. The appearance of ADi and ADn demonstrates the value of an intensive examination of the significance, ends and dangers of violent political factions. It also lends credence to Furet and Reynaud’s suggestion that extreme-left terrorists radically reinterpret the modern state J They argue that ideology rather than violence distinguishes these organizations. In this light, AD’s ideology[1] is comprehensible in its context, but not a sign of crisis. The ideology shows the power of certain ideas in French political culture and thus the utility of ideological interpretation. In the French context, ideology is moreover explicitly central to political action. In point of fact, terrorism lends itself to symbolic analysis since its victims are 'only a representative of a population which maybe very large, Western imperialists, or quite small, such as NATO generals. It is not always clear who is the target audience since sets or populations overlap... That there is always a wider target audience, how[r]ever, is never in doubt?[2] By examining AD’s ideology, this discussion shows how ideas shaped, limited and oriented AD’s acts. Specifically, AD’s terrorism was circumscribed by concepts of historical necessity and revolution. The above discussion also shows that AD’s ideas were once widespread bur were irrelevant by the 1980s, a context in which the ‘rational’ goal of communist revolution was unattainable.

Given the right circumstances, fringe groups might always use violent direct action in democratic settings regardless of the ‘pre-modern’ label attached to it. The mortal threat to officials, military leaders and business personnel is clearly a menace to democratic rights and obligations since it can provoke authoritarian responses. In many types of political systems, violence often appears in times of reform, when values and expectations are being challenged or revised. A case in point is that ofTsar Alexander II of Russia, a liberating, reforming absolutist whose social and political views were significantly in advance of his peers. He w[T]as murdered by the Narodnaya Volya on 1 March 1881? The Narodnaya Volya, a revolutionary anarchist organization, viewed administrative and judicial reforms and liberation of serfs as props for the autocracy. It believed that revolution was the only solution for mass misery. The immediate effect of the murder was to w eaken the radical camp, but Alexander's death also ended reforms and so helped set the stage for 1917. Like Narodnaya Volya, AD formulated an extremist reaction to reformism. It also insisted that reform was not change and believed that violence would help foment revolution. Both groups sought absolute solutions to problems and placed enormous significance on individuals. The two also had a faith in action for its own sake that precluded free choice by the ‘oppressed’, who were in neither case attracted to revolution. OAS armee secrete)* attempts to

murder de Gaulle illustrated a similar reaction although the motive in this case was opposition to decolonization. The extreme right in the French military had supported de Gaulle’s d'etat because it believed that he would prevent Algerian independence. Like Alexander II, de Gaulle could have opposed reform, but he was sensitive to domestic and international pressure for decolonization. Unable to stop decolonization institutionally or democratically, the extreme right tried to murder de Gaulle. Like AD, it turned to terrorism out of weakness and fear of marginalization. It was a traditionalist extreme right that attacked a modernizing, reformist and moderate right. In contrast, AD was a traditionalist extreme-left revolutionary faction that attacked a modernizing, reformist and moderate left

Conclusions relating to French politics

AD’s ideology was shaped within a universalist political culture. The group did not question this universalism, only modernizing reformism. It repeatedly cited the supposedly universal heritage of the 1789 revolution, the wartime resistance movement and the Algerian independence struggle.

AD diverged from mainstream-left views of 1789 and France’s contemporary The latter views were repeatedly articulated in the

1980s by Mitterrand, who referred to a national civilizing ‘mission’ based on

France’s faithfulness to the best of its traditions, the sense of the universal. This is a combat that I intend to take up, to which I invite all women and men who believe in their country’s mission.., France is above all a land, a history, a culture. This is our homeland. We know its considerable power to absorb and unite. Made of many alluvial deposits, it has been this way for a thousand years. The danger would be to change its nature/

AD’s concept of politics differed from that of the mainstream left in two important ways. First, it evaluated the political system on the basis of an extreme-left tradition of revolutionary direct action. Second, and ironically, its search for support made it receptive to new issues that anticipated later mainstream preoccupations. This ability is linked simultaneously to anticipate new wishes and to express anachronism to the evolution of post1960s French political culture. AD appeared as old divisions declined and a new political vocabulary based on alternance, cohabitation and 02/vertare emerged. By the 1980s, the socialist and nationalist themes that de Gaulle once used to polarize Fifth Republic politics had dramatically declined. In their place, themes such as European integration, Third World development, poverty, racism, immigration and the social power of money dominated political discourse in the late 1980s. The FN and AD were the first political organizations to seize on these issues as political trademarks. AD’s programme thus had potential appeal, but its refusal to forsake violent revolutionary direct action consigned it to the fringe. The group was ultimately unable to resolve the contradiction of being simultaneously in advance of and behind the mainstream. The rest of the extreme left dropped extra-parliamentarianism and fielded electoral candidates in the 1970s. By the mid-1980s, its political protest role was taken up by the FN, which built its strength on denouncing political cliques and corruption, and by concentrating on local issues. AD’s development paralleled and juxtaposed that of the FN. The former was equally sensitive to political change. Both organizations voiced fear of marginalization, suspicion of politicians, xenophobia and anti-Americanism. AD’s 1979-80 condemnation of lepatronat^ African policy, real-estate speculation and the military' expressed widespread extreme-left views. In addition, AD’s charge that France was reintegrated into NATO and the Western military' industry was accurate. France was a leading world arms dealer in the 1980s. Its military forces participated in NATO manoeuvres.[6] European and US arms manufacturers agreed to design and construct jointly advanced military[7] equipment, including airborne radar and ‘clever’ shells that hunt targets, and to share costs and technological spin-offs.[7] It is significant that AD was arrested even as government policies partly confirmed its charge that the mainstream left had betrayed national traditions of independent foreign and defence policies? The shift was further seen in the strong French support for US policy in the Gulf War.

The nature of Action directe

AD believed that PS reformism was extremist because it removed revolution from political discussion. The group thought that reformism had contaminated French socialism. However, AD’s struggle subsequently centred on affirming revolutionary ideals rather than actually seizing power. It hoped to provoke a revolutionary movement that would transform French society. Neither ADn nor ADi saw themselves as alternative elites* ADFs assassinations were motivated by its convictions that individual murders would vindicate errors and alter histoiy. The sacrifice of ‘imperialists’ was intended to heighten anti-capitalist and class antagonism. Despite fundamental similarities, ADi and ADn had distinct personalities and orientations. ADn’s violence was an audacious protest that aimed to humiliate the establishment ADn wanted to embody hope that exploitation would end and authentic social equality could be established. ADFs violence was more ideologically elaborated. For one thing, it explicitly justified ritual human sacrifice. By advocating the defeat of ‘imperialist projects’, ADi implicitly acknowledged that global factors could not be ignored. It recognized that new influences were at work on French political culture and tacitly accepted the idea that national ‘exceptionalism’ had diminished. Its call for ‘anti-capitalist’ unity and violence were accordingly articulated as supposed springboards for revolutionary consciousness?

The explanation for AD’s turn from symbolic attacks to assassination lies in its ideological evolution. After 1984, political murders became central to ADFs activities. ADn continued to attack material targets and only killed in ‘self-defence’. ADn, but not ADi, was apparently fascinated by crime. ADn’s 1989 trial revealed that it was strongly anti-Semitic. ADi, in contrast, claimed that it was anri-Zionist, but not anti-Semitic.[10] ADFs early focus on France gradually declined in favour of an international outlook, in tandem with a shift in overall French political orientations. After 1982, ADi began to attack international organizations and individuals associated with them. Believing that a battle against international ‘imperialism’ was the best revolutionary strategy’ in the era of Cruise missiles and SDI, it increasingly targeted NATO. ADn all the while held a franco-franpiis (‘true-blue French*) orientation. It focused on domestic issues and referred its acts to global trends insofar as they related to national events. The national-international split between the two organizations might be a pattern worth examining in relation to groups such as the BR. Both ADs recognized the emergence of a new global order, but evaluated its impact differently. ADi decided to attack the 'heart of the military-industrial complex’ in alliance with the RAF and concentrated on three types of targets: (1) the French state (ministries of industry and defence); (2) international organizations (World Bank, IMF, fustitwr Atlanlique, ESA and WEU); and (3) arms manufacturers Dassault, MessierHispano-Bugatti and SIAR).

After 1985, ADi also targeted international organizations and arms manufacturers[11] and tried to assassinate military and business personnel.[12] Its orientations shifted after it began to coordinate attacks with foreign groups. The original AD was influenced by the BR view[13] that terrorism would increase the revolutionary role of the proletariat. For a time, both the BR and RAF influenced AD due to common concerns based on

The symbol of the human condition in contemporary society; they reduce politics to a conflict by challenging any idea of compromise; they reject any legitimacy for the liberal state while defending a political position that claims to go beyond defence of the creativity of productive individuals; lastly, and above all, the final goal (emancipation of‘proletarian power’) tends to disappear before the medium of guerrilla warfare, to the point of merging with it: for U. Mcinhoff, engagement in guerrilla warfare freed subjectivity; for the Red Brigades, the organization of workers[1] power becomes blended with the organization of armed struggle.[14]

ADi embraced the RAF view that violence could foment working class awareness about the state and the need for Third World revolution in 1982-84. The post-1982 split ironically reflected French society despite AD’s pretentious claim to be the clarion of West European revolution. A social movement is a necessity for all revolutionary organizations. Its failure to win support had previously pushed ADi to re-examine its goals and political conditions in Pour un pro/erf commumste and [’imperialism? americain. BR influence then further declined after Rizzato’s death and Spano’s arrest.

Cipriani’s fluent German and Rouillan and Menigon’s friendship with CCC leader Carette facilitated RAF influence. Although targets shifted and the two groups agreed over shared ends, the RAF did not ‘take over’ ADi. The latter continued to follow a French agenda, but increasingly saw domestic issues from a global perspective after 1985. Its victims reflected the shift. Audran and Blandin worked in the French arms trade, the former in an international division of the public sector, the latter in the army. Besse and Brana were important in national institutions that were traditional extreme-left targets and in a process of adaptation to new world market conditions?[5] Renault in particular was central to PCF, CGT, extreme-left and gaiMste theories of the French working class. However, AD’s obsession with Renault was pathetic and tragic. Renault workers were indifferent to AD’s revolutionary appeals and claim to be an tft’Mgarde. The group’s posturing ultimately caricatured the ideal of an enlightened tutelage of popular unrest by a revolutionary' elite. AD seriously miscalculated the political impact that gaudtisie 'popular forces’ had in 1968. It ignored die fact that gaudiisme was not a mass movement, but had tried to manipulate one, and that its projected worker-student alliance was a complete failure.[16] AD also ignored the GP rejection of terrorism. The former’s focus on ‘revolutionary cadres’ said more about its needs than any risk it might pose to society . After its effort to connect to die ‘lumpenproletariat’ failed in 1979-80, AD developed a new strategy[7], but remained what could be termed a variety’ of hopelessly marginal ^wnpen-gaMehisme’.

ADi and ADn shared the anti-military focus of previous extreme-left groups like the LCR. The theme explains the motives behind AD’s post1982 attacks on ronsmt/s, alteniance, tt/iabilation and former radicals working in the system. In other areas, the two groups differed from one another. ADi’s self-appointed ‘project’ was to reconstitute the proletariat and use the Third World as a motor for revolutionary[7] change. EEC integration and fear of multinational corporations led it to attack international organizations, business and the military?[7] These targets and the use of assassination set ADi apart from the original AD. ADn was an ‘extreme-left protest’ faction. It struck symbols that it believed would arouse popular protest: racism; Le Pen; and New Caledonia?* Its antimilitarism was less programmatic and more attitudinal than that of ADi. ADi articulated more theoretically elaborate anti-military and antiinternational themes based on opposition to European integration and international economic, technological, scientific and political coordination. Shortly before being completely dismantled, ADi began to attack French economic restructuring. Both groups illustrated how anti-Americanism remained important for the French extreme-left fringe in the 1980s, However, they also demonstrated that this sentiment could not be used to arouse popular protest. Despite this, ADi proclaimed a [£]new international’ against US dominance?’ Both ADi and ADn had motives that led to continued struggle against impossible odds. Their fringe status undoubtedly hardened determination into dogmatism and made the two groups similar to the medieval millenarian groups described by Norman Cohn. Like these groups, AD was motivated by a vision of collective, terrestrial, imminent, total, miraculous salvation*[20] A crucial difference between Cohn’s typology and AD was the latter’s secular, materialist and nihilist character. AD’s historical materialism emphasized the working class. It advocated the violent destruction of political, economic and social institutions from the point of view of nihilist communism. The homogenizing tendencies in both nihilism and historical materialism led AD radically to oppose the rise of consensus politics in the Fifth Republic.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Chronology of Action Directe, 1979-90

1979

18 March - machine-gun attack on Minister of Cooperation by Rouillan and Menigon.

25 March - Schleicher imprisoned.

1 May - machine-gun attack on CNPF headquarters by Olivier’s group.

28 August - theft of 16 million francs from Conde-sur-L’Escaut (Nord) tax collection office by Italian, Spanish and French militants believed to belong to AD.

15 September

explosion in annexe of Ministry of Labour and Participation.
two bombs dismantled near Ministry of Health.

16 September

bomb attack on SONACOTRA.
machine-gun attack on facade of Ministry of Labour and Participation. First AD claim of responsibility on 17 September 1979.

24 September - attack on building housing Ca/s^professionnelle deprevoyance des salaries and Delegation regionale pour Pemplois ddle-de-Franee.

1980

1 February - Schleicher condemned to three years’ imprisonment and fined 1,000 francs for possessing arms, explosives and forged documents.

3-5 February - two failed attacks on Direction regionale du travail et de la main-d'aeuvret

10 February - bombing of Societe immobilize de construction de Paris.

10 March - bomb seriously damaged SEMIREP offices.

15 March - bombing of DST, AD tracts found on site.

18 March - machine-gun attack on Ministry of Co-operation by Rouillan and Menigon.

28 March

bombing of GIGN.
round-up of AD members, including several Italians connected to Aldo Moro’s murder.

30 March - Toulouse police headquarters attacked in retaliation for arrests.

4 April - 15 AD members indicted before the Cour de surete de PEtat.

5-6 April - Philips Data Systems computers in Toulouse attacked without visible destruction.

9 April - fire set in Toulouse CH Honeywell offices by AD’s Clodo group.

1+ April - failed attack on Toulouse Palais de Justice.

15 April

bazooka and explosives attacks on Ministry of Transport and Ministry annexes,
bazooka attack on the Delegation d la seeurite routiere.

9 June - arson damages building at the Universite Rennes-I.

12 June - bombing at Orly-Ouest air terminal injures seven cleaning personnel.

August - AD raids police station and captures passports, identity cards and material for producing identification.

8 August - robbery of BNP by AD Paris.

28 August - hold-up on avenue Bosquet, Paris.

13 September - Menigon and Rouillan captured in rue Pcrgolese police ambush.

19 September - machine-gun attack on Ecole militaire.

29 October - Olivier and Frerot steal 90,000 francs from BNP in Caluirc (Rhone) and kill security guard Henri Delrieu.

79<W

30 March - AD Lyon robs Lyon Credit fyonnais. Frerot brutalizes a bank employee.

15 April -robbery of Place des Temes BNP in Paris. A policeman is killed.

24 April - AD Lyon robs another Lyon BNP.

11-12 May - bomb alert on TGV attributed to AD.

21 June - ADn robs Lyon Credit du nord. An employee is stabbed. AD Lyon escaped with 400,000 francs.

15 July - Schleicher freed from prison, benefiting from PS government amnesty.

5 August - Rouillan amnestied.

6 August - PS First Secretary[1] Jospin’s automobile, stolen from a car park near Saint-Sulpice on 13 July, is recovered. AD tells Liberation it is responsible.

29 August - attack on Intercontinental Hotel injures ten people. Attack undertaken to pressure authorities to free imprisoned militants.

17 September-Menigon freed after 20-day hunger-strike and disappears.

22 September - anti-goinfrerie (anti-piggery) attack on La Tour dArgent restaurant to draw attention to imprisoned militants. Twenty people vandalize entry and leave behind tracts entitled

23 September - Radinter" (Bowifecurs anonymes pour la defense des incareeres tres excites parRobety) attack Toulouse Palais de Justice.

24 September - Wm ’ set fire to annexe of Comite de probation in Paris and attack statue of Saint-Louis in Vincennes.

26 September - ‘Germain*attacks food store handlingFauchon products and paints stock. A telegram to AFP links incident to those above.

29—30 September - Cotnite unilaire de defense des prisotmiers politiques occupies QtMidien de Paris editorial offices, demanding dedication of a page in the next morning's edition to hunger-strikers.

30 September - 50 people occupy AFP offices and falsify news item about the death of AD hunger-striker.

31 October-40 militants of la repression enAlgerie occupy Le

Monde offices.

32 October - AD group occupies set of television station FR3 programme on Anwar Sadat (assassinated that day).

33 November - AD Lyon shoot-out with police during robber}’ of a Soaeie lyonnaise kills police brigadier Guy Hubert. ADn escapes with 40,000 francs.

34 December - Rouillan participates in squatter occupation ofvacant building as member ofzfHraariow des ouvriers-paysans du 18eme arrondissement.

35 December - AD Lyon again robs a Lyon Credit fyonnais. Frerot again brutalizes a bank employee.

10 December - AD Lyon robs a Lyon BNP. Bank manager is stabbed.

23 December - butane gas cartridge explosions hit ‘symbols' of consumerism: Rolls Royce, Le Train Bleu (toy shop), Brasserie Bofinger and Burberrys (clothes shop).

1982

19 January - AD Lyon robs a Societe lyonnaise branch.

18 February - AD Lyon robs another Societe lyonnaise branch.

13 March - Lebanese painter Chatline, a member of AD's murdered by Schleicher. Chahine was an informer for the RG.

31 March - machine-gun attack on Israeli Defence Ministry’ commercial mission in Paris.

8 April “ discovery[r] of AD arms depot A pistol-machine-gun used in the 31 March attack on Israeli commercial mission proves links to FARL, 27 May - Menigon, in the company of Belgian CCC leader Carette, is severely injured in car accident Tracts protesting against the Versailles summit found in the car.

28 May

gunshots fired at Paris Bank of America by AD Lyon.
25 AD sympathizers questioned in Paris and Grenoble after a tract is distributed calling for armed protest against US President Reagan’s risit to France.

3 June - European headquarters of World Bank and Paris IMF offices hit by six-kilogram bomb planted by Unitecombattanle Lahouari-FaridBenchellal.

4-5 June - explosion at Ecole americaine in St Cloud several days after the Paris American Legion branch received a telephone bomb threat

5 July - during AD Lyon robbery of a bank in Saint-Chamond (Loire), Frerot shoots a cashier in the temple*

20 July - attack on Bank Leumi and Ganco (an Israeli company) in Paris, August - Olivier splits from Rouillan and Menigon, creating AD’s ‘national[1] and ‘international’ wings,

1 August - unoccupied Israeli diplomatic car machine-gunned by Unite combattante Marcel Rayman.

7 August - explosion at Diskount Bank (subsidiary of former Rothschild Europeenne des Banques) by Unite combattanteMami Rayman.

8 August - explosion at Jewish-owned Nemor company supply store by Unite combattante Lahouari-Farid Benchellal.

11 August - bombing of Citrus GMBI of Israel severely injures a woman.

17 August - Paris court refuses to release Hamami (arrested 8 April). After he confirms three AD attacks in a Liberation interview, a search warrant is issued for Rouillan.

18 August - Mitterrand bans AD as part of counter-terrorist strategy after rue des Rosiers attack.

19—20 August - explosion seriously damages offices of extreme-right monthly Minute.

21 August-FARL bomb explodes under car of a US embassy commercial adviser, killing two police specialists who were trying to dismantle it.

September - one and a half tons of explosives found at remote rural commune in Ardeche.

17 September - 19 AD activists questioned after discovery of a car containing arms and explosives. Former GARI militants Camillieri, Grosmougin and Chibaud imprisoned.

13 October - Oriach and Christian arrested and documents seized, including about 40 file-cards about Jewish businesses in Paris.

20 October - AD militant Moreau escapes police as they try to question him.

April la Legion d^ionneur ransacked to pressure for liberation of

Oriach.

31 May - policemen killed on Avenue Trudaine as they attempt to check papers of six AD militants. Three suspects, Ham ami, Argano and Fotina, are never found.

15 June - AD members Camillieri, Grosmougin, Magron, Chibaud and Moreau (m dfoeHZfz?) sentenced for possession and transportation of arms and explosives.

29 July - ADn robs Saint-Etienne bank. Client is shot in the stomach by Frerot.

30 July - robbery' of jewellery store ‘Aldeberf by Menigon and Rouillan.

28 August - attacks on national headquarters of PS and Ministry of Defence.

25 September - attack on Se/wes techniques de construction navale. No group claims responsibility but AD suspected.

26 September - ADn bomb attack on Centre documentation des carrieres de la Marine nationale,

29 September - bombing of Cercle militaire,

14 October - Italian extreme-left and COLP member Rizzato killed in robbery'. Early confirmation of AD’s Euro-terrorist links.

17 November - bomb attacks on Maison diocesaine and Seventh-Day Adventist church.

6 December - AD members Moriset and Jacquet sentenced to ten and seven years in prison for attempted robbery.

1984

29 January' - arms manufacturer Panhard-Lavessor bombed. Company constructs light machine-gun AML and troop transport VAB sent to Chad.

2 February' - arrest of Italian extreme-leftist Spano. BR and FARL murder American General Leamon Hunt, chief of Sinai multinational force, in Rome.

4 February' - Rouillan and Mcnigon escape police drag-net in Paris. Incident precipitates ADi move to a farm at Le Gue Girault at Vitryaux-Loges, near Orleans.

13 March - Menigon and Rouillan take Belgian police inspector hostage and escape capture. Confirms use of Belgium as a refuge.

27 March - police general Guy Delfosse murdered in hold-up of Lyon BNP by Olivier, Joelle Crepet and Max Frerot.

12 July - bombing of Institut Atlantiqtte des Affaires /nfernationales by Commando Ciro Rizzato.

13 July

bombing of Ministry of Defence Centre de recherches et de constructions navales by the Cowffwnrfo Lahouari Farid BenchellaL
Schleicher and Halfen brothers charged with Avenue Trudaine murder.

14 July - bombing of Ministry of Industry building containing the offices of NATO pipeline management by Commando Lahouari Farid BenchellaL

2 August-bombingofAgence spatiale europeenneby Commando CiroRizzato.

23 August - failed car-bomb attack on Union de /Europe Occidentale. M^nigon phones to warn of explosion. Police tow away the car for violating traffic laws.

28 August-bomb attacks on headquarters of PS and Ministry of Defence.

15 September - Schleicher, Halfen brothers, Besse and Spano begin hunger-strike to protest against isolation and lack of visiting rights.

2 October - CCC bomb attack on Litton Business International.

4 October - 635 prisoners at Fleury' refuse to eat in solidarity with AD hunger-strikers and to draw[r] attention to prison conditions.

10 October - ADn member £mile Ballandras arrested in hold-up and hostage incident in Lyon.

20 October - bombing of Messier-Hispano-Bugatti computer services by Commando Lahouari Farid BenchellaL

21 October - bombing of company

24 October - four of five AD hunger-strikers end their protest after family delegation receives permission to visit them from courts.

25 November - Portuguese extreme-left Popular Forces of 25 April fires mortars at US embassy in Lisbon.

9 December

attack on RPR offices by ADn Commando Hienghene.
Portuguese extreme-left Popular Forces of 25 April fires mortar at NATO command post in suburban Lisbon*

10 December - attack on Elf-Aquitaine offices by Commando Hienghene.

18 December - failed RAF bomb attack on NATO military college in West Germany. Investigators discover explosives from stockpile stolen in Belgium. ADi used same stockpile to attack UEO. First evidence of ADi-RAF alliance.

1985

15 January

AD and RAF announce guerrilla action against NATO and FrancoGerman cooperation.
CCC bombs US Army social centre in Brussels, slightly injuring American guard and causing $500,000 damage.

19 January - Schleicher begins hunger-strike to support West German terrorist prisoners.

25 January - assassination of Audran by Commando Elisabeth-von-Dick.

28 January - Portuguese extreme-left Popular Forces of 25 April fire mortars at three NATO frigates in Lisbon harbour.

1 February

Ernst Zimmerman assassinated by RAF Ratricb O’Hara Commando.
Popular Forces of 25 April bomb 18 cars belonging to West German military[1] personnel in Beja, Portugal to demand closure and dismantlement of base.

13 April - explosions at Paris offices of Israeli Bank Leumi and ONI by Unite combattante Sana Mheidli.

14 April - Afrwnte offices bombed by Unite combattante SanaMheidlL

27 April - explosion at Paris IMF headquarters by Unite combattante Lahouari Farid BenchellaL

30 April - explosions at TRT and SAT set by Unite combattante Ciro Rizzato.

1 May - CCC bombs FEB headquarters in Brussels. Two firemen killed after police ‘forget’ to warn of explosion.

26June

ADi Unite combattante Antonio Lo Musico fires shots at car of Henri Blandin.
Judge Bruguiere protests to Algerian embassy over lack of cooperation in search for Hamami.

4 July - RAF member Ingrid Barabass arrested in Frankfurt. She was spotted in Paris shortly before Audran’s assassination.

5 July - police seize material at Radio-Mouvance, which sympathized with extreme-left and Third World movements and defended AD ideas on air.

26 July - Algerian government says it does not oppose Bruguicre’s investigation for Hamami case in Algeria.

8 August - ADi-RAF Commando Georgejackson bombs US air force base in Frankfurt, West Germany. Two Americans killed and 11 injured.

4 September - attacks on businesses accused of investing in South Africa: ATIC; Aluminium-Pechiney; Renault; and Spie-Batignolles.

9 September - Bruguiere goes to Algeria to investigate Hamami’s role in Avenue Trudaine shooting.

17 September - Bruguiere finds no trace of Hamami in Algeria.

14 October - explosions at the AfatioH de la Radio andAntenne-2.

17 October - explosion at the Haute Autorite de I’Audiovisuel by Commando Ahmed-Moulay after Le Pen interview on Antenne 2’s *L’heuredeverite’.

19 October - explosions at airline UTA and shipping firm Chargeurs Reunis, active in South Africa, by CbmrcflWfl #

20 October - Meyer Azeroual, AD founder and 'financier’, arrested in Paris,

7 December - two attacks on NATO pipeline network. The control room for military oil pipeline in Belgium and Versailles building of managers of NATO pipelines, d’exploitation, bombed.

15 December - Belgian police arrest CCC members. Rouillan and Menigon seen speeding through a Brussels police blockade.

20 December - ADn blows up Lyon Qu&e z/’^^w^but cannot find money.

1986

24 January - BW, which resembles AD, first appears in attack on CIRPO,

4 March - AD robbery of Banque de France in Niort,

27 March - ADi robs a Societe generate in Orleans.

28 March - ADn leader Olivier and Bernard Blanc arrested. Documents (weighing 150 kilograms) seized.

30 March - Crepet arrested in Saint-Etienne as she tries to burn and flush a bundle of papers down a lavatory. Discovery of ADn archives,

6 April - BW attacks Parti ouvrier europeen (POE) offices.

9—10 April - Lisbon Air France offices in Lisbon bombed. Telephone threat against French consul and Institut flranfais.

15 April - shots fired by Commando Christos Kassimis at CNPF VicePresident Guy Brana.

16 April - 40 extreme-left militants questioned about attack on Brana.

18 April - public prosecutor opens inquiry on six people after Brana attack.

23 April - police search Liberation offices. Journalist Millet, who interviewed Rouillan in 1982, questioned and held. PSD journalist Marc Francelet also arrested,

25 April-Black and Decker France Director Marston murdered by Frerot.

26 April - American Express and Control Data offices in Lyon bombed by Frerot.

27 May - CCC members Carette, Chevolet, Sassoye and Vandergcerde begin hunger-strike to protest against prison isolation cells and demand the right to meet, end to censure of correspondence and right to wear civilian clothes,

16 May-ADi OzmmiN ChristosKassimis andJWCrnpo Gallende attack Interpol. Security guard slightly injured.

24 May - explosion in front of police commissariat in Paris 11 e arron dissement. ‘Insecurity mart aux flics' written on nearby wall.

11 June - two Americans and two Irish citizens arrested smuggling arms from Le Havre to Ireland in a camping vehicle shipped from Los Angeles for INLA*

12 June - arrest of Alain Pojolat, suspected of links to AD,

16 June - Pascale Turin imprisoned in Lyon. She had sheltered AD members and concealed stolen equipment and goods.

22 June - BW attacks Rothmans cigarette company offices*

3 July - robbery[7] of Brnigue de France in Saint-Nazaire.

6 July - explosions at Thomson computer unit and /for JifjtdJe*

7 July - arrest of ADn member Succab*

9 July

bomb by ADn Commando Loi'c Lefevre devastates BRB temporary’ offices. Division inspector Basdevant killed, four policemen seriously wounded and 20 others injured.
Siemens co-director Beckerts and chauffeur killed by bomb set by RAF Commando Maria Cagol in Munich.

21 July - ADi explodes 12-kilogram bomb at OECD.

9 September - arrest of ADn members Lahy and Augay in Lyon*

19 September-14 October - France participates in NATO military manoeuvres.

24 September - Oriach and five others questioned after 9 September FARL attack.

4 October-four armed men claiming to belong to AD steal detonators and coils of safety fuse from building site in Saint-German de Joux (Ain).

10 October - Gerald von Braummuelh assassinated by RAF commando West European Revolutionary Front.

29 October-Eket, Guadaloupean recruited into ADn by Succab, arrested in Paris.

I November - explosions at state-owned /f/r and the ONI to protest against Chirac government policy of expelling immigrants.

II November - explosions at headquarters of Peugeot, Total and PechineyUgine-Kuhlmann as South African President Botha begins private visit in France.

17 November - Besse shot by Cb/MWflnab

19 November - European and US arms manufacturers agree to joint design and construction of advanced military equipment.

December - Gilbert Vecchi, who aided bombing of Paris BRB headquarters, arrested.

3 December - trial of Schleicher and Halfen brothers for Avenue Trudaine shooting, Defendants force adjournment by threatening court and jury.

15 December - Alain Peyrefitte’s car bombed. Chauffeur Serge Langer killed.

1987

5 January - police thwart assassination attempt on Bruguiere. Live grenade on the end of a nylon string in front of his apartment door dismantled.

12 February - ADi claims responsibility for assassinating Besse.

20 February - France announces production of chemical weapons and continues nuclear blasts in South Pacific.

21 February - Rouillan, Cipriani, Mdnigon and Aubron arrested on Pontaux-Dions farm in Vitry-aux-Loges (Loiret).

23 February - RPR secretary-general Toubon criticizes PS ‘laxisme* in terrorism and states that Besse and Audran would be alive if not for the 1981 amnesty.

25 February - ADi leaders charged.

5 March - Aubron and Menigon charged with Besse murder.

18 March - police discover AD hide-out in containing

11 kilograms of explosives.

20 March - Italian air force general Licio Giorgieri shot by Union des communities eombattants.

30 March - ADi leaders charged with Audran murder.

28 May - anti-terrorist summit of nine Western nations in Paris.

13 June - seven professional magistrates deliberating over Avenue Trudaine shooting condemn Schleicher to life-imprisonment, Nicolas Halfen to ten years and acquit Claude Halfen.

19 June - BW attacks offices of Societe generate des Techniques industrielles (SGTI), French branch of Union Carbide.

27 November

Frerot arrested in Lyon.
Oriach charged with o&wia&m rfe nialfaileurs en fetation avec une entreprise terroriste and imprisoned.

1 December-Rouillan, Cipriani, Schleicher, Aubron and Menigon began hunger-strike to demand political prisoner status and closing of reinforced isolation cells.

2 December - Helyette Besse joins hunger-strike.

3 December

Frerot charged.
Oriach appears in court to apologize for comments over Audran murder.

16 December - Oriach sentenced to six months in prison for his statements.

21 December - Menigon and Aubron transferred from Fleury-Merogis prison to penal hospital at Fresnes.

28 December - Bruguifere finds threat signed by AD in his letter box.

1988

9 January -- BW explosion at offices £rferte(MIL).

24-25 January - Hamburg (Germany) Renault dealership destroyed by fire started by Organisation pour les prisonniers d Action directs.

3 February - 50 helmeted and masked demonstrators carrying banner supporting AD prisoners vandalize /nstitut culture!fran^als in Frankfurt, Germany.

5 February - five persons declaring themselves to be an informal AD prisoner support committee occupy Brussels’France Presse offices, 19 February

BW bombs INSEE (polling company) building to protest against violdes Joules, mensonges st manipulation de Fopinion\
Menigon, Schleicher and Gailhac acquitted for Charpentier murder attempt.
Parents of AD members appeal for satisfaction of group demands.

23 February - Institut medico-legal on the Quai de la Rapee bombed by Solidarity revolutionnaire internationals.

18 April - BW bombs offices of Claude Thomazon, president of regional association of bailiffs. Two residents of the building seriously injured.

21 April - 22 persons in Paris questioned by the brigade criminelle following BW attack. Injured occupants of building in very’ serious condition.

22 April - 12 of 22 persons questioned in connection with BW attack, mostly 20to 25-year-old extreme-left militants, held in custody.

23 April - all those questioned about BW attack freed.

17 May - BW vows to ‘continue struggle’ if government does not abandon Superphenix nuclear fusion project. It calls for a boycott of South Africa and a response to FLNKS demands.

Appendix 2: Attacks by Action Directe, 1979-87

Violent acts attributed to AD:

1979 - 9 attacks
1980 — 17 attacks
1981 — 4 attacks
1982 —8 attacks
1983 — 7 attacks
1984 — 9 attacks
1985 — 16 attacks
1986 — 6 attacks

1979

1 May - machine-gun attack on CNPF headquarters.

15 September

explosion in annexe of Ministry of Labour and Participation.
two bombs dismantled near Ministry of Health.

16 September

bomb attack on SONACOTRA.
machine-gun attack on facade of Ministry of Labour and Participation.

24 September - attack on building housing Ghw professionelle de prevoyance des salaries and Delegation regionalepour I’emplois d'lle-de-France.

1980

3 and 5 February - two failed attacks on Direction regionale du travail et de la main-d'oeuvre.

10 February - bombing of Societe immobiliere de construction de Paris.

11 February - bomb damages offices of SEMIREP (Soa/r/ mixte renovation du quartier Plaissance).

16 March - bombing of DST.

18 March - machine-gun fired into Ministry of Cooperation.

28 March - bombing of GIGN.

30 March - attack on Toulouse police headquarters.

5-6 April - fire started by Clodo destroyed computers in Toulouse offices of Philips Data Systems.

31 April - fire in Toulouse CII Honeywell offices.

32 April - attack on Toulouse Palais de Justice fails.

33 April

• Ministry of Transport bombed.

• Ministry of Transport annexe attacked by bazooka.

• Delegation d la securite routiere attacked by bazooka.

9 June - arson damages Universite Rennes-1 building.

12June-bombatOrly-Ouest air terminal injures seven cleaning personnel.

19 September - machine-gun attack on Ecole militaire.

1981

23 December - butane gas cartridge explosions at Rolls Royce, Le Train Bleu (toy shop)* Brasserie Bofmger and Burberry's (clothes shop).

1982

31 March - Israeli defence ministry commercial mission in Paris machinegunned.

26 May - gunshots fired at Bank of America.

3 June - European headquarters of World Bank and Paris IMF offices hit by six-kilogram bomb planted by Unite combattanle Lahouari Farid Bench ellaL

4-5 June - explosion at Scole Americaine in St Cloud.

20 July - attack on Bank Leumi and Ganco, an Israeli company.

1 August - unoccupied car belonging to Israeli diplomat machine-gunned by Unite combattanleMarcel Rayman.

7 August - explosion at Diskount Bank by Unite combatlantc Marcel Rayman.

8 August - attack on Jewish-owned Nemor company supply store by Unite combattan te Lahouari Farid Benchellal.

11 August - woman severely injured by explosion at Citrus GMBI of Israel.

19-20 August - explosion damages offices of extreme-right monthly Afinate*

1983

31 May - two police killed on Avenue Trudaine.

28 August - attacks on national offices of PS and Ministry of Defence.

25 September - attack on Sfltws techniques de construction navale.

26 September - explosion at Centre documentation des carrieres de la Marine nationale.

29 September - bomb attack on Cercle militaire.

17 November - bomb attacks on Alzz/st??? diocesaine and Seventh-Day Adventist church.

1984

29 January' -bombing of offices of arms manufacturer Panhard-Lavessor.

12 July - bombing of Institut Atlantique Affitires Internationales by Commando Ciro Rizzato.

13 July - bombing of Centre de recherches et de constructions navales_t annexe of Ministry of Defence by Commando Lahouari Farid Benchellal.

14 July - bombing of Ministry of Industry offices by Commando Lahouari Farid Benchellal.

2 Augustbombing ofAgence spatiale europeenne by Commando Ciro Rizzato.

23 August - failed attack on WELL

28 August-bomb attacks on headquarters of PS and Ministry of Defence.

20 October - bombing of Messier-Hispano-Bugatti computer services by Lahouari Farid Benchellal.

21 October - bombing of Marcel Dassault company.

9 December - attack on RPR offices by Commando Hienghene.

10 December - attack on Elf-Aquitaine offices by Commando Hienghene.

1985

25 January - assassination of Audran by Commando Elisabeth-von-Dick.

13 April - powerful explosions at Paris offices of Israeli Bank Leumi and the ONI by Unite combattante Sana MheidlL

14 April -Minute offices bombed by Unite combattante Sana Mheidli.

27 April - Paris IMF headquarters bombed by Unite combattante Lahouari Farid Benehellal.

30 April - explosions at TRT and SAT by Commando Ciro Rizzato.

26 June - shots fired at Blandin by Unite combattante Antonio LoMusico.

8 August - ADi-RAF Georgefackson Commando bomb at US air force base in Frankfurt, Germany kills two Americans.

5 September - attacks on businesses operating in South Africa: ATIC; Aluminium-Pechiney; Renault; and Spie-Batignolles.

14 October - explosions at the ADjjsw la Radio and Antenne 2.

17 October - explosion by Commando Ahmed-Moulay at Haute Autorite de FAudwvisueL

19 October-bomb attacks by Commando B. Moloi'se on UTA and Chargeurs Reunis.

7 December-bomb attack on Agence centre-Europe d'exploitation, management offices of NATO pipelines in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Holland and Germany.

7956

9-10 April-Air France offices in Lisbon bombed.

15 April - shots fired at CNPF Vice-President Brana by Commando Christos Kassimis.

26 April-bombing of Lyon offices of American Express and Control Data.

16 May - machine-gun and bomb attack on Paris Interpol headquarters.

6 July - explosions at Thomson computer unit and Air Liquide.

9 July-Commando Lok Lefet^ebombs BRB temporary offices, killing division inspector and injuring four policemen seriously and 20 other persons.

21 July - car bomb explodes at OECD offices.

I November - offices of^rA/wen^ and the ONI bombed.

II November - bombing of Peugeot, Total and Pechiney-UgineKulhmann by Commando Clarence Payi-Sipho Xulu.

17 November - assassination of Besse by QftmWo Pierre Ovemey.

15 December - explosion under car of Alain Peyrefitte. Chauffeur killed.

1937

5 January - assassination attempt on Bruguiere.

20 March - Italian air force general Licit) Giorgieri shot by gunmen by the Union des communis les combatants.

Appendix 2.2 Types of Political Violence in France

French leftand right-wing political violence is based on fascist, Nazi, Marxist-Leninist and anarchist ideologies. A 1984 French Senate study showed regionalist terrorists committing 4,284 attacks between 1975 and early 1984. Extreme-leftists committed 676 attacks; international terrorists, 329; racists, 231; and the extreme-right, 217. The overall level of attacks increased between 1975 and 1982, Regionalist attacks on property tripled. Racist attacks doubled from 1981 to 1982. This increase was linked to politics. After the PS took power, regionalists demanded more decentralization while racists charged that there were too many immigrants in France. Racist terrorists had been inactive until the late 1970s. Their reappearance was linked to rising unemployment and a perception that it was connected to Third World immigration.

Most violence between 1975 and early 1984 attacked property' rather than people. International terrorists attacked property 4.7 times more than they did people. Regionalists attacked property 18 times more than people. Racist terrorists were four times more likely to attack property' than persons. Extreme-right terrorists were three and a half times more likely to attack property* than persons. Extreme-left terrorists were 34 times more likely to attack property than individuals.

Overall, regionalists and extreme-leftists were less likely to attack individuals. International, racist and extreme-right terrorists were more likely to attack persons. Only two per cent of extreme-leftist attacks hit individuals as opposed to 22 per cent of extreme-right and 17 per cent of international terrorist attacks. International terrorism caused most deaths and injuries: dead and wounded outstripped those of the nearest group, regionalists, by more than two to one. In contrast, ideologically* motivated deaths and injuries by extreme-left and extreme-right were lower. Extreme-left terrorism in France (including AD) varies from the five other types. This variation contradicts the view that leftist violence is particularly dangerous or threatening. Data suggest that this form of terrorism may often appear arbitrary, but is not.

Appendix 3 Murders and Attempted Murders by 4c77(W 1979-87

1980

29 OctoberOlivier and Fr^rot kill security guard Delrieu in BNP robbery*

1981

15 April - policeman killed in robbery of a Paris BNP.

3 November - Brigadier Hubert killed in ADn robbery of Societe lyonnaise.

1982

13 iMarch - murder of Chahine, member of AD’s mouvance and informer for the RG in Paris*

79&?

31 May - policemen Emile Gondry and Claude Caiola killed on Avenue Trudaine*

1984

27 March - police general Guy Delfosse murdered in hold-up of a Lyon BNP.

1985

25 January - murder of General Audran in front of his home by Commando Elisabeth -von -D ick.

26 June - ADi Unite combaltante Antonio Lo Music# fires shots at Henri Blandin’s car.

8 August - ADi-RAF George Jackson Commando bombs Frankfurt, Germany US air force base. Two Americans killed and 11 injured*

7956

15 April - shots fired by Commando Christos Kassimis at CNPF VicePresident Brana in front of his home*

25 April - Black and Decker France Director Marston murdered in his home by Frerot

9 July - ten-kilogram bomb devastates offices of Brigade de repression du bandilisme (BRB), killing a division inspector and wounding 24 others.

17 November - Renault President Besse shot in front of his home by Commando Pierre-Ovemey.

15 December - Alain Pevrefitte’s car bombed. Chauffeur Serge Langer killed.

1987

5 January - assassination attempt on Bruguiere.

Appendix 4.1: Attacks by the Croupe Bakounlve-gdansk-parisguatemala-salvador (Gbgpgs)

1981

20 December - bomb attack on offices of Polish transport company Botrans. Responsibility claimed in ‘Communique 1 ’.

1982

lOJanuary-three bomb attacks. Responsibility claimed in ‘Communique2'\

offices of ESMIL import-export firm working in US.
offices of Soviet jewellery company SLAVA.
offices and store of Metallex, a Polish tool company.

11 February - three bombs. Responsibility claimed in ‘Communique 3

offices of Chilean national airline, Lan Chile.
offices of American applicance firm ITT Television.
offices of Sansinea, a company importing Argentine beef.

14 February - two bomb attacks. Responsibility taken in ‘Communique3 bis

offices of Colombian steel firm/4n‘eras Paz Del Rio.
offices of American appliance firm^Utv.

1 November - bombing of ‘La Slava’ jeweller}’ shop by Hooligans Internationalistes, GBGPGS.

19 November - two bomb attacks. Responsibility claimed in ‘Communique 5'by Hooligans Intemationalistes, GBGPGS.

offices of Outspan Organization, French subsidiary of South African company that imports and exports citrus fruit.
offices of Promo Chirnie, French import-export firm working in China, Japan and South Africa. The text denies GBGPGS links to AD.

21 November - bombing of French metallurgy company COFRANET (Compagnie franfaise des metaux)^ a Rothschild subsidiary* by Hooligans /nternationalistes, GBGPGS. Responsibility claimed in 6\

26 December - bombing at ground-floor offices of Air Material, which sells aircraft radar equipment. Responsibility claimed in 7\

1983

20 January - bombing of administrative offices for reviews published by Ministry of Defence. One person slightly injured. Responsibility claimed in Communique 8\

14 February-bomb attack on exterior fatjade ofSAMM (Societed application des machines matrices). Responsibility claimed in Communique 9\

Appendix 4.2: Black War (Bw)

BW first appeared in a 12 December 1985 attack on Legitime defense. It then struck the Ctw/erai# Internationale des resistances en pays occupes (CIRPO) on 24 January 1986. On 6 April, BW hit Parti ouvrier europeen (POE) offices and, on 22 June, bombed Rothmans cigarette company offices. BW attacked Union Carbide’s French subsidiary; Societe generale des Techniques industrielles (SGTI) on 19 June 1987. On 9 January 1988 it bombed the movement dnitiative et Liberte (MIL), charging that it was an Organisation fasciste qui amalgamesocialisme et SIDA MIL claims to defend initiative and liberty. BW attacks rose in 1988. On 19 February it bombed an INSEE (polling company) building, declaring that in fihis pre-electoral period, polls signify the rape of crowds, lies, and manipulation of opinion . . . Let’s force a stop to polls for political ends’.[1]

On 18 April, BW bombed offices of the Paris-region bailiffs’ association, injuring two people. A communique stated that fin this pre-electoral period, Black War, with its modest means, presents its programme; first of all, in solidarity with all the poor who have been expelled or seized, it proposes the destruction of all the offices of bailiffs and the Public Treasury’? BW said it struggled 'against racism and fascism.. . apartheid and those who support it’ to Taise awareness in connection with the slide of our democracies towards police states and soft fascism’? On 21 April 1988, 22 people aged from 20 to 25 were questioned. Many were close to the rock group Les Berrurier noir. The group rejects 'the system’ and 'the pigsty Le Pen’ and was named France’s best rock group in 1987. Some produced the Parloirs libres radio programme. Others were anti-racist activists and conscientious objectors at the review Reflexe. By 23 April all were freed. On 17 May BW said it would continue attacks if the Superphenix nuclear project went ahead. It demanded a boycott of South Africa and negotiations with FLNK.S in return for a ‘truce’. BW said it had no illusions about the PS: ‘we know very well that a Chevenement is capable of the same jingoism and crimes as a Charles Hernu’.[4]

Appendix 4.3: Action Directs Trials and Imprisonment

AD/ trials

The first trials focused on the 1983 Avenue Trudaine shooting. On 3 December 1986, Schleicher, Nicolas and Claude 1 lalfen went to court. They repeatedly threatened the jury. Schleicher declared that ceux qui siegeront id, magistrals ou jures, s'exposeront aux rigueurs de la justice proletarienne, et, a titre d’information, jevoudrais savoird ce sujet amibien de temps vous avez prevu pour les faire proteger\ Judge Xavier Versini adjourned proceedings. The jury resigned on 8 December. Seven Paris judges then sentenced Schleicher to life-imprisonment and Nicolas Halfen to ten years, and acquitted Claude Halfen on 13 June 1987.

The defence ministry filed a complaint of injury to public administration against Oriach on 20 June 1986. During a 12 June edition of the Europe-1 radio show Oriach stated: ne vais pas la regretter, le general

Audran etait un trafiquant dames international ’ When the interviewer said Audran was only a civil servant, Oriach responded: ‘Ota, ;7j a desfondionnaires chez les trqfiquants d'armes.’ Police afterwards questioned Oriach about the 9 September 1986 FARL attack on a Rue de Rennes Tati store.[1] Although his FARL-AD links were unclear, police suspected that he was an intermediary and also questioned him about a two-month visit to Syria* On 27 November 1987, Oriach was charged with teflaataw de malfatteurs en relation avec une entreprise terrorist? and imprisoned. He had been questioned by DST on 23 November at his home near Rennes, where he was writing a book In his house*, police found a list of officials, magistrates and Interior Ministry anti-terrorism directors along with the floor-plan of the Paris Palais de Justice. Lawyers Isabelle Coutant-Peyre and JeanLouis Chalanset said Oriach was originally questioned about Iranian extreme-leftist, Azita Chipour, and claimed that he was virtually abducted, In a Paris court on 3 December, Oriach refused to retract statements about Audran. He declared he was an enemy of the government and a revolutionary communist. The prosecutor argued that Oriach’s statements justified murder. On 16 December 1987, he was condemned to six months in prison.[2]

AD found the prison system ripe for agitation. On 1 December 1987, Rouillan, Cipriani, Schleicher, Aubron and Menigon began a hungerstrike. They insisted that AD militants were political prisoners and should be grouped together. They demanded immediate closure of the reinforced security isolation cells in which they were held.[3] Helyette Besse joined the hunger-strike on 2 December. Their health slowly deteriorated but the Chirac government refused to give in. On 21 December, Menigon and Aubron were transferred to Fresnes penal hospital.

A trial of 22 people linked to ADi began on 11 January' 1988/ Charges ranged from leadership of AD to association with known criminals. The prosecution described the defendants as a criminal group having 'entente en vue de preparer des crimes The crime w[r]as first defined by die Code Napoleon to punish highway robbers. Its provisions were extended to political delinquency in a controversial 18 June 1893 amendment. The other main charge was association with known criminals, a charge that permits legal action in the absence of substantiating evidence. The French term association refers to a range of political and emotional relationships. The charges against ADi members and associates were 350 pages long.

State witnesses spoke on 17 January.[5] Schleicher, in his second court appearance after arrest, read two texts that affirmed his membership in AD and support for 'la lutte molutionnaire du peuple palestinien contre rimpmalisme sioniste\ The first witness was a former Renault worker, Jean-Antoine Carbo. The prosecution alleged that Baudrillart, Benoit and Jean Asselmeyer[6] tried to incite Carbo to commit violence at Renault’s Rouen factory. However, Carbo said the accused did not encourage violent acts and that their discussions focused on conditions in Italian Fiat plants. He said police intimidated him into signing statements and that he cooperated out of fear. Witness Sylvie Regnier, a friend of Carbo, concurred that her signed testimony was untrue. A fourth witness, Sylvie ValUe, contradicted previous statements to police by denying any knowledge that Benoit and Baudrillart hid arms in her cellar?

On 18 January, deputy public prosecutor Michel Gauthier requested a variety of sentences: from a one-year suspended sentence (for lawyer Charlotte Granier and niece Sandrine Guibert) to eight years (for mouvance members Baudrillart, Benoit, Poirr£ and Asselmeyer) to ten years (for Rouillan, Menigon, Aubron, Cipriani, Schleicher, Spano, the Halfens, Besse and Hamami). He asked for clemency for repentant Frederique Germain? The request provoked sarcastic derision from defence benches. ?\Di members considered Germain a lightweight and a traitor and suspected that the state had paid her off. After listening to her lawyer argue over compensation for repentant Italian terrorists on 19 January 1988, Menigon said En France, (a se passe sous la table’, Judge Jacques Duclos expelled her from court. A guard standing above her hit Menigon’s shoulder. She was expelled from court crying ‘Let me go!. Other defendants were expelled after protests. The trial ended on 21 January 1988. Lawyers defending ADi members were then at risk. On 22 January[7], a Toulouse court postponed ruling on lawyers Marie-Christine and Christian Etelin, who defended many AD members. Charged with violating professional secrets, they were questioned and their offices searched during the Audran investigation.

The above trials and hunger-strikes had impact outside the courts. On 24-25 January, the Organisation pour les prisonniers d’Action directe destroyed a Renault dealer office and showroom in Hamburg, Germany. Petrol was spread around and showroom w[r]indow[r]s smashed, but no fire was started. On 3 February, the Frankfurt /nstitut culture/ fran^ais was ransacked, causing about 50,000 francs worth of damage. Fifty[7] helmeted and masked demonstrators carrying a banner of support for AD prisoners blocked the street and vandalized the institute. The group was then on day 65 of its hunger-strike. On 5 February', five persons calling themselves an informal AD prisoner support committee occupied Brussels AFP offices, demanded publication of a text affirming solidarity with AD prisoners, and protested against media silence on the hunger-strike.

The Chirac government still refused to respond. Security minister Robert Pandraud declared on 17 February 1988: fa ire la greve de la faint, c’estleur droit. Onpeuttoujoursfaired.es regimes amaigrissants. ’The statement aroused serious concern over the prisoners* conditions. Ligue des droits de I’homme president Yves Jouffa demanded that justice minister Albin Chaiandon end ADi leaders’ isolation. He said it contradicted nondiscrimination clauses in the European declaration of human rights and a 1973 Council of Europe document. Jouffa stated in a letter of 12 February to Albin Chaiandon that the trial brought out 7^ derogatoire aux droits de Fhomme que constituent anjourd'hui les conditions carcerales de certains prisonniers en France\ However, the secretary of state for human rights, Claude Malhuret, condemned Jouffa’s statements on 18 February. He said the criticism aided AD’s struggle since the strike was part of the same combat it waged outside prison. The communist candidate in the 1988 presidential election, Pierre Juquin, then declared that state terrorism was not an acceptable response to violence. The Kfrtj demanded that the government end the strike and AD’s isolation,

Concern over the group members’ deteriorating health spread from families to left-wing politicians and intellectuals. On 19 February, parents and friends of AD members[9] appealed to the government. They declared:

Pis (dement auquel est soumis I’ensemble des prisonniers politiques en France, ce n 'estpas settlement etre seul en cellule. C'est, comtne le denonce Amnesty International, line veritable torture, la 'torture blanche'. L'isolement c 'est couper leprisonnier de tout contact social, affectif. C 'est la volonte de casser unepersonne. . . TVowjJaisons parattre cet appel au nont des droits de Phomme etpar simple humanisme. La prison est censee sanctionner des delits par privation de liberte, rien de plus.

The appeal and international publicity had some effect. On 20 February, Frangois Mitterrand, preparing for the 1988 presidential elections, declared to the newspaper Dauphine libere that a terrorist’s right to self-defence in court had to be respected. On 22 February' 140 public figures™ asked the Minister of Justice to postpone ADi’s trial for health reasons, arguing that not doing so would transform the trial into a 'sinistre ceremonie', and agreeing with Yves Jouffa’s statements of 12 February.

These events accompanied a very real decline in the health of the ADi prisoners. Rouillan and Cipriani were hospitalized shortly after trial on 30 January 1988. ADi lawyer Bernard Ripert said their health was 'worrying’ after the two-month hunger-strike and added that Aubron and Mcnigon’s health was ‘precarious’.[11] The two were soon hospitalized in Frcsnes prison. On 15 February, Rouillan could not appear in court to extend his detention without charge. Fresnes prison hospital authorities said he was too fragile. Instead, Judge Bruguiere went to Fresnes. Dominique Poirre, serving five years in prison for association with known criminals, went on a solidarity hunger-strike on 16 February[7]. The government continued to separate and isolate AD members. Poirre was transferred to a Metz prison on 11 March.

A determination to act decisively and show no compassion was central to the image the Chirac government constructed in the 1988 elections.

However, it was decisively rejected by the voters. ADi trials continued despite controversy. On 12 February, Menigon, Rouillan, Aubron and Cipriani were each sentenced to ten years for associating with known criminals and possessing forged documents, arms and explosives* On 17 February, Menigon was sentenced to 12 years for the 13 September 1980 Rue Pergolese shoot-out* Menigon, Schleicher and Jean-Francois Gailhac were tried for a 1982 murder attempt on Alain Charpentier on 18 February 1988* Menigon’s health again aroused concern since she was weak, distracted and fell asleep in court. The defendants were acquitted on 19 February after Charpentier testified that he did not know them. He said police had pressured for his accusation because they had difficulty developing a case in 1982*

The ADi four appeared in court for the 1983 robbery' of the Aldebert jewellery[7] boutique and the Avenue de Villiers Sodete generale on 23 February* Testifying about Rouillan’s character, psychiatrist Michel Dubec noted he was very talkative, had a particularly happy childhood and turned to terrorism out of conviction rather than unhappiness. Dubec said Rouillan created his life without romanticism and is convinced his choices are guided by a revolutionary[7] communism that is bereft of a personal dimension. At the same trial, Frederique Germain claimed to have been ‘naive’ about AD. She said she participated in the Aldebert heist to protect her lover, Claude Halfen. On 23 February, two 5:30 a*m explosions rocked the Paris Institut medico-legal, Tracts left behind by So/idarite revolutionnaire intemationa/e declared:

Lfa Etat trafiquant d ’armes, une sodete qui tire profit de la mart ne pas s’etonnerdes rotons auprods dAction directe, Nous nesommespas des tympathisants d Action directe mats nous reclatnons la suppression des QHS et des quartiers d'isolement. Noussommes centre lelangage d’unEtat can nibale.

The explosions shattered windows, blew off doors and damaged the office of the Police said the cover ‘SRI’ was used by several

groups. Later the same day, philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre and Catherine Regulier-Lefebvre condemned the treatment of AD and declared sympathy with the goal of a communist society. The next day, a public appeal was issued about ADfs treatment and prison isolation practices*

ADi’s trial progressed slowly because of the complex charges, the poor health of the accused and the government’s tough anti-terrorist stand. Declaring they had nothing further to say, Rouillan, Schleicher, Spano and the Halfens left court on 24 February* This followed a court refusal to suspend Rouillan’s trial. Proceedings none the less continued. On 27 February, Menigon, Rouillan, Aubron and Cipriani were very weak and refused intravenous feeding. The four only drank water and rejected vitamin additives to prevent irreversible health problems. Prison doctors said their health had not deteriorated enough to merit forced intravenous feeding, which they wanted to avoid. ADi prisoners aroused sympathy among other detainees, Alain Trouve, an inmate convicted for robbery, refused to eat for ten days in solidarity with ADi. On 29 February, inmates in the Fleury-Merogis Ata&ofl d’amt des femmes refused food in solidarity with ADi. Many prisoners were then transferred, and the hunger-strike began seriously to disrupt the prison system. A Fleury-Merogis DPS group announced a day of protest against prison isolation on 14 March 1988. They called for an end to prison isolation and urged other inmates to refuse food. They said the struggle against isolation assisted AD and thousands of other detainees ‘who refuse to be reduced to the state of a bleating and docile herd’. The protest focused on Patrick Langlois, condemned to 15 years’ imprisonment and considered a prison protest movement leader. He had been held in isolation for two years and transferred to a different prison every four months.

The image of starving prisoners is unacceptable in a democracy and reveals the political intent of the hunger-strikes. Menigon, Aubron, Rouillan and Cipriani drew the Chirac government into an unfavourable role by using their health to annul procedures in the Besse murder. Hunger-strikes were ADPs ultimate weapon and were far more successful than terrorist techniques. Lawyer Bernard Ripert stated that their health turned proceedings into a ‘trial on intravenous nourishment’. He announced that ADi members were confined to wheelchairs. The government’s obsession with pursuing the trials began to appear brutal and single-minded. Menigon and Aubron were intravenously force-fed after 5 March. On 10 March, six signatories of the 23 February appeal[12] demanded a meeting with Albin Chaiandon and said his response to the Ligue des droits de I'hamme was unacceptable. However, the government continued to treat AD severely. On the hundredth day of the hunger strike (11 March 1988), the justice ministry said pieces of chocolate and biscuits were found under ADi prisoners’ beds and that they willingly accepted intravenous nourishment.

A group of intellectuals[13] made yet another appeal on 20 March. They demanded that prison authorities end their severe methods. They said that nothing prevented the satisfaction of ADi demands and that the authorities’ attitudes w[r]ere ‘ani? On 22 March 1988, after 116

days on hunger-strike, the ADi four were in Fresnes prison hospital. On 12 March, Rouillan and Cipriani w[r]ere retaining w[r]ater in their legs, a sign of serious metabolic problems, and had lost feeling in their hands, Aubron and M^nigon were very weak. Prison hospital authorities urged the four to consent to intravenous feeding or be forced to accept it. The group agreed and from 12-20 March received three litres of liquid per day. The injections contained potassium, lipids, glucose, proteins and multivitamins. This treatment was hard on the weakened militants since it took up to ten hours per day to administer. They recovered some strength, but Aubron had respiratory and hearing problems. Alternating hunger-strikes and intravenous feeding increases the risk of serious muscular problems, weakness and infection. ADi leaders risked colds, viruses and falling into semi-suicidal states. Solidarity movements demanding an end to the strike and the abolition of isolation grew at Fresnes and Fleury-Merogis. A committee of public figures started an inquiry into prison conditions and the accompanying psychosomatic problems. A Comile pour /abolition de I'isolenient carceral was formed to support DPSs. Signatories of the intellectuals’ appeal said the situation was at an impasse.’[4] The deadlock was resolved on 26 March 1988 when the four called off the hunger-strike and gradually began eating. A Chancellery spokesperson said suspension of the strike was not linked to concessions. Lawyer Marie-Christine Etelin released an ADi statement declaring the strike suspended but asserting that the will to struggle was unbroken.

The trials continued. After the 1988 elections, ADi’s prison conditions seemed about to change. The new PS Justice Minister, Pierre Arpaillange, lifted isolation measures for Corsican, Guadeloupean, Basque and AD prisoners charged with terrorism on 5 July 1988. Taken without consulting either the Elysee or Matignon, the move embarrassed the government and provoked right-wing attacks. The new measures provided that prisoners be ‘held in detention’ before hearing and judgment. Sensitive to Amnesty International’s description of isolation as ‘torture’, Arpaillange w[r]anted to improve conditions for humanitarian reasons and not tarnish France’s human rights’ record during the 1989 bicentennial, in which die Declaration droits de I'honmie w[r]as the central theme. Arpaillange proposed that two prisoners be allowed in a cell and that they exercise with other prisoners. Legal authorities found the measures ‘disturbing’. Prison management and guard unions said they would be seen as a weakness by groups opposed to the state and would jeopardize personnel. Fifty-four thousand prisoners w[r]ere detained in France and its overseas departments at the time. Two hundred and eighty-one prisoners demanded _f political status, of whom 33 were in isolation in the Paris region. Sixteen prisoners had been in isolation since 1987 (of these nine w[r]ere in isolation for over a year). Tw[f]o of the 33 prisoners had been held in isolation since July 1986/

Over the entire period, ADi trials continued. On 18 April 1988 Rouillan was charged with 'attempted murder and destruction of a building and property by explosives’. Schleicher, Claude Halfen and Spano’s ten-year sentences for association with criminals w[r]ere confirmed on 4 July 1988. Nicolas Halfen received a six-year sentence. At the same time, Helyette Besse’s eight-year sentence was reduced to six years. On 30 September, she was acquitted in connection with two incidents, but remained in prison. Jean Asselmeyer’s seven-year sentence was reduced to six years. Salvatore Nicofia, acquitted for associating with criminals, was given four years for receiving forged documents. Annelyse Benoit and Bruno Baudrillart were sentenced to five and seven years respectively for receiving, using and forging documents. In confirming the sentences, judges distinguished ADi members and the In their view, the

mouvance could not be punished for the company it kept.

ADi’s hunger-strike spread to other terrorist prisoners. On 10 September 1988, nine Basque militants in Fresnes, Fleury-Merogis and La Sante prisons began a hunger-strike. They demanded the end to the isolation of leader Philippe Bidart (held in isolation since his 20 February 1988 arrest) and the transfer of his aide Joseph Etcheveste to a hospital that could care for him. Etcheveste’s vertebral column had been injured during his arrest and he was paralysed. His lawyers argued that this resulted from improper medical care. Hunger-strikes dien spread. On 13 September 1988 a letter from Paris region prisoners to Francois Mitterrand warned of impending hunger-strikes and demanded: (1) end of isolation status; (2) end to special status for certain prisoners; (3) improved conditions (hygiene, work, study, family contact); and (4) more flexible penalties (looser conditional release and increased exit permits),

The text resembled a union document. Having underestimated the movement’s magnitude, prison authorities were disconcerted. The ensuing hunger-strike was followed to varying degrees across France: 600 of 3,900 dinners were refused in Fresnes; 800 of 4,700 in Fleury-Merogis; 250 of 1,400 in Bois-d’Arcy; 165 of 1,950 in La Sant£; 575 in 1,150 atLyon; 50 of 150 in Chambery; and 1,430 of 2,027 in Baumettes. In a prison near Toulouse, the CRS had to force prisoners back into the cells after exercise. Across France, 5,620 dinner trays were refused. Prison authorities said the movement w[r]as calm and the problem was being contained. The hunger-strike reflected a general malaise in the prison system that spread to employees. On 7 October, the Besse murder trial was delayed by a prison guard strike.

On 7 August 1988, a Belgian court set trial dates for militants involved in a series of 1985 bombings. CCC members Carette, Chevolet, Vandergeerde and Sassoye faced charges for 21 bombings. They went on trial in

Brussels with FRAP (From revolu/ionnaire d'action proUtarienne) members Luc Van Acker and Chantal Patemostre on 26 September 1988. The defendants were charged with associating with known criminals, destroying public buildings, possessing arms, involuntary homicide and attempted murder. The prosecution tried to substantiate CCC, AD and RAF links using documents from the Audran case and captured arms and explosives. Belgian journalists described the CCC as an anarchist group with sect-like structures. Controversy grew over the extent of police knowledge about CCC plans, locations and connections before attacks. The CCC withdrew its lawyers on 27 September, stating that the trial w[r]as counter-revolutionary and contrary to its interests. Defendants warned die jury: *un jour viendra ou les forces politiques revolutionnaires deuront sevir amtre ceux qui continueront d collaborer d la contre-revolution, Alors, ce jour-ld, la place quevous occupez actuellement pourra router tres cher. ’ FRAP defendants accepted the triaPs legitimacy, but denied the charges.

CCC members then went on hunger-strike to protest against conditions. Their lawyers wrote to the justice minister to request improvements, expressing concern over their clients’ health, on 18 October. Chevolet’s weight fell from 71 to 61 kilos by day 47 of his strike. Vandergeerde, on strike for 33 days, went from 48 to 36 kilos. Carette went from 83 to 71 kilos. Bertrand Sassoye went from 66 to 53 kilos by day 26. Only the latter was able to attend proceedings. Doctors said irreversible long-term health effects were possible. Defendants were nevertheless sentenced to life terms of forced labour on 21 October. The sentences were considered extremely severe. FRAP members received five years in prison. CCC defendants were found guilty' in all 21 attacks during 1984 and 1985. One attack killed a fireman. Another wounded a bank guard. The assistant public prosecutor said the death penalty (still in force in Belgium) was unsuitable since it responded to the CCC claim that it was in a state of war. Lawyers pressed the government to give the CCC political status and to improve conditions.[15]

By 1989, both wings of AD were moribund.[1]* Police stated that the French extreme-left terrorist [£]pooF had no more than 250 persons and estimated that there were 180 potential AD and members.[17]

Twenty-two of 25 known AD members were imprisoned on 1 January 1989, making violence unlikely even though 53 persons connected to AD remained at large. Police regularly watched 45 of them. On 9 January, the Besse murder trial began in a special Paris court made up of seven judges. Deliberation was carried out under provisions of the 9 September and 30 December 1986 anti-terrorist laws on 'infractions en relation avec une entreprise collective ay ant pour but de troubler gravement Vordre public par rintimidation ou la ierreur\ Rouillan, M6nigon, Aubron and Cipriani said

they had ‘nothing to say’ about the circumstances and motives for Besse’s murder. On 14 January they were sentenced to life imprisonment plus 18-year security sentences*

On 20 April 1989, Rouillan, M^nigon, Cipriani and Aubron began yet another hunger-strike for political prisoner status, grouping in adjacent cells and the right to communicate between themselves* The government did not respond and the strike dragged on for months* On 11 July 1989, the Justice Ministry described the four as 'affatblis et amaigris ’and said they moved with difficulty and refused all medical assistance. Prison officials began intravenous force-feeding on 18 July. Aubron in particular resisted. Medical conventions stating that no doctor should treat a patient against their wishes were overridden by article D 390 of the French Penal Code, which stipulates: \S7 un detenu se livre a une greve de la faim proIongee, il pent etre procede d son alimentation forcee, mats settlement sur decision et sous surveillance medicale lorsque ses jours risquent d'etre mis en danger. ’ As the hunger-strike reached its ninety-fifth day, the state was ready to compromise* It proposed changes, but excluded granting political prisoner status since the category[1] had been abolished in 1981* The main barrier to changing ADi conditions was Bruguiere* ADi lawyers Isabelle CoutantPeyre and Christian Etelin said the group’s health was alarming:

C esr une question d’heures. Les deux gar^ons ne marchent plus. Ils ont le teint gris, sont decharnes. foelle Aubron pese moins de 40 kg pour 7, 72 m. Les hommes sont sur des Jauteuf/s roulants/Ils ont du mal a tenir leur tete droite. Les files marchent tres difficilemenL Elles etaient recroquevillees sur une table, prostrees, lorsqueje les ai vues. Lairs muscles leurfont trop mal. Il ont tons des absences, des problanes de concentration.™

Critics said Bruguiere’s reasons for maintaining isolation were personal since he had long been an AD target and was obsessed by the group’s trial and punishment. AD lawyers pleaded in a Paris court that dieir clients had to be freed because of their rapidly deteriorating health. About 15 AD sympathizers then occupied newspaper Quotidien de Paris offices to force publication of a text denouncing [f]le discours des medias'.

Bmguiere was called to the Justice Ministry on 19 July to help find a solution. He lifted communication restrictions imposed on ADi* The Garde des Sceaux said the decision was taken for humanitarian reasons. The government placed the four in adjacent cells (rather than in the same one as ADi demanded) and allowed common exercise* Former Chirac security minister Robert Pandraud said giving into the demands was a capitulation to ‘blackmail’ because the four ton/ criminels tres dangereux prets d d'autres chantages, afin d'organiser, depuis la prison, de nouveauxactes terroristes ’* Audran’s daughter said the hunger-strike was a form of blackmail to which no concession should be made: \5’7Z$ ont choisi de sc donner la mart, Fest leur libre choix. La peine de mart n 'exisle plus. S’ils se la donnent eux-memes, eA /iznz wzAztv. ’[19] On 21 July 1989, the hunger-strike ended even though the demand for 'working meetings[7] was not met. When the Justice Minister said there was no question of more concessions, the group capitulated and the four were placed in neighbouring cells. The Syndical de la magistrature, specifying that it did not accept AD ideas, declared

I’isolement rigoureux el prolonge des detenus est assimilable a une torture et d tin traltement inAamain et degradant au regard de A?

europeenne de sauvegarde des liberies. It serait peut-etre temps que la France . . . introduise une possibility de recours centre de telles mesures d'isolement et de wise au secret.

In contrast, the Association professionnelle des magistrals denounced ‘les pressions de toute nature exercees stir le juge Bruguiere pour le contraindre d modifier le regime de detention des dirigeants d Action directe. Des promesses inconsiderees ont ete, avec la demiere imprudence, faites a des lerroristes d&ngereux. Club 89, led by former RPR minister Michel Aurillac_> deplored ‘les mesures de clemence que le gouvemement vient de consentir sous le chantage d des terror is tes qui ont du sang sur les mains et n 'on! d aucun moment manifeste de repentir au stijet des crimes par eux commit. ™

ADn trials

One of the first persons associated with ADn who went to trial was former member Mouloud Ai'ssou.[21] He was accused of taking part in hold-ups with Olivier and Frerot on 24 March 1980, 7 December 1981 and 30 March 1981 (according to Frerofs notes), and was detained without charge on 23 July 1987, Witnesses said Aissou, a former student of Olivier’s, saw neither the latter nor Fr^rot by the time of the last two robberies. Believing his repentance and willingness to cooperate merited consideration^ Aissou went on hunger-strike to demand bail on 21 June 1988. He openly admitted his past ties to ADn members. He had had an affair with Crepet and sheltered Renaud Laigle.[21] Aissou’s lawyer, Thierry Lew, argued that he should be freed under the 1981 amnesty since he had no intention of evading justice, as demonstrated by his arrest in his own home in both July 1986 and July 1987. ATssou’s plight aroused public sympathy* A group[23] appealed for his release on 29 July 1988. Sixty Lyon prisoners refused meals in solidarity with him on 3 August None the less, a Lyon court rejected Ai'ssou’s appeal of 5 August. Levy again raised the issue during preparations for ADn’s trial in November 1988,

On 3 December 1987 Frerot was charged with associating with known criminals, voluntary homicide, armed robbery, hostage-taking, destruction with explosives, and possession of arms and explosives. He chose Klaus Barbie’s lawyer, Jacques Verges, to defend him. On 10 October 1988, ADn member Mathieu Polack was charged by Paris juge d'instruction Gilles Riviere with damaging private property and goods with explosives in an attack on Minute on 19 August 1982.[24] In November 1988, shortly before ADn’s trial, prosecutor Francois Coste requested that the 21 defendants appear in a special court Preparations for ADn trials ran into problems. Investigations into the 1984 murder of police general Guy Delfosse were delayed when police recovered two different revolvers used in the hold-up. A P-38 special found in an ADn hide-out near Saint fitienne was believed to have killed Delfosse, but a Lyon police laboratory had previously stated that a 357-Magnum was the weapon. Juge destruction Marcel Lemonde ordered more ballistics tests.

The ADn trial started in a special Lyon cour d’assises on 16 May 1989. Seven judges substituted for the jury under provisions of the 9 September 1986 anti-terrorist law. Twenty persons[25] appeared for judgment in relation to 34 armed attacks and three counts of second-degree murder. The crimes were committed in Lyon and Saint fitienne. Twenty-seven bomb attacks, one which led to a death, were to be tried later in Paris. Observers were interested to see how Olivier, Frerot, Crepet, Ballandras and Blanc had moulded a diffuse group of depoliticized drop-outs into a revolutionary terrorist unit?[6] ADn activity resembled banditry more than terrorism. From March 1980 to December 1985, ADn robbed about 30 banks, amassing 3,500,000 francs. ADn did not use assassination, but three persons were killed during robberies (Delrieu, Hubert and Delfosse).

When the trial finally started, defence lawyers quickly appealed for a delay. They argued that the Lyon trial would conflict with later ones in Paris. The trial went ahead. Although ADn pleaded it was a group of ‘revolutionary fighters’ motivated by political ideals, testimonies by victims and witnesses contradicted the claim. One witness with a fairly serious mental handicap, Nicole Faure,[27] said she became involved in ADn through her love for Bernard Blanc. Olivier subsequently intimidated her into scouting banks, borrowing cars and hiding packages. Witnesses at bank robberies testified that ADn physically abused bank employees and anyone in its way. Frerot then read a long declaration denouncing the evils of imperialism and France’s role in Africa. A Portuguese cleaning woman then contradicted these humanitarian ideals by stating Frerot pulled her hair, hit her, threatened her with death, and threw her into a lavatory with adhesive tape over her mouth during a robberyThe woman still suffered depression, nightmares and suicidal fits five years later.

Olivier and Frerot tried to get attention on 18 May 1989. Openly revealing his anti-Semitism, Olivier declared: fe liens a signaler que le keffieh esi interdit dans les tribunauxfranfaisljfe suppose que la calottejuive doit etre autorisee .. ri He wore a bright red shirt at the trial and carried a Palestinian scarf until the authorities, fearful he would attack co-defendants who said too much, made him change his clothes. Frerot criticized the prosecution for refusing to free Nicole Charvolin. He noted that Gennevilliers municipal councillor Pierre Van Dorpe had shot at a Maghrebin on 29 April but was freed after paying 12,000 francs. The court refused to delay proceedings on the basis of logistical evidence. ADn had access to a dozen apartments, about 20 garages, tons of forged papers, 22 vehicles and 19 guns of various calibres. GRB (Gw/pf de repression du banditisme) member Bruno Savoye described Frerot as a ‘grand profession?! du vol d main armee and a handyman who tapped into bank agency telephone lines to learn about fund transfers and investigators’ conversations. On 24 May Crepet made a long statement in which she declared:

fe ne suis pas une terrorist?, pas une criminelle, je suis contre la violence et j[l]ai ioujours agi pour la limiter a des actes symboliques contre PEtat. > >fe suis femme, et la misery dte enfants du monde etalee par les medias m [J]est insupportable. Je suis infimiere, et pour avoir luite quotidiennement contre elle je connais la souffrance qui ne s ’embarrass? ni de race ni de classe.Je suis citoyenne, et je constate la violence fail? aux hommes par le capitalism? et {’imperialism?. Je suis travailleuse, et j’ai acquis le sens de la solidarite a cote des gens qui Juttent pour leur dignite. Cest comme travailleuse, citoyenne, injtrmiere et femme, s ’insurgeant contre toutes les injustices, que j’ai engage ma vie dans I Action direct?.

Crepet had previously only appeared as Olivieris lover but now set herself apart:

Je suis contre les assassinatspolitiques, comme celui de Al. Besse. Oui, nows avons fail des braquages mats je regretle qu'ils aient, accidentalemeKl. entrain? trois marts d’hommes . . . Contrairemenl aux politiciens dont les tripotages ont ete amnisties, nous n ‘avons pas pu nous financer par des fausses factures. Moi, simple et pauvre revoltee, devaisfe pour autanl renoncerd Ai lutle?

Olivier said that this demonstrated AD’s democratic character, adding that he favoured killing several ‘pores} but the demand to discuss politics did not impress the court. It sentenced ADn members to pay 5,500,000 francs to victims: 3,678,000 francs to the state, which litigated for Delfosse; and 960,000 francs to Dclrieu’s family. The latter appealed to a compensation commission since ADn members were broke. The court sentenced ADn members to long terms of imprisonment on 29 June:

perpetuite assortie d’une periode de surete de dix-huit ans pour Andre Olivier et Maxime Frerot, perpetuite dont seize annees de sureiepour Emile Ballandras -aucun d'eux n tyant beneficie des drconstances attenuates - vingt ans dont les deux tiers de surete pour Bernard Blanc et dix-huit ans dont dix de surete pour Joelle Crepetd*

Twelve other ADn members[29] received lighter sentences. Eight of the 19 were freed. Ex-member Lallaoui received ten years for possession of arms, ammunition, explosives and stolen money.[30]

Appendix 4.4: Action Directe Commando Units

1979-82

Clodo (Comite liquidant ou detournant les ordinateurs)

Affiche rouge

Jeune Taupe

Casse-Noix

Mouton-Enrages

Nous

Badinter(Bombeurs anonymespour la defense des incarceres tres excites parRobeiy) Germain

Comite Riposte d la repression enAlgerie

ADi:

Commando Lahouari Farid Benchellal

Unite combattante Antonio Lo Musico

Commando George Jackson (with RAF)

Commando Christos Kassimis

Commando Pierre-Ovemey

Unite combattante Marcel Rayman

Commando CiroRizzato

Commando Elisabeth-von-Dick

ADn:

Commando Hienghene

Commando Ahmed-Moulay

Commando B. Moloise

Commando Loie Lefevre

Commando Clarence Payi-Sipho Xulu

Unite combattante Sana Mheidli

La mouvance:

Comite unitaire de defense desprisonniers politicises

Appendix 5.1: Coawunique Num£ro 7, 18 March 1980

Gafsa d Djamena (sic), de Djibouti d Bangui, farmee fran^aise fait regner Fordre afin de preserver la prosperity du commerce neo-colonialiste de la marehandise et de la main-d[f]oeuvre. Marchands d'armes, negriers, traficants officiels et officieux *.. Toute la politiquefran&zisepuelA Gafsa comme d Barbes, la meme exploitation, la meme miscre. Des H. D Af. Vitry aux bidonvilles, les donneurs de coups de trique ont la meme gueule. Les ratissages d Djibouti, la torture d Gafsa, fespaee judicaire, FEtat de siege d la Coutte-d'Or; la meme repression. Lutter contre la politique imperialiste de la France en Afrique, e*est latter contre FEtat fran^ais dans la globalite de ses institutions. Il est temps de prendre les armes contre FEtat negrier.

(From Gafsa to Djamena (sic), from Djibouti to Bangui, the French army keeps order so as to preserve the prosperity of neo-colonialist trade in merchandise and labourers. Arms dealers, slave traders, official and unofficial traffickers ... The entire French policy stinks! In Gafsa as in Barbes, the same exploitation, the same misery. From the public housing in Vkry to the shanty-towns, those who use the cudgel have the same face. Police sweeps in Djibouti, torture in Gafsa, judicial space, the state of siege in Goutte-d^r; the same repression. To struggle against French imperialist policy in Africa is also to struggle against the entire range of French state institutions. It is time to take up arms against the slave - trading state.)

Appendix 5.2, Number of Attacks by Action Directe, 1979–87

Appendix 5.3, Machine-Gun Attacks by Action Directe, 1979–87

Appendix 5.4, Number of Bombings by Action Directe, 1979–87

Appendix 5.5, Number of Murders by Action Directe, 1979–87

Appendix 5.6, Political and Non-political Murders by Action Directe, 1979–87

Appendix 6.1 Motivations for Action Directe, International Attacks, 1982-87

[Anti-International, Anti-Militarist ...]

Appendix 6.2 Motivations for Action Directe, National Attacks, 1982-87

Bibliography

(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly ResourceXt'To^⁸’’ Terrorism

Ai blaster, Anthony, Terrorism- Mvths M . ’^⁹^3).

Vol.XXV, No.3 (Sept. 1977). ’ ^M«ⁿⁱ"S »nd Morals’, in Poli,ieal Studies,

Arendt, Hannah, On Violence (New York- A u

Bafrkun, Michael, ‘Millenarian Aspects of ^B°°^k’ ¹⁹⁶⁹⁾

Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 1 No 4 7^ ^S^P^^macist” Movements’, in

Movements’, in

Bill, James A. and Robert L. Hardee T_r r ¹⁹⁸⁹>’PP-⁴"-34.

Theory (Lanham MD: University"Pres's ofCmXTgRD ^f"^T

Burke, Kenneth, er Grammar of Motives (Berkelev 1 .re- ,.. . —

1969).

ia Press,

Burton, Anthony, Urban Terrorism (London- T r

Carlton, David and Carlo Schaerf (_eds) Int, ^L • ^C°°^per’ ¹⁹⁷⁵)-

(London: Croom Helm, 1975). ’ ^ernatwnal Terrorism and World Security

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War (trans, and ed. by Michael M a .

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press⁷1984) ^{1H d and Peter Pa}ret)

Clutterbuck, Richard, Living with Terrorism (London- Faber 197^

^C°?9ⁿ81)^Orman’ ^{nePurSUitOftheMiUennium} (New VOA; Oxford University Press,

Crenshaw, Martha (ed.), Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power- The r

Political Violence (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press 19831“"““ °^f

Day, A.J. (ed.), Political Dissent: An International Guide to Dissent Extra Parliamentary, Guerrilla and Illegal Political Movements (Detroit: Gale Research

Co., 1983). , , . ., „_n .. ,, , _r-

Delumeau, Jean, Rassurer et proteger: Le sentiment de secunte dans I Occident d autrejois

(Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1989).

Dobson, Christopher, Black September (New York: Macmillan, 1975).

Dollard, John, Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University

Drake, Robert, ‘The Red Brigades and the Italian Political Tradition, in Yonah

Alexander and K.A. Meyers (eds), Terrorism tn Europe (London.

1982), pp.103-40.

Dyson, Freeman, Weapons and Hope (New York, 1984).

„ ‘C^e Study and Theory in Political Science’, in H_andL , ^{MA: Ad}^

^{38 (PafiS: InS}‘^{itUt Fran?aiS P0l6n}°'*

J 1 Ullvl^l ^X •) ’*)

Freedman, Lawrence, 'The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategist,. _in Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modem Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear A_ge (Oxford- Clarendon Press, 1986).

Freedman, Lawrence, Christopher Hill, Adam Roberts, R J. Vincent, P_aul Wilkinson and Philip Windsor, Terrorism and International Order (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, P986).

Fritzche, Peter, ‘Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy: Legacy of the ’68 Movement or “Burden of Fascism”?’, in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.l, No.4 (Oct. 1989), pp.466-81.

Furet, Francois, Antoine Liniers and Philippe Raynaud, Terronsme et democratic (Paris: Librairie Antheme Fayard, 1983).

Goren, Roberta, The Soviet Union and Terrorism (ed. by Jillian Becker) (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

Gurr, Ted, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).

Gutteridge, William (ed.), Contemporary Terrorism (New York: Facts on File, 1986).

Hempel, C.G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965).

Herman, Edward S., The Real Terror Network (Boston: South End Press, 1982).

Hocking, Jenny, ‘Orthodox Theories of “Terrorism”: The Power of Politicised Terminology’, in Politics: Journal ofthe Australasian Political Studies Association, Vol. 19, No.2 (Nov. 1984), pp.103-10.

Janke, Peter, Guerrilla and Terrorist Organizations: A World Directory and Bibliography (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983).

Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary Change (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982).

Julien, Claude, Lapeur et Tordre’, in LeMonde diplomatique, No.386 (May 1986).

Kazdin, Alan E., Single-Case Research Designs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

Kupperman, Robert H. and Darrell M. Trent (eds), Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979).

Laqueur, Walter, ‘Reflection on Terrorism’, in Foreign Affairs (Fall 1986), Vol.65, No.l.

Laqueur, Walter, Terrorism: A Study of National and International Political Violence (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1977).

LeMonde Diplomatique, Special section: Lapeur et I’ordre', No.386 (May 1986).

Lewis, Bernard, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (London^- Al Saqi Books, 1985).

,. hart Arend, Comparative t'omics ano tne i nmnu.

^litical Science Review, ^No’^{65 (Sc}Pt- 1971), pp.682-93 ^C'^,e'^ho'^ljn-^f«n... vferkl, P^{eter Polltlcal} Violence and Terror: Motifs m ■

'lean

¹ University of California Press, 1986). ' ^dMottvations (Berkeley-

_Mjrabeau, Octave, Combagpolitiques (Paris: Librairie Seguier 1990)

Mommsen, JJ. and G. Hirschfeld (eds), Social Protest vLl'a Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe (London: Macmillan X?

Murphy, John F., Punishing International Terrorists: The Leeal Frtd t r „ (Totowa, NJ: Rowman &Allanhead 1985) ^Frameworkf^orPoh<y

Norton, A.R. and M.H. Greenbert, International Terrorism-Anj graphy and Research Guide (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980). '

O’Sullivan Noel (ed.), Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution (Boulder, CO- Westview Press, 19oo).

O’Sullivan, Noel, Fascism (London: J.M. Dent, 1983)

Opler, Morris Edward, ‘Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture’, in The American Journal oj Sociology, Vol.LI (July 1945).

Ortner, Sherry B., On Key Symbols’, in American Anthropologist, No\.15 No 5 (Oct. 1973), pp. 1338-46.

Padovani, Marcelle, Vivre avec le terrorisme: Le modele italien (Paris: Calmann-Levy 1982).

Porzecanski, Arturo C., Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla (New York: Praeger Publishers).

Pye, Lucian, ‘Political Culture’, in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12, p.218.

Ra’anan, Uri, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Richard Shultz, Ernst Halperin, Igor Lukes (eds), Hydra of Carnage: International Linkages of Terrorism: The Witnesses Speak (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986).

Rapaport, David R. and Yonah Alexander (eds), The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).

Raynaud, Philippe, ‘Les origines intellectuelles du terrorisme', in Francois Furet, Antoine Liniers and Philippe Raynaud (eds), Terrorisme et democratic (Paris: Librairie Antheme Fayard, 1983).

Report on Business Magazine (Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Newspapers). Vol.3,

Schlesinger^ Graham Murdock and Philip Elliott Tetonsing ‘Terrorist,,:

Political Violence in Popular Cutare (London: Comedia, 1983).

Selirer Martin Ideology and Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin, l)7b).

Sheehan, Thomas, ‘Myth and Violence: The Fasdsm.ofJulius Evola and Alam de Benoist’Analy^^ „ aid’s.’Oshertln (eds), Comparative Research Methods (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Soli,Roben^Le’ddfil^orisle: Lefons ilaliennes a Vusage del’Europe (Pans: fidmons du Seuil, 1979).

y Berklev RnoK I9RH

TL Tf^^{/r Xf,Tr}''’’ ' u_{f A}nor of Polttiral \gitatinn’.

Thnm«< V 'TctTot . _r _ff Pre« of Glencoe. 1964)

v,«.A VAw. 1 ^T^^m _n>. _M/>rw Uwlitv Plnv: Termnrm <k <» S<.<•„,/ fj XXr■ P»ri^h‘'. K-Gn I

_r.._rL,n<n, (Cambridge: Cambridge I nWenity P

1982)

\X imr.rl:, Mi< hrl 4»m/]V de In I'inlence politique'. in Connexions, No 4s t]90- Willman Panl. Terrorism and the I iheral State (second edition) (New Ynrl

Ynri I nnrrMtv Press, 19^6).

French political culture

Bh^t. Suzanne, 'French Politics at a Turning Point?', in French Pnl,^ nJ Soarfi. Issue 15 (Ncn. 1986).

Benrex. Suzanne,'The Trench Resolution in Contemporary French Polmcs. m f rmch Poltftc and Soact)\ Vol.8, No.2 (Spring. 1990). pp.53-64.

Best (icoflrcv (cd.). The Permanent Rrcnlutmn: The French Revolution and its /7X9 /W9 (I .ondon. Fontana Press, 1988).

Biackincr. Donald and Sidney Tarrou (eds), (himmunism in Italy and France (Pnmcton. \l Princeton Lniversity Press, 1975).

Borclla I ranyois, Les partis fxilttiquo dans la France d’aujourd'hui (Paris. Editions du Scuil. 1981).

Bound. |o\ and Kevin Featherstone, ‘The French Left and the European Community', in D.S Bell (cd.), Ctinlernporary French Political Parties (New Virk Si Martin's Press, 1982).

Brinton Crane, 4 l\.ad_t Raoluiiun 1789-1799 (New York: Harper N Row,

Cenn P G ‘Cleavage, Aggregation and Change in French Politics’, in The tinmi. ,/uun_tJ_l./Pj₁n.uj,Xac_n.<\ol.2 \u 4 ((Rt 197 V

^(XbelD_cd ) ?^,"^U7' ^A^-V;^apkallSni ^{and the} ^public’, in DS. rary bench P^tual Pania (New York St Martin’s Press,

’ ^l’u' ^V ^tj, ^(jl‘^{ulUslu N}^lcai Weapons and the State’, in Jolyon Howorth and P7":n^'X' *l.onJon.

¹ ^d‘ ^w-’

‘ PM W o. f ./,._pu„ / WW (Pans

l J..VI.I \S|. Wl.lT*” ““ ^J pulunu (I’ uiv A Colin.

Chariot, Jean, 'La transformation de Fimaoc

frantjaise de science politique, Vol.30, No. I (p_ct, |_98f ^quc' l^r(,"<i^a'*, in Revue Chariot, Monica, 'L'emergence du Front national' in i

politique, Vol.36, No.l (Feb. 1986). ’ " ^{f (ai}'^{e de} ^scle™

Chebcl d’Appollonia, Ariane, L'extreme-droite en France />, u , _r

(Paris: Editions Complexe, 1988). ^{Mm a}

Crozier, Michel, The Stalled Society (New York: Viking Press 1973)

Duverger, Maurice, La Cinquieme Republique (Paris: PUF, 1970)

Duverger, Maurice, La Republique des citoyens (Paris: Editions Ramsay, 1982).

Ehrmann, Henry W., Politics in France (Boston: Little, Brown and Co 1983) Esprit, La France en politique 1988 (Paris: Esprit Fayard Seuil, 1988).

Furet, Francois, Penser la Revolution fran<;aise (Paris: Gallimard, 1978).

Furet, Francois, Jacques Julliard and Pierre Rosanvallon, La 'republique du centre (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1988).

Furet, Francois and Mona Ozouf, Dictionnaire critique de la revolution francaise (Paris: Flammarion, 1988).

Hoffmann, Stanley, ‘The Constitution and the Elections of 1986’, in French Politics and Society, 13 (March 1986).

Hoffmann, Stanley, ‘Heroic Leadership’, in Louis J. Erdinger (ed.), Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies (New York: Wiley, 1967).

Hoffmann, Stanley, ‘Paradoxes of the French Political Community’, in In Search of France (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

Hoffmann, Stanley, Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s (New York: Viking Press, 1974).

Hoffmann, Stanley, ‘Transformations et contradictions de la V'e Republique', in George Santoni (ed.), Societe et culture de la France contemporaine (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981).

Howorth, Jolyon, France: The Politics of Peace (London: Merlin Press, 1984).

Janos, Andrew C., ‘Authority and Violence: The Political Framework of Internal War’, in Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

July, Serge, Les Annees Mitterrand (Paris: Grasset, 1986).

Kriegel, Annie, ‘The French Communist Party and the Fifth Republic’, in Donald Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow (eds), Communism in Italy and France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

Lavau, Georges, ‘The PCF, the State, and the Revolution: An Analysis ot Party Policies, Communications and Popular Culture’, in Donald Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow (eds), Communism in Italy and France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). , .

Martin, Pierre, 'Le rapport de forces droite/gauche en 1986 , in Revue Jramaise de sciences politiques, Vo\.36, No.5 (Oct. 1986).

Masurel, Edouard, /.’«»»« 1987 l.c Monde (Paris: Gallmurd/Le Monde, 1988)

Masurcl, Edouard, L 'annee 1988dans LeMonde (Paris: (iallimaid/1 .e i\ londe, 1989).

¹⁹⁴ /• i •

Nicolet

UsGhlicaineen France (Pans’. Editions Gallimard, 190,, ' f.'-ta-M«i: llisloirooultitrellf dr la France Mai 1968-M^L

Ory Pascal,/-⁽ ‘ .. ]983)

ne Year of ^ Terror in the French R_atl

Palmer, R.R-. I ’<¹ ‘ University Press, 1973). ^>n

(Prinalon NJ: 1™ ^.ouGnardandNan Order1940-1944

Paxton, Robci l k.

_rk.2S:X, /. W (Paris: La Decouverte/Le M„_nde,

Bonelli^ Hugues, La en France sous la Ve Republic (Paris: Ber_nard Vortelli Hugucs^'La presidenlialisalion des partis franpaisin Pamirs, 14(1980). Quermonne, Jean-Louis, Legouvemetnent de la France sous la VeRepublique (Paris: Dalloz, 1980).

Remond, Rene, Les droites en France (Pans: Aubier, 1982).

Rioux, Jean-Pierre, ‘A Changing of the Guard? Old and New Elites at the Liberation’, in Jolyon Howorth and Philip G. Cerny (eds), Elites in France (London: Frances Pinter, 1981).

SOFRES, L ’etat de I’opinion: Clespour 1988 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1988).

Sur, Serge, La vie politique en France sous la Ve Republique (Paris: Editions Montchrestien, 1982).

Tarrow, Sidney, ‘Communism in Italy and France: Adaptation and Change’, in Communism in Italy and France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

Tarrow, Sidney, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Thibaudet, Albert, Les ideespolitiques en France (Paris: Librairie Stock, 1932).

Tiersky, Ronald, ‘Alliance Politics and Revolutionary Pretensions’, in Communism in Italy and France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

Waites, Neville, Defence Policy: The Historical Context’, in Jolyon Howorth and Patricia Chilton (eds), Contemporary France (London: Croom Helm, 1984).

Wright, Vincent, ‘The Change in France’, in Vincent Wright (ed.), Continuity and Change in France (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

III. The French extreme left

maoism

1974). ’ ' ^ma,dstesI^rant^ais- unederiveinstitutionelle (Paris: Editions Anthropos, "(Paris: UGE-lO/lR^Q?^"^^ ™ ^{et documents}> 1963-1968

Kessel P ' 17/Z).

d’editions, 1972) ^{WUVenient ,nauiste} en France, Vol.l (Paris: Union generale

d’6ditions, 1978). ^{UVenttnt ma}°i^ste en France, Vol.2 (Paris: Union generale

Kouchner, Bernard and Michel-Antoine Burnier P

Editions Publications Premieres, 1970). ’ ^rt'^{nCe satrva}K^e (Paris:

Lefebvre, Henri, Everyday Life in the Modern World Orans h„ « u n . •

(New York: Harper and Row, 1971). bacha Rabmovitch)

^LeDaⁿ«c.Jean-^pierre,£«*,_ff„_AM/„₇₍p ^_:p_reMes(1

Lind'nbergDarnel.Ann«,_s,u_Urr._ma(P_aris; g_{ditionsde u D} ™

Manceaux, Michele, Les Maos en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1972) ’ ™ '

trotskyism

Craipeau, Yvan, Le mouvemenl trotskyste en France (Paris: Editions Syros, 1971).

THE EXTREME LEFT

Brigouleix, Bernard, ‘Les nouveaux esprits de I’extreme gauche’ Le Monde (10 May 1975 (Part 1) and 11-12 May 1975 (Part 2)).

ANARCHISM

d’Axa, Zo, En dehors (Paris: Champ libre, 1974).

Maitron, Jean, Le mouvement anarchiste en France, 2 vols (Paris: Maspero, 1975).

Maitron, Jean, Ravachol et les anarchistes (Paris: Julliard, 1964).

Salmon, Andre, Le Terreur noire (Paris: J.-J. Pauvert, 1959).

Rioux, Jean-Pierre, ‘La bombedu Terminus’, special section: ‘Frissonsfin dusiecle', in LeMonde (8 Aug. 1990).

Tailhade, Laurent, Imbeciles etgredins (Paris: R. Laffont, 1969).

INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES

Aron, Raymond, Les demieres annees du siecle (Paris: Julliard, 1984).

Belden Fields, A., ‘Western Maoism: A French Interpretation’ (unpublished manuscript, 1983).

Belden Fields, A., ‘Trotskyism in France’ (unpublished manuscript, 1983).

Capdevielle, Jacques and Rene Mouriaux, Mai 68:1'entre-deux de la modernite - Histoire de trente ans (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1988).

Cerny, P.G., ‘The Fall of Two Presidents and Extraparliamentary Opposition: France and the United States in 1968’, in Government and Opposition, Vol.5, No. 1 (1970), pp.287-306.

Cohn-Bendit, Daniel, Nous l’avons taut aimee, la revolution (Paris: Editions Bernard Barrault, 1986).

Cohn-Bendit, Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism: The Left- Wing Alternative (London: Deutsch, 1968). , .

Fisera, Vladimir, ‘The French New Left and the Left-Wing Regime , in tuart

Williams (ed.), Socialism in France: From Jaures to Mitterrand (London. 1 rances Pinter, 1983). . . ,

Fisera, Vladimir, Writing on the Wall, France, May 1968: A Documentary Anthology, (London: Allison & Busby, 1978). _t ..

Furet, Frangois, Antoine Liniers and Philippe Raynaud, Ferronsme e ien (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1985).

iWrc.J«"-'’^{aul Sar,rc and}""" ^ViC'°^r’ ^d‘^{Se rh}"'^,lr^ ""crtillimard. ’”⁴U _ltmrisle (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1981).

Geismar. Ah®. f _Er|y„ _M„_rilnc, y_m fa guerre avile (Paris:

Gcismar, Alam, ' 1969)

^l’';^WiC±;;j7’^nri_ne_Sd^-'‘^'^<^l’^{aris: l}7"?^{ns du Seuil}- 'W ^Gon”'ⁿ'|i ‘nY and Patrick Kotman, General'™: L Les annees de rhe (_Paris. Hamon, 1987)

Editions dui hem. * ₂. La annees de prndre (P_aris.

Hamon, Henc anu

HTnm "stephen, 'The New Left in Italy’, in Social and Political Movements in ¹ Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1976).

i ffnn 1 aurent Mai 68: Histoire des tenements (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1988).

Keniston. Kenneth, Young Ratals: Notes on Commuted Youth (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968).

Lavau, Georges, Les enfants de Barbe-Bleue et le cabinet sangiant: les partis communistes francais et italien et le refoulement du stalinsime’, in Les interpretations du stahnisme (ouvrage publie sous la direction de Evelyne Pisier-Kouchner) (Paris. Presses Universitaires de France, 1983).

Lindenberg, Daniel, ‘Un anniversaire interminable: 1968-1988, in La France en politique 1988 (Paris: Esprit Fayard Seuil, 1988).

Maupeou-Abboud, Nicole de, Ouverture du ghetto etudiant. La gauche etudiante a la recherche dun nouveau mode d’intervention politique (1950-1970) (Paris:

Anthropos, 1974).

Monchablon, Alain, Histoire de I’UNEF de 1956 a 1968 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983).

Morin, Edgar, Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis, Mai 68: La breche - suivi devingt ans apres (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1988).

Nizan, Antoine Bloye (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

Nizan, Paul, Les chiens de garde (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1960).

Nugent, Neill and David Lowe, The Left in France (London: Macmillan, 1982).

Offe, Claus, ‘Structural Problems of the Capitalist State’, in German Political Studies, Vol.l (1974), pp.31-57.

Padovani, Marcelle, Vivre avecle terrorisme: Le mod'ele italien (Paris: Calmann-Lew, 1982).

Pisier-Kouchner, Evelyne (ed.), Les interpretations du stalinisme (Paris: PUF, 1983).

Ranciere, Jacques, La null des proletai res (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1981).

Sauvageot, Jacques, Alain Geismar, Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Jean-Pierre Duteuil, La revolte etudiante: les animateurs parlent (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968).

Schnapp, Alain and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Journal de la commune etudiante. Textes el documents. Novembre 1967-juin 1968 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1988).

■ ole, Robert, Le deJi terroriste: Lemons italiennes a/'usagedel'Eurobe (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979).

Sprinzak, Ehud, ‘France: The Radicalisation of the New Left’, in Social and Political Movements in Western Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1976).

BIBI IOGR \|'||\

197 urhaine en F.urope uSeuil, 1977).

<xn</< MM/<'(Pans: Mcndicns Klincksicck, 19B7) Touchard.Jean, l.agaiuhcen France dcfinis /Wt? (Paris- Editions cl

Il ‘ Action dircctc

INTERPRETATIONS

Hamon, Alain and Jean-Charles Marchand I

eurotenvrisme (Paris: Editions du Seuil, ^{directe:Dulerrorisme}f^ran(™«u

Jacquard, Roland, La longue traauc d'Artin., ,r

Moxon-Browne, Edward, ‘Terrorism in f/^’ ^ar>s: Albin Michel, 1987).

Contemporary Terrorism (New York: Facts on^CFiie"¹|£^{am Gutterid}S' ^!“^|J'

Raufcr, Xavier -Termrisme violence (Paris: Editions Carters 1984) Quadrappani, Serge, L anti-terrorisnie en F_rn«_n. t '

(Paris: La Decouverte, 1989). ^a ‘^{emur ,nt}&‘^e 1981-1989

DOCUMENTS

Texts outlining strategy and communiques about AD activities were published in the radical journal L Internationale. AD published the journal Rebelles. Sympathizers published communiques in an immigrant affairs journal, Sans frontieres. Before AD, debate on armed opposition to the state appeared in gauchiste publications such as Cahiers proletaries and La Cause du Peuple. Below is a list of known texts that total 273 pages and 48 documents. Documents not located are indicated.

TVc-Action directe

January 1971 - ‘Illegalisme et guerre’-, founding text of the Nouvelle Resistance Populaire in Cahiersproletaries, No.l.

Not in possession of: ‘Quisommes-nous?’ (NAPAP).

1979

17 September - not in possession of untitled communique taking credit for attack on the Ministry of Labour and Participation.

1980

15 March - untitled communique taking credit for attack on DST offices. 1 p.

19 March - ‘Communique no. 7: Operation armee contre le ministere de la cooperation .

1 P-

30 March - not in possession of untitled communique claiming credit for bombing of a Toulouse police station.

19 September - not in possession of tract claiming responsibility for attack on the Ecole militaire.

,₍₎₈

22 September - not in possession of Wow tract distributed during occupation _of

₁₀ Decemto-Xo«eTkft on site of a robbery of a Lyon BNP by AD fe A/jichc Rouge). 1 P-

1982

February-imprisonmentin isolation ofGUlesCollomb. Ip. March - ‘Pour un projet communiste’, theoretical text. 43 pp.

April - ‘Stir I'imperialisme americaine’, theoretical text. 13 pp.

20 July - not in possession of ‘Palestine vaincra issued after attack on Bank Leumi. August - not in possession of ‘Compte rendu de la reunion clandestine du ler aout 1982'-, text declaring division of AD into two factions.

1 August - ‘Nous, combattants juifs d’Action Directe’, communique claiming credit for attack on car of an Israeli diplomat. 1 p.

11 August - wall graffiti left after attack on Jewish-owned Citrus Marketing of Israel.

October - not in possession of untitled text denying⁷AD’s involvement in the series of bloody attacks that occurred in Paris in this period (Boulevard Marbeuf, Rue Copernic and Rue des Rosiers). See LeMonde (21 Oct. 1982), 7 pp.

1983

28 August - ‘Indochine, Algerie, . .. Tchad?’, attack on PS officers and Ministry of Defence. 1 p.

29 September - D Oum-Chalouba au Chouf Taviation fran^aisepoursuit son entreprise criminelle’, attack on offices of the Marine nationale. 1 p.

30 September - ‘Opprimes de tons les pays: Get up, stand up!’, attack on Cercle militaire. 1 p.

17 November - ‘14 t’en guerre amateurs de croisades calmez-vous!’, attack on Paris diocesan offices and Seventh-Day Adventist church. 1 p.

1984

“tZ*^{in P}°^S“^SSi°^{n U1,ti}'^k'^{d ,eM} “^kta8 ^Credi< f” ⁰¹¹ P”'^hard-

(SeptXU984) 1 P' ^-strike, No.10

'' 3^Upp. ^{by ,,}""^r «mbaUanu FaridBenA'IW.

„,_<t _ Vne aam crnlre I'Etmpan Space Arena' i„ r ;

I St-Oct. I984). P-S Attack on the European Space ^N° ¹⁰

_st- letter by Regis Schleicher. 2 pp.

No. 10 (Sept.-Oct. 1984), p.24. 1 p. ^her ’^{L Inte}™onale,

September-October - ‘Surl’initiativedu regroupement des militants revolutionnaires detenus’, by Vincenzo Spano, in L Internationale, No. 10 (Sept.-Oct 1984^ 5pP- _; ^A

October - ‘Mise au point No. 1, L ’Attentat manque contre I’UEO (Union eurooeenne occidentale) 2 pp. ^p

Mise au point No. 2, La fusillade de I’avenue Trudaine, le 31.6.1983’. 1 p

Mise au point No.3, Sur la campagne politico-militaire des C. C. C. et la reponse propagandistedeI’etatBeige’. Ip.

21 October - Nous avons attaque I’usine Dassault a St Cloud’, attack on Dassault factory, St Cloud, Unite combattante Ciro Rizzato. 4 pp.

9 December - ‘Nouvelle Caledonie: Guerre des classes ’, attack on RPR and Elf- Aquitaine offices, Commando Hienghene. 1 p.

1985

January - ‘Pour I’unite des revolutionnaires en Europe de I’ouest - Fur die Einheit der Revolutiondre in Westeuropa’, announcement ofcoodination of AD-RAFactions. 10pp.

17 January - not in possession of Les tdches essentielles de la guerilla communiste en Europe de I’Ouest\

19 January - letter from Regis Schleicher declaring hunger-strike by imprisoned AD members. 3 pp.

25 January — ‘Construire le front politico-militaire en Europe de I Quest, en tant que partie de Vaffrontement mondial entre proletariat international et bourgeoisie imperialiste\ assassination ofAudran by Commando Elisabeth-Von-Dick. 6 pp.

13—14 April - ‘Conseils donnes d’un point de vue de classe aux racistes de France et d’ailleurs: Touche pas a mon pote travailleur immigre a mon pote Kanak^Tchadien. Libanais, Palestinien, etc. . . \ attacks on Bank Leumi, Minute, an (immi gration offices) by Commando Sana Mheidh. Ip.

29 April - ‘Revendication de I’attaque contre leFMIet la Banque mondude, attacks on the IMF and the World Bank by Unite combattante Lahouan FaridB^ch el _ p.

30 April — Armement: recherche et cooperation occidentale, attac s on

by Unite combattante Ciro Rizzato. Ip. ™ Rhndin hv

26 June - ‘Revendication de [’operation contre legeneralBlandm, a a

Commando Antonio Lo Musico. Ip- , . _1Trf Ppchinev

4 September - Machoro-Mandela: Meme combat’, attack on A1 IC, rec . Renault and Spie-Batignolles. 2 pp.

200

_{]4 October} _ _W, radio, ni tele pour Le Pen’, attack on Maison de la Radio and 17October - Action contre la Haute Autorite’, attack on the Haute autorite de

I'audiovisuel bv Commando AhmedMoulayAp-*

19 October - ‘Machoro-Moloise morts pour le meme combat, attack on Union des Transports Aeriens and Chargeurs Reunis by Commando B. Moloise. 1 p.

1986

February - ‘Interview au journal revolutionnaire “Zusammen Kampfen” (Struggle Together) West German radical journal publishing material by the RAF. 9 pp.

15 April - ‘Communique no. 1 ’, attack on CNPF Vice-President Brana by Commando Christos Kassimis. 1 p.

29 May - ‘Communique no.2’, attack on Interpol. 11 pp.

6 July - ‘Les capitalistes blancs fetent leurliberte', attack on Air Liquide and Thomson.

I P-

II July - ‘Legitime defense’, attack on the BRB (Brigade de repression du banditisme).

1 p.

21 July - untitled communique issued following attack on the OECD. 3 pp.

1 November - ‘On a presse le citron, on peut jeter lapeau attacks on Air Minerve and ONI. Ip.

11 November - ‘L "apartheid, <:a commence en France’, attack on Peugeot, Total, and Pechiney-Ugine-Kulhmann by Commando Clarence Payi-Sipho Xulu. 1 p.

1987

12 February - ‘Le 17 novembre, en eliminant la brute Besse, le commando Pierre- Ovemey a frappe au coeur meme de la contradiction la plus forte au sein du consensus general de pacification et d’exploitation’, Besse murder. 26 pp.

3 June — letter from Regis Schleicher stating refusal to participate in his trial. 5 pp.

Index

Abadie, Paula, 178n

ziaeras Paz Del Rio, 163

Action directe, 3, amnesty, 78; anti-reformism 139-41; attacks, 157-61,182-3,187-8; chronology, 147-57; commando units, 180- cooperation with FARL, 80-1; extreme-left tradition, 36; formative years, 75—8- gauchiste influence, 47, 58, 66; goals, 1, 2, 139; ideology, 3-4, 76, 97-100,122-7; ’ influences, 64, 65, 73-5; military and scientific targets, 113-19; ‘mouvance’ nature of, 141-4; overview, 11-13; political context, 40; revolutionary character, 137-8; revolutionary roots, 18-24; robberies, 80; secretive character, 9; new of consensus, 38

Action directe internationale, 79-80, 83, 85-91; dismantling, 123; global economy, 107-8, 111-13; goals, 138; internationalization, 116-17, 123, 142-3; political violence, 122-7; prison campaigns, 62, 78, 79, 86-7, 100, 112-13; trials and imprisonment, 165-75; violent struggle, 107.

Action directe nationale, 79-80, 81-5, 121; anti-racism, 83, 102—6; anti-semitism, 100-1, 102, 123, 141; dismantling, 123; focus on domestic issues, 141-2; goals, 138; ideology, 97, 100-6; political violence, 122-7; trials, 175-8

Adenauer, Konrad, 34

Affiche rouge, 81-2, 93n 128n, 180

Agence centre-Europe d’exploitatwn, 8 / , Agence France Presse, 79, 149, 157 AirLiquide, 84, 94n, 155, 160

Air Material, 164

AirMinerve, 84, 155, 160

Aissou, Mouloud, 175, 179n

Alexander II, Tsar, 139

Alexander, Yonah, 6, 14n, n, 139

Algeria, 28, 88, 103, 105; independence, 139 Algerian War, 48, 49, 50

Allende, Salvador, 65, 107

Alsace-Lorraine, 27 altemance, 36—7, 45 n

Alumm.um-Pechi_neyi94_n 151 _lal Amadori, Luigi, 1₇₉„ ^l53'¹⁶⁰

American Express, 160

Amisonrouge, Jacques, 90

Amon, Moshe, 7,15_n

ANC^h;™'³⁰’⁴⁷’⁵⁴’⁵⁷'⁷⁴’⁷⁶-^I06'"0

Anglo-American cooperation 34

Angola, 120

Antenne-2, 83, 153, 160

anti-imperialism, 79, 82

anti-racism, 143; ADn, 83, 102-6 anti-Semitism, 100-1, 123,141,144n, 177

Antich, Puig, 74

appeasement, 27

Arblaster, Anthony, 13n

Arendt, Hannah, 7, 15n

Argano, Gloria, 178n

Ariane, 86, 114, 116,133n

Armant, Giuseppe, 96n

Army, French, 28, 33

Arpaillange, Pierre, 171 assassinations see murders

Asselmeyer, Jean, 166, 167, 172, 178n

Assemblee nationale, 27, 30, 31

Association federative generale des etudiants de

Strasbourg, 55

Association technique de I’importation charbonniere, 94n, 153, 160

Aubron, Jdelle, 80, 90, 92n, 93n, 156, 165, 167, 169, 170-1, 173-4, 178n

Audran, Rene, 88, 96n, 117, 119, 136n, 143, .153,156, 160, 162, 165, 167

Augay, Josette, 94n, 155, 179n, 180n

Aurenche, Guy, 179n

Aurillac, Michel, 175 authoritarianism, charismatic, 26 autonomists, 66-7, 76, 78, 92n, 98, 99, 124 Avenue Trudaine, 85, 123, 152, 165-6

Azema, Jean-Pierre, 42n, 128n

Azeroual, Meyer, 88, 154

Babeuf, Francois-Noel ‘Gracchus’, 180n

Badinter, 78, 149, 180

Robert, 92n, 104

Badmtcr, i70n „

B_alil«r,Eucnnc,l7" ₁₇₆,_I79n

B.ll»<lr«'^£n'82 150,159

B»,'k»f^Amen"’₈7 50 5.1,159. K’⁰

Bank Uum.»2. «

Barabass, Ingnd, 8?.

Barrault, Jan-Lom, I79n

Barre, Raymond, 3/

Barsimantov, Youn, $

Baudrillarf. Bruno, 166 167 172,1 /»n

Beckerts, Karl-Heinz, 90,155

Ben Jalloun, Tahar, 179n

Benchellal, Lahouan Farid, 93n

Benoit, Annelyse, 166, 167,172, 178n

Berger, Suzanne, 43n

Besse, Georges, 89, 92n, 93n, 96n, 121 2, 143,155,156,160,162,172,173-4

Besse, Helyette, 86,113,132n, 152,156,166, 167,172, 178n

Bianco, Enrico, 179n

Bianco, Oriana, 179n

Bidart, Philippe, 172

Black and Decker France, 84, 154, 162

Black Panthers, 111, 13In

Black War, 154,155,156,157,164-5,179n

Blanc, Bernard, 83, 94n, 154, 176,177, 179n

Blandin, Henri, 118,136n, 143,153,160,162

Blanqui, Auguste, 23

blanquisme, 11, 21, 23, 41 n

BNP, 81,148,149,162 bombings, AD, 76-7, 99, 125,184; ADi, 86;

ADn, 82,83,84; CCC, 87-8; FARL, 80-1;

GARI, 74, 75; GBGPGS, 77-8,163-4; NAPAP, 75; Popular Forces of April 25, 88

bonapartisme, 21, 32, 41 n

Borella, Franqois, 43n

Bortone, Nicola, 95n

Botha, P.W, 84, 105,155

Botrans, 163

Bou Nidal, 96n

Bouchardeau, Huguette, 57

Boulanger, Georges, 26, 32

Bourdet, Claude, 179n

bourgeoisie, 18-19, 25, 121

Brana Guy, 1,88-9,119-20,136n, 154,160 162 ’

Braummuelh, Gerald von, 90, 155

Breton nationalism, 58 ’

Brigade de repression du banditisme, 84 155 loU,163 ’

Brigate Rosse see Red Brigades

onnton, Crane, 42n

Britain, 34, 126

Bruguiere, Jean-Louis, 78 85 so _r

156,161,168,174 ’ ^8,96Ms₃

Burton, Anthony, 13n

Cachau-Hereillat, Henri, 17% i_Hf Cagol, Maria, 90, 95n, 155 ’ ⁿ

Caiola, Claude, 85, 162

Caisse professionelle deprevoyance des snt 147,158 ' ' ^alari^\

Camillieri, Michel, 75,80,91n, 93_n, _J5

Canadian Direct Action or ‘Direct Acf ’ ⁵¹

(Canada)’, 95n ' °ⁿ

Capdevielle, Jacques, 46n, 70n, 72n

capitalism, world, 110-13

Carbo, Jean-Antoine, 166

Carette, Pierre, 85,95n, 142,149,154,172-3

Casse-Noix, 75, 180

Castoriades, Claude, 179n

Castroism, 50

Catholicism, disestablishment, 24; electorate

Cazenave-Laroche, Jean-Pierre, 179n

Ceausescu, Nicolae, 39

Cellules combattantes communis les, 85, 87, 88, 89,142,153,154,172-3

central authority, France, 18, 32

Centre de recherches et de constructions navales, 86, 152,159

Centre documentation des carrieres de la marine

nationale, 82, 151, 159

Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 89

Cercle militaire, 82, 151, 159

Cerny, Philip, 43n, 44n, 68n, 69n

Chad, 82, 86,101,102,103,151

Chahine, Gabriel, 80, 93n, 125, 149,162

Chaiandon, Albin, 167, 168

Chalanset, Jean-Louis, 166

Chapsal, Jacques, 4In, 42n, 43n, 44n, 68n, 70n

Chargeurs Reunis, 83, 104, 154, 160

charisma, 25, 26, 39; de Gaulle, 30

Chariot, Jean, 45n, 46n

Chariot, Monica, 43n

Charpentier, Alain, 169

Charvolin, Nicole, 177, 179n

Chernobyl, 90

Chesnais, Jean-Claude, 16n

Chevolet, Didier, 95n, 154, 172-3

Chibaud, Olivier, 80, 9In, 93n, 150, 151

Chile, 65

China, 49

Chipour, Azita, 166

Chirac, Jacques, 37,45n, 84,85,89,96n, 105,

120, 124, 144n, 167, 168

Chomsky, Noam, 14n

CIl-Honeywell, 77, 99, 147, 158

inpr-'

n,,rin«, Georges, 90, 92n;93„ _Qt %, 165,167, 168, 169, l₇₀ ’,⁹⁵,ⁿ’ 02, 173-4,

' %BI, «²'^,Jft ¹⁵⁹

C. a«"^ra''^,SOn

^!6"' If”

-lenicnceau, Georges, 26

Clodo (Comite IJuidant ou ddtoumant les ffrdmateurs), 75, 77, 99,148,158,180

nutterbuck, Richard, 13n

_COGEMA, 89

[ffhabittition, 105, 125, 140, 143

Cohn, Norman, 143, 144

Cohn-Bendit, Daniel, 55-6, 67, 179_n

collaboration, 28

colonialism, France, 34, 48,101-2, seeako neo-colonialism

Co^de^riposte d la repression enAlgerie, 79 ^49

/ Zj 1 IZj 1 OU

Commando Ahmed-Moulay, 83, 153 160 180

Commando B. Moloise, 83, 154,160,180

Commando Christos Kassimis, 88,89 154 160

162,180

Commando Ciro Rizzato, 86, 152, 153,159, 160,180

Commando Clarence Payi-Sipho Xulu, 84, 160, 180

Commando Elisabeth-von-Dick, 88, 153,160, 162, 180

Commando Hienghene, 82, 152, 160, 180

Commando Jose Kepa Crespo Gallende, 89,154

Commando Lo 'ic Lefebre, 94n, 155, 160,180

Commando Maria Cagol, 90, 155

Commando Pierre-Ovemey, 89, 155, 160, 163, 180

Conti, I ,aundro, 96n

Control Data, 160

Corsican nationalism, 58

Coste, Franqois, 176

Cot, Jcan-Picrre, 179n

Coutant-Peyrc, Isabelle, 166,174

Credit Lyonnais, 81,148,149

Crenshaw, Martha, 14n, 16n, 17n

Crepetjoelle, 81,83,93n, 154,175,176,177,

179n

Crespo, Jose, 95n

Crozier, Michel, 41 n, 42n

Cuadrado, Floreal, 9In, 179n

Curcio, Renato, 95n

Darmon, Jacques, 89, 95n

Dassault, 115-16,142,152,159 de Mita, Ciriaco, 96n d’Eaubonne, Fran^oise, 179n Debray, Regis, 68n decolonization, 28,102-3,139 decree, rule by, 28 Defence Ministry, 117 defence policy, France, 32 Delegation a la securite routiere, 158 Delegation regionalepour I ’emplois d’lle de France, 76-7,147,158

Deleuze, Gilles, 179n

Delfosse, Guy, 81,124,162,176,177

Delgado, Raymond, 91n, 179n

Dell’Omo, Marcello, 95n

Delors, Jacques, 39

Delrieu, Henri, 81,162, 176, 177

Dessaux, Annie, 179n

detente, 35

Dick, Elisabeth von, 95n

directaction, 59; anti-capitalist, 54;

revolutionary, 140; violent, 52, 139

Direction de la surveillance du territoire (DST), 77, 99, 147,158

Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 49 ^ommunistes organises pour la liberation du proletariat (COLP), 81, 85

Compagniefran^aise des metaux, 164

Comte, Antoine, I79n

Confederation franpaise democratique du travail

(CFDT), 58

Confederation generale du travail (CGT), 28,61, 69n, 75, 92n, 143

Conference Internationale des resistance en pays occupes, 154, 164

Conseil constitutionnel, 29, 44n

Conseil national du patronat fran^ais (CNPF), 28, 76, 88-9, 147, 158, 160, 162 consensus, 25, 31, 38, 87, 126, 143, 144 Constitutional Council, 32; see also Conseil

Constitutionnel

Direction regionale du travail et de la main- d’oeuvre, 77, 147, 158

Diskount Bank, 82, 150, 159

Djibouti, 99, 127n, 181

Dollard, John, 14n

Drake, Robert, 8, 16n, 17n

Droit, Michel, 90

Dror, Yezekiel, 5, 14n

Dubec, Michel, 9In, 169

Dubray, Christian, 179n, 180n

Duclos, Jacques, 167

Duhamel, Alain, 45n

Duras, Marguerite, 179n

Dutschke, Rudi, 56, 68n

Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 105

Duverger, Maurice, 4In, 43n, 45n

204

• XI 87,

Eckstein, Har y, _j5()

Eadearnfocatne,₇ i’₄₈₎ 158 £_coletnditaire, ’ economic^ ’j _4n>J7n

Edelman, Murray, education, 3/,^"

^EEC’²⁷’³³’ France,20,21,23 egalitanamsm, France,

Ehrmann-Henry W.,^ 179n, 180n

Eket, Alam, 83 94 ₁₅₂,160

Elf-Aquitaine, 8Z, tvz.,

Enrages, 19

ESMIL, 163

ETA, 90,125,126

Etcheveste, Joseph,!/^

Etelin, Christian, 167,1/4

Etelin, Marie-Christine, 167,1/1

M2.85 U7,m European Space Agency, 86, 92n, 114-15, jS«^fc,⁵51-7,64, 66, 69n, 74, 75, 98

Fabius, Laurent, 37, 84, 89,92n

Fanon, Frantz, 7, 52

fanners, 62

Faure, Nicole, 176,179n, 180n

Federation des entreprises beiges, 87

feminists, 58

Fields, A. Belden, 72n

Fifth Republic, 29-40, 51, 60, 126,139,144

Fiorina, Franco, 178n

Fisera, Vladimir, 70n, 72n

Fiterman, Charles, 38

FLN, 102

FLNKS, 157,165

Fonda, Jane, 61

Fontaine, Andre, 45n

force de frappe, 27, 33, 35, 87, 116

foreign policy, France, 32-5, 39; Third

Republic, 26-7

Fort, Pascal, 179n, 180n

Fournier, Martine, 179n

Fourth Republic, 27-8, 31, 36, 39, 40

FR3 television station, 79, 149

Fractions armees revolutionnaires libanaises (FARL), 80-1,82, 85,86, 93n, 106 149 150,151,155,165

France, as cultural centre, 144rr Fifth Republic, 29-40, 51,60,126,’139,144- Fourth Republic, 27-8, 31, 36 39 40-’

tradition _ln politics, 11, 13, 18-24 97- Th'rd RepuhKc, 22, 23, 25-7, 28,31,36 d^>40, violence, 10-11, 161

Francelet, Marc, 89

Franceschi, Joseph, 91 n

Franck, Daniel, 178n

Franco regime, 74

la francophonie, 33

Freedman, L.Z., 5, 14n

French Revolution, 7, 18-24

Frerot, Maxime, 81,84-5, 93n, 94_n ion

150,151, 156, 162, 175, 179n; trial j"’

Front arme homosexuel revolutionnaire, xj -<T Front de la Liberation Nationale, 9 ’ ’ * Front national, 12, 29, 38, 39, 40, 45n ]n?

104, 124, 140 ’ ^Z’

frustration-aggression theory, terrorism, 5 Furbury, Christine, 95n

Furet, Franqois, 8,13n, 15n, 138

Gailhac, Jean-Franqois, 157, 169

Gaillot, Jacques, 179n

Galley, Robert, 77

Ganco, 82, 150, 159

Gaucheproletarienne, 59-64, 75, 81, 94n, 98,

106, 107, 143; Nouvelle resistance populaire, 64-7

gauchisme, 5, 14n, 29, 30, 38, 64, 69n, 75—6,

78, 79, 90, 98, 143; influence on Maoism, 59-64; influence on Trotskyism, 58-9;

May 1968, 51-7; origins, 47-51

Gaulle, Charles de, 29-30, 32-6,48,49, 52,

126,139

Gaullism, 29, 30, 32—3, 37, 48

Gauzens, Christian, 81, 150

gays, 58

Geismar, Alain, 179n

general strikes, 51

George Jackson Commando, 88, 153, 160,162, 180

Gerard, Jean-Paul, 75

Germain, 78-9, 180

Germain, Frederique, 95n, 167, 169, 178n

Germany, 12, 27, 66, 67

Gibault, Philippe, 95n

Giorgieri, Licio, 95n, 156, 161

Giorgieri, Simonetta, 95n, 96n

Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, 37, 75, 78, 99

giscardisme, 76

Giunti, Gino, 95n

Godard, Jean-Luc, 61, 179n

Gombin, Richard, 69n

Gomez, Alain, 90

Gondry, Emile, 85, 162

Grailly, Michel de, 65

Granier, Charlotte, 167, 178n

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 59, 60

Grossmougin, Charles, 80,9 In, 93n, 150,151

/NL""'

rmufif Bakounine- Gdansk-P_arG_ r,,„,

JJ^GBGPGS), 77-8,

Groups d’action revolutionnaires intemationalistes (GARI), 73-5 70 90,91n,92n, 150 ' ’ ⁷⁸’ ⁷⁹> 85,

grouptiscules, 50, 53, 55, 75

Guattari, Felix, 179n

Guegan, Gerard, 179n

Guevara, Ernesto Che, 56, 68n 75

Guibert, Sandrine, 167 17fi_n ’

Gulf War, 141

Gurr, Ted, 5, 14n

/nslilul Atlantique des Affaires Internationales 86,113,142,152,159

International Monetary Fund, 80,83,108

112,1 17,142,150,153,159,160

Interpol, 1 19,120,154,160

IRA, 90,125

Ireland, 126

Irish National Liberation Army, 89-90,

155

Islam, 41n

Israel, 80, 82,100-1,103,120,123,126

Italy, 8,12,66,98-9

ITT Television, 163

Habre, Hissen, 95n

Hacker, Frederich, 5,14n

Haig, Alexander, 95n

Haiti, 120

Halfen, Claude, 85,86-7,95n, 152,155 165,167,169,171,178n

Halfen, Nicolas, 85, 86, 95n, 152,155 1 165,167,169,172,178n

Hamami, Mohand, 80, 88, 93n, 151 153 167

Hamon, Herve, 64, 68n

Hassan Khaled Thamer al-Birawi, 96n

Haute autorite de I’audiovisuel, 83, 153, 160

haute bourgeoisie, 25

Hempel, C.G., 14n

Herbon, Angela, 179n

Herman, Edward, 14n

Hernu, Charles, 84-5

Hersant, Robert, 90

Hezbollah, 9

Hocking, Jenny, 1,8, 13n

Hocquenheim, Guy, 179n

Hoffman, Stanley, 16n, 40n, 42n, 43n, 44n, 45n, 46n

Hooligans Intemationalistes, 163, 164

Horowitz, Irving, 7, 15n housing, 109-10

Howorth, Jolyon, 44n

Hubert, Guy, 81, 94n, 149, 162, 176 hunger-strikes, 62, 79, 86-7, 89, 92n, 152, 156, 168, 169-71, 172-3, 174, 175,I79n

Hunt, Leamon, 86, 151

ideology, AD, 3-4, 76, 97-100, 122-7;

French, 12, 13, 22-4 immigrants, 61-2, 78, 99, 101, 102-3, 105, 109

immobilisme, 25, 26, 36, 42n imperialism, 79, 107-8, 109, 120—1 Innes Torres, Mario, 75, 91n

INSEE, 157, 164

Jackson, George, 95n

Jacobinism, 9,21,23-4,41 n

Jacques, Paula, 87, 95n ’

Janos, Andrew, 40n

Japan, 35

Jauregui, Carlos, 91 n

Jaures, Jean, 73

Jenkins, Brian, 16n

Jeune Taupe, 75,180

Jeunesse communiste revolutionnaire (JCR), 53.

Joffrin, Laurent, 68n, 69n

Johnson, Chalmers, 6, 14n

Jospin, Lionel, 78, 84, 92n, 148

Jouffa, Yves, 167-8

Julien, Claude, 16n

July, Serge, 4In, 7In, 72n

Juquin, Pierre, 168, 179n

Kassimis, Christos, 95n

Kendall, Raymond, 120

Khmer Rouge, 9

kidnapping, GARI, 74; NRP, 65

King, Martin Luther, 56, 68n

Krivine, Alain, 57, 58, 59

Krushchev, N.S., 49

La Maestra, Franco, 96n

labour militancy, 57

Laguiller, Arlette, 58

Lahy, Chantal, 179n

Laigle, Renaud, 175, 179n, 180n

Lajoinie, Andre', 37

Lallaoui, Hamid, 89

Lancelot, Alain, 41n, 42n, 43n, 44n, 68n

Lan Chile, 163

Langer, Serge, 155, 162

Langlois, Patrick, 170

Lapeyre, Michel, 75, 9ln

Laporal,Jean-Charles, 94n, 179n Laqueur, Walter, 6-7, 8, 15n, 16n

Lavau, Georges, 68n

206

u ■ "?7 IQ 45n 83,94n, 103, Le Pen,Jean-Mar e 37 39 4i>n, w, 104, 105, 143, 144n, 153

Lebanon, 80, 82, 100-1, 102, 103, 123

Lefebre, Loi'c, 94n

Lefebvre, Henri, 179n

left, France, 19-20

legitimacy, political, France, 19

Legitime defense, 164

Leninism, 56, 67, 74

Lenzer, Christian, 116

lepenisme, 38, 45n, 83, 104

Levy, Thierry, 175

Libya, 89

Ligue communiste, 58-9

Ligue communiste revolutionnaire (LCR), 48,57, 58-9, 143

Lijphart, Arend, 14n

Lindenberg, Daniel, 67n, 68n, 136n

Liniers, Antoine, 13

Litton Business International, 85

Livingstone, Neil, 15n

Lo Musico, Antonio, 95n

Louis-Philippe, due d’Orleans, 29

Lutte ouvriere (LO), 57, 58

Lux, Guy, 84

MacMahon, Marie de, 26, 32

Madagascar, 105

Maison de la Radio, 83, 153, 160

Malhuret, Claude, 168

Manrique, Victor, 91n

Mao Tse-tung, 62—3

Maoism, 30, 47, 49, 50, 55, 56, 57, 66, 76,

92n; influence of gauchisme, 59-64

Marchais, Georges, 38-9

Marshall Plan, 28

Marston, Kenneth, 84, 124, 154, 162

Marxist-Leninism, 106, 110

Maspero, Francois, 61

Maupeou-Abboud, Nicole de, 68n, 69n, 70 May 1968,13,43n, 51-8,64,66,69n, 74,75, 98

media, terrorism and, 15n

Meinhoff, Ulrike, 67, 142

Mendes-France, Pierre, 28

Menigon, Nathalie, 76, 77, 85, 86, 9In, 92n, 142,147,150,151,152, 154,156,157, 178n; arrest, 13, 77, 90, 123, 148, 156; hunger-strike, 79, 149, 156, 160, 166, 170-1,174; sentence, 167, 169, 173-4 merchants, small-town, protest, 62

Merkl, Peter, 8, 15n, 16n

Messier-Hispano-Bugatti, 86, 115-16, 142, 152,159

Metallex, 163

Miguel Martin, Jose de, 179n

military power, Third Republic u

Millet, Gilles, 89 ^eiefin>26<;

Ministry of Cooperation, 76, 99 _]47

Ministry of Defence, 101, 114

Ministry of Labour and ParticLc ’¹⁵⁹

147,158 ^ICIPatio_n, 77,

Ministry of Transport, 158

Mitterrand, Francois, 36, 37 38 30 ₄₀ 78, 79, 96n,101,102,103j04inA⁶A 140,150,172 ’^1UM26,

modernization, France, 21-2 25-6 27 0

Mollet, Guy, 27 ’ ^,z/~«>33

Moloise, Benjamin, 104

monarchists, France, 22

Monchablon, Alain, 68n

Moreau, Eric, 85, 95n, 150, 151

Morin, Edgar, 68n, 69n, 70n

Moro, Aldo, 77, 148

Motoren und Turbinen Union Muenchen GmbH 88

Moulay, Ahmed, 94n

Mouton-enrages, 75, 180

Mouvement de liberation des femmes, 58

Mouvement du 22 mars, 55-6, 60

Mouvement iberique de liberation, 74

Mouvement initiative et liberte, 157, 164

Mouvementpour la liberte de I'avortement et de la contraception, 58

Mouvement pour un parti des travailleurs

(MPPT), 57

Mouvement republicain populaire (MRP), 27,30

Moxon-Browne, Edward, 127n

Mozambique, 103

Munich Olympics, massacre, 65

murders, AD, 125,162-3,185,186; ADi, 88, 89, 97, 98, 112,117,121, 123-4, 124, 125-6,141;ADn,81,124, 125,141;

FARL, 80; NAPAP, 75

Napoleon, 20, 32

Napoleon III, 23

Narodnaya Volya, 139

nationalism, regional, 58

nationalization, 28

NATO, 35,39,40,85,87,112,113,116,118,

120,126, 138, 140, 141, 144n, 152, 154

Nazism, 9

Nechaev, Sergei, 127

Nemor, 82, 150, 159

neo-colonialism, 99-100

New Caledonia, 83, 93n, 102, 104, 128n, 143

Nicolet, Claude, 41 n, 42n

Nicosia, Salvatore, 172, 178n

nihilism, 9

Nogrette, Robert, 65

Noir, Michel, 45n

149, 180

y'o"^s'L '^stance popuiaire, 64-7

W¹'¹ tines po"^r / 'autonomic populate ^;VCl’Al’).H 65, 72, 75, 90, 91n, 92n

ztAS 15⁹

cciun nationalism, 58

J_ECD,89,120,121,155,160

Olio, Claus, 69n

Office national de rimmigration (ONI), 83, 103 153,155,160

O’Hara, Patrick, 95n

oil crisis, 108

Oliver, Andre, 76, 81, 92n, 93n, 94n, 147, ]50,162,175, 179n; arrest, 83, 154;

trial, 176-7

Opler, Morris Edward, 15n

Organisation arrnee secrete (OAS), 139

Organisation communiste intemationaliste 47 58 ’ ’

Organisation pour les prisonniers d'Action Directe 157, 167

~8,66

Oriach, Frederic, 75, 91n, 95n, 151, 155;

arrest, 81, 85, 150, 156; sentenced, 156: trial, 165-6, 178n

orleanisme, 21, 29, 32, 41n

Orly-Ouest air terminal, 77,148, 158

Ortner, Sherry, 14n

Oty, Pascal, 136n

O’Sullivan, Noel, 7, 15n, 16n

Outspan Organization, 163

Ovemey, Pierre, 61, 65, 7In

Palais de Justice, Toulouse, 78, 149, 158

Palestine, 14n

Palmer, R.R., 41n

Pandraud, Robert, 174

Panhard-Lavessor, 86, 95n, 151, 159

Pannekoek, Anton, 54

Papon, Maurice, 84

Paret, Peter, 16n, 127n

Paris Commune, 15n

Particommunistefran(ais (PHF), 27,28,, , ,

34, 35, 37, 43n, 46n, 48-9, 50, 51, 54 55, 57, 64, 66, 67, 76, 78, 98, 106, 109, 124, 126, 143 . _

Parti communiste marxiste-lentniste de France, 49,59 . .,

Parti communiste revoluttonnaire (marxiste- leniniste),57

Parti ouvrier europeen, 154, 16

MM <FS>. 30, Tn

64, 76, 78, 82. 87.’8, '00,101, 105,106,108,109,110,123,124,125,127, 144n, 152, 159, 156, 165

•ayb Clarence, 94n

P^c'Rntroika, 39

’’^cr™lt, Gilles, 179n

detain, Henri, 26,27 32

pelatnisme, 104

Peugeot, 84,155,160 ^>>‘,^,75,155,160,162

Philippines, 120

Philips Data Systems, 77,148 158

Pierre, Abbe, 179n

Pina, Franqois, 179n

Pisani, Edgar, 85

Plenel, Edwy, 8

Poirre, Dominique, 167,168, 178n

Pojolat, Alain, 90,155

Polack, Mathieu, 176,179n

Polak, Francois, 179n, 180n

political prisoner, status, 62, 79, 100 112-13 i 166,174

Pompidou, Georges, 35, 37, 78

Pons, Bernard, 84

Popular Forces of April 25, 88,152, 153

Porte, Sylvie, 179n

Portelli, Hugues, 43n

Potecher, Frederic, 179n

Poujade, Robert, 44n

poujadistes, 33, 62

Pour un projet communiste, 106,110,111

Prague Spring, 107

presidential system, France, 30,31-2

prisoners, 178n; conditions, 62; political, 79, 100, 112—13, 166, 174; rights, 78, 86—7

Promo Chimie, 163

Prosec, Victor, 179n

Proudhon, Pierre, 66

psychological interpretations, terrorism, 5

Pye, Lucian, 14n

Quainton, Anthony, 6, 15n

Quebec, 33

Quermonne, Jean-Louis, 43n, 44n

Quotidien de Paris, 79, 149, 174

Radicals, 30

Raffy, Serge, 178n

Raimond, Jean-Bernard, 144n

Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR), 13,

30, 37, 45n, 96n, 102, 156, 160

Raynaud, Philippe, 13n, 138

Reagan, Ronald, 80, 104, 150

Red \nnvl'at'tloii(RAF), 76,85 6,86 7,88, <)0,%n,9'»,ll3,ll6 17,123-4,142,152, 155

Red Brigades (Urigiilr Rossr), 8,64,76, 77,86, 95n, 99, 138, 142, 151

Red Brigades I'ighling (,'oiniiiunist /’nrty, 96n

Red Guards, 59

Reeves, Ihibert, I79n

Regnier, Sylvie, 166-7

relative deprivation theory, terrorism, 5, I In

religitrrr, seciilnrsclio<»ls, 4In

Remond, Rene, 46n

Ren.iiilt, 28,35, 47, 61, 65, 75, 89, 94n 101

KI9,122,143, 153, 160, 166

republicanism, 21

resistance, l''rench, 13, 27, 76

Rcinaud, Daniel, I79_n, l80n

Ripen, Bernard, 168, 170

Riviere, Gilles, 176

Ciro. S5, 86, |₂) |₄₂ ,,,

Aft 76: Al>i, 85,89MD„,8|-2,

Robertson, Kenneth, ix, 144

Rocard, Michel, 37,57

Rothmans, 154,164

Rotman, Patrick, 64, 68n

Rouillan, Jean-Marc, 74,75,76,78,79,86, 91n, 92n, 93n, 95n, 99,127n, 142,147, 149,150,151,154,169,178n; amnestied, 148; arrest, 77, 90,123,148,156; hunger-strike, 156,166,168,170-1,174; sentence, 167,169,172,173-4

Rousseau, J.-J., 20,66

Ruffilli, Roberto, 96n sabotage, GARI, 74

Sadat, Anwar, 79,149

Sagan, Franqoise, 179n

Saint-Just, Louis Antoine Leon de, 24,61

Saintes, Dimitri, 91n

Sartre, Jean-Paul, 7,61

Sassoye, Bertrand, 95n, 154,172-3

Savimbi, Jonas, 105

Schleicher, Regis, 75,85,90,92n, 93n, 149, 152,157,178n; amnestied, 148; arrest, 77, 132n, 147; hunger-strike, 86,152,153, 156,165; imprisonment, 147; sentenced, 156,167,172; trial, 155,165,166,169

SD1,119,141

Scbbar, Leilla, 179n

Secours rouge, 62

Section franfaise de I’inteniationule ouvriere (SF10),27,30,34„35,43n,48-9, 50

Section Gracchus BabeuJ, 180n

Selingcr, Martin, 14n

Senders techniques de construction ,

|5l ^-82,

Signoret, Simone, 61

Simpson, Jolin R., 120

Sino-Sovict split, 49, 50

sitnationisnic, ^{1 |f)}

Six-1 >ny W:tr, 62, 82

social democracy, 109

socialism, 21,24, 65-6

Smiele Anonytne tie Telecommunications, 117-18,153,160

Socicte general des techniques induslrielles, 15^ 164

Societe imtnobiliere de construction de Paris 77 147,158

Societe Le Nickel, 82-3

Societe lyonnaise, 81,149,162

Societe mixtede renovation du quartier Plaissance 77,147,158

Societe Nationale de Constructions pour les

Travailleurs, 76,147,158

Solidarite revolutionnaire intemationale, 157

Sorel, Georges, 65

South Africa, 83,84,94n, 102,103,105,157, 163

Soviet Union see USSR

Spain, 73-4

Spanish Civil War, 73

Spano, Vincenzo, 86,123,142,151,167,171, 178n

Spie-Batignolles, 94n, 153,160

Sprinzak, Ehud, 68n, 70n, 71n

Stalin, J.V., 49

Stalinism, 46n, 48-9, 50,106

state, French, 18, 20, 22

Sterling, Claire, 6

strikes, 51

students, May 1968 unrest, 13,43n, 51-8

Suarez, Balthazar, 74

Succab,Jean-Pierre, 83,94n, 155,179n, 180n

Suez, 28

Sur, Serge, 41 n, 42n, 44n

Sur I’imperialisme americaine, 106, 111 123 131n, 142

Surveillance industrielle de rarmament,\\4,142 systems theory, approach to terrorism, 5-6

technocrats, 33

Telecommunications radioelectriques et telephones 83,117-18,153,160 ’

terrorism, analysis, 1-2, 138-9; extreme left 161; theory, 2-8, 10, 138-9

Testard, Jacques, 179n

Thibaudet, Albert, 42n

Third Republic, 22, 23,25-7, 28,31 36 39

40 > > > >

Third World, 50, 107, 108, 123; liberation movements, 99; revolutionaries, 52, 56-7,

112

Thomazon, Claude, 157

Thomson, 84, 94n, 155,160

Tictmayer, Hans, 96n

Thornton, Thomas P., 13n, 16n

Tjibaoujean-Marie, 94n

Total (petroleum company), 84, 155, 160

Touati, Robert, 91 n

Touhon, Jacques, 96n, 156

Touchardjcan, 68n

Tour d’Argent restaurant, 78, 149

Tramoni, Jean-Antoine, 71 n, 75, 9]_n

Trillat, Pascal, 75

Trotskyism, 30, 47-8, 50, 53,55, 56,57, 66- influence ofgauchismc, 58-9

Trouvc, Alain, 170

Tunisia, 99, 127n

Tupamaros, 56-7

Turin, Pascal, 83, 94n, 155, 179n

Ulster, 126

Ultras, 19, 21, 41 n

Union des coinmunistes combattantes, 95n, 96n 156, 161

Union des etudiants comniunistes (UEC), 49—50, 51,59

L mon desjeunesses communistes-niarxistes- leninistes (UJCml), 53, 59, 63

Union des transport aeriens (UTA), 83, 104, 154, 160

I nion nationale des etudiants franfais (UNEF), 49-50, 51, 52, 55

Union pour la democraticfran(aise (UDF), 30, 45 n

unions, 47, 52, 57, 58, 64

Unite combattante Antonio Io Musico, 88, 153, 162, 180

Unite eombattante Lahouari-Fartd Benchellal, 82, 86, 150, 152, 159, 180

Unite conibattante.MarcelRayman, 82,150,159, 180

Unite combattante Sana Mheidlt, 153, 160, 180

United Kingdom see Britain

United States, 10, 28, 33-4, 39, 90, 105, 108,

universal suffrage, 27

University of Rennes, 77, 148 158 Uruguay, 8, 56-7

USSR, 6,14n, 34,35,39,49, 67

Vallee, Sylvie, 167

Van Dorpe, Pierre, 177

Vandergeerde, Pascale, 95n, 154 172-3

Vecchi, Gilbert, 85,129n, 155, 179n

Vendetti, Carla, 95n, 96n

Verges, Jacques, 176

Versailles summit, 90,111

Versini, Xavier, 165

Vichy, 27,102, 104

Vietnam, 105

Vietnam War, 51, 55, 60

Viett, Inge, 85—6

violence, ADi attitude to, 107; explanations of, 7-9; France, 10-11; GP, 60, 61; political, 122—7, 161; revolutionary, 65; social and political, 9-10, 137-8

Vive la revolution (VLR), 59—60

Voix ouvriere (VO), 47, 58, 67n

Wagner-Pacific!, Robin Erica, 8, 14n, 16n Wardlaw, Grant, 14n

Warsaw Pact, 35

West European Revolutionary Front, 90, 155

West European Union (WEU), 86, 87, 115, 116,142,159

Wilkinson, Paul, 7,15n

Wincock, Michel, 42n

Witteman, Werner, 179n workers’ councils, 54, 59 working class, 54—5, 56, 60, 61, 63, 67, 99, 100,106, 109,113,120, 143 workplace, accidents, 16n

World Bank, 80, 112, 117, 142, 150, 159

World War, First, 27

Wright, Vincent, 45n

Xulu, Sipho, 94n

Zaire, 99, 127n

Zentano Anaya, Joachim, 75

Zimmerman, Ernst, 88, 153

Books of Related Interest

EUROPE’S RED TERRORISTS

The Fighting Communist Organisations

YONAH ALEXANDER and DENNIS A. PLUCHINSKY

WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

ALEX P. SCHMID and RONALD D. CRELINSTEN

POLITICAL PARTIES AND TERRORIST GROUPS

Edited by LEONARD WEINBERG

TERROR FROM THE EXTREME RIGHT

Edited by TORE BJ0RGO

TECHNOLOGY AND TERRORISM

Edited by PAUL WILKINSON

VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED IN THE MODERN WORLD

Edited by MARK JUERGENSMEYER

THE VIOLENT SOCIETY

Edited by ERIC MOONMAN

LIBERTY AND LEGISLATION

Edited by RICHARD HOGGART

TERRORISM RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY

CLARK McCAULEY

About the Author

FRANK CASS

Dr Michael Dartnell is a lecturer in Political Science at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. He has previously taught French politics at McGill University and works as a public policy consultant.

Jacket design by Seth Levinson

Printed in Great Britain

[1] Tati is a French discount department store.

[2] The Chirac government’s tough stance was illustrated by harassment of journalists covering the trial. Mwve/ Obseruateur publications director Claude Perdiel and journalist Serge Rafly were detained because they reported on Oriach’s statements.

[3] Two types of isolation existed in French prisons in 1987: disciplinary and security. Separate reinforced security and high security quarters were abolished after 1982. Political prisoner status was no longer recognized by the authorities. Those who would have been called political prisoners before 1982 were held in the same centres as other prisoners and not in individual isolation. Disciplinary and security isolation were afterwards introduced. Security isolation was applied to terrorists and isolated prisoners from their peers and fellow[r] militants as ‘DPS’ (i/rtmws ngiw/es/ DPS arc held individually in cells. Exercise is solitary and the schedule constantly altered. All communication is subject to tight restrictions. A light is left on tn cells at night. Body searches are constant. No visits are permitted. Nationalist terrorists held under DPS have long asked to be grouped together. In the AD four’s cells, window grilles were replaced by bars. The group was held in nine-metre square cells. Exercise periods lasted one hour in a 9-metre-by-6-metre courtyard with Overhead grille.

[4] The group consisted of Aubron, Helyette Besse, Cipriani, MSnigon, Rouillan, Schleicher, the Halfens, Jean Asselmeyer, Dominique Poirre, Bruno Baudrillart, Annelyse Benoit, Salvatore Nicosia and Spano (all imprisoned at the time of trial), Paula Abadie, Daniel Franck, Frederique Germain, Charlotte Granier and Sandrine Guibert (all free at the time), Gloria Argano and Franco Fiorina (both imprisoned in Italy), and Hamami (in hiding).

[5] Facing charges that day were Annelyse Benoit, Bruno Baudrillart, Dominique Poirr^, Jean Asselmeyer and Salvatore Nicosia.

[6] Asselmeyer, a cons&Her d education populaire arrested on 13 December 1984, was bom in 1942. Charged with associating with known criminals, he denied AD membership. In the 1970s, he helped create a French support committee for RAF members’ lawyers and held views similar to that group.

[7] Liberation, 16-17Jan. 1988.

[8] Fred&ique Germain, nicknamed 'Bbmdbbmd' by ADI members, was arrested on 31 May 1983She participated in robbing the Aldebert jewellery shop. She w as held in preventative detention, charged with associating with known criminals and then turned state-witness. Her testimony led to the arrest and conviction of Schleicher, Nicolas Halfen, Spano, Gloria Argano and her boy-friend, Claude Halfen. She was a central witness in the Avenue Trudaine trial.

[9] Including M. and Mme. Schleicher, M. and Mme. Rouillan, Mme. Aubron, Mme. Poirre, Mme. Halfen, Mme. Delzongle-Baudrillard, EricDelzongle and Mme. Bucchard.

[10] Including film-maker Jean-Luc Godard, the Bishop of Evreux Jacques Gaillot, biologist Jacques Testard, physicist Hubert Reeves, Abb«f Pierre, Jean-Louis Barrault, Jean-Pierre Cot, Henri Lefebvre, Pierre Juquin, Alain Geismar, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Gilles Deleuze, Gilles Perrault, Framjoise Sagan and manv lawvers.

[11] LeMonde, 31 Jan.-l Feb. 1988.

[12] Marguerite Duras, Fran^oise Sagan, Monseigneur Gatllot, lawyers Guy Aurenche and Antoine Comte, and Dr Antoine Lazarus.

[13] Including Etienne Balibar, Claude Castoriadis, Franchise d’Eaubonne, Felix Guattari, gay rights militant and writer Guy Hocquenheim (then dying of AIDS) and Gilles Deleuze.

[14] Balibar, Castoriadis, d’Eaubonne, Guattari, Gerard Guegan, Hocquenheim and Deleuze.

[15] The four defendants were held in prison from December 1985 until their trial.

[16] A spin-off of AD appeared as Black War in 1985. See Appendix 4.2.

[17] Another trial illustrated the one-time extent of the extreme-left ‘pool’. On 17 April 1988 a trial began for the 28 August 1979 robbery of a tax collector’s office in Conde-sur-l’Escaut. Defendants argued that they should not be tried since their crime fell under the 1981 amnesty pardoning infractions Vn relation avee une enf reprise tendant a /wrier af/einte J rautorife de I’Etat'. The court rejected the argument, stating that the crimes were common law infractions. In one of its last sittings after being abolished by the National Assembly on 17 July 1981, the Cour de surete de lEiai stated that in this robbery ‘riew ne pennei de penser Qu’i/sagft dun arte subuersif dirige con/re I Efatfrattpiis'. The detainees, in prison at the time of the amnesty, went on hunger-strike to demand release. They were freed in October 1981, In 1989, the accused claimed their actions were intended to finance an international network for victims of repression. The prosecutor maintained that the accused divided the money among themselves, which made it a common law rather than political offence. Those charged were: Italians Francois Pina (married and a father, a cinema lighting engineer), sailing instructor Luigi Amadori, Enrico and Oriana Bianco, Spaniard Jos£ de Miguel Martin, French printer Raymond Delgado, language teacher Martine Fournier, Angela Herbon, graphic designer Floreal Cuadrado, offset mounter Sylvie Porte, schoolteacher Annie Dessaux, photographerjean-Pierre Cazenave-Laroche and German Werner Witteman. On 19 April, Lille SRJP divisional chief inspector Victor Prosec said the Conde-surTEscaut robbery was a common-law crime. The statement weakened defence arguments, but RG involvement indicated that the robbery had a political dimension. Early investigations established connections between the group and AD. On 26 April, the court freed Delgado, Cuadrado, Fournier, Porte, Dessaux and Cazenave-Laroche under the 1981 amnesty. Amadori was sentenced to 14 months for receiving stolen goods. The court reacted unfavourably to his purchase of a sailboat with the money that he had received and to the fact that he also faced drug charges.

[18] LeMonde_t 19July 1989.

[19] 21 July 1989.

[20] Ibid.

[21] A'fssou was an Algerian national bom in 195 6 in Lyon.

[22] Laigle hid arms and sheltered ADn on his parents’ property when he was 20 years old. He later participated in some armed robberies. Terrorized by Olivier, he tried to flee but was arrested in Munich Airport on 18 October 1987.

[23] Including Frdd£ric Potecher, Claude Bourdet, Tahar Ben Jalloun, Leilla Sebbar and Bishop of Evreux Jacques Gaillot.

[24] Polack was bom in 1955. He was a photographer at the agency Colletti/Pre$se> Questioned on 5 August 1986 in connection with investigations into ADn, he was imprisoned in Lyon for armed robbery, complicity with armed robbery[7] and receiving stolen goods,

[25] Olivier, Frerot, Ballandras, Crepet, Blanc, Francois Polak, Christian Dubray, Vecchi, Augay, Chantal Lahy, Succab, Eket, Jean-Charles Laporal, Aissou, Daniel Reynaud, Laigle, Turin, Nicole Charvolin, Henri Cachau-Herein at and Pascal Fort.

[26] See LeMtmde* 16 May 1989.

[27] Faure was bom in 1960. She was married and pregnant when arrested. She had broken with ADn in 1983. Her love for Blanc, bom in her Loire village, led to a supporting role.

[28] Le Monde, 30 June 1989.

[29] Daniel Reynaud, Vecchi, Succab, Eket, Laigle, Christian Dubray, Chantal Clairet, Francois Polak, Augay, Henry Cachau Hereillat, Faure and Pascal Fort.

[30] Despite heavy sentences for members of AD, some extreme-left terrorism continued. On 20 May 1989, an explosion hit Saint-Pierre de Chaillot church in Paris. A tract by the tatfw GnkzTws Babeuf claimed responsibility. Fran^ois-NoEl ‘Gracchus' Babeuf advocated communism and creation of a ‘society of equals[1]. In 1796, he and Buonarroti tried to overthrow the Directory. Executed in 1797, he left the name babnitvisme.

[31] [l]D’Oum-Chaloubaan ChofTarnationfranfaisepoursttilson enireprisecriminelle, '26 Sept. 1983.

[32] 'Oppressed from all countries: Get up, stand up?

[33] "TWcwid Et la chanson des promesses, i! la connait. Rappelez-vous: de quoi a etesuwi le discours de Canrun? - preparation franco-americaix-sionis/e de Finvasion du Li ban - comedie du sommetde Versailles pour amvrir le d&lenchement de cette invasion - debarquement de Farmee franpme a Beyrouth - invasion militaire du Tchad. ’ ftius les pays: Get up, stand up!\ 29 Sept. 1983.

[34] Ta f guerre amateu rs de croisades calmewous! Non aux Penhing et autres missiles “de croisiere 7 Si elle or aura!. . . "Fa t 'en guerre amateurs decroisades calmez-

(War-mongering lovers of crusades calm down!), 17 Nov, 1983.

[35] "New Caledonia, Class War? The Kanaks are New Caledonia's aboriginal inhabitants. French settlers predominate on the southern half of the island while Kanaks are a majority indie north,

[36] Xcs /Hfiirer racisies, au nom d[f]un mysterieux "seuil de iol^unce^!-), declarent qu hiy a dans Icurs communes trap de frawi/Tazn nnmtgr^r ... de couleur. Que dire de la situation en NouvelleCaledonie, oil 50,000 blancs stmt installes sans jamais avoir sof/frite, auprts des 60,000 Canaques. le moindre PERMIS DE SEJOUR?'

[37] Eepetit dictateur qui a mal au Tchad.[1]

[38] Literally, des valises ’ or "porters’. The image is of Tello w travellers’.

[39] ‘Dfs fran^ais ont apporte leursoutiett au FLNalgfriem Nous le notre aux lutiespopulaires anti^colonialistes et anti-captialistes. ’

[40] ‘Ex-propriete de la ntajfia Rothsch ild AWW/fCal^donie Guerre de classes \ 9 Dec. 1984.

[41] 'Advice given from a class point of view to racists in France and elsewhere. Hands off my immigrant buddy, my Kanak, Chadian, Lebanese, Palestinian buddy[1], 13—14 April 1985.

[42] — couverture judiciaire des eri mes racisles de lapolice en metrnpole Heenciement et expulsion travailleurs immigres politique racist? d? DUFO/X et de I'ONI (regroupement familial plus prccaire que jamais, magouitles en/re fa regie Renault el RONI sur fa nafionalile Jwfli7/fwrr d 'origin? africaine el done remise en cause de Raid?au retour, etc. ...) overture des studios de la television fran prise, sous protection policiere, au nazi, torlionnaire d'Algeriens LE PEN /fc mftfnrp de ccite ordure racist?, Id encore sous protection policierc.'

[43] La grande houcherie en Aigerie. ’

[44] 'Politique racist? d Regard des travailleiirs immigres[f], Vwrt whs simitfes ajufrc /ey peoples Libanari et Palesrinien ’ [L]un des relais les plus virulent; de /a propogande racist? (sitmisfe, colonialist?, antiimmigree) en Era nee ’, 'Corneils h A d ’a n po in t de vue de class? a ux raristes de Fra nee et d 'aillen rs: Touche pas a mon pot? iruvtrifleur immigre, a hwk pot? kanafc, tchadieu. Hbanais, palcstinien, etc 13-14 April 1985.

[45] ‘Machoro-Mandela: Same combat?

[46] 'Ley Efatsjranftris et sttd-ajncain sent prefs <i tout pour assurer leur domination surlcs pcuples qu 'Us erpfottflit. Ce s&nt Jej El a is en armes. L 'Etai imperialist? fratqais entretient sur le pied de guerre des dizaines de milliers de m Hilaires cw de nombreux points du globe.'

[47] [f]Lf mepris de race el de clause determine les conditions de sun'ie qumidienne.

En France: taudis ywrpewpfe ew ur//e, /figrry-rtMenres de la Sonacotra cl ciies-dwluirs en baniieu sen-ent de fogementprearirepourles travel Men rs immigres.

EnA/rique du Sad ce son/les townships pour les truvailkurs noirs. Leprinapcesl Ie meme. C ’csl celui du GHETTO. * 'Machoro-Afandda: Aleme combat[f], 4 Sept. 1985, p, 1.

[48] D^pw L I arrive? au pouvoir de la sociai-democraiiefranca ise, *

[49] 'C’eyt les ministbres pans tens que commencent a mottrir les Noirs des ghettos acheves par Pretoria. [f]Ibid_f]p,2.

[50] 'Neither radio nor television for Le Pen?

[51] On France-Inter on 14 April and/Mteoe? on 16 April.

[52] 'BtfweeHHJwrF.

[53] *La mn rt de jewnes imm igres en France est la resulta tile de ce qu i es t dit et de cc qui esi fail ’. ‘A'7 radio, ni tele pour Le Pen *,14 Oct. 1985.

[54] The attack unit, Commando Late Lefevre^ was named after an unarmed young man shot on the Rue de la Victoire on 4 July 1986 by CRS Gilles Burgos. Burgos said he thought Lefevre was reaching for a gun.

[55] [f]Nc setnb/e pas r/re wn erime pnwr Zes /unnansodrtH.v-J^MOfra/t’s, puis^wf iJadinter courre Fajfaire en refusant /’mstnirtian ttfar/wrtf’AWflisf.Alorts pour le meme combat' (‘MachoroMolotse: Dead for the same combat’), 19 Oct. 1985.

[56] 'Les capitalisles blancsfiieni leurliberie[1] fThe white capitalists celebrate their liberty’), 6July 1986.

[57] 'Lf couplefranco-americain sable le champagne avec le sang des noirs des townships de Pretoria on de New York.'

[58] 'Libertep^u r les Rambo quip repa rent la guerre de classe: accord 0 TANTh omson,

Liberte pour Fetal capitalist?/ranfaij a fissassTner ft' people tchadicn, amaqicc, antillais, corse, basque, grace aux executeurs du G./.G.N., du GA.L. etdl'annee.

Liberte pour les 120enireprises et banquetTnjnpiises a cnllaboreraz-cc I'etatfasciste sud-africain, Liberte pour les tortionnaires des guerres roZonia/es, Liberte pour lefascisieLe Pen etses porte-parole.

L ibene pour le crinti nel Duva Her.

Liberty pourle retour aux bonnes t[l]triHes methodes de Fir/ty; delation, renforctment de Petal policier, traquedes immigres.

Libert4 pou r les patrons d licencier encore plus, toujou rs plus.'

[59] 'Comedic mediatique de /a social-democraiie/R P. R. ’ ‘Les capitalistes blancs fa fen t leur /i&erte.'

[60] ‘Legitimate defence*. ADn was by this time reduced to Frerot and Vecchio.

[61] Fh France, pays des droits de I 'homme blanc, on tuepour delit defacies. * ‘L4?i/ime [h], 9 J uly 1986.

[62] 'We have squeezed the lemon, we can throw away the skin?

[63] Wi7s armees ort! demand? des visas auprn de quels pays pour cfl/niiAer et ntassacrcr m Znr/or/itHe, cn Algriie, aAWagascar,..

[64] ‘Mw ^rtwusw/rr ef des DOAl-TOAI constituent uue reserve/^nnrrfaWe wimcflw.r rsrtam. Deportes au pays de la “JikrtP*. Expfoites par le patranat, Tires a vuepar les Le Pen. jfetes dans les camps de retention dfy'ii inaicgures par lefoscisie Mitterrand pendant la guerre d’Afgerie. ’ On a pressMe citron, onpeutjeterlapeau’, 1 Nov, 1986.

[65] ‘L ’apartheid(a commenceen France’ (‘Apartheid begins in France’), 11 Nov. 1986.

[66] ‘L ’Europe ctdoniale, qui s 'est bdiie truer la sueur et les raJotTrs Jrs noirs, desfounes. des arabes, des indiens, a cotifu an X17/ sibcle son rtfetan; I ’Afrique du sud. Les interets de dasse des capitalists bfancs apilfer ft d massacrer son ties memes d Paris qit 'a Pretoria,'

[67] L ’apartheid n esf qu *une face dufascisme.[1]

[68] En sonvcmr de Petain, *

[69] 'Les medias caiitionnent depuis r/ndochine les crimes contre Thumaniti des capitalisles blancs." [l]L ’apartheid$a commencecn France’.

[70] Tor a communis t project * and ‘ Regard in g America n i rape ri a I i sm *,

[71] SceChAandLMWJr (25 Feb. 1987).

[72] ‘Lrs pAantosm^s Jes jwma/rux pawns toujoim avides de "compfoi international” et de ’fols Jr bou rgeois qui ant mal tottrne" ’

[73] ’Lepauvoirsocialisfe matitie de quelques s/aliniens.[1] Pour tinprojet communiste\ March 1982, p.5.

[74] ’Capa ble d ’imp ulser le monvemenl revcdutionna ire Jons Zr <wtextr Jrs sorites capitals ties develop - pees a pouvair socialdemocrate. ’ Ibid*, p. 6*

[75] ‘L ’tnaipacile pour la classr tmvribre Jr J^passrr par elle-meine la conscience trade-union iste, de se libererdes tentations du reformisme ridel’ideologic hourgeoise. ’ Ibid., p. 10.

[76] [l]La spoftfaneife - ou ses formes actue/les: crrariri/r, desir ... les contacts personnels inform els, I ’app ropriation de la vie quolidienne, le concret-p ratique. * Ibid.

[77] ‘L t sodal-democrate, a la reaction dedroiieom au "cammunisme"Stalinien.[1] Ibid., p. 11.

[78] Au moment ou Fennemi de clause concentre toutes ses forces et ou ses satellites incrustes dans le mouvement tentent de le caster ou dele detoumervers des votes de garage. ’ Ibid., p, 12.

[81] 'La r/a/mrr rst Zu, autolegiiimee, car elle est In forme logique d'expression de ceux que les me'canisrnes du maJe de production capitafiste abaissenl et bafouent; et eile n ’est pas settlement une reaction de desespoir amtme le voudrait le miserabilisnte, elle est action d'espoir qui vise ait depassement pratique reuolutionnaire des rapports J'exp/onafion ri de domination. Action directe et tons eeux qui partagent son raisonnement se situent a ce moment du processus de rrtWte [1]1bid., p J 3,

[83] ’Stade supreme du capitalism e decadent.[1] Ibid., p. 17.

[85] 'Lw systmr[1] de determinants centresur lepouvoir technologique et la deculturation des domines qui imposent un modele de production et un models de amsommation oaJJmaHsrs. Jrrr le transfert techrudogique, les pays en vote de developpemeni s ’endcttent indefiniment et accept ent le gouvemement des cadres et reelin idem des pays developpd, ou d’autock tones formes dans leurs universites, ce quiest paifois pire... si les nomies adturelles ocddentales ant rfas st d ecraser toute resistance, les classes populates y accederont, mais en sacrifiani leur vie eniiered ce rfae: les habitants des biJom’J/es Larinr possedent sowi’ent ainsi T. F. et pick-up, vaiture pendant ce temps, leurs enfants meurent defaim et les adolescents vent sepros!ituer dans les quartiers riches. Ibid.

[86] StfWJagr du Sysieme Monetaire International garant de leur puissance et de fa stabilite de la domination des pays developpes. ’Ibid., p.l 9.

[89] ‘Dn>i( du travail cherement acquis par ceux-ci, tout en se barrant la possibilite d’etablir un programme politique qui soilfat! pour les t ravaillleu rs.’ Ibid., p. 2 5.

[90] ‘Ce ne sont pas les socialistes qui vont y f/jingrr ^ranJ-rAasr puisr/we leurs maitres-mots sont justemcHt rationalisatitm et compel it ivite.' Ibid., p.26,

[91] capitalizes attaqaew la vie des proletaries a Busine, its les poursuivent fusque dans leurs quarters cn Jfmo/iirani Jeu r cadre d'habitat traditionnel et twites les solidarity de ciasse qui y stmt attacheesri Ibid., p.27.

[93] Symbolically, Renault shut its Billancourt plant in 1990. The factory had been the centre of company growth and a birthplace of French (especially CGT) unionism.

[95] ‘Ac gw'swr /? mcpris envers les ouvriers, les paysans el les etudiants, cf la distribution genereuse du pactole au sein de I oligarchicfinanciered des grands tmnmis de I Elat. ’ Ibid., p.31.

[97] 'Orientation qui ne vise mt ne mene qu'd la reconductian dun niftJf de production depuis dear siecfa ecraselavie de I'humauife et /w votteau suicide nucieaireou ecfdogique. * Ibid.

[99] T optique pro-sitntiiionniste en valurisuni de la file, du fin, de In cummunantc, de la sexualitc, etc. ’Ibid., p.38.

[101] See above, Ch J.

[102] A ’«:/«/ act net pou r it ne orga n isa tian revolu tionnaire est de savoir et de ptntvid rfit ire converger touies les luttes de base ven le renversement de I’ordre rxistonf. //rsf^ fwitr nous, leprojet communisteau sens au K Marxdisait: *'Le aimmunisme est le mnavemeut reel qtti abfditl etat de choses existaut. [f]'Ifiaxe por/cixr rftt profit cpwuniraA/r rcra dZars celtti de la transfi/nnalitm des jJ/rgafarnes c/r lutte arufie, "Ibid.,p.4L

[103] ‘Emrfliwer luppari/itm diilegalismes de metsse el deles coGrJGJinrrsyusfirmedecontre-pouvoir.[J] Ibid*

[104] ‘jVm'raw fravrti/ Jr wr?.w, ct pas scuietuent J^rnse et rcpresailfi mais anficipatinn cottfinite du mottvcmeut/lM., p.42.

[105] ’L ekAorali&n Jm ?iomvc7 ord re econamique international (XO1E). ’

[107] lbid.,p.5₊

[108] ’La rigidification des normes et des cadences, la collectivisatifm du processus de production qui esiompe la relation entresalairee! ejfirt individuel. ’Ibid._f p.9.

[111] [f]L flS£iwnZiilio?i de revoites aitssi violcnts que les Bia riPaw Jim mt rimegration paries industries de la contre-nilture, la nomialisation des devitincescommela drogue ou rhomosexualite laissent presumcr que la gestion de la contestation, si elle ties ’attaquepas flrt.t ravines memes du pouvoircnpitulisfe, pent s 'effectuer sansdommages mafiars. Ibid.

[112] ‘Gffljtfjwj de rimpfrtij/tsmr LLSW combattants juifs d'Act ion direct . . .' ('We, the Jewish fighters in Action direct?[1]), 1 Aug. 1982.

[113] policiers n'entrevirent pas la portee de leur reaction. Ils en porterent entierement les consequences.[1]a a point fdo.2, La /wst'HaJe de lavenue 7’mdaine. 1c SL5.7 9S3’ f Clarification Number 2, the Avenue Trudaine Shooting, 31 May, 1983").

[114] [l]La scute contradiction entreproletariat intemationale ct bourgeoisie nn]>eraih‘sk[k].' 7Wwf caw paint A’g.J, Ai/r Aj raw/pagwe ptfh/irp-rMtAraire des C.C.C. ef lu reponse pro/Jagartrfw^ de I eta! Beige' (‘Clarification Number 3, Regarding the CCC Political-Military Campaign and the Propagandistic Response of the Belgian State’), 31 May 1984. reflexion et de Faction centre les tenants ei les aboutissants du mode de production capitalist?.' Ibid.,pp.4-5.

[115] Such as leproject du Grand Louvre, the Opera de la Bash/k, la Willette, media decentralization and the new ‘TGB’ (7r£y grand hibliotheque', nickname for the new' national library at Tolbiac).

[117] Then qu'ily cut afors deux millions tie rAomewrs ronfre hail cent mills a Favenemenl du Front populaire, la lutte des classes cst restec twins violente, et plus grande la patience des travaillcurs, <j ia/ois ntoins accables par ie labeur el I’insecurite, etplus consnenls de la distance entre le souhaifabic et le possible,[1] Du verger, p.34.

[119] After losing the 1988 presidential elections, RPR-UDF rwifnwferm demanded policy renewal and new leadership. Chirac was challenged by Lyon RPR mayor Michel Noir, whose relative progressiveness was popular. Noir openly stated that Peugeot CEO Jacques Calvcfs attitudes to a strike, for example, were evidence of outdated management practices. Chirac allied with Giscard to battle with the FN.

[121] At the very moment that Prague demonstrators demanded political pluralism and die resignation of authorities in November 1989, a reconstructeur (group led by Marcel Rigout, Claude Popercn and Felix Damette) document said that Stalinism had survived PCF reforms: Wa ft* rraduit par rm de cvnstater les evidences et par de laborieuses contorsions . , _t Une regression intellectuelle et politique sans precedent nows a fait revenir t rente ans en cirri ere. * (26-27 Nov. 1989).

[122] Pierre Martin, ‘Le rapport de forces droite/gauche m I986\ in 7?rjwr /rauprire dir srreures politique, Vol .36, No .5 (Oct 1986).

[123] ‘Bilan globalemenf posiltf and minimized its de dfveioppemerrf', claiming 7a fntt Ju capitalism?, eUe, esi tinecrise du system?LeMonde (14 Nov. 1989).

[124] yfwruw JrZ'af ideologique n ’a pu se deuetopper en son sein.. . le parti lui-meme n a plus d'ideologic. Lu perestroika prtnwque dans des partis communistes sectaires ou group usculaires, comine les PC portugais on ouesl-allemand, devrai debats de fond, ou les “brejneviens" affront ent otivertemeni les “gorbatcheviens " et vice versa; mats eWe entrc dans fePCPcentime Jans un centre mou. L hemorragie militant? de la fin des aimers 70 et du debat des anuses 80 n 'est pas etrangere a eelte situation. Le rentplacement de cadres seriettsemcniformes etparfois tris attaches au mode/e sovietique par defeunes adherents d la culture politique incertaine et ne considerant pas I[f]Union soviet ique cum me une reference foci lite grandement la tdche de M. Marchais. * 31. MareWj, le dernier des Mohicans[1], Le Monde (14 Nov. 1989).

[125] ‘£/»f re’rtainc celebration de Pefficacite el de la modernisation famomique mats rieti de plus/ Hoffmann, Trattj/pnaatowp.269.

[126] Universalism and a sense of grandeur (greatness) were very clear in the 1989 bicentennial. The 14 July 1989 edition of Zf MphJ* declared: [l]Les ceremonies du Bicentennaire de la Revolution et le sommet des sept pays industrialises: M AIiwotmid veut exalter Ie “message" de la France.[5] Mitterrand hailed the coincidence of the bicentennial and a Western summit that Wt Ie merit? majeur de rassembler chez nous, autour de notre Revolution, de noire Declaration des droits de I'hontme, autour de la France, une trentaine de chefs d’Elat et degouvemement, qui tous avaientd coeurd'etre Id cesfours-ld\ Le Monde (14July 1989, p.34). He tried to transform coincidence into a North-South summit by inviting Third World world leaders. The extreme left and extreme right grumbled over expenses, but the public and mainstream opposition supported Mitterrand. In fact, the public saw the summit and celebrations as evidence of France’s international political-moral leadership.

[127] This stance was, in any event, already evident: Trench defence policy from 1981 made them the staunchest (non-integrated) member of the Atlantic alliance. This commitment on the part of the French government of the left enabled the NATO council to hold its annual meeting in Paris in June 1983 for the first time since the rupture of 1966.’ Waites, pp. 41-2.

[129] la droite et, de ce fait, serf la gauche qui ne manque dailleurs pas de sen servri en alleguant une “convergence croissante *entre rextremedroite et la droite. ’Chariot, p.44.

[130] Rene Remond, to droites en France (Paris: Aubier, 1982), p.31,

[131] ‘CAaugewtew/ a etepleinement realise dans le cadre jrtsrifw tionnel, t7 resr Jie d 'une echeance regyiliere, il est le produit m/canismfs Ju sj’stcm^ et non sa negation, il a ete decide, et decide par detixfois par le corps electoral Iffavoriseainsi rinstitutionnalisation du regime. Celui-ci appartienl desormais d Ious, 11 est detache d'une maforite conjonciurelle, d'tine conception donnee de son fouctionnement. * Sur, p.571.

[194] ‘Dde touts raison objective dans la situation politique generate et pa riiculiere.’ Ibid,, p. 5.

[199] Les negotiations apres I’assassinat de Besse on t demontr# dans leu r duree (plus d un mots) le manque evident de super-specialistes de la restructuration. * Ibid.

[201] 'Depuis 45 toujours ... an cteur de contradictions centrales du mode de production capita lisle.[1] Ibid., p.15.

[207] See Ch.4: the groups were referring to creation of rapid-strike military' units, revitalizing of the WEU, arms manufacture cooperation, West German force de frappe participation, US technological and R & D dominance, increased unemployment and a weakened welfare state.

[209] See Appendices 5.2-5.5, pp. 182-5.

[212] See Appendix 5.4, Number of Bombings,

Michael Dartnell

Action Directe Ultra-Left Terrorism in France, 1979-1987

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

1 Interpreting Terrorism: A Case-study of Action directe

2 French Traditions of Political Violence and Protest

3 The Elusive Formula: Gauchistne, May 1968 and Action directe

4 The History of Action dire etc. From Gauchisme to Nihilism

5 The Ideological Trajectory of Action directs. Radicalization and Violent Protest

6 Conclusions

Appendices

Appendix 1: Chronology of Action Directe, 1979-90

Appendix 2: Attacks by Action Directe, 1979-87

Appendix 2.2 Types of Political Violence in France

Appendix 3 Murders and Attempted Murders by 4c77(W 1979-87

Appendix 4.1: Attacks by the Croupe Bakounlve-gdansk-parisguatemala-salvador (Gbgpgs)

Appendix 4.2: Black War (Bw)

Appendix 4.3: Action Directs Trials and Imprisonment

Appendix 4.4: Action Directe Commando Units

Appendix 5.1: Coawunique Num£ro 7, 18 March 1980

Appendix 5.2, Number of Attacks by Action Directe, 1979–87

Appendix 5.3, Machine-Gun Attacks by Action Directe, 1979–87

Appendix 5.4, Number of Bombings by Action Directe, 1979–87

Appendix 5.5, Number of Murders by Action Directe, 1979–87

Appendix 5.6, Political and Non-political Murders by Action Directe, 1979–87

Appendix 6.1 Motivations for Action Directe, International Attacks, 1982-87

Appendix 6.2 Motivations for Action Directe, National Attacks, 1982-87

Bibliography

Index

Books of Related Interest

About the Author

Action Directe
Ultra-Left Terrorism in France, 1979-1987