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Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans
Letter of Transmittal
Preface
A. The Committee’s Mandate
B. The Major Questions
C. The Nature of the Committee’s Investigation
1. Selection of Agencies, Programs and Cases To Emphasize
2. Limitations and Strengths
D. The Purpose of the Committee’s Findings and Recommendations
Contents
I. Introduction and Summary
A. Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens’ Rights
B. The Questions
C. Summary of the Main Problems
1. The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelligence Activity
2. Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long
3. Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means
4. Ignoring the Law
5. Deficiencies in Accountability and Control
6. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity
7. Cost and Value
II. The Growth of Domestic Intelligence: 1936 To 1976
A. Summary
1. The Lesson: History Repeats Itself
2. The Pattern: Broadening Through Time
3. Three Periods of Growth for Domestic Intelligence
a. 1936–1945
b. 1946–1963
c.1964–1976
B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure: 1936–1945
1. Background. — The Stone Standard
2. Main Developments of the 1936–1945 Period
3. Domestic Intelligence Authority: Vague and Conflicting Executive Orders
a. The Original Roosevelt Orders
b. Orders in 1938–39: The Vagueness of “Subversive Activities” and “Potential” Crimes
c. Orders 1940–43: The Confusion Continues
4. The Role of Congress
a. Executive Avoidance of Congress
b. Congress Declines to Confront the Issue
5. Scope of Domestic Intelligence
a. Beyond Criminal Investigations
b. “Infiltration,” Investigations
c. Partisan Use
d. Centralized Authority: FBI and Military Intelligence
6. Control by the Attorney General: Compliance and Resistance
7. Intrusive Techniques: Questionable Authorization
a. Wiretaps: A Strained Statutory Interpretation
b. Bugging, Mail Opening and Surreptitious Entry.
C. Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era: 1946–1963
1. Main Developments of the 1946–1963 Period
a. Domestic Intelligence Authority
b. Scope of Domestic Intelligence
c. Accountability and Control
d. Intrusive Techniques
e. Domestic Covert Action
2. Domestic Intelligence Authority
a. Anti-Communist Consensus
b. The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Program
c. Executive Directives: Lack of Guidance and Controls
3. Scope of Domestic Intelligence
a. “Subversive Activities”
b. “Racial Matters”and “Hate Groups”
c. FBI Political Intelligence for the White House
d. IRS Investigations of Political Organizations
4. Accountability and Control
a. The Emergency Detention Act
b. Withholding Information
c. CIA Domestic Activity
5. Intrusive Techniques
a. Communications Interception: CIA and NSA
b. FBI Covert Techniques
c. Use of FBI Wiretaps
6. Domestic Covert Action
a. COINTELPRO: Communist Party
b. Early Expansion of COINTELPRO
D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964–1976
1. Main Developments of the 1964–1976 Period
a. Scope of Domestic Intelligence
b. Domestic Intelligence Authority
c. Domestic Covert Action
d. Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent
e. Intrusive Techniques
f. Accountability and Control
g. Reconsideration of FBI Authority
2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence
a. Domestic Protest and Dissent: FBI
b. FBI Informants
c. Army Surveillance of Civilian Political Activity
d. Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence
e. The Justice Department’s Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU)
f. COMINFIL Investigations: Overbreadth
3. Domestic Intelligence Authority
a. FBI Intelligence
b. Army Intelligence
c. FBI Interagency Agreements
4. Domestic Covert Action
a. COINTELPRO
b. FBI Target Lists
c. Internal Revenue Service Program
5. Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent
a. Origins of CIA Involvement in “Internal Security Functions”
b. CIA Intelligence About Domestic Political Groups
c. CIA Security Operations Within the United States: Protecting “Sources” and “Methods”
d. NSA Monitoring
6. Intrusive Techniques
a. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance
b. CIA Mail Opening
c. Expansion of NSA Monitoring
d. FBI Cutbacks
7. Accountability and Control
a. The Huston Plan: A Domestic Intelligence Network
b. Political Intelligence
c. The Justice Department’s Internal Security Division
d. The FBIs Secret “Administrative Index”
8. Reconsideration of FBI Authority
a. Developments in 1972–1974
b. Recent Domestic Intelligence Authority
III. Findings
A. Violating and Ignoring the Law
Major Finding
Subfindings
Elaboration of findings
Subfinding (a)
Subfinding (b)
Subfinding (c)
Subfinding (d)
Subfinding (e)
Subfinding (f)
Subfinding (g)
B. The Overbreadth of Domestic Intelligence Activity
Major Finding
Elaboration of Findings
Subfinding (a)
Subfinding (b)
Subfinding (c)
Subfinding (e)
C. Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques
Major Finding
Subfindings
Elaboration of Findings
Subfinding (a)
Subfinding (b)
Subfinding (c)
D. Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups
Major Finding
Subfindings
Elaboration of the Findings
Subfinding (a)
Subfinding (b)
Subfinding (d)
E. Political Abuse of Intelligence Information
Major Finding
Subfindings
Subfinding (a)
Subfinding (b)
Subfinding (c)
Subfinding (d)
F. Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention
Major Finding
Subfindings
Elaboration of Findings
Subfinding (a)
Subfinding (b)
Subfinding (c)
Subfinding (d)
G. Deficiencies in Control and Accountability
Major Finding
Subfindings
Elaboration of Findings
Subfinding (a)
Subfinding (b)
Subfinding (c)
Subfinding (d)
Subfinding (e)
Subfinding (f)
Subfinding (g)
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
A. Conclusions
B. Principles Applied in Framing Recommedations and The Scope of the Recommendations.
C. Recommendations
i. Intelligence Agencies Are Subject to the Rule of Law
ii. United States Foreign and Military Agencies Should Be Precluded from Domestic Security Activities
a. Central Intelligence Agency
b. National Security Agency
c. Military Service and Defense Department Investigative Agencies
iii. Non-Intelligence Agencies Should Be Barred From Domestic Security Activity
a. Internal Revenue Service
b. Post Office (U.S. Postal Service)
iv. Federal Domestic Security Activities Should Be Limited and Controlled to Prevent Abuses Without Hampering Criminal Investigations or Investigations of Foreign Espionage
a. Centralize Supervision, Investigative Responsibility, and the Use of Covert Techniques
b. Prohibitions
c. Authorized Scope of Domestic Security Investigations
d. Authorized Investigative Techniques
a. Covert Techniques Covered
b. Judicial Warrant Procedures (Electronic Surveillance, Mail Opening, Search and Seizure, and Surreptitious Entry)
f. Attorney General Oversight of the FBI, Including Termination of Investigations and Covert Techniques
v. The Responsibility and Authority of the Attorney General for Oversight of Federal Domestic Security Activities Must Be Clarified and General Counsels and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies Strengthened
a. Attorney General Responsibility and Relationship With Other Intelligence Agencies
b. General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence
c. Office of Professional Responsibility
d. Director of the FBI and Assistant Directors of the FBI
vi. Administrative Rulemaking and Increased Disclosure Should Be Required
a. Administrative Rulemaking
b. Disclosure
vii. Civil Remedies Should Be Expanded
viii. Criminal Penalties Should Be Enacted
ix. The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act Should Either Be Repealed or Amended
x. The Espionage Statute Should be Modernized
xi. Broader Access to Intelligence Agency Files Should be Provided to GAO, as an Investigative Arm of the Congress
xii. Congressional Oversight Should Be Intensified
xiii. Definitions
[Appendices]
Appendix A: Senate Resolution 21
Appendix B: Previously Issued Reports and Hearings of the Senate Select Committee
A. Reports
B. Hearings
Appendix C: Staff Acknowledgments
Final Report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans
Supplementary Detailed Reports
[Additional Views]
Additional Views of Senator Philip a. Hart
Additional Statement of Senator Robert Morgan
Introduction to Separate Views of Senators John Tower, Howard H. Baker Jr., and Barry M. Goldwater
Separate Views of Senator John G. Tower, Vice Chairman
Separate Views of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Long-Term Improvement of Intelligence Community
Thorough Study Necessary in Several Areas
Cumulative Effect of Recommendations
President’s Program
Specific Reforms
Foreign Intelligence Recommendations
Scope, of Domestic Security Investigations
Watergate-related Inquiry
Individual Views of Senator Goldwater
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Internal Revenue Service
Supplemental Views of Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
[Missing footnotes]
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